A judicial officer challenged compulsory retirement and sought reinstatement. The Court dismissed the petition, finding relevant service material supported the decision and no basis for interference under Article 226. It also rejected the challenge that the retirement was disproportionate.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 02.08.2019
Pronounced on : 04-10-2019
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBBIAH and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN
Writ Petition No. 5558 of 2018
R. Navamurthy .. Petitioner
Versus
1. The Additional Chief Secretary to Government
Home (Courts-I) Department
Secretariat, Fort St. George
Chennai - 600 009
2. The Registrar General
High Court of Madras
Chennai - 600 104 ... Respondents
Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of The Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the impugned orders issued by the first respondent in G.O. (2D) No.305, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 04.10.2017 and the subsequent order issued by the second respondent in notification No.197/2017 dated 14.11.2017 and to quash the same and consequently directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service as Senior Civil Judge with all consequential and other attendant benefits.
For Petitioner : Mr. Ar.L. Sundaresan, Senior Advocate for Mr. K.H. Ravikumar
For Respondents: Mr. V. Shanmuga Sundar Special Government Pleader for R1 Mr. Santhanaraman for R2
ORDER
R. SUBBIAH, J
The petitioner has come forward with this writ petition seeking to quash the order in G.O. (2D) No.305, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 04.10.2017 on the file of the first respondent and the subsequent order passed by the second respondent in notification No.197/2017 dated 14.11.2017 with a consequential direction to direct the respondents to reinstate him in service as Senior Civil Judge with all consequential benefits.
(Vigilance) of this Court were the basis for issuing the charge memo and the charges related to the alleged failure on the part of the petitioner in discharging his judicial functions properly in awarding compensation amount in Motor Accident Cases. On receipt of the charge memorandum, the petitioner submitted his explanation on 20.03.2015 denying the charges. According to the petitioner, in 16 cases, on the basis of the material evidence made available, he arrived at a higher compensation amount based on the various principles enunciated by the High Court, Madras as well as the Supreme Court. Further, such higher compensation amount has been awarded by following the norms and making meticulous calculation. It is also submitted that when several counsels represented the Insurance Companies, only two advocates appearing for the Insurance Company have filed Transfer Applications and even in those applications, there is no allegation of any corrupt practice against the petitioner nor have they alleged any favouritism shown in favour of the claimants in those cases.
in the meeting convened on 17.08.2017. After considering the entire records relating to the service rendered by the petitioner, the Full Court unanimously resolved that in view of the fact that the petitioner had been proceeded against departmentally on charges of corrupt practices and imposed with punishment, a direction was issued to the Registry to address the Government to issue necessary orders to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service under FR 56 (2) in public interest. Pursuant to such an order passed by the Full Court of this Court, the Government passed the order in G.O. (2D) No.305, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 04.10.2017 on the basis of the recommendations made by the Full Court and in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 56 (2) of the Fundamental Rules and ordered to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service. Consequently, the second respondent issued the notification No.197 of 2017 dated 14.11.2017 relieving the petitioner from Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service with effect from the date of service of G.O. (2D) No.305, Home (Courts-I) Department dated 04.10.2017. In the meanwhile, prior to passing of order relieving the petitioner from judicial service, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 18.08.2017 to the second respondent herein seeking to permit him to retire from service voluntarily on health grounds. However, by a subsequent proceeding of the same date namely 14.11.2017, the second respondent rejected the request of the petitioner made in his letter dated 18.08.2017 to permit him to retire from service voluntarily.
earlier punished for corrupt practices on proven charges. It is this note, according to the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, that had influenced the Full Court to arrive at a decision not to extend the service of the petitioner beyond the age of 50 years. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner proceeded to contend that the original decision of the Administrative Committee is to permit the petitioner to continue in service beyond the age of 50 years. If the Full Court intends to differ from such decision of the Administrative committee, the Full Court should have sent the issue to the Administrative Committee for re-consideration. When it is admitted that the review under FR 56 (2) was deferred due to the pendency of charges under Rule 17 (b) against the petitioner from the year 2015 and the Honourable Full Court had taken a decision to impose the punishment of withholding of increment for two years with cumulative effect, there should have been no further proceedings under FR 56 (2) against the petitioner. Such decision of the Full Court is contrary to FR 56 (2) and clause 8 (i) of G.O. (Ms) No.623, Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department dated 14.07.1983, which prescribe procedures to be followed while passing an order of compulsory retirement against a government servant, wherein it has been ordered as follows:-
"8 (i) In case wherein action has been initiated for imposing a major penalty and the proceedings are in the final stage, the disciplinary proceedings will be finalised instead to compulsorily retire the officer under FR 56 (d)."
two years with cumulative effect. During the tenure of the petitioner, he has reached the norms set out by the High Court, Madras. In the Annual Confidential Report relating to the petitioner, his performance was recorded either as 'good' or as 'satisfactory' and no adverse remarks has been made against him. However, only for the period between 24.05.2013 to 30.12.2013, it was recorded as 'doubtful' when the petitioner was working as Chairman/Judicial Officer, Taxation Appellate Tribunal, Tiruppur Corporation on deputation. While the petitioner was on deputation, no norms has been fixed by the High Court for such post. In such circumstance, the order of compulsory retirement had cast an aspersion against the petitioner besides it has become a stigma in his career. Therefore, the order of compulsory retirement can only be regarded as a punishment imposed on the petitioner as contemplated under Article 311 (2) of The Constitution of India. There is no public interest in passing such an order of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. The order of compulsory retirement is solely on the basis of the order of punishment imposed against him, and in such event, the Administrative Committee or the Full Court ought to have issued a show cause notice or afforded a pre-decisional hearing to the petitioner. In the absence of the same, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. In effect, it is the submission of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner that when the Full Court has already imposed the punishment of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect, the decision to compulsorily retire him under FR 56 (2) is unwarranted. In order to buttress this submission, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Registrar of High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah reported in 1988 (3) Supreme Court Cases 211 wherein it has been held as follows:-
"21. We may now come to the merits of the case. It has been upheld by both the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court that the impugned orders were not supported by any material. Further, it has been held that no material has been placed before the High Court to show that the impugned orders have been passed in public interest. This finding has not been challenged by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the High Court. All that has been submitted by him is that the High Court was not justified in considering the adequacy or otherwise of the materials in support of the orders of compulsory retirement. There can be no doubt that when the High Court takes the view that an order of compulsory retirement should be made against a member of the subordinate judicial service, the adequacy or sufficiency of such materials cannot be questioned,
unless the materials are absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. But, in the instant case, there is no question of adequacy or sufficiency of the materials in support of the impugned orders of compulsory retirement. According to the High Court, no material has been placed in justification of the impugned orders of compulsory retirement of the respondents.
"28. ......It is now settled that the object of compulsory retirement from service is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and honesty and to keep the judicial service unpolluted. Keeping this object in view, the contention of the appellant has to be appreciated on the basis of the settled law on the subject of compulsory retirement.
the administrative committee is based. In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively taken into consideration the service record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACRs. There appears to be some discrepancy. We say so for the reason that the appellant has produced the copies of the ACRs which were obtained by him from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a comparision of these two would positively indicate that the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents of the ACRs.
"12. During the pendency of the matter, on two earlier occasions, this Court passed two orders dated 01.12.2016 (set out in para 8 to 10, above) and 08.12.2016 (set out in paras 1 to 7, above). The substance of the said orders is that the appellant submitted before this Court that there are serious allegations of misconduct against the first respondent, therefore, the continuation of the respondent's service will not be in the larger public interest and the judiciary. In the context of the submissions made by the appellant, this Court by the abovementioned orders called upon the appellant to file an affidavit in support of the statements made at the Bar. Such affidavit along with huge volume of the material in support of the affidavit is filed.
"8. This takes us to the meat of the matter viz., whether the appellant was retired because and only because it was necessary in the public interest so to do. It is an affirmative action, not a negative disposition, a positive conclusion, not a neutral attitude. It is a terminal step to justify which the onus is on the administration, not a matter where the victim must make out the contrary. Security of tenure is the condition of efficiency of service. The administration, to be competent, must have servants who are not plagued by uncertainty about tomorrow. At the age of 50 when you have family responsibility and sombre problems of one's own life evening, your experience, accomplishments and fullness of fitness become an asset to the administration and if only if you are not harried or worried by "what will happen to me and my family" "where will I go if cashiered?" How will I survive when I am too old to be newly employed and too young to be superannuated? These considerations become all the more important in departments where functional independence, fearless scrutiny and freedom to expose evil or error in high places is the task. And the Ombudsmanic tasks of the office of audit vested in the C & AG and the entire army of monitors and minions under him are too strategic for the nation's financial health and discipline that immunity from subtle threats and oblique overawing is very much in public interest. So it is that we must emphatically state that under the guise of "public interest" if unlimited discretion is
regarded acceptable for making an order of premature retirement, it will be the surest menace to public interest and must fail for unreasonableness, arbitrariness and disguised dismissal. To constitutionalise the rule, we must so read it as to free it from the potential for the mischiefs we have just projected. The exercise of power must be bona fide and promote public interest. There is no demonstrable ground to infer mala fides here and the only infirmity alleged which deserves serious notice is as to whether the order has been made in public interest. When an order is challenged and its validity depends on its being supported by public interest, the State must disclose the material so that the court may be satisfied that the order is not bad for want of any material whatever which, to a reasonable man reasonably instructed in the law, is sufficient to sustain the grounds of 'public interest' justifying forced retirement of the public servant. Judges cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Administrator but they are not absolved from the minimal review well settled in administrative law and founded on constitutional obligations. The limitations on judicial power in this area are well known and we are confined to an examination of the material merely to see whether a rational mind may conceivably be satisfied that the compulsory retirement of the officer concerned is necessary in public interest. 16. One wonders how an officer whose continuous service for 14 years crossing the efficiency bar and reaching the maximum salary in the scale and with no adverse entries at least for five years immediately before the compulsory retirement, could be cashiered on the score that long years ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors had allowed him to cross the efficiency bar without qualms. A short cut may often be a wrong cut. The order of compulsory retirement fails because vital material, relevant to the decision, has been ignored and obsolete material, less relevant to the decision, has influenced the decision. Any order which materially suffers from the blemish of overlooking or ignoring, wilfully or otherwise, vital facts bearing on the decision is bad in law. Likewise, any action which irrationally digs up obsolete circumstances and obsessively reaches a decision based thereon, cannot be sustained. Legality depends on regard or the totality of material facts viewed in a holistic
perspective. For these reasons, the order challenged is obviously bad and we quash it. It is, however, open to the A.G. to take a fresh decision based on legal material and guided by principles. The appellant has, by now, reached the age of superannuation in the normal course. The result is that the consequence of any fresh order may only be financial. It is for the A.G. to consider whether in the circumstances a fresh evaluation for the purpose of compulsory retirement is called for. We merely allow the appeal, quash the order of compulsory retirement and leave the law to take its course. The appellant will be entitled to costs which we quantify at Rs.2,000.
respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another) reported in (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 117 wherein in para No.4, it has been held as follows:-
"4. This contention is required to be appreciated on the basis of settled law on the subject of compulsory retirement. In Baikuntha Nath Das vs. Chief District Medical Officer (1992) 2 SCC 299, this Court considered Fundamental Rule 56 (j) and the rule corresponding to it and observed that the object and purposes for exercise of these powers are well settled in Union of India vs. Col.J.N. Sinha (1970) 2 SCC 458 and other decisions referred to by the court and held thus: (SCC pp.315-16 para 34):-
"34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour
(ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsorily retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such
remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference"
petitioner in service beyond 50 years and it was a typographical mistake. The fact remains that the Administrative committee, though resolved to permit the petitioner in continue in service has clearly stated that such a decision is subject to the approval to be accorded by the Full Court. When the Full Court resolved not to extend the service beyond 50 years, the petitioner cannot seek a judicial review over such a decision by citing the typographical error which crept in the order passed in G.O. (2D) No. 305, Home (Court-I) Department dated 04.10.2017. The learned counsel for the second respondent therefore submitted that judicial review in a case of this nature is not warranted by this Court. To buttress this submission, the learned counsel for the second respondent relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of R.R. Parekh vs. High Court of Gujarat and another reported in (2016) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1 wherein in para No. 15 and 16, it has been held as follows:"15. The first submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant is that there was no warrant for the Full Court to require a reconsideration of the decision initially taken by the Disciplinary Committee on 27.10.2004. The submission is that once the Disciplinary Committee concluded that the appellant should be exonerated by accepting the report of the enquiry officer, the Full Court in the Chamber meeting had no jurisdiction to revisit that decision. 16. The submission suffers from a fundamental fallacy. Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises control over the District Judiciary. The exercise of disciplinary control is a manifestation of that power. Exercise of disciplinary control over the District Judiciary is vested in the High Court in pursuance of the provisions of Article 235. The High Court, in order to streamline the process governing the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction may make - as High Courts in fact do make - procedural provisions regulating its exercise. The High Court of Gujarat in a meeting of a Full Court held on 02.03.2004 resolved that matters listed in Annexure 'A' to the resolution should be dealt with and decided by the High Court as a whole. Action to be taken against judicial officers in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction was one of those matters. However, having regard to the multitude of administrative matters over which the Full Court exercise jurisdiction, the High Court assigns and distributes its administrative functions to constituent committees. This is imperative for the efficient
exercise of the control of the High Court over the District Judiciary under Article 235. Distribution of work to a committee of the High Court does not efface the jurisdiction that vests in the High Court. By a resolution that was passed in a Chamber meeting of the High Court held on 26.12.1998, a detailed procedure was enunciated for the conduct of disciplinary inquiries against judicial officers of the District Judiciary. The procedure envisages that after an enquiry officer submits a report, the report together with underlying material on the record would be examined by a Disciplinary Committee consisting of two Judges. The Disciplinary Committee would submit its provisional conclusions in a report which would be laid before the High Court and this would become a decision of the Court after a stipulated period. The second stage for the Disciplinary Committee to prepare and submit its report would be after issuing a notice to show cause to the officer and granting him a personal hearing after which the Disciplinary Committee would prepare a report containing its reasoned conclusion regarding the punishment. Once again the report would be tabled before the High Court and would become a decision of the Court after passage of a stipulated period. The recommendation which is submitted by the Disciplinary Committee on whether or not to accept the report of an enquiry officer is not binding on the High Court. The Full Court has an obligation to apply its mind to a report which has been submitted by the Disciplinary Committee and to determine whether it should or should not be accepted. Hence, there is no merit in the submission that the Full Court was bound by the decision of its Disciplinary Committee."
the petitioner cannot turn around and assail the order of compulsory retirement passed against him. The learned counsel for the second respondent therefore prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
them much to their chagrin. The enquiry proceedings were defended by the petitioner by stating that he had passed the award fixing the compensation on the basis of material evidence available in each case in the light of the parameters laid down by this Court as well as the Supreme Court. However, the enquiry officer, upon scanning the oral and documentary evidence made available, concluded that the petitioner is guilty of dereliction of duty. The documentary evidence produced before the enquiry officer includes the cases in which the petitioner has passed exorbitant award than the one made in the claim petition. Ultimately, accepting the report of the enquiry officer, the petitioner was imposed with the punishment of withholding of increments for a period of two years with cumulative effect. Admittedly, such an order of punishment dated 01.08.2016 has not been challenged by the petitioner and it had reached a finality.
material. In this context, reference can be made to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar vs. Udaysingh and others) reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2286 wherein it was held as follows:-
"10. ......The only question is; whether the Tribunal was right in its conclusion to appreciate the evidence and to reach its own finding that the charge has not been proved. The Tribunal is not a Court of appeal. The power of judicial review of the High Court under Article 226 of The Constitution of India was taken away by the power under Article 323-A and invested the same in the Tribunal by Central Administrative Act. It is settled law that the Tribunal has only power of judicial review of the administrative action of the appellant on complaints relating to service conditions of employees. It is the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge has been proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application for the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal when the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence. Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence....
the High Court is based on no evidence at all. The necessary conclusion is that the misconduct alleged against the respondent stands proved. The question then is; what would be the nature of punishment to be imposed in the circumstances? Since the respondent is a judicial officer and the maintenance of discipline in the judicial service is a paramount matter and since the acceptability of the judgment depends upon the credibility of the conduct, honesty, integrity and character of the officer and since the confidence of the litigant public gets affected or shaken by the lack of integrity and character of the judicial officer, we think that the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service is well justified. It does not warrant interference.
integrity in discharge of his duties, we can only approve the decision taken by the respondents to compulsorily retire the petitioner from service. In this context, we are fortified by a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Union of India and others vs. P. Gunasekaran) reported in (2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 610 wherein in para No.20, it was held as follows:-
"20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of The Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the Court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford Dictionary is 'moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreprochability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc., In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."
Sd/Assistant Registrar(CS-IV)
//True copy//
Sub Assistant Registrar
rsh
To
+1cc to Mr.K.H. Ravikumar, Advocate SR.No.85659
WP No. 5558 of 2018
PM(CO)
GMY(06/11/2019)
2 issues framed by the court
Was the judicial officer's compulsory retirement unsupported by relevant service material or based on an incorrect agenda before the Full Court?
Could the compulsory retirement be interfered with under Article 226 as stigmatic or disproportionate?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Registrar of High Court of Madras vs. R. RajiahReferred¶29
1988 (3) Supreme Court Cases 211
Ram Ekbal Sharma vs. State of Bihar and anotherReferred¶34
1990 (3) Supreme Court Cases 504
High Court of Judiciature at Patna vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava and othersReferred¶40
(2017 (5) Supreme Court Cases 138
Baldev Raj Chadha vs. Union of India and othersReferred¶44
(1980 (4) Supreme Court Cases 321
Nawal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and anotherReferred¶53
(2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 117
R.R. Parekh vs. High Court of Gujarat and anotherReferred¶67
(2016) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1
High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar vs. Udaysingh and othersRelied on¶83
AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2286 · Who else cites this
Union of India and others vs. P. GunasekaranApplied¶91
(2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 610
2 provisions across 2 enactments
R. Navamurthy
The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home (Courts-I) Department
The Registrar General, High Court of Madras
R.SUBBIAH
C.SARAVANAN
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
