A PIL sought implementation of Supreme Court police-reform directions in Tamil Nadu. The High Court declined parallel implementation proceedings while Supreme Court monitoring continued. It rejected the allegation of perjury against the first respondent and dismissed the petition with costs payable to the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice Fund.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 04.04.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR and THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
W.P.No.2342 of 2019
Y.Akbar Ahmed .. Petitioner Vs. 1. The Secretary Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Secretariat,Chennai-600009.
Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the 1st Respondent herein to Comply with all the directions, issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India and Ors. dated 22 September, 2006 in W.P.(Civil) No.310 of 1996 and to report its Compliance within a stipulated time.
For Petitioner : Mr.Y.Akbar Ahmed
For Respondents: Mr.E.Manoharan Additional Government Pleader
O R D E R
(Order of the Court was made by SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.)
Mr.Y.Akbar Ahmed, party-in-person, has filed the instant public interest litigation, for a Writ of Mandamus, directing the Secretary, Government of Tamil Nadu, Home Department, Chennai, 1st Respondent herein, to Comply with all the directions, issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India and Ors. dated 22 September, 2006 in W.P.(Civil) No.310 of 1996 and to report compliance within a stipulated time. Directions issued in the above decision, are extracted hereunder:
" we have perused the various reports. In discharge of our constitutional duties and obligations having regard to the aforenoted position, we issue the following directions to the Central Government, State Governments and Union Territories for compliance till framing of the appropriate legislations : State Security Commission (1) The State Governments are directed to constitute a State Security Commission in every State to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country. This watchdog body shall be headed by the Chief Minister or Home Minister as Chairman and have the DGP of the State as its ex-officio Secretary. The other members of the Commission shall be chosen in such a manner that it is able to function independent of Government control. For this purpose, the State may choose any of the models recommended by the National Human Rights Commission, the Ribeiro Committee or the Sorabjee Committee, which are as under:
NHRC Ribeiro Committee Sorabjee Committee
The recommendations of this Commission shall be binding on the State Government:
The functions of the State Security Commission would include laying down the broad policies and giving directions for the performance of the preventive tasks and service oriented functions of the police, evaluation of the performance of the State police and preparing a report thereon for being placed before the State legislature. Selection and Minimum Tenure of DGP:
(2) The Director General of Police of the State shall be selected by the State Government from amongst the three senior-most officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission on the basis of their length of service, very good record and range of experience for heading the police force. And, once he has been selected for the job, he should have a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective of his date of superannuation. The DGP may, however, be relieved of his responsibilities by the State Government acting in consultation with the State Security Commission consequent upon any action taken against him under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or following his conviction in a court of law in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption, or if he is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his duties.
Minimum Tenure of I.G. of Police & other officers:
(3) Police Officers on operational duties in the field like the Inspector General of Police in-charge Zone, Deputy Inspector General of Police in-charge Range, Superintendent of Police in-charge district and Station House Officer in-charge of a Police Station shall also have a prescribed minimum tenure of two years unless it is found necessary to remove them prematurely following disciplinary proceedings against them or their conviction in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption or if the incumbent is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his responsibilities. This would be subject to promotion and retirement of the officer.
Separation of Investigation:
(4) The investigating police shall be separated from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people. It must, however, be ensured that there is full coordination between the two wings. The separation, to start with, may be effected in towns/urban areas which have a population of ten lakhs or more, and gradually extended to smaller towns/urban areas also.
Police Establishment Board:
(5) There shall be a Police Establishment Board in each State which shall decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Establishment Board shall be a departmental body comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department. The State Government may interfere with decision of the Board in exceptional cases only after recording its reasons for doing so. The Board shall also be authorized to make appropriate recommendations to the State Government regarding the posting and transfers of officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police, and the Government is expected to give due weight to these recommendations and shall normally accept it. It shall also function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding their promotion/transfer/disciplinary proceedings or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders and generally reviewing the functioning of the police in the State.
Police Complaints Authority:
(6) There shall be a Police Complaints Authority at the district level to look into complaints against police officers of and up to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Similarly, there should be another Police Complaints Authority at the State level to look into complaints against officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above. The district level Authority may be headed by a retired District Judge while the State level Authority may be headed by a retired Judge of the High Court/Supreme Court. The head of the State level Complaints Authority shall be chosen by the State Government out of a panel of names proposed by the Chief Justice; the head of the district level Complaints Authority may also be chosen out of a panel of names proposed by the Chief Justice
or a Judge of the High Court nominated by him. These Authorities may be assisted by three to five members depending upon the volume of complaints in different States/districts, and they shall be selected by the State Government from a panel prepared by the State Human Rights Commission/Lok Ayukta/State Public Service Commission. The panel may include members from amongst retired civil servants, police officers or officers from any other department, or from the civil society. They would work whole time for the Authority and would have to be suitably remunerated for the services rendered by them. The Authority may also need the services of regular staff to conduct field inquiries. For this purpose, they may utilize the services of retired investigators from the CID, Intelligence, Vigilance or any other organization. The State level Complaints Authority would take cognizance of only allegations of serious misconduct by the police personnel, which would include incidents involving death, grievous hurt or rape in police custody. The district level Complaints Authority would, apart from above cases, may also inquire into allegations of extortion, land/house grabbing or any incident involving serious abuse of authority. The recommendations of the Complaints Authority, both at the district and State levels, for any action, departmental or criminal, against a delinquent police officer shall be binding on the concerned authority.
National Security Commission:
(7) The Central Government shall also set up a National Security Commission at the Union level to prepare a panel for being placed before the appropriate Appointing Authority, for selection and placement of Chiefs of the Central Police Organisations (CPO), who should also be given a minimum tenure of two years. The Commission would also review from time to time measures to upgrade the effectiveness of these forces, improve the service conditions of its personnel, ensure that there is proper coordination between them and that the forces are generally utilized for the purposes they were raised and make recommendations in that behalf. The National Security Commission could be headed by the Union Home Minister and comprise heads of the CPOs and a couple of security experts as members with the Union Home Secretary as its Secretary.
The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the Central Government, State Governments or Union Territories, as the case may be, on or before 31st
December, 2006 so that the bodies afore-noted became operational on the onset of the new year. The Cabinet Secretary, Government of India and the Chief Secretaries of State Governments/Union Territories are directed to file affidavits of compliance by 3rd January, 2007."
2. Party-in-person has contended that on 24.09.2018, he sent representations to the Under Secretary /Public Information officer Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Chennai600009 and the Public Information Officer/Under Secretary to Government, Public (Miscellaneous) Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Chennai-600009, respondents 2 and 3 herein, under RTI Act 2005, seeking certain information, as to whether, Government of Tamil Nadu, have obeyed and followed all the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India And Ors, on 22 September 2006 in Writ Petition (civil) No.310 of 1996, and requested to provide him with detailed informatio n. The said representation was forwarded by the Under Secretary /Public Information Officer, Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Secretariat, Chennai-600009, 2nd Respondent herein, to the Public Information Officer/Under Secretary to Government, Public (Miscellaneous) Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Chennai-600009, 3rd Respondent herein, who forwarded the same to the Inspector General of Police (Establishments), Office of the Director General of Police, Mylapore, Chennai-600004, 4th Respondent herein. But he has not received any information from the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu, 1st Respondent herein, complying with the aforesaid directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He further submitted that under Article 141, 142,and 144 of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, 1st respondent herein, to obey, follow and act, as per the directions/orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Hence, he has filed the present writ petition, for the relief, as stated supra.
"The petitioner/party-in-person, who claims to be a Public Interest Litigant, would submit that in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 22.09.2006 made in Writ Petition (Civil) No.310 of 1996 [Prakash Singh & Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors.] reported in (2006) 8 SCC 1 = (2006) 3 SCC (Crl.) 417, there must be a separate wing for Investigation and Law and Order and that apart, the State Security Commission is also yet to be constituted and therefore, came forward to file this writ petition for implementation of the said judgment in letter and spirit with a further direction to file compliance report.
Call on 14.03.2019. The Principal Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Fort St.George, Chennai 600 009, shall file a comprehensive counter affidavit with supporting documents, if any, as to the compliance of Prakash Singh's case (cited supra) as well as the Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013."
September, 2013. The Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013 has been enacted, in compliance with the directions, with the following provisions,
(a) State Security Commission
(b) Selection and minimum tenure of Director General of Police.
(c) Minimum tenure of Inspector General of Police and other officers.
(d) Separation of investigation.
(e) Police Establishment Board.
(f) Police Complaints Authority.
to Government, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department, Chennai
600 009, in W.P.(Civil) No.310 of 1996, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
"I am the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 and as such I am well acquainted with the facts of the case from the records available. I have read the Written Submission filed by the petitioner in W.P. (Civil) No.310 of 1996. As the subject matter dealt with in this Writ Petition relates to Home department, I have been authorized to file this Reply affidavit and hence I am filing this Reply affidavit on the implementation of the directions contained in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India issued on 22nd September, 2006 in Prakash Singh and Others Versus Union of India and Others reported in [(2006) 8 SCC].
(a) State Security Commission.
(b) Selection and minimum tenure of Director General of Police.
(c) Minimum tenure of Inspector General of Police and other officers.
(d) Separation of investigation.
(e) Police Establishment Board.
(f) Police Complaints Authority.
the petitioner, the specific remarks are given hereunder:-
| Sl.N o. |
Provision/Compli ed in Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013 |
Comments made in the Affidavit of the petitioner |
Specific Remarks of the respondent |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) | State Security Commission :- Incorporated in |
1. Composition does not follow any of three |
The State Security Commission has been constituted in the |
| section 5 to 7 of the Tamil |
models prescribed by Court. |
Act, taking into consideration the |
|
| Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013. |
Sorabjee Committee recommendation, as a model. For the 5 independent Members recommended in Sorabjee Committee, Chairpersons of Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu State Women's Commission, Tamil Nadu State Minorities Commission are included as Members. |
||
| 2. SCC has Chairpersons of Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, State Human Rights |
The said 5 members, included in the State Security Commission are Chairpersons of the concerned Constitutional / |
||
| Commission, State Women Commission, State minorities Commission as members. They are all ex-officio members are Government nominees and therefore cannot be considered ndependent |
Statutory Bodies of the state Of Tamil Nadu and they will be more efficient rather than independent members. Hence, it is premature to assume that these Members cannot be considered independent. |
Sl.N Provision/Compli Comments made in Specific Remarks of
o. ed in Tamil Nadu the Affidavit of the respondent
Police (Reforms) the petitioner
Act, 2013
3. Not clear that As per sub-section (I)
recommendations of and (2) of section 7
the Commission of the Act, the
will be binding. Commission shall, at
the end of every year,
submit to the
Government the annual
report on its work
during the preceding
year and on the
evaluation of
performance of the
Police Force which
shall include
recommendations for
improvement and the
Government shall lay
the annual report on
the table of the
Legislative Assembly.
Further process on the
recommendation is
within the prerogative
of the Legislative
Assembly.
(b) Selection, 1. Grounds for The observation that
appointment and premature removal this proviso could be
tenure of include "Other misused is not
Director General Administrative acceptable and it is
of Police:- grounds to be presumptive in nature.
Incorporated in recorded in
section 3 of the writing. This
Tamil Nadu Poice could be misused.
(Reforms) Act,
2013
Sl.N Provision/Compli Comments made in Specific Remarks of
o. ed in Tamil Nadu the Affidavit of the respondent
Police (Reforms) the petitioner
Act, 2013
2. Court had AS per the Act, five
wanted Union officers are to be
Public Service considered for
Commission to appointment as
prepare panel of Director General of
five officers. Police. However the
Intention appears Director General of
to be to give more Police will be
latitude to CM. appointed from the
list of officer short
listed by the Union
Public Service
Commission only.
(c) Minimum tenure 1. Act is silent The Director Genera!
of Inspector about tenure of Of Police has sent
General of DIG i/c Range of proposal for an
Police and other IGP i/c Zone. amendment in this
officers:- regard. The above said
Incorporated in proposal is under
section 4 of the consideration of the
Tamil Nadu Government.
Police (Reforms)
Act, 2013.
2. Officers may be Necessary provision is
transferred on already in Section 4
administrative (2)(i) of the Act, in
grounds to be this regard.
recorded in
writing.
Sl.N Provision/Compli Comments made in Specific Remarks of
o. ed in Tamil Nadu the Affidavit of the respondent
Police (Reforms) the petitioner
Act, 2013
(d) Separation of No comments have The Police Stations
Law and Order been made were separated into
and Criminal two different wings
Investigation i.e. Law & Order and
wings:- Investigation as
Incorporated in mentioned in G.O(Ms)
section 9 of the No.640, Home (Pol.XIV)
Tamil Nadu Department, dated
Police (Reforms) 26.04.2007.
Act, 2013. Subsequently, in G.O
(Ms)No.59, Home
(Pol.XIV) Department,
dated 20.01.2011 the
Police Stations are
separated as law and
Order and
Investigation Wing in
the ratio of 75:25 and
67:33 staffing pattern
for Chennai City and
other Cities I
Districts
respectively.
(e) Police 1. DGP alone (and The Act clearly
Establishment not PEB) will send provides that the
Board:- proposals for transfer and posting
Incorporated in Officers of and of the officers in the
section 8 of the above the rank of rank of Superintendent
Tamil Nadu IGP. of Police and above up
Police (Reforms) to the rank of
Act, 2013. Inspector General of
Police are done by
Police Establishment
Board. The promotion,
transfer and posting
of officers above the
rank of Inspector
General of Police
(i.e) for Additional
Director General of
Police, the Director
General of Police
shall send proposals
to Government.
Sl.N Provision/Compli Comments made in Specific Remarks of
o. ed in Tamil Nadu the Affidavit of the respondent
Police (Reforms) the petitioner
Act, 2013
Not clear that Normally the
recommendations of recommendation of
Police Police Establishment
Establishment Board accepted by the
Board will be Government without any
given "due weight" deviation. Hence, it
by the Government, is considered that
which should there is no need for
normally accept incorporating the same
them. in the Act.
3. Composition and With regard to
function of Police composition and
Establishment functions of Police
Committees of Establishment
Zonal, Range, City Committee at Zonal,
and District Range, City and
Levels has not District level,
been clarified. framing of Tamil Nadu
Police (Reforms) Rules
is under consideration
of the Government.
4. Board has not The Director General
been given power Of Police has sent
to generally proposal for an
review the amendment in this
functioning of regard. The above said
police in this proposal is under
State. consideration of the
Government.
| Sl.N | Provision/Compli | Comments made in | Specific Remarks of |
|---|---|---|---|
| o. | ed in Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013 |
the Affidavit of the petitioner |
the respondent |
| (f) | Police | Authorities are |
The instances such as |
| Complaints | headed by |
custodial death, |
|
| Authority:- | bureaucrats at |
custodial | |
| Incorporated in | both levels by | disappearance, | |
| Sections 10 to | Home Secretary at | custodial rape are | |
| 19 of the Tamil | State Leval and | investigated by |
|
| Nadu Police |
Collector/ DM |
Judicial Magistrate as | |
| (Reforms) Act, | district level. |
per section 176 of |
|
| 2013 | Direction was that | Cr.PC, 1973. The |
|
| they should be headed by retired |
recommendation of the Judicial authorities |
||
| judges. | are considered and | ||
| appropriate orders |
|||
| passed by the Government. Moreover, instances of Serious |
|||
| misconduct and |
|||
| violation of Human | |||
| Rights are closely | |||
| monitored by the |
|||
| National Human Rights |
|||
| Commission / Sate |
|||
| Human Rights |
|||
| Commission and actions | |||
| are taken on their | |||
| recommendations then | |||
| and there. Hence, in | |||
| the present |
|||
| circumstances, the |
|||
| State Police |
|||
| Complaints Authority, | |||
| District Police |
|||
| Complaints Authority | |||
and Police Complaints Division which have |
|||
| been constituted in | |||
| the Act is considered | |||
| adequate to the State | |||
| of Tamil Nadu to | |||
| enquire in to the | |||
| complaints against Police. |
Sl.N Provision/Compli Comments made in Specific Remarks of
o. ed in Tamil Nadu the Affidavit of the respondent
Police (Reforms) the petitioner
Act, 2013
2. Authorities Section 13 (2) and 16
will make (b) of the act dearly
"recommendations"t provide that the State
o State Government Police Complaints
for appropriate Authority and District
action. Direction Police Complaints
was that these Authority shall submit
should be binding its recommendations to
on State the Government for
Government. appropriate action.
Accordingly, the
Government will take-
appropriate action
based on the
recombination.
5. With regard to the averment made by the
petitioner to bring the 'public order' and 'police'
from the 'State List' to the 'Concurrent List', it is
respectfully submitted that public order is always a
local issue and the crime of local nature should be
addressed only by local police of the State. As
regards inter-state crimes, the present arrangement is
working well and there is always a coherent,
collaborative and congenial relationship between
inter-state police forces and every inter-state crime,
is being solved in the shortest time with the support
of other state police forces. Changing of 'public
order' and 'police' from State List to Concurrent List
is fraught with the danger of altering the federal
structure to a great extent and it is against the
Constitution. In view of the above, it is considered
that there is no necessity at present to transfer the
subjects of “public order" and "police” from the State
List to Concurrent list."
All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court."
"1. Short title and commencement: (1) This Act
may be called the Tamil Nadu Police (Reforms) Act, 2013.
(2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 11th day of September 2013.
(a) “Board” means the Police Establishment Board constituted under section 8;
(b) “Commission” means the State Security Commission established under section 5;
(c) “Government” means the State Government;
(d) “Police Officer” means any member of the Tamil Nadu Police and includes an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer working in connection with the affairs of the State and the Tamil Nadu Police;
(e) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act;
(f) “subordinate ranks” means all ranks below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or its equivalent;
(g) “supervisory ranks” means ranks of Deputy Superintendent of Police or its equivalent and above;
(2) Words and expressions used in this Act, but not defined specifically shall have the same meaning as provided in the Police Act, 1861, the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859, the Chennai City Police Act, 1888, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Indian Penal Code.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Service Rules, the Director General of Police appointed under sub-section (1) shall hold the post for a minimum period of two years, irrespective of the date of his/her superannuation.
(3) The Director General of Police may be relieved of his/her responsibilities under the
following circumstances, namely:— (a) on conviction by a court of law in a criminal case or a case of corruption;
(b) on punishment of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service or of reduction to a lower post awarded under the provisions of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or any other relevant rule;
(c) on incapacitation by physical or mental illness or otherwise becoming unable to discharge his/her functions;
(d) on appointment to any other post either under the State Government or Central Government, with his/her consent for such posting;
(e) on other administrative grounds to be recorded in writing.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in cases where any Police Officer referred to in sub-section (1) is—
(a) convicted by a court of law in a criminal case or a case of corruption;
(b) involved in a criminal case wherein charges have been framed by a court;
(c) awarded punishment in disciplinary
proceedings;
(d) placed under suspension;
(e) subjected to disciplinary proceedings after charges having been framed;
(f) incapacitated by physical or mental illness or otherwise becoming unable to discharge his/her functions;
(g) promoted to a higher post;
(h) to be relieved to fill up a vacancy caused by promotion, transfer or retirement of other officer;
(i) to be relieved for any other administrative grounds to be recorded in writing.
(2) The Commission shall consist of the following members, namely:— (a) the Minister, in-charge of the port folio of Police, who shall be the Chairperson, ex-officio;
(b) the Leader of the Opposition in the Tamil
Nadu Legislative Assembly;
(c) Chairperson, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, ex-officio; (d) Chairperson, Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, exofficio; (e) Chairperson, State Women’s Commission, exofficio; (f) Chairperson, State Minorities Commission, exofficio; (g) the Chief Secretary, ex-officio; (h) the Secretary in-charge of the Home Department, ex-officio; and (i) the Director General of Police, who shall be the Member-Secretary, ex-officio. 6. Functions of Commission:- The Commission shall perform the following functions, namely:— (a) to frame broad policy guidelines for promoting efficient, effective, responsive and accountable policing, in accordance with the law; (b) to identify performance indicators to evaluate the functioning of the Police Force, which shall include operational efficiency, public satisfaction, victim satisfaction in respect of Police investigation and response, accountability, optimum utilisation of resources and observance of human rights standards;
(c) to review and evaluate organisational performance of the Police Force; and
(d) such other functions that may be entrusted by the Government. 7. Annual Report:- (1) The Commission shall, at the end of every year, submit to the Government the annual report on its work during the preceding year and on the evaluation of performance of the Police Force which shall include recommendations for improvement. (2) The Government shall lay the annual report referred to in sub-section (1) on the table of the Legislative Assembly.
(a) Additional Director General of Police (Administration);
(b) Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order); (c) Additional Director General of Police (Head Quarters); and
(d) Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence).
(2) The Director General of Police shall be the Chairperson and the senior-most Additional Director General of Police shall be the convener of the Board. (3) The functions of the Board shall be as follows:-
(a) The Board shall consider and recommend promotion, transfer and posting of the officers in the rank of Superintendent of Police and above up to the rank of Inspector General of Police. On the recommendations of the Board, the Director General of Police shall send the proposals to the Government for appropriate action. For promotion, transfer and posting of officers above the rank of Inspector General of Police, the Director General of Police shall send the proposals to the Government for appropriate action.
(b) The Board shall function as a forum to deal with the representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above. The Board shall examine such representations and send its recommendations to the Government by the Director General of Police.
(c) The Board shall also make recommendations to the Government for award of Medals.
(4) There shall be a State Police Establishment Committee to consider matters relating to promotion, transfer and postings of officers of and below the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police.
(5) There shall be Zonal, Range, City and District Level Establishment Committees which will be empowered to effect transfers of Police Personnel of subordinate rank within their jurisdiction in accordance with the instructions and guidelines issued by the Government.
(6) The Government shall prescribe the composition, responsibilities, functions and powers of the State, Zonal, Range, City and District Level Establishment Committees.
(7) The recruitment and promotions made under this section shall be in accordance with the service rules governing the respective service, category and class.
ordination between the two wings.
(2) The Investigation Wing shall be responsible for investigation and prosecution of all cases registered in the station, including cases detected by the Law and Order Wing.
(3) The Police Officers of the Investigation Wing may be called Detective Constables, Detective Head Constables and Detective Sub-Inspectors. They shall not be diverted to any bandobust work except with the prior approval of the Zonal Inspector General of Police or Commissioner of Police.
(4) The Investigation Wing shall be provided with adequate staff to cope with the work load. The Board shall lay down norms for staff strength taking into account the volume of cases.
(5) Every Police Station shall have a Missing Person Liaison Officer in the rank of a Detective SubInspector to co-ordinate and follow up the cases of missing persons.
(6) Within the Investigation Wing of each Police Station, at least one officer with aptitude and appropriate training and orientation shall be designated as the ‘Juvenile or Child Welfare Officer’ as required under sub-section (2) of section 63 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. This Officer will handle juveniles or children in co-ordination with other Police Officers. These officers together will be members of the Special Juvenile Police Unit of the District or City to coordinate and to upgrade the Police treatment of juveniles and children.
Provided that in case of death in Police custody, the complaint can be received from the legal heirs or close relatives of the victim:
Provided further that the State Police Complaints Authority shall entertain the complaint, only on prima facie satisfaction about the veracity of the complaint:
Provided also that no anonymous or pseudonymous complaints shall be entertained: Provided also that the State Police Complaints Authority shall not entertain complaints of serious misconduct which are the subject matter of any judicial proceedings or inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 or the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 or the Police Standing Orders.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this Chapter, “serious misconduct” means any act or omission of a Police Officer that leads to or amounts to—
(a) death in Police custody;
(b) rape;
(c) grievous hurt in Police custody.
(2) The State Police Complaints Authority shall submit its recommendations to the Government for appropriate action.
(2) The District Police Complaints Authority shall have as its Chairperson the District Collector/District Magistrate. The Superintendent of Police and the Additional Superintendent of Police shall be the members of the District Police Complaints Authority. In the case of Commissionerates, other than Chennai, the Superintendent of Police of the District and the Deputy Commissioner of the Commissionerate shall be the members. In the case of Commissionerate
of Chennai, the District Collector and the Commissioner of Police shall be the members.
Provided that in the case of death in Police custody, the complaint can be received from the legal heirs or close relatives of the victim:
Provided further that the District Police Complaints Authority shall entertain the complaint, only on prima facie satisfaction about the veracity of the complaint:
Provided also that no anonymous or pseudonymous complaints shall be entertained:
Provided also that the District Police Complaints Authority shall not entertain complaints of serious misconduct or misconduct which are the subject matter of any judicial proceedings or inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, or the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, or the Police Standing Orders.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this clause, the expression ‘serious misconduct’ will have the same meaning assigned in the explanation to section 12 and ‘misconduct’ means extortion, land or house grabbing or any other incident involving serious abuse of authority;
(b) The District Police Complaints Authority shall refer to the State Police Complaints Authority complaints received by it against Police Officers in the ‘supervisory rank’ and such other matters as it may deem fit.
(a) Any complaint of misconduct or serious misconduct received by the District Police Complaints Authority which is not covered by the fourth proviso to section 15 shall be referred to the Police
Complaints Division for enquiry and report, if necessary, after examining the victim or complainant or any other person and relevant documents, and after ascertaining from the concerned disciplinary authority whether any disciplinary proceedings have already been initiated in regard to the same complaint of misconduct.
(b) The District Police Complaints Authority shall submit its recommendations to the Government for appropriate action.
(2) (a) All rules made under this Act shall be published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, and unless they are expressed to come into force on a particular day, shall come into force on the day on which they are so published.
(b) All notifications issued under this Act, shall, unless they are expressed to come into force on
a particular day, come into force on the day on which they are so published.
(3) Every rule made or notification or order issued under this Act, shall, as soon as possible, after it is made or issued, be placed on the table of the Legislative Assembly and if, before the expiry of the session in which it is so placed or the next session, the Legislative Assembly makes any modification in any such rule, notification or order, or the Legislative Assembly decides that the rule, notification or order should not be made or issued, the rule, notification or order shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule, notification or order.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done, any action taken or any direction given under the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done, taken or given under this Act."
implementation of the orders in Prakash Singh's case (cited supra) and in response, the State Government have filed a reply affidavit and when the same is pointed out, propriety demands that the High Court should restrain from issuing directions, on the same subject matter. High Court should not abrogate the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. By undertaking such exercise, High Court should not interfere in the constitutional jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Prayer of the partyin-person, on the strength of Article 144 of the Constitution of India, cannot be granted.
Abhishek Dixit, IPS., Commandant, TSP VIII Battalion, New Delhi-64
The Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, Chennai-04.
C.No.E3/5476/2018 Dated-14.01.2019
Sir,
Sub:- Police-TSP VIII Bn., - New Delhi Filing of counter affidavit in W.P.(Civil)No.310 of 1996 filed by Tr.Prakash Singh and Others Vs Union of India – Acknowledgement-Copy-forwarded reg.
Ref:- Chief Office Fax Message in Rc.No.211177/A & R-1/2014, Dated:11.11.2019.
In response to the Chief Office fax message cited in the reference, the copy of Acknowledgement with seal of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India regarding the filing of reply affidavit on 14.08.2018 to the W.P.(Civil)No.310 of 1996, filed by Tr.Prakash Singh and Others Vs Union of India, received from the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is sent as desired.
2.This is for favour of kind information.
Yours faithfully, Commandant, TSP VIII Bn., New Delhi. POLICE DEPARTMENT From To
Abhishek Dixit, IPS., The Director General of Police, Commandant, Tamil Nadu, TSP VIII Battalion, Chennai-04. New Delhi-64
C.No.E3/5476/2018 Dated-14.01.2019
Sir,
Sub:- Police-TSP VIII Bn., New Delhi - W.P.(Civil)No.310 of 1996 in the file of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India filed by Prakash Singh and others Vs Union of India-Presentstage called for – report – sent-reg.
Ref:-1.Chief Office Memo in Rc.No.211177 / A & R-1/2014, dated 18.09.2018.
2.This Office Fax Message in even no dated:20.09.2018.
3.This Office letter in even no dated 24.09.2018.
4.Chief Office Fax Message in RC.No.211177/A & R-1/2014, dated:10.01.2019.
5.This Office letter in even no dated 10.01.2019.
Kind attention is invited to the references cited.
2.As instructed in Chief Office fax message in the references 4th cited, a copy of the Counter Affidavit obtained from Hon'ble Supreme Court of India is connection with W.P. (Civil)No.310 of 1996, is sent herewith for favour of kind perusal as desired. The above W.P. Has been posted for hearing of applications filed by the status of West Bengal and Kerala on 15.01.2019.
3.This is for favour of kind information.
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION ©/(CRL).No.-------- of 201-
W.P./T.P/APPEAL NO.---------- OF 201
BETWEEN
U.O.I fors RESPONDENT(S)
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
| Sl.N . |
o Particulars |
copies Court Fee |
|---|---|---|
| 1. |
Limitation Report |
|
| 2. | Synopsis of List of Dates Impugned order |
|
| 3. |
T.P/W.P/S.L.P/C.A/Contempt |
|
| 4. |
Petition/Review Petition |
|
| 5. | with ... | |
| 6. | Annexure(s)... to .... Application for Condonation |
|
| 7. | of Del SLP/Refiling of SLP Application for Exemption |
|
| form till certified Copy of | ||
| 8. | the impugned order. | |
| Application for exemption | ||
| 9. | form till Transaction | |
| Application for interim |
||
| 10. | Stay/Direction/Vacation | |
| 11. | Stay/Bail | |
| Application for recalling of | ||
| 12. | the order | |
| Application for imp |
||
| 13. | leading/intervention | |
| Application for producing | ||
| 14. | additional documents | |
| Application for Substitute | ||
| 15. | on LRs of |
|
| 16. | Petitioner/Respondent | |
| 17. | Application for Restoration | |
| 18. | of SLP with Affidavit. | |
| 19. | Additional Documents |
|
| Counter/Rejoinder Affidavit. | ||
| 20. | Affidavit of Submission by | |
| R-23 |
||
| Interim Relief |
||
| Consolidated Court |
||
| 21. | Fees/Spare Copies of |
|
| SLP/Appeal | ||
| 22. |
Vakalat name with memo of |
|
| 23. |
Appearance for |
|
| 24. |
Respondent/Petitioner | |
| 25. | ||
| Caveat on behalf of the | ||
| respondent/Caveator with Vakalatnama |
||
| Proof of Service | ||
| Proof of Dasti Service | ||
| Proof of surrender | ||
| copy of Logement for SLP | ||
| paper Book |
Filed on. 14.08.2018
M.YOGESH KANNA
Advocate of the petitioner(s) Appellant(s) Respondent(s) 104, Lawyers Chambers, Supreme Court of India, New Delhi-110 001 Mob.9868429142.
V.Saravana Kumar L.C.4860 MO.9910339467
affidavit, dated 14/8/2018, was not brought to the notice of this Court and therefore, there was sufficient cause, for the petitioner to infer that there is an act of perjury by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government, Home, Prohibition and Department, Chennai.
(i) In S.P.Anand v. H.D.Deve Gowda, reported in 1996 (6) SCC 734, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 18, held as follows: "It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court's jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the court that he does not rush to court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-baked information without proper research or by persons
who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third party rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings is in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filling a series of petitions refusing to accept the Court's earlier decisions as concluding the point. We say this because when we drew the attention of the petitioner to earlier decisions of this Court, he brushed them aside, without so much as showing willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as having become stale and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration. Except for saying that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expresssion, uniform civil code, etc., we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself."
(ii) In Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India and Others, reported in 2000 (10) SCC – 664, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
“232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the Court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The Court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the Court's jurisdiction.
enormous power, the Court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The Courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The Courts must therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the Court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the Court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the Court itself is not above the law. 234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the Courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the Court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation, the Court should not refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the Court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.”
The above mentioned observations have been quoted with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in BALCO EMPLOYEES' UNION (REGD) Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS {2002 (2) SCC – 333}.
(iii) In Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India reported in 2002 (2) SCC 333, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that,
"Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. "litigation in the interest of the public." ........
arise in this present case.
(iv) In Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and another vs. C.K.Rajan and others, reported in 2003 (7) SCC 546, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
(i) The Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition filed by any interested person in the welfare of the people who is in a disadvantaged position and, thus, not in a position to knock the doors of the Court.
The Court is constitutionally bound to protect the fundamental rights of such disadvantaged people so as to direct the State to fulfil its constitutional promises. (See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of
India [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 262] , Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 1638 : (1964) 1 SCR 561] and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] .)
(ii) Issues of public importance, enforcement of fundamental rights of a large number of the public vis-à-vis the constitutional duties and functions of the State, if raised, the Court treats a letter or a telegram as a public interest litigation upon relaxing procedural laws as also the law relating to pleadings. (See Charles Sobraj v. Supdt., Central Jail [(1978) 4 SCC 104 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 542] and Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] .)
(iii) Whenever injustice is meted out to a large number of people, the Court will not hesitate in stepping in. Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as well as theInternational Conventions on Human Rights provide for reasonable and fair trial.
In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani [(1979) 4 SCC 167 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 934 : AIR 1979 SC 468] it was held: (SCC p. 169, para 2)
“2. Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner's grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances.”
(See also Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal [(2003) 6 SCC 230 : (2003) 5 Scale 138] .)
(iv) The common rule of locus standi is relaxed so as to enable the Court to look into the grievances complained on behalf of the poor, the depraved (sic), the illiterate and the disabled who cannot vindicate the legal wrong or legal injury caused to them for any violation of any constitutional or legal right. [See Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568 : AIR 1981 SC 344] , S.P. Gupta [1981 Supp SCC 87] , People's Union for Democratic Rights [(1982) 2 SCC 494 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 262] , D.C. Wadhwa (Dr) v. State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 378] and BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [(2002) 2 SCC 333] .]
(v) When the Court is prima facie satisfied about variation of any constitutional right of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, it may not allow the State or the Government from raising the question as to the maintainability of the petition. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] .)
(vi) Although procedural laws apply to PIL cases but the question as to whether the principles of res judicata or principles analogous thereto would apply depends on the nature of the petition as also facts and circumstances of the case. [See Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC 504] and Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) [(1986) 1 SCC 100]
(vii) The dispute between two warring groups purely in the realm of private law would not be allowed to be agitated as a public interest litigation. (See Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India [1989 Supp (1) SCC 251] .)
(viii) However, in an appropriate case, although the petitioner might have moved a court in his private interest and for redressal of personal grievances, the Court in furtherance of the public interest may treat it necessary to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice. (See Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr Mahesh Madhav Gosavi [(1987) 1 SCC 227] .)
(ix) The Court in special situations may appoint a Commission, or other bodies for the purpose of investigating into the allegations and
finding out facts. It may also direct management of a public institution taken over by such Committee. (See Bandhua Mukti Morcha [(1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389 : (1984) 2 SCR 67] , Rakesh Chandra Narayan v. State of Bihar [1989 Supp (1) SCC 644] and A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu [(1999) 2 SCC 718]) In Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. [(1987) 2 SCC 295] this Court held: (SCC pp. 334-35, para 61)
“61. It is only when courts are apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group or a class action on when basic human rights are invaded or when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the courts, especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected. I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self-imposed restraint on public interest litigants.”
In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] this Court opined: (SCC p. 348, para 109) "109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.” The Court will not ordinarily transgress into a policy. It shall also take utmost care not to transgress its jurisdiction while purporting to protect the rights of the people from being violated.
(V) In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., reported in 2004 (3) SCC 349, the Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering few decisions, on the aspect of public interest litigation, observed as follows:
"4. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is
nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant or poke ones into for a probe. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary [1992 (4) SCC 305] and Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. See Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R.Srinivas v. R.M.Premchand (1994 (6) SCC 620).
"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class
of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."
"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."
"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that Courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."
it was observed as follows:
"109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold". 11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus
criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system.
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.Duryodhan Sahu and Ors., v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors., (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so- called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
"But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate
administrative action or to gain a political objective."
"Today public spirited litigants rush to courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name. They must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. They must be above suspicion. (SCC p. 331, para 46)
I will be second to none in extending help when such help is required. But this does not mean that the doors of this Court are always open for anyone to walk in. It is necessary to have some self- imposed restraint on public interest litigants." (SCC p.335, para 61)
that the application of the busybody should be rejected at the threshold in the following terms: (SCC p. 683, para 37)
"It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories : (i) 'person aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold."
"48. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him."
"While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the superior court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights being considered by the court."
"I am prepared to assume, nay, concede, that public activists should also be permitted to espouse the cause of the poor citizens but there must be a limit set to such activity and nothing perhaps should be done which would affect the dignity of the Court and bring down the serviceability of the institution to the people at large. Those who are acquainted with jurisprudence and enjoy social privilege as men educated in law owe an obligation to the community of educating it properly and allowing the judicial process to continue unsoiled."
"Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, are entertained it would amount to abuse of process of the court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 must approach this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is the duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation".
(vi) In Dr.B.Singh vs. Union of India, reported in 2004 (3)
SCC 363, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
(vii) In Vikas Vashishth v. Allahabad High Court reported in 2004 (13) SCC 485, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"At the very outset, we put it to the petitioner that a bare perusal of the petition shows that it is based entirely on newspaper reports and asked him whether before filing the petition he has taken care to verify the facts personally. His answer is in the negative. In the writ petition all the 21 High Courts have been included as respondents and Union of India has also been impleaded as the 22nd respondent. We asked the petitioner what has provoked him to implead all the High Courts as respondents and he
states that it is his apprehension that similar incidents may occur in other High Courts though there is no factual foundation for such appreciation.
(viii) In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2005 (1) SCC 590, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
"12..... The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not be publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique considerations. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives, and try to bargain for a good deal as well as to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs."
(ix) In R & M.Trust Vs. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group reported in 2005 (3) SCC 91, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 23 and 24, observed as follows:
"23. Next question is whether such Public Interest Litigation should at all be entertained & laches thereon. This sacrosanct jurisdiction of Public Interest Litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigant and
not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends.
(x) In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2005 (5) SCC 136, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the scope of a petition styled as a public interest litigation, held as follows:
"5. The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be
allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as publicspirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. 6. ..... 7. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of socalled PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should
do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
(xi) In Rohit Pandey v. Union of India reported in 2005 (13) SCC 702, Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"1. This petition purporting to be in public interest has been filed by a member of the legal fraternity seeking directions against the respondents to hand over the investigation of the case pertaining to recovery of light machine gun, which is said to have been stolen from the army according to reports published in two newspapers, to the Central Bureau of Investigation for fair investigation to ensure that the real culprits who are behind such theft of army arms and ammunition endangering the integrity and sovereignty of the country may be brought to book and action may be taken against them in accordance with law. The only basis for the petitioner coming to this Court
are two newspaper reports dated 25-1-2004, and the other dated 12-2-2004. This petition was immediately filed on 16-2-2004 after the aforesaid second newspaper report appeared. On enquiry from the learned counsel, we have learnt that the petitioner is a young advocate having been in practice for a year or two. The Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh, have been arrayed as party respondents. In the newspaper reports, there is no allegation either against the Union of India or against the Chief Minister.
(xii) In DIVISIONAL MANAGER, ARAVALI GOLF CLUB AND ANOTHER 2008 (1) SCC 683, in paragraphs Nos.17, 19, 20 and 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-
“17. Before parting with this case, we would like to make some observations about the limits of the powers of the judiciary. We are compelled to make these observations because we are repeatedly coming across cases where judges are unjustifiably trying to perform executive or legislative functions. In our opinion this is clearly unconstitutional. In the name of judicial activism judges cannot cross their limits and try to take over functions which belong to another organ of the State.
“82.... I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a Judge ... I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, expect Judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of a public utility operation.”
It is not the function of a Judge to act as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator.”
(xiii) In Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India reported in 2008 (5) SCC 511, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju (as he then was), held as follows:
"59. Unfortunately, the truth is that PILs are being entertained by many courts as a routine and the result is that the dockets of most of the superior courts are flooded with PILs, most of which are frivolous or for which the judiciary has no remedy. As stated in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 2005 SC 540, public interest litigation has nowadays largely become 'publicity interest litigation', 'private interest litigation', or 'politics interest litigation' or the latest trend 'paise income litigation'. Much of P.I.L. is really blackmail.
obstructing the hearing of the genuine and regular cases which have been waiting to be taken up for years together."
In the same judgment, concurring with the view of his Brother Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.K.Sema (as he then was), further added, as follows:
"69. Therefore, whether to entertain the petition in the form of Public Interest Litigation either represented by public-spirited person; or private interest litigation in the guise of public interest litigation; or publicity interest litigation; or political interest litigation is to be examined in the facts and circumstances recited in the petition itself. I am also of the view that if there is a buffer zone unoccupied by the legislature or executive which is detrimental to the public interest, judiciary must occupy the field to subserve public interest. Therefore, each case has to be examined on its own facts."
(xiv) Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, reported in (2009) 7 SCC 561, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
both trial and error are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts.
(xv) In State of Uttranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 402, the Hon'ble Supreme court has held as follows:
(1) The Courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.
(2) Instead of every individual Judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this Court immediately thereafter.
(3) The Courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL.
(4) The Courts should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.
(5) The Courts should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.
(6) The Courts should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest,
gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.
(7) The Courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The Court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation.
(8) The Courts should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.
(xvi) In Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash Rahangdale reported in 2012 (2) SCC 425, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
"57. In the light of the above, we shall first consider whether the High Court committed an error by entertaining the writ petition filed by Subhash Rahangdale as public interest litigation. This Court has, time and again, laid down guiding principles for entertaining petitions filed in public interest. However, for the purpose of deciding the appellants' objection it is not necessary to advert to the plethora of precedents on the subject because in State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402, a two-Judge Bench discussed the development of law relating to public interest litigation and reiterated that before entertaining such petitions, the Court must feel satisfied that the petitioner has genuinely come forward to espouse public cause and his litigious venture is not guided by any ulterior motive or is not a publicity gimmick.
Union of India (2006) 6 SCC 613, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 110, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2008) 1 SCC 407 and observed:
"These are some of the cases where the Supreme Court and the High Courts broadened the scope of public interest litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in governance of the State, there is transparency and no extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except the public interest. These cases regarding probity in governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the courts can be placed in the third phase of public interest litigation." 59. Reference also deserves to be made to the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (1987) 1 SCC 227 in which a new dimension was given to the power of the Superior Courts to make investigation into the issues of public importance even though the petitioner may have moved the Court for vindication of a private interest. In that case the High Court had entertained a writ petition filed by Assistant Medical Officer of K.E.M. Hospital, Bombay questioning the assessment of answer sheets of the Post Graduate Medical Examinations held by the Bombay University in October 1985. He alleged malpractices in the evaluation of the answer sheets of the daughter of the appellant who, at the relevant time, was Chief Minister of the State. The learned Single Judge held that altering and tampering of the grade sheets was done by Dr. Rawal at the behest of the Chief Minister. The Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge with some modification.
moved in his private interest but enquiry into the conduct of the examiners of the Bombay University in one of the highest medical degrees was a matter of public interest. Such state of affairs having been brought to the notice of the Court, it was the duty of the Court to the public that the truth and the validity of the allegations made be inquired into. It was in furtherance of public interest that an enquiry into the state of affairs of public institution becomes necessary and private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation and such an enquiry cannot be avoided if it is necessary and essential for the administration of justice." (emphasis supplied)
(xvii) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishore Samrite v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2013) 2 SCC 398, once again laid down the principles governing obligations of the litigants while approaching the Court and the consequences for abuse of process of law while filing the Public Interest Litigation.
(xviii) In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in a public interest litigation, the Court must ensure that there is an element of genuine public interest is involved.
(xix) In State of Jaipur Shahar Hindu Vikas Samiti vs State of Rajasthan and Others, reported in 2014 (5) SCC 530, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
Managing Committee [(2003) 7 SCC 546] wherein this Court observed: (SCC pp. 574-75 & 578, paras 60, 64 & 76)
“60. It is possible to contend that the Hindus in general and the devotees visiting the temple in particular are interested in proper management of the temple at the hands of the statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self-contained code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of its statutory duties. ***
under the Act governing the field are inadequate. The High Courts and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to carry out its statutory functions in a particular manner. Normally, the courts would ask the State to perform its statutory functions, if necessary within a time-frame and undoubtedly, as and when an order is passed by the State in exercise of its power under the statute, it will examine the correctness or legality thereof by way of judicial review.”
(xx) In D.N.Jeevaraj vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka and Others reported in 2016 2 SCC 653, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
procedural technicalities ought to take a back seat in public interest litigation. This Court held in Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. to this effect as follows:
" The writ petitions before us are not interpartes disputes and have been raised by way of public interest litigation and the controversy before the court is as to whether for social safety and for creating a hazardless environment for the people to live in, mining in the area should be permitted or stopped. We may not be taken to have said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not apply. At the same time it has to be remembered that every technicality in the procedural law is not available as a defence when a matter of grave public importance is for consideration before the court.”
“Mandamus literally means a command. The essence of mandamus in England was that it was a royal command issued by the King’s Bench (now Queen’s Bench) directing performance of a public legal duty.
A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or
neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been granted.”
“The powers of the High Court under Article 226 are not strictly confined to the limits to which proceedings for prerogative writs are subject in English practice. Nevertheless, the well recognised rule that no writ or order in the nature of a mandamus would issue when there is no failure to perform a mandatory duty applies in this country as well. Even in cases of alleged breaches of mandatory duties, the salutary general rule, which is subject to certain exceptions, applied by us, as it is in England, when a writ of mandamus is asked for, could be stated as we find it set out in Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 13, p. 106): “As a general rule the order will not be granted unless the party complained of has known what it was he was required to do, so that he had the means of considering whether or not he should comply, and it must be shown by evidence that there was a distinct demand of that which the party seeking the mandamus desires to enforce, and that that demand was met by a refusal.” In the cases before us there was no such demand or refusal. Thus, no ground whatsoever is shown here for the issue of any writ, order, or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
purview of public interest litigation. Exercise of discretion
issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if the “duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a “right”.
In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion.” 43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. The reasons given by the court for disabling the statutory authority from taking a decision can always be tested and if the reasons are found to be inadequate, the decision of the court to by-pass the statutory authority can always be set aside. If the reasons are cogent, then in an exceptional case, the court may take a decision without leaving it to the statutory authority to do so. However, we must caution that if the court were to take over the decision taking power of the statutory authority it must only be in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has not given any reason why it virtually took over the decision taking function of the authorities and for this reason alone the mandamus issued by the High Court deserves to be set aside, apart from the merits of the case which we have already adverted to.
(xxi) In Joint Secretary, Political Department, State of Meghalaya, Main Secretariat, Shillong vs. High Court of Meghalaya, reported in 2016 (11) SCC 245, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed as follows:
“14. Although we have dismissed this appeal, we strongly feel that the Central and the State Governments through Social Welfare Boards should prepare schemes for rehabilitation all over the country for physically and sexually abused women commonly known as the ‘prostitutes’ as we are of the view that the prostitutes also have a right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India since they are also human beings and their problems also need to be addressed.
the Court and also expects the executive to respond keeping in view the laudable exercise.
“33. The High Court while entertaining the writ petition formed a prima facie opinion as regards the systematic commission of fraud. While dismissing the writ petition filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu public interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, as is well known, in a private interest litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas in the latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is adversarial. In a public interest litigation, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary procedure. It may not only appoint committees but also issue directions upon the State from time to time. (See Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd.& another[8] and Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar.)”
(xxii) In Re-Inhuman conditions in 1382 Prisons, reported in 2018 SCC Online SC 1662, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs, 2 to 4, held as follows:
illegalities. The failure of the State to take remedial steps to fill in the gap when there is no operative law, except that enshrined in the Constitution, more particularly Article 21 has resulted in public interest litigation and at least two cases where a treaty obligation ought to be fulfilled.
(xxiii) In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India reported in 2018 (6) SCC 72, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 96 to 98, held as follows:
"96. Public interest litigation has developed as a powerful tool to espouse the cause of the marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, that was the foundation on which public interest jurisdiction
was judicially recognised in situations such as those in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389]. Persons who were unable to seek access to the judicial process by reason of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy are faced with a deprivation of fundamental human rights. Bonded labour and undertrials (among others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons who are unable to pursue their rights. Public interest litigation has been entertained by relaxing the rules of standing. The essential aspect of the procedure is that the person who moves the court has no personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from a general standing as a citizen before the court. This ensures the objectivity of those who pursue the grievance before the court. Environmental jurisprudence has developed around the rubric of public interest petitions. Environmental concerns affect the present generation and the future. Principles such as the polluter pays and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. Over time, public interest litigation has become a powerful instrument to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the accountability of and transparency within structures of governance. Public interest litigation is in that sense a valuable instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural due process.
Underlining these concerns, this Court held thus: (SCC p. 453, para 143)
“143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse
on the basis of monetary and non-monetary directions by the courts.”
competitive market for goods and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights and entitlements. Courts protect the rule of law. There is a danger that the judicial process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes beyond the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space."
"No. SRO C-2/2010.
By virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution of India and of all other powers hereunto enabling, the High Court makes the following Rules to regulate Public Interest Litigations (PIL) filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
Every Public Interest Litigation must be filed in accordance with the following rules:
The above rules will not be applicable to the Public Interest Litigations taken on file by the High Court"
was of the prima facie view that it is not in consonance with the directions issued in Prakash Singh's case. Taking note of the further submissions of the learned Additional Government Pleader, as to the implementation of the said Act, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, on 28/1/2019, has granted time.
(i). Perjury is committed by the Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai.
(ii). factum of filing of the reply affidavit, dated 14/8/2018 and W.P.(C) No.310 of 1996 was not reported to Court, at the time of admission, on 28/1/2019 and when the writ petition was posted for further hearing.
(iii). Nothing could be deduced from the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in I.A.No.24610 of 2019 in W.P.(C) No.310 of 1996 along with I.A.Nos.115064 of 2018, 20735 of 2019 and 11484 of 2019 and therefore, according to him, submission of the respondents made all along was the cause for him to plead that there was perjury committed by the first respondent in making a statement to this Court that an affidavit, dated 14/8/2018 has been filed in the Supreme Court. In this context, he referred to the order made in I.A.Nos.115064 of 2018, 20735 of 2019 and 11484 of 2019 and submitted that the same does not reflect filing of an affidavit, copy of which is produced before this Court.
| Doc.No. | Document type Fi |
led by | Filing date |
Entered on |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 115105/ | Affidavit M. |
Yogesh | 14/8/201 | Amrit Bhola |
| 2018 | K | anna | 8 | 27/8/2018 @ |
| 3.26 p.m | 4.21 p.m. |
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.129261/2018
(Application for Modification of Hon'ble Court's order dated 3.7.2018 filed by
Mr.M.Shoeb Alam, Advocate) IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 310 OF 1996 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
Prakash Singh & Ors. etc. .. Petitioners
Versus Union of India & Ors. etc. ... Respondents
OFFICE REPORT
It is submitted that the Writ petition above mentioned alongwith applications and connected matters was listed before the Hon'ble Court on 03.07.2018 withoffice report dated 29.06.2018 when the Hon'ble Court was pleased to inter-alia pass the following order:-
“LA.No.25307 of 2018
This is an application for modification of the judgment in Prakash Singh and others vs. Union of India & others, (2006) 8 SCC 1. In the said judgment the Court has prescribed a minimum tenure for Director General of Police. Direction No.2 given in the said judgment, which is relevant for the present purpose, reads thus:
“(2) The Director General of Police of the State shall be selected by the State Government from amongst the three seniormost officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission on the basis of their length of service, very good record and range of experience for heading the police force. And, once he has been selected for the job, he should have a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective of his date of superannuation. The DGP may, however, be relieved of his responsibilities by the State Government acting in consultation with the State Security Commission consequent upon any action taken against him under the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or following his conviction in a court of law in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption, or if he is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his duties.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we pass the following directions:
(a) All the States shall send their proposals in anticipation of the vacancies to the Union Public Service Commission, well in time at least three months prior to the date of retirement of the incumbent on the post of Director General of Police;
(b) The Union Public Service Commission shall prepare the panel as per the directions of this Court in the judgment in Prakash Singh's case (supra) andintimate to the States;
(c The State shall immediately appoint one of the persons from the panel prepared by the Union Public Service Commission;
(d) None of the States shall ever conceive of the idea of appointing any person on the post of Director General of Police on acting basis for there is no concept of acting Director General of Police as per the decision in Prakash Singh's case(supra);
(e) An endeavour has to be made by all concerned to see that the person who was selected and appointed as the Director General of Police continues despite his date of superannuation. However, the extended term beyond the date of superannuation should be a reasonable period. We say so as it has been brought to our notice that some of the States have adopted a practice to appoint the Director General of Police on the last date of retirement as a consequence of which the person continues for two years after his date of superannuation. Such a practice will not be in conformity with the spirit of the direction.
(f) Our direction No.(c) should be considered by the Union Public Service Commission to man that the persons are to be empanelled, as far as practicable, from amongst the people within the zone of consideration who have got clear two years of service. Merit and seniority should be given due weightage.
(g) Any legislation/rule framed by any of the States of the Central Government running counter to the direction shall remain in abeyance to the aforesaid extent.
The present directions shall be followed scrupulously by the Union of India and all the States/Union Territories. If any State Government/Union Territory has a grievance with regard to these directions, liberty is granted to them to approach this Court for modification of the instant order.
I. A. stands disposed of accordingly.
Rest of the matters
List after two weeks.”
Thereafter the Writ petition above mentioned alongwith applications and connected matters was listed before the Hon'ble Court was pleased tointeralia pass the following order:-
“I.A. No.97142/2018 in W.P.(C) No.310/1996
This is an application at the instance of the State of Meghalaya for modifying the order dated 3rd July 2018. We may immediately clarify that there is no need for modification at the instance of the State of Meghalaya because the situation is quite different.
At this juncture, it is submitted by Mr.Bhushan, learned counsel for the original petitioner that clause (f) of the order passed on 3rd July, 2018, needs to be clarified. He has given certain instances which may occur in future. Liberty is granted to Mr.Bhushan to file an application for clarification, if occasion arises.
Let all other interlocutory applications and petitions be listed after two weeks. Learned counsel for the parties are required to file their submissions on proposition wise by the next date of hearing.”
Pursuant to above order certified copies were sent to concerned parties through Registered Post on 9.08.2018.
It is submitted that M/s.Devasa & Co., Advocates has on 9.8.2018 filed Written proposition on behalf of petitioner in connected Contempt Petition(c) No.1037/2018 and same is placed in a separate volume with the paper books.
It is further submitted that Mr.M.Yogesh Kanna, Advocate has on 14.08.2018 filed an affidavit on behalf of State of Tamil Nadu and same is place in a separate volume with the paper books.
It is next submitted that Mr.Prashant Bhushan, Advocate for the petitioners has on 14.8.2018 filed an application seeking clarification of this Hon'ble Court's order dated 3.7.2018 alongwith an application seeking permission to file additional documents. The said applications are registed as I.A.Nos.115064/2018 and 115046/2018 respectively and placed in a separate volume with the paper books.
It is further submitted that Mr.Abhinav Mukerji, Advocate has on 27.8.2018 filed an affidavit on behalf of UPSC regarding steps taken in compliance of order dated 30.7.2018 and same is placed in a separate volume with the paper books.
It is further submitted that M/s.PLR Chambers & Co., Advocates has on 31.8.2018 and Mr.M.Shoeb Alam, Advocate has on 7.9.2018 filed separate applications for modification of Hon'ble Court's order dated 3.7.2018 on behalf of State of West Bengal and State of Jammu & Kashmir. The said applications are registered as I. A.Nos.125544/2018 and 129261/2018 respectively. I.A.No.125544/2018 is placed in a separate volume with the paper books and I.A.No129261/2018 is being circulated for kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court.
It is lastly submitted that I.A.No.129261/2018 (Application for Modification on behalf of State of Jammu & Kashmir) was mentioned before the Hon'ble Court on 7.9.2018 when the following order was passed:-
“Let the application be listed on Monday, 10.09.2018 before appropriate Bench as per roster, subject to removal of defects, if any.”
The application in the matter above-mentioned is listed before the Hon'ble Court with this Office Report for Orders.
Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home, Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, has committed perjury, whether the statement made by the party-inperson without responsibility, should simply be ignored or in the light of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, be deprecated by imposing exemplary costs.
42. On the facts and circumstances, we dismiss the writ petition with costs of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only) to be paid by the party-in-person to the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice Fund, Ministry of Social Defence, Kellys, Chennai, within a period of fifteen days, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which, the District Collector, Chennai District, is directed to take proceeding against the petitioner under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1890.
submissions of the Government, right from the date when the matter came up for admission.
Sd/Assistant Registrar(CS IV) //True Copy// Sub Assistant Registrar
mvs.
To 1. The Secretary Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu, Secretariat,Chennai-600009. 2. The Under Secretary /Public Information officer Home Department,Government of Tamilnadu, Secretariat,Chennai-600009. 3. The Public Information Officer/ Under Secretary to Government, Public (Miscellaneous) Department, Government of Tamilnadu,Secretariat, Chennai-600009. 4. The Inspector General of Police (Establishments) O/o the Director General of Police, Mylapore,Chennai-600004. 5.The Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Home Prohibition & Excise Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai. 6.The District Collector, Chennai. 7.The Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice Fund, Ministry of Social Defence, Kellys, Chennai +1 cc to The Government Pleader, Sr.No.34624 +6 cc's to M/s.Y.Akbar Ahmed, Advocate Sr.No.33854,33121 Writ Petition No.2342 of 2019 CSL/12.04.2019
2 issues framed by the court
Could the High Court invoke Article 144 to direct implementation of police reforms while the Supreme Court was monitoring compliance?
Was the perjury allegation against the first respondent established, and did the unverified allegation warrant costs against the petitioner?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India and Ors.Referred¶16
Prakash Singh & Ors vs Union Of India and Ors. dated 22 September, 2006 in W.P.(Civil) No.310 of 1996
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3 provisions across 3 enactments
Y.Akbar Ahmed
The Secretary Home Department, Government of Tamilnadu
The Under Secretary /Public Information officer Home Department,Government of Tamilnadu
The Public Information Officer/ Under Secretary to Government, Public (Miscellaneous) Department, Government of Tamilnadu
The Inspector General of Police (Establishments) O/o the Director General of Police
S.MANIKUMAR
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
