A High Court judge dismissed a writ petition challenging a departmental order imposing a stoppage of increments for two years against a police inspector accused of demanding illegal gratification. The court held the punishment was proportionate to the charges.
No relief; the writ petition and connected miscellaneous petition were dismissed.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
W.P.No.15834 of 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 02.08.2024
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Mrs. JUSTICE R.KALAIMATHI
W.P.No.15834 of 2009 and M.P.No.1 of 2009
Mohammed Nazeer ...Petitioner
vs.
1.The Additional Director General of Police, (Law and order) Chennai.
(R5 impleaded as per order dated 10.11.2010 in M.P.No.1 of 2010)
... Respondents
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PRAYER:
PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records in C.No.B2/5000/08 dated 16.06.2008 passed by the 2nd respondent and the consequential in vide Rc.No.020028/AP1(2)/2009 dated 19.03.2009 passed by the 1st respondent and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and against the law and direct 4th respondent to release the increment due to the petitioner.
For Petitioner : No Appearance For Respondents : Mr.S.Rajesh Government Advocate for R1 to R4 : Mr.U.Karunakaran for R5
ORDER
There is no representation for the petitioner for several hearings.
the respondents 1 to 4 and Mr.U.Karunagaran, learned counsel for the 5th respondent.
by the 2nd respondent and the order passed in RC.No.020028/AP1(2)/2009 dated 19.03.2009 passed by the 1st
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respondent are under challenge.
The petitioner Mohammed Nazeer son of Mohammed Ismail was enlisted directly as Sub-Inspector of Police on 28.09.1987. He completed 20 years service and promoted to the post of Inspector and posted to Dhindivanam Kanjanur Police Station and thereafter, he was transferred to Sholavaram Police Station, Ponneri Sub-Division, Thiruvallur District. While, he was working as Inspector of Police at Thiyagadhurgam Police Station, he registered a case in Crime Nos.112/08, 114/08 and 115/08 for the offences committed under Section 379 IPC against Howrang Baha and John Basha. Later, they gave a false complaint against the petitioner for demand of illegal gratification from them to the Superintendent of Police, Villupuram who in turn conducted a preliminary enquiry through Deputy Superintendent of Police. Based on the preliminary enquiry, a charge under Rule 3(b) of TNPSS (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1955 was framed against the petitioner by the 2nd respondent and appointed the 3rd respondent as an Enquiry Officer. Upon enquiry, the Deputy Inspector General of Police gave a finding by way of stoppage of increment for a period of two years based on the enquiry report given by the Additional Superintended of Police (Crimes) by
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proceedings dated 16.06.2008. An appeal preferred before the Additional Director General of Police has confirmed the order of the 2nd respondent in the proceedings dated 19.03.2009. Hence, this writ petition.
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“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
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judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
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finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
“ 33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on
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context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy - deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate
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guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain.”
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Petitioner has to be looked into.
“tpGg;g[uk; khtl;lk;. jpahfJUfk; fhty; Ma;thsuhf gzpg[hpe;j ePh; jpahfJUfk; fhty; epiyak; Fw;w vz;/112-08. 114-08 kw;Wk; 115-08 gphpt[ 379 ,/j/r/ tHf;Ffspy; jpUl;Lg;bghUs; th';fpa jpahfJUfj;ijr; nrh;e;j ,Uk;g[ tpahghhpfshd bcwsu';ghl;coh j-bg ncof; mg;Jy;yh kw;Wk; $hd;ghl;coh j-bg/,!;khapy; vd;gth;fs; kPJ bgha; tHf;F nghlg;nghtjhf kpul;o Kiwna U:/20.000 kw;Wk; U:/15.000 bgw;w xG';fPdkhd Fw;wj;ij g[hpe;Js;sPh;/”
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future increments for a period of two years. Considering the nature of the charges, the petitioner who was officiating the Inspector of Police, punishment awarded can never be considered as disproportionate to the charges.
02.08.2024 (2/3)
Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes/No Speaking Order/Non-Speaking Order Neutral Citation Case : Yes/No mac
To
1.The Director General of Police, (Law and order) Chennai.
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Villupuram.
R.KALAIMATHI, J.
mac
W.P.No.15834 of 2009 and M.P.No.1 of 2009
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02.08.2024
(2/3)
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3 issues framed by the court
Whether the departmental order of stopping increments for two years was passed in accordance with principles of natural justice.
Whether the punishment imposed on the petitioner was disproportionate to the gravity of the offence charged.
Whether the appellate order confirming the departmental order should be quashed as being arbitrary and against the law.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of IndiaExplained¶46
1995 (6) SCC 749 · Who else cites this
State of Rajasthan Vs. Heem SinghExplained¶56
2020 SCC Online SC 886 · Who else cites this
State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S.Sree Rama RaoExplained¶66
AIR 1963 SC 1723 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Mohammed Nazeer
The Additional Director General of Police, (Law and order) Chennai
The Deputy Inspector General of Police Villupuram Range, Villupuram
The Additional Superintendent of Police (Crimes)/ Enquiry Officer, Villupuram
The Superintendent of Police, Villupuram District, Villupuram
A.Amalraj
R.Kalaimathi
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
