16.The learned counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded and proved that the “A” Schedule property was the nucleus from which the income was derived and Schedule “B” to “E” properties were purchased only out of the said income. The learned counsel further submitted that even the other Schedule properties viz., “B” Schedule, “C” Schedule and “E” schedule properties were standing in the name of individuals and they were held to be the joint family properties and the very same yardstick should be applied for the “D” Schedule properties also. The learned counsel further submitted that the properties in the “D” Schedule were purchased during the period from 1965 to 1989 in the name of the 2nd defendant. Whereas, the 2nd defendant stopped going for work from the year 1963. He became a contractor only in the year 1970 and Exhibits B16 at B21 which were relied upon by the 2nd defendant to prove the income only pertained to the year 1979 to 1992. Therefore, there was absolutely no explanation for any income from 1963 to 1979. That apart, most of the properties in the “D” Schedule were purchased during the period when the “C” Schedule properties were purchased in the name of the 1st defendant and many were adjacent properties. Therefore, what was applied for the “C” Schedule properties, should be applied for the “D” Schedule properties also. The learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff sufficiently discharged the burden and the 2nd defendant was not able to prove sufficient individual income to purchase the “D” Schedule properties. Hence, the learned counsel concluded his arguments by submitting that there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the Judgment and Decree of both the Courts below. The learned counsel in order to substantiate his submissions, relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Ponnuswamy vs. Meenakshi Ammal and others reported in 1989 2 LW 227.
