Allowed

M/S Rohini Housing Developers v. the Inspector General of

Madras HC23 Apr 2021WP/16815/2008

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court quashed orders demanding additional stamp duty for a consent deed. It held that where a sale and a subsequent consent deed form a single transaction, only the principal instrument attracts duty under Section 4 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, preventing double taxation for the same property conveyance.

What did the court decide?

Impugned orders demanding stamp duty on the consent deed were quashed, and any further demand for duty or bank guarantee renewal was prohibited.

M/S Rohini Housing Developers Vs the Inspector… — Writ and Judicial Review | Madras HC (2021)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

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Date : 23.04.2021

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CORAM:

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.SURESH KUMAR

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W.P.No.16815 of 2008

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M/s. Rohini Housing Developers Pvt., Ltd., Rep. by its Managing Director M.V.Marudhachalam No.15/10, Gandhi Road, Sri Rangam, Trichirapalli - 6 ... Petitioner

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Vs.

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The Inspector General of Registration and the Chief Revenue Collector Office of the Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road,

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Chennai - 600 028.

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The Sub Registrar (District Registrar Cadre) Woraiyur, Trichy District ... Respondents

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Prayer : Petition filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the order, dated 06.05.2008 in P.Mu.No.41646/P1/2007 of the first respondent and the order dated 06.08.2007 in No.2/07 of the second respondent herein and quash the same and direct the second respondent to forthwith release the Document No.29/07 on its file.

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For Petitioner : Mrs.A.L.Gandhimathi

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For Respondents : Mr.B.Kannan Government Advocate

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ORDER

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The prayer sought for herein is for a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to the order, dated 06.05.2008 in P.Mu.No.41646/P1/2007 of the first respondent and the order dated 06.08.2007 in No.2/07 of the second respondent herein and quash the same and direct the second respondent to forthwith release the Document No.29/07 on its file.

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The short facts which are required to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition are as follows:

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2.1. The landed property for an extent of 36 cents 7 links together with the buildings in ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor in new T.S.No.38/57 Old Ward No.3 in

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Chinthamani village, Oraiyur Sub-District, Thiruchirapalli District, originally belongs to one M.Padmavathy, M.Sivaraman, M.Jayanthi and M.Saraswathi, the wife, son and daughters of late S.Mahadevan.

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2.2. They executed a power of attorney in favour of one M.Anand on 01.11.2004. On the strength of the said power, Anand negotiated with the petitioner for sale of the property and accordingly, after fixing the sale consideration, the sale was effected and the sale deed was registered on 04.09.2006 on the file of the second respondent. The total sale consideration of Rs.2,13,61,200/- was paid and accordingly the necessary stamp duty for the said sale deed also have been paid and it was registered as such by the second respondent office and since the said sale, the petitioner had been in possession and enjoyment of the property.

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2.3. When that being so, subsequently, the petitioner came to understand that, even before the sale deed was executed by M.Anand, i.e., the power of attorney holder, in favour of the petitioner, one among the four persons, i.e. principals who executed the power in favour of Anand, that M.Sivaraman had cancelled the power on 24.11.2005. It further comes to know that, the said Sivaraman though cancelled the power on 24.11.2005 had not conveyed the same to M.Anand, i.e. power of attorney holder.

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2.4. However, when the said issue of cancellation of power had came to the knowledge of the petitioner, the petitioner, in order to confirm the sale that was effected on 04.09.2006, wanted the said Sivaraman to give a consent deed and accordingly, agreeing with the same, Sivaraman has executed a consent deed for the sale and when the said consent deed was presented before the second respondent for registration it was objected by the second respondent on the ground that, though it has been claimed to be the consent deed, since on the date of the original deed was executed on 04.09.2006 one of the principals since cancelled the power as early as on 24.11.2005 on the date of sale dated 04.09.2006, the said Sivaraman's property or share were not properly conveyed through the sale deed dated 04.09.2006. Therefore, the present consent deed executed by the said Sivaraman can only be treated as fresh deed as now only through this consent deed, the sale of Sivaraman's portion is being conveyed to the petitioner. Therefore, it shall be treated as a fresh sale deed and for the said purpose, stamp duty ad-valorem to be calculated for the said portion of the property of Sivaraman shall be paid.

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2.5. Making this stand of the second respondent, an order was passed by the second respondent on 06.08.2007, as against which, the petitioner preferred appeal to the first respondent and the said appeal also was rejected by the order dated

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06.05.2008. Therefore, challenging the same, the petitioner has moved this writ petition with the aforesaid prayer.

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Heard Mrs.A.L.Gandhimathi, learned counsel appearing for

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the petitioner, who would submit that, no doubt on the date of sale which was effected on 04.09.2006 neither the power of attorney holder nor the petitioner did not know that one of the principal i.e. Sivaraman cancelled the power given in favour of one Anand as early as on 24.11.2005. Nevertheless the sale has been executed and sale deed has been registered, for which the entire sale consideration for the whole property including Sivaraman's portion has been paid through the power of attorney holder to the original owners including the Sivaraman and having receipt of the same, the sale was executed. In respect of the said sale deed executed on 04.09.2006, at the time of registration, the entire stamp duty as claimed by the Registration Department also was paid by the petitioner. Therefore, what has been conveyed on 04.09.2006 through the sale deed for the entire property belongs to all the original vendors including the Sivaraman since have been conveyed and the stamp duty for the entirety had been paid, no further stamp duty can be demanded by the Registration Department. Therefore, the order in this regard passed both by the second respondent and the first respondent who confirmed the order of the second respondent is unlawful and unjustifiable.

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In this context, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon Section 4 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 which reads thus:

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"4. Several instruments used in single transaction of sale, mortgage or settlement. — (1) Where, in the case of any sale, mortgage or settlement, several instruments are employed for completing the transaction, the principal instrument only shall be chargeable with the duty prescribed in Schedule I, for the conveyance, mortgage or settlement, and each of the other instruments shall be chargeable with a duty of one rupee instead of the duty (if any) prescribed for it in that Schedule.

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(2) The parties may determine for themselves which of the instrument so employed shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be deemed to be the principal instrument:

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Provided that the duty chargeable on the instrument so determined shall be the highest duty which would be chargeable in respect of any of the said instruments employed."

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By relying upon this provision, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, in respect of single transaction of sale, mortgage or settlement, if several documents are executed, what is the principal document under which the property is conveyed by way of sale, mortgage or settlement, that alone shall be subjected to stamp duty. She would also submit that, in the present transaction, the sale actually effected on 04.09.2006, on that date the entire property including Sivaraman's share had been conveyed and in order to confirm the same, since the Sivaraman cancelled the power on 24.11.2005, therefore, on 04.09.2006 effectively there was no power in favour of Anand who executed the sale deed on behalf of the vendors to the petitioner on 04.09.2006, it become necessitated to execute a consent deed to confirm the sale and that was executed by the said Sivaraman. Therefore, the said consent deed, which is in question now, can only be treated as an additional document for a single transaction. Therefore, since the principal document which is the sale deed dated 04.09.2006 has already been subjected to stamp duty, for which the entire stamp duty have been paid by the petitioner, no further demand can be made from the petitioner to make any further stamp duty for the very same transaction which has already been conveyed on 04.09.2006 for valid sale consideration.

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In this context, the learned counsel would further submit that, insofar as Clause 23 of the Schedule of the said Act is concerned, it speaks about only the conveyance. Here in the case in hand, the conveyance actually taken place on 04.09.2006, for which the stamp duty has been paid. Therefore, citing the said clause 23 of the Schedule once again the respondent cannot claim further stamp duty, therefore, the impugned orders are totally unsustainable.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would further submit that, in fact during the pendency of the writ petition since the document in question was required to be utilised for some other purposes, the petitioner demanded the same, therefore, by interim order of this Court a bank guarantee was directed to be given equal to the stamp duty demanded through the impugned order and accordingly after executing the bank guarantee the document in question after having registered, was returned to the petitioner. However, subsequently a learned Judge of this Court, in view of the document in question since has been returned to the petitioner, was of the view that, nothing was surviving in this writ petition, therefore, he has disposed the writ petition by order dated 02.11.2018.

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The learned counsel would further submit that, however, the issue was not stopped with that, as subsequently the

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Registration Department made their further demand to the petitioner to renew the bank guarantee already executed in favour of the Registration Department for encashing the demanded stamp duty and only in that circumstances, it triggered the petitioner to file an intra court appeal in W.A.No.59 of 2020 against the order passed by the Writ Court dated 02.11.2018.

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She would also submit that the said writ appeal was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 13.01.2020, where, after noting the aforesaid developments, the Hon'ble Division Bench having set aside the order of the writ Court dated 02.11.2018, has remanded the matter back to the Writ Court for taking a decision afresh, that is how this writ petition again has come up before this Court, she contended.

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On the other hand, Mr.B.Kannan, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents, by relying upon the reason stated in the impugned order passed by the second respondent as confirmed by the first respondent Appellate Authority, would submit that, admittedly as on 04.09.2006, the Anand, Power of Attorney holder did not have the valid power from Sivaraman who was one among the four owners of the property. When that being so, what has been executed by way of sale deed on 04.09.2006 and registered at the second respondent office, is not a sale deed insofar as M.Sivaraman's portion of the property, as that has not been conveyed in the eye of law. Therefore, if at all a consent deed, which is in question now, is presented by the petitioner to confirm the sale taken place on 04.09.2006, it cannot be treated merely as a consent deed in order to rectify the mistake committed on 04.09.2006 whereby the portion of the said Sivaraman has not at all been conveyed to the petitioner. Therefore, that kind of rectification cannot be made by presenting a document like the consent deed, without paying any stamp duty.

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The learned Government Advocate would further submit that, in view of Clause 23 of the Schedule to the Act, whatever be the conveyance that is by way of sale or settlement, the conveyance could be treated as if it is taken place only if the valid document is presented, that means, the vendor or owner of the property must have conveyed the property to and in favour of the purchaser.

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Here in the case in hand, according to the learned Government Advocate, on 04.09.2006, no doubt, the sale deed was executed and registered and the execution has been made through a Power of Attorney holder, namely, Anand who claimed to have been the power agent of all the four vendors including the Sivaraman, only on that claim, the sale deed was registered on 04.09.2006 of course on receipt of the necessary stamp duty.

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However, subsequently the petitioner came to know that on 24.11.2005 the power was cancelled by Sivaraman and that only

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made the petitioner to come out with the present consent deed. He would further submit that, in that case, as on 04.09.2006, there was no valid power at the hands of the Anand to execute the sale deed for conveying the property / share belongs to Sivaraman, therefore, the actual conveyance has not been taken place on 04.09.2006, hence, the said alleged conveyance cannot be confirmed or ratified by way of subsequent consent deed, which is now presented for registration without stamp duty.

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Therefore, the actual conveyance now only being taken place through the consent deed, hence it can only be treated as a fresh sale deed within the meaning of Clause 23 of the Schedule to the Act. Therefore, it shall carry the ad-valorem stamp duty to be prescribed and collected in this regard. Hence, the learned Government Advocate would submit that, the reason stated by the second respondent in the order in original and the said reason having been confirmed by the first respondent being the Appellate Authority which is also the order impugned herein, are sustainable and justifiable. Therefore, the demand of stamp duty made in this regard through the respective impugned orders passed by the respondents are to be sustained. Hence, a direction can be given to the petitioner to pay the stamp duty towards the registration of the consent deed as a fresh or regular sale deed.

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I have considered the said rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials placed before this Court.

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It is a fact that the property in question originally belongs to four persons including the said Sivaraman. All joined together and executed a power in favour of one M.Anand, to that extent, absolutely there is no quarrel. On the strength of the power executed in favour of the said Anand, he negotiated the sale of the property in question with the petitioner and after having confirmed the sale consideration, the sale deed was executed and was registered on 04.09.2006 on behalf of all the vendors i.e. owners of the property.

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At that time, i.e. on 04.09.2006 it was nobody's case that the sale deed executed and registered on 04.09.2006 is not a proper sale deed for want of any power in favour of the Power of Attorney holder who executed the document in favour of the petitioner on behalf of the vendors.

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Only subsequently it comes to the knowledge of the petitioner that the said Sivaraman cancelled the power as early as on 24.11.2005. Therefore, taking clue from the said episode, the petitioner has come to the conclusion that, if at all the power given to the Power of Attorney holder Anand was cancelled by one of the vendor i.e. Sivaraman on 24.11.2005, the conveyance of his portion of the land through the sale dated 04.09.2006 cannot be construed as a final execution or

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conveyance, therefore, unless and until it is confirmed by way of a consent deed to be executed by the said Sivaraman, the sale effected or executed or registered on 04.09.2006 cannot be said to be completed. Only in that context, the petitioner approached the said Sivaraman and who also readily consented to execute the consent deed, accordingly, the consent deed in question having been prepared was presented for registration to the second respondent.

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The said consent deed dated 03.05.2007 when was presented, it was demanded, after scrutiny, by the second respondent, that it shall be treated only as a fresh sale deed, as on the date, i.e., 04.09.2006 the property of Sivaraman was not conveyed. Therefore, now only since the property of Sivaraman being conveyed through this consent deed dated 03.05.2007, the stamp duty payable for the portion of Sivaraman property, which was quantified as Rs.8,54,448/-, has to be paid, accordingly the said demand was made by the second respondent.

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Got annoyed with the said order passed by the second respondent to make a demand of stamp duty to the extent indicated above, which is a second time demand as the entire sale consideration as well as stamp duty has been paid by the petitioner on 04.09.2006 itself, the petitioner preferred appeal to the first respondent, who also after having considered the reason stated by the second respondent, has confirmed the order. That is how the petitioner has moved this writ petition challenging both the orders passed by the respondents.

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If at all the stand of the respondents as projected by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents is accepted, that the consent deed dated 03.05.2007 is a fresh document as the conveyance of the land or property belongs to Sivaraman being conveyed only through the said deed, dated 03.05.2007, for which necessary stamp duty has to be paid as demanded, the stamp duty already paid by the petitioner and received by the Registration Department for the entire property including the share of Sivaraman on 04.09.2006 could not have been received by the registration Department.

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It is an admitted case that, pursuant to the sale deed dated 04.09.2006 the entire sale consideration has been paid to the vendors through the Power of Attorney Holder and insofar as the Sivaraman's portion is concerned, there has been no dispute to that aspect.

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This has been evidenced in the very consent deed itself executed by the said Sivaraman. In order to appreciate the same, the relevant portion of the consent deed is extracted herein : ",jdoapw;fz;l brhj;ij ehDk;. vd;Dila jhahh; jpUkjp/gj;khtjp-1 kw;Wk; vd; rnfhjhpfs; M.b$ae;jp-2,

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M.ru!;tjp-3 kw;Wk; N.Mde;j;- 4 Mfpnahh;fspy; jpU/M.Mde;j; mth;fSf;F 01/11/2004k; ehs; xU b$duy; gth; gj;jpuk; vGjpf; bfhLj;J mtw;iw _u';fk; rhh;gjptfj;jpy; 4 g [j;jfk;. 208-2004k; vz; gth; fj;jpug;go jpU/M.Mde;j; mth;fs; j';fSf;F brd;w 04/09/2006k; ehs; xU fpiuag; gj;jpuk; vGjpf; bfhLj;J mtw;iw jpUr;rpuhg;gs;sp lt[d;. ciwa{h; rhh;gjptfj;jpy; 1 g[j;jfk;. 2006k; Mz;od; 4395k; vz; gj;jpukhfg; gjpthfpa[s;s fpiuag; gj;jpug;go Vw;fdnt fpiuaj; bjhif KGtJk; v';fSf;F gw;WtHpahfptpl;lJ/ ,f;fpiuaj;jpw;F Kd; v';fSila gth; Vb$d;l; jpU/M.Mde;j; mth;fSf;F vGjpf; bfhLj;j b$duy; gth; gj;jpuj;ij ehd; uj;J bra;Jtpl;nld;/ ehd; uj;J bra;j tpguj;ij vd;Dila gth; Vb$z;;l;lhd jpU/M.Mde;j; mth;fSf;F bjhptpf;fg;glhjjhy; vd; KftUk; j';fSf;F ,g;gj;jpuj;jpy; fhzg;gLk; brhj;ij fpiuag; gj;jpuk; vGjpf; bfhLj;jpUe;jhh;/ mt;thW uj;J bra;j tpguk; vd; gth; Vb$z;l;Lf;F vGj;J K:ykhf ehd; bjhptpf;fhj fhuzj;jhy; mJ rl;lg;go bry;Ygo MfhJ vd jw;bghGJ bjhpe;Jbfhz;nld;/ nkYk; mJ uj;J bra;af;Toa gj;jpuk; my;y vdt[k; bjhpe;Jbfhz;nld;/ , Ug;gpDk; ic& fpiuag; gj;jpuj;jpy; cs;s brhj;jpid jh';fs; 04/09/2006k; njjp vd;Dila gth; Vb$z;olkpUe;J fpiuak; bgw;W chpik bfhz;lho tUtjpy; VJk; j';fSf;F g';fk; tuf;TlhJ vd jh';fs; vd;dplk; nfl;Lf; bfhz;ljw;fpz';f ,e;j rk;kjg; gj;jpuj;ij vGjpf; bfhLf;fyhndd;/

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vd;Dila gth; Vb$z;l; K:yk; ,g;gj;jpuj;jpy; fz;l brhj;jpy; vdf;Fhpa chpik midj;Jk; j';fSf;F 04/09/2006k; njjpa fpiuag; gj;jpuk; K:yk; khw;wk; bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/ ,e;j rk;kjg; gj;jpuj;jpw;fhf ehd; j';fsplkpUe;J ahbjhU gpujp gpunah$dKk; bgw;Wf; bfhs;stpy;iy/

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,e;jg;go vd; g{uz kndhuhrpapy; rk;kjpj;J vGjpf; bfhLj;j rk;kjg; gj;jpuk;/ "

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The said sivaraman has made it clear that, though he has cancelled the power on 24.11.2005, the same has not been conveyed or informed to the said Anand, Power of Attorney holder. Moreover, he has also stated that, the power was mistakenly revoked and he has also further stated that it is not a revokable document. Only in order to clear the title which was conveyed through the sale deed, dated 04.09.2006, he has come forward to execute the consent deed he has stated and he has further stated that, entire rights of the property belongs to Sivaraman was already conveyed to and in favour of the petitioner by execution of the sale deed through the power agent on 04.09.2006 itself.

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These statements made by the said Sivaraman in the consent deed in question is concerned, he has made it very clear that, actually on 04.09.2006 or before that, the entire sale consideration of the property in question have been paid by the petitioner, for which the total stamp duty also having been calculated was recovered from the petitioner.

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When that being so, whether the Registration Department can once again seek the very same stamp duty for the very same property which has already been conveyed on 04.09.2006, from the petitioner, is a question.

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In this context, even though the learned Government Advocate very much relied upon clause 23 of the Schedule to the Stamp Act by stating that, the actual conveyance has been effected only on 03.05.2007, that is the date of the consent deed and not on 04.09.2006 i.e. date of the earlier sale deed, however, this argument has been met by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner by relying upon Section 4 of the Stamp Act which has already been quoted herein above.

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In case of single transaction if there are several instruments used or involved, only the principal instrument shall be taken into account for the purpose of stamp duty.

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Here in the case in hand, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the transaction conveying the property belongs to the Sivaraman has been conveyed as early as on 04.09.2006 by way of registered sale deed. However, in order to rectify the mistake since on 04.09.2006 the Anand, Power of Attorney holder who executed the sale deed did not have the valid power from one of the vendor, i.e., Sivaraman as he had cancelled the power well before the sale deed dated 04.09.2006 i.e. on 24.11.2005, it become necessitated for the petitioner to get a consent deed from the Sivaraman and present it for registration before the second respondent.

¶69

Therefore, the transaction effected is only conveying the portion of the land i.e. the portion of the Sivaraman to and in favour of the petitioner i.e., the single transaction. For the said purpose two instruments are utilised, one is the sale deed dated 04.09.2006 and another one is consent deed dated 03.05.2007. Under both these deeds only one transaction is effected i.e. conveying the land belongs to Sivaraman to and in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, for single transaction, only one principal deed has to be taken into account for the purpose of stamp duty and therefore, in this regard, according to the petitioner, the 04.09.2006 sale deed having been taken as

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a principal deed, the entire stamp duty was paid by the petitioner and having receipt of the same only, the said deed was registered on 04.09.2006.

¶72

However, it is the stand of the respondents that though the sale deed was registered on 04.09.2006 the portion or share of the property actually belongs to Sivaraman being conveyed only through the consent deed dated 03.05.2007, therefore, it can only be treated as an actual sale deed or a fresh sale deed. If that stand is taken by the respondents, no doubt, the 03.05.2007 consent deed can be treated as a sale deed effecting the actual conveyance of the land belongs to the Sivaraman to and in favour of the petitioner.

¶73

In that case, certainly it can be subjected to stamp duty, for which the petitioner is liable to pay the stamp duty as demanded by the respondents. However, in the case in hand, the same amount of stamp duty already was demanded from the petitioner at the time of registration of sale deed dated 04.09.2006 and the said stamp duty having been paid by the petitioner, the sale was registered on 04.09.2006.

¶74

Therefore, if at all the consent deed dated 03.05.2007 is treated as a principal deed, for which, the stamp duty demanded by the respondent has to be paid by the petitioner, then, the stamp duty demanded and was paid by the petitioner pursuant to the 04.09.2006 sale deed for the share of the land belongs to Sivaraman shall be treated as an unjust enrichment on the part of the respondents. Therefore, the present demand made through the impugned order taking the consent deed, dated 03.05.2007 as a principal deed, if it is accepted, the Registration Department shall return back the stamp duty for Sivaraman's property, already received from the petitioner for 04.09.2006 sale deed.

¶75

Therefore, the effect is one and the same insofar as the demand of stamp duty from the petitioner as per the impugned order. Either the Registration Department can treat the sale deed, dated 04.09.2006 as a principal deed and consent deed dated 03.05.2007 as an additional instrument for a single transaction of sale being conveyed to the petitioner on 04.09.2006 or the Registration Department can treat 03.05.2007 being the principal deed insofar as the conveyance of land belongs to Sivaraman and in that case, the stamp duty already been paid by the petitioner in respect of sale effected on 04.09.2006 with regard to the portion of the Sivaraman's property, which is the exact amount now has been demanded through the impugned order, can be adjusted by the Registration Department themselves and even in that case, absolutely there could be no chance for demanding any further from the

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petitioner by way of stamp duty for registering the consent deed dated 03.05.2007 as demanded by the second respondent and confirmed by the first respondent through the impugned orders.

¶78

Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that,

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the impugned demand made through the orders which are under challenge in this writ petition are unsustainable, accordingly, they are liable to be quashed.

¶80

In the result, while disposing this writ petition, the following orders are passed:

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(i) That the impugned orders are quashed.

¶82

(ii) Since the document in question (consent deed) already been registered and returned back to the petitioner pursuant to the earlier interim order passed by this Court, of course, against the execution of bank guarantee, insofar as the return of the document is concerned, no further order is required.

¶83

(iii) Insofar as the execution of bank guarantee is concerned, it was made only pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court, now by virtue of the decision taken by this Court in this writ petition through this order, no further demand since can be made by the respondents from the petitioner by way of stamp duty for the consent deed dated 03.05.2007, the further demand, if any, made by the Registration Department from the petitioner to renew or re-execute the bank guarantee does not arise, therefore, such demand cannot be made by the respondents.

¶84

With these directions and observations, this Writ Petition is allowed as indicated above. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

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Assistant Registrar(CS VIII)

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True Copy

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Sub-Assistant Registrar

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sgl/tsvn

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The Inspector General of Registration and the Chief Revenue Collector Office of the Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai - 600 028. 2. The Sub Registrar (District Registrar Cadre) Woraiyur, Trichy District +1 CC to M/s.A.L. Gandhimathi, Advocate sr 25299 +1 CC to The Government Pleader sr 25305.

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W.P.No.16815 of 2008

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RLD(CO) SP(22/07/2021)

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https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

M/S Rohini Housing Developers v. the Inspector General of

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

M/S Rohini Housing Developers v. the Inspector General of

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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