Complainant appealed her acquittal in a Section 138 cheque-dishonour case, arguing the 2020 cheque evidenced a fresh promise to repay a 2015 loan. The High Court held the debt was time-barred under the Limitation Act and upheld the acquittal.
None; criminal appeal against acquittal dismissed, upholding the trial court judgment dated 07.04.2025.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 15.07.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN
Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
Sangeetha ..... Appellant
Vs
M.Kamalakannan ..... Respondent
PRAYER : Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminla Procedure, praying to set aside the Judgment dated 07.04.2025 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvottiyur, Chennai – 600 019 in STC No.343 of 2020.
For Appellant : Mr.S.Balaji
JUDGMENT
This Criminal Appeal has been filed challenging the Judgment dated
07.04.2025 passed in STC No.343 of 2020 by the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvottiyur, thereby dismissing the complaint filed by the appellant and acquitted the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
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Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is alleged that the respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.2,40,000/- in the month of August, 2015 and assured to repay the same along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. However, the respondent paid the interest upto December 2015. Thereafter, he failed to pay both the interest and principal amount. In the year 2020, the respondent issued a cheque in order to repay the said loan amount. When the said cheque was presented for collection, it was returned dishonoured with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”. After causing a statutory notice, the appellant filed a complaint, which was taken cognizance by the Trial Court in STC No.343 of 2020.
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Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
limitation. The loan was borrowed in the year 2015 and the cheque was issued in the year 2020. He further relied on Section 25(3) of the Contract Act, asserting that the issuance of the cheque constituted a clear promise to repay the loan amount. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said cheque was not issued for legally enforceable debt.
admitted the issuance of the cheque and found the signature therein, it was issued only in the year 2020 for the loan availed by the respondent in the year 2015. Therefore, the debt itself is barred by limitation. In fact, after borrowal of the loan, there was an enmity between the appellant and the respondent on 26.08.2020. It is also settled that a cheque constitutes a bill of exchange. Article 35 under the Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963, would fix the period of limitation as 3 years, if the payment is made through a bill of exchange or a promissory note and on demand, unless and until there is anything in writing to postpone the right to sue. Therefore, as per Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a person would loose her right to sue, if a period of three years from the
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date of his demand lapses. Hence, the Trial Court rightly dismissed the complaint.
15.07.2025 (½)
Speaking order/Non-speaking order Index :Yes/No Internet :Yes/No Lpp To
The Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvottiyur.
G.K.ILANTHIRAIYAN, J.
Lpp
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Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
Crl.A.No.930 of 2025
(½)
15.07.2025
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1 issue framed by the court
Whether a debt of 2015 repaid by cheque issued in 2020 was barred by limitation, making it not a legally enforceable debt under Section 138 NI Act.
3 provisions across 2 enactments
Sangeetha
M.Kamalakannan
G.K.Ilanthiraiyan
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
