AC 37, CIT v. Mahaliram Ramjidas [1940] 8 ITR 442 (PC), India United Mills Ltd. v. CEPT [1955] 27 ITR 20 (SC)/[1955] 1 SCR 810 and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR 1 (SC)/[1963] 3 SCR 893.] But it must also be realised that provision by which the authority is empowered to levy and collect interest, even if construed as forming part of the machinery provisions, is substantive law for the simple reason that in the absence of contract or usage interest can be levied under law and it cannot be recovered by way of damages for wrongful detention of the amount [See Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. v. Ruttanji Ramji AIR 1938 PC 67 and Union of India vs. A.L. Rallia Ram [1964] 3 SCR 164 and 185 to 190]. Our attention was, however, drawn by Mr. Sen to two cases. Even in those cases, CIT v. M. Chandra Sekhar [1985] 44 CTR (SC) 110 /[1985] 151 ITR 433 (SC); and Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1986] 58 CTR (SC) 112/[1986] 160 ITR 961 (SC), all that the Court pointed out was that provision for charging interest was, it seems, introduced in order to compensate for the loss occasioned to the Revenue due to delay. But then interest was charged on the strength of a statutory provision, may be its objective was to compensate the Revenue for delay in payment of tax. But regardless of the reason which impelled the legislature to provide for charging interest, the Court must give that meaning to it as is conveyed by the language used and the purpose to be achieved. Therefore, any provision made in a statute for charging or levying interest on delayed payment of tax must be construed as a substantive law and not adjectival law. So construed and applying the normal rule of interpretation of statutes, we find, as pointed out by us earlier and by Bhagwati, J. in the Associated Cement Co.'s case (supra) that if the Revenue's contention is accepted it leads to conflicts and creates certain anomalies which could never have been intended by the legislature."
