A challenge to NCLT orders approving a resolution plan and rejecting a related application alleged defective cause-list publication and delayed pronouncement. The Court dismissed the writ petition, upheld the special Bench's competence, and treated the relevant timelines as directory. The merits were left for the appellate forum.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 21.02.2020
DELIVERED ON : 19.03.2020
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.SATHYANARAYANAN AND THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE R.HEMALATHA
W.P.No.1926 of 2020
and WMP.No.2253 of 2020
Shaji Purushothaman .. Petitioner
Vs.
1.Union of India,
through Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
A-Wing, Shastri Bhavan,
Rajendra Prasad Road,
New Delhi-110 001.
2.Registrar of National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai, Corporate Bhavan (UTI Building), 3rd Floor, No.29 Rajaji Salai, Chennai-600 021. 3.S.Rajendran, Resolution Professional of Empee Distilleries Limited. No.188/87, 2nd floor, Evlappan Mansion, Habibullah Road, (Near Kodambakkam Rly Stn.) T.Nagar, Chennai-600 017. 4.Union Bank of India, Rep. by its AGM, Mr.Renjith Swaminathan, Industrial Finance Bank, Union Bank Bhawan, 1st Floor, 139, Broadway, Chennai-600 108. 5.Andhra Bank, Rep. by its AGM, Mr.V.Gurusubramaniam, Andhra Bank, Mount Road Branch, 95, Anna Salai, Mount Road, Chennai-600 002.
https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Rep. by its VC-Mumbai, Mr.Vishal Varma,
6th Floor, Metropolitan Building, Sandra-Kurla Complex, Bandra (E),Mumbai-400 051.
Mumbai-400 098.
10.M/s.SNJ Distilleries Pvt. Ltd.
Rep. by its Director,
Ms.Geetha Jayamurugan.
Old No.47, New No.99,
Canal Bank Nagar, CIT Nagar,
Nandanam, Chennai-600 035.
.. Respondents
(R10 impleaded as per order dated 30.01.2020
made in WMP.No.2637 of 2020)
Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records of the common order dated 20.01.2020 and made available on 27.01.2020 passed by the learned National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai in MA/780/2019 and MA/1250/2019 of CP/280/IB/2018 and quash the same as illegal and non-est in law.
For Petitioner : Mrs.Vibhadatta Makhija, Senior Counsel for Mr.Karuppaiah Meyappan and M/s.R.Ramanlaal
For Respondents: Mr.K.Ramanamoorthy,
Central Govt. Standing Counsel for R1 & R2
Mr.P.S.Raman, Senior Counsel for Ms.M.Savitha Devi for R3
Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, Senior Counsel for Ms.Harshini J. for R8 and R9
Mr.P.H.Aravind Pandian, Senior Counsel for Mr.Avinash Krishnan Ravi for R10
Mr.J.Harikrishnan for R5
O R D E R
M.SATHYANARAYANAN, J.
The petitioner, who claims to be the suspended Managing Director of M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited, came forward to file this writ petition by making a challenge to the common order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai dated 20.01.2020 made in MA/780/2019 and MA/1250/2019 of CP/280/IB/2018.
Authority, namely NCLT, Chennai for setting aside the order initiating Corporate Insolvency Process against M/s.Empee Distilleries Limited dated 01.11.2018 and the said application was dismissed by the NCLT, Chennai, vide order dated 29.07.2019 holding that consent of 90% of the Committee of Creditors [in short “COC”] ought to have been received for withdrawing the petition in terms of Section 12A of IBC.
shock and surprise became aware of the fact that at about 06.15 p.m. on 21.01.2020, Mr.B.S.V. Prakash Kumar and Mr.S.Vijayaraghavan had commenced sitting and the Cause List was affixed as to the constitution of the Bench and pronouncement of orders, which include MA/780/2019 and MA1250/2019, which was heard along with the same, was not shown in the Cause List. However, common order came to be passed on 20.01.2020 in allowing MA/780/2019 and dismissing MA/1250/2019.
date of reserving orders and therefore, prayed for setting aside the common order dated 20.01.2020 with a further direction for listing and hearing of the matter afresh.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of his submissions, has placed heavy reliance upon the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Kamal K.Singh v. Union of India and Others [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5609] and also the judgments in Pushpa Singh v. Union of India and Others [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2385] and Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others [(2019) 2 SCC 1].
in Court No.II did not rise until 4.45p.m. It is also brought to the knowledge of this Court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent that pursuant to the Resolution Plan, the 10th respondent has brought in Rs.134.78 Crores as stipulated in the Resolution Plan and Rs.15.90 Crores towards the difference in payment of Tax and all amounts as stipulated in the Resolution Plan and payment of operational creditors have been done in accordance with the terms of the Resolution Plan and about 33% of the dues to the financial creditors have been paid and also made a submission that the Promoters / Corporate Debtors did not provide for any solution, despite opportunities granted by the NCLAT and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
(i)Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur [(1965) 1 SCR 970: AIR 1965 SC 895]
(v)M/s.Hyundai Motor India Ltd. v. Union of India, Ministry of Finance and Others [2014 SCC OnLine Mad 12157]
the proceedings and prays for dismissal of the writ petition with exemplary costs.
https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 23. At the outset, this Court is not inclined to go into the merits of the impugned orders for the reason that the grounds urged by the petitioner can be decided only by the
Appellate Forum, as it is an efficacious and alternative remedy available.
“89. Preparation and publication of daily cause list –
(1) The Registry shall prepare and publish on the notice board of the Registry before the closing of working hours on each working day the cause list for the next working day and subject to the directions of the President, listing of cases in the daily cause list shall be in the following order or priority, unless otherwise ordered by the concerned Bench,
namely:-
(b) cases for clarification ;
(c) cases for admission ;
(d) cases for orders or directions:
(e) part-heard cases, latest part-heard having precedence ; and
(f) cases posted as per numerical order or as directed by the Bench.
(2) The title of the daily cause list shall consist of the number of the appeal or petition, the day, date and time of the court sitting, court hall number and the coram indicating the names of the President, Judicial Member and Technical Member constituting the Bench,
(3) Against the number of each case lists in the daily cause list, the following shall be shown, namely:-
(a) names of the legal practitioners appearing for both sides and setting out in brackets the rank of the parties whom they represent ;
(b) names of the parties, if unrepresented, with their ranks in brackets.
(4) The objections and special directions, if any, of the Registry shall be briefly indicated in the daily cause list in remarks column, whenever compliance is required.”
2013, vide Gazette Notification dated 03.01.2020 and the said member assumed charge on 05.01.2020 as the Acting President of NCLT, Principal Bench at New Delhi.
Principal Bench at NCLT, New Delhi – Court No.1
1.Shri B.S.V. Prakash Kumar, Acting President.
2.Ms.Sumita Purkayastha, Member (Technical).
NCLT, Division Bench at New Delhi – Court No.111
1.Shri Ch.Mohd.Sharief Tariq, Member (Judicial),
2.Smt. Saroj Rajware, Member (Technical.
The very same official has passed an order dated 17.01.2020 stating that there shall be a Special Bench for NCLT, Chennai on 20.01.2020 for pronouncement of orders at Court No.II, reserved by the Bench comprising of Mr.B.S.V.Prakash Kumar, Member (Judicial) and Mr.S.Vijayaraghavan, Member (Technical) and the said order is in modification of the order dated 25.07.2019 for 20.01.2020 only and it was issued with the approval of the Hon'ble Acting President of NCLT.
the Notice Board at NCLT, Chennai Bench. It is further stated in the 2nd respondent affidavit that the Registrar, NCLT, was unable to display the Cause List as well as in the Notice Board on the previous day on 19.01.2020 as it happen to be a Sunday (Holiday) and on account of the said reason, Cause List was unable to uploaded in the website.
above cited judgment, in Paras 50, 56, 59 to 61 has dealt with the rule position and in paras 72 and 75 observed as follows:
“72. Therefore, by sub-rule (1) of Rule 89, the Registry is required to prepare and publish on the notice board of the Registry before the closing of working hours on each working day the cause list for the next working day and subject to the directions of the President, listing of cases in the daily cause list shall be in the order of priority, unless otherwise ordered by the concerned Bench. Ultimately, the requirement of this nature and to be followed by a court, particularly a substitute for a Civil and Company Court means that people and litigants should know when orders are to be pronounced in cases which have been already heard. Therefore, the broad heads which have to be enumerated in the daily cause list ensure that litigants, parties and equally the public at large know that the cases have been listed for that purpose and with that object. In cases in which arguments are concluded and judgments are ready for pronouncement, then, the pronouncement has to be done after notifying to the parties in advance the date of such pronouncement. The rule makers did not desire or contemplate dispensation of the requirement of pronouncement at all. If dispensation of that was contemplated, then, possibly, there would not have been guidance provided by rules such as Rules 89 and 90. By Rule 90, there is a further assurance that if by reason of declaration of holiday or for any other unforeseen reason, the Bench does not function for the day, the daily cause list for that day shall, unless otherwise directed, be treated as the daily cause list for the next working day in addition to the cases already posted for that day. Now that information technology is introduced, particularly for listing of cases, then, all the more with the advances therein, the rule makers desired that there should be complete transparency, fair and just treatment to litigants and parties. Nobody should carry an impression that the case has been heard behind their back or that they have been taken up without any intimation or knowledge to the party or litigant and disposed of. Therefore, when cases are preponed or postponed, litigants have to be informed. They may have engaged advocates, but such transparency, faith, consistency, credibility and sanctity of judicial acts and proceedings is maintained. Everything in relation to judicial proceedings, therefore, is covered in the broad and wider concept of dispensation of justice. Ultimately, courts are endowed with the duty to render justice. If courts and tribunals exercising judicial functions are chosen by the legislature to render justice to litigants, then, all the more they cannot be expected to work in a closed door fashion. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Judicial proceedings have to be open to public.
In para 79, the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has dealt with Rules 150 and 151 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 and the purport of the said Rule in para 80 and in para 84 has dealt with Justice Delivery System and concluded that the writ petition challenging the order of the NCLT, Bombay is maintainable and after making observations as to the nature and concept of the Tribunals, has set aside the impugned order on the ground that it is nullity and directed that the application is to be decided afresh in accordance with law.
2385] (cited supra) has no application to the case on hand for the reason that in respect of the order passed by NCLT, Bombay, which was the subject matter of challenge, the other Member had neither given concurrence with his reasoning on conclusion nor had he signed the transcript of the purported judgment/order dated 28.08.2018.
“45. Sethi, J. has enumerated them succinctly as follows:
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the judgment where, on the first page, after the cause-title, date of reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately mentioned by the Court Officer concerned.
(ii) That Chief Justices of the High Courts, on their administrative side, should direct the Court Officers/Readers of the various Benches in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within the period of that month.
(iii) On noticing that after conclusion of the arguments the judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months the Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the Judges of the High Court for their information. Such communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover.
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from the date of reserving judgment, any of the parties in the case is permitted to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early judgment. Such application, as and when filed, shall be listed before the Bench concerned within two days excluding https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the intervening holidays.
(v) If the judgment, for any reason, is not pronounced
within a period of six months, any of the parties of the said lis shall be entitled to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court with a prayer to withdraw the said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh arguments. It is open to the Chief Justice to grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in the circumstances.”
It is also relevant to extract Para 46 of the said judgment:
“46. I have chosen to reiterate the above instructions in this separate judgment only for providing added emphasis to them. I make it clear that if the Chief Justice of a High Court thinks that more effective measures can be evolved by him for slashing down the interval between conclusion of arguments and delivery of judgment in that particular court, it is open to him to do so as a substitute for the measures suggested by us hereinbefore. But until such measures are evolved by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, we expect that the measures suggested above would hold the field. I may also mention that the above-enumerated measures are intended to remain only until such time as Parliament would enact measures to deal with this problem.”
https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (iii) If the publication was not strictly in accordance with the manner provided in Section 94 (3) is the defect curable under Section 135(3)?
In para 8 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had dealt with the general question whether a particular provision of the Statute which on the face of it appears mandatory is merely directory or not? and it is relevant to extract para 8 of the said judgment:
“8. The question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory, inasmuch as it uses the word “shall” as in the present case — is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory.”
In para 9, the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [(1958) SCR 533], wherein the observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin [(1917) LR, AC 170] were extracted and it is relevant to extract the following observations made in para 9:
“9...Thus this Court approximated Article 320(3) (c) to a statutory provision like the one which came up for consideration in Montreal Street Railway Company case [(1917) LR, AC 170] and held that if the article were construed as mandatory, it would cause serious general inconvenience, and injustice to persons who had no control over those entrusted with the duty. That decision was clearly based on the special facts in that case dealing with appointments and dismissals of public servants and the duty of the Government to consult the Public Service Commission in that behalf and cannot and should not be extended to cases based on a different set of facts. As the Judicial Committee itself pointed out the question whether provisions in a statute are directory or mandatory cannot be decided by laying down a general rule and in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. That case therefore in the circumstances if of little assistance to the respondent, except insofar as it lays down the principle that no general rule can be laid down for determining the question whether a provision in a statute is directory or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mandatory, and that every case will have to be judged on the basis of the object of the statute concerned.”
“9. The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case of the latter substantial compliance may be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain broad propositions which can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding the rules of construction that should be followed in determining whether a provision of law is directory or mandatory may be summarised thus: The fact that the statute uses the word “shall” while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is a mandatory or directory provision. In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one. Where, however, a provision of law prescribes that a certain act has to be done in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers an immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner, the former has to be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if the defect in the act done in pursuance of it can be cured by permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be contravened. Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow.”
On the facts of the case, it was held that Section 89(3) of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 is mandatory and non-compliance of the same would result in dismissal of the Election Petition under Section 94 of the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Act.
“43. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3, at p. 102 the law is stated as follows: “… unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation of the power of the officer”.
At p. 107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow non-compliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows:
“As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive.”
“[G]enerally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.”
“ ‘… It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.’ … that in each case you must look to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the subject-matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and
upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory.”
The Hon'ble Apex Court, as to the interpretation of Section 21 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 found that Section 21 is to meet the changed situation and contingencies which might not have been contemplated while preparing the first final development plan.
“33. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this; procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/ employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under 'no notice', 'no opportunity' and 'no hearing' categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice.”
“56. Generally, time limits prescribed, especially in subordinate legislation, can be taken only to be directory and not mandatory. Otherwise, a subordinate legislation may even destroy the Parent legislation, by default.
to consider the purpose for which the provision had been made, its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting therefrom when the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject as well as other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case, including the language of the provision. The said decision of the Constitution Bench was followed in Salem Advocate Bar v. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC 344]. While doing so, the Supreme Court pointed out therein that our laws on procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decision should not be reached behind their back, that proceedings that affect their lives and properties should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.
“In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by noncompliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a provision of law relates to the performance of any public duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of that provision causes serious prejudice to those for whose benefit it is enacted and at the same time who have no control over the performance of the duty, such provision should be treated as a directory one.”
consequences of non compliance with the condition, it would normally be taken to be mandatory. If the consequences of non compliance are not indicated, then, the provision has to be seen only as directory.”
who heard the case, it shall be deemed to have been released from part-heard and listed afresh for hearing. Such a situation has not arisen in this case for the reason that both Members of the Bench heard together and reserved orders and only pronounced orders by way of Special Sitting on 20.01.2020 at NCLT, Chennai.
“7. Yet there is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It is a well-settled principle that if a thing is required to be done by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3, at p. 107, it is pointed out that a statutory direction to private individuals should generally be considered as mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that which obtains with respect to public https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ officers. Again, at p. 109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory
provision may be determined by an expression in the statute itself of the result that shall follow noncompliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as follows:
“As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive.”
public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified”. Admittedly, the consequences that may emanate as to the nonadherence/infraction of the Rules have not been indicated in the Statutory Rules. Hence, the impugned common order cannot be set aside on that ground.
Sd/-
Assistant Registrar (CS-III)
//True Copy//
Sub Assistant Registrar
Jvm
To
1.Union of India,
through Ministry of Corporate Affairs,
A-Wing, Shastri Bhavan,
Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi-110 001.
Chennai, Corporate Bhavan (UTI Building), 3rd Floor, No.29 Rajaji Salai, Chennai-600 021.
+2cc to M/s.M.Savitha devi, Advocate, sr24265
+1cc to Mr. Avinash Krishnan Ravi, Advocate, SR. No. 24225
+1cc to Mr.K.Ramamoorthy, Advocate, SR. No. 24200
+1cc to T.Harikrishnan, Advocate, SR. No. 24220
W.P.No.1926 of 2020
KS(CO) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ RMP(17/07/2020)
3 issues framed by the court
Did non-adherence to Rules 89 and 150 to 153 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 vitiate the common order?
Was the special NCLT Bench legally competent to pronounce the reserved orders?
Were the timelines under Rules 150 and 153 mandatory or directory?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Kamal K.Singh v. Union of IndiaDistinguished¶107
Kamal K.Singh v. Union of India [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5609] · Who else cites this
Pushpa Singh v. Union of India and OthersDistinguished¶113
Pushpa Singh v. Union of India and Others [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2385] · Who else cites this
Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and OthersDistinguished¶126
Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others [(2019) 2 SCC 1] · Who else cites this
Anil Rai v. State of BiharReferred¶116
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar [(2001) 7 SCC 318] · Who else cites this
R.C.Sharma v. Union of IndiaReferred¶116
R.C.Sharma v. Union of India [(1976) 3 SCC 574] · Who else cites this
Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, RampurRelied on¶128
Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur [AIR 1965 SC 895] · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal SrivastavaReferred¶134
State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [(1958) SCR 533] · Who else cites this
Montreal Street Railway Company v. NormandinReferred¶134
Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin [(1917) LR, AC 170]
Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani LoneRelied on¶136
Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone [(1980) 1 SCC 403] · Who else cites this
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and OthersRelied on¶139
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Others [(2003) 2 SCC 111] · Who else cites this
P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir and OthersRelied on¶149
P.T.Rajan v. T.P.M.Sahir and Others [(2003) 8 SCC 498] · Who else cites this
Pesara Pushpamala Reddy v. G.Veeraswamy and OthersRelied on¶150
Pesara Pushpamala Reddy v. G.Veeraswamy and Others [(2011) 4 SCC 306] · Who else cites this
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.SharmaReferred¶150
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] · Who else cites this
M/s.Hyundai Motors India Ltd. v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶152
M/s.Hyundai Motors India Ltd. v. Union of India [(2016) 1 CTC 308]
Balwant Singh and Others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and OthersRelied on¶171
Balwant Singh and Others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and Others [(2003) 3 SCC 433] · Who else cites this
8 provisions across 4 enactments
Shaji Purushothaman
Union of India
Registrar of National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai
S.Rajendran, Resolution Professional of Empee Distilleries Limited
Union Bank of India
Andhra Bank
M.SATHYANARAYANAN
R.HEMALATHA
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
