34.The next question is whether such involvement would necessary lead to the conclusion for the Appointing Authority to hold as to whether he should be selected and appointed for the services or not. Involvement without knowledge is also a factor that can eclipse any disadvantage or prospective impediment in ceratin circumstances, as explained by the Apex Court in the case of M.Manohar Reddy and another Vs. ,Union of India and others, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 99. whether the fact or information unknowingly withheld is at all a material fact, is a matter of assessment on the peculiarity of the material and it's impact to be judiciously and objectively assessed by the employer without any prejudice or preconceived notions to rule out any possibility of malice or pure subjectivity in the decision making process. It is here that a play in the joints has to be given to the employer and unless such a latitude is given, it will be injuncting the authority from exercising its discretion to engage a person suitable for the post. We, therefore, find that an assessment has to be made by the Appointing Authority as to whether the involvement of a candidate in a criminal case would ultimately lead to the conclusion that his engagement would be detrimental for the nature of the employment for which he is being engaged. This may involve a bit of subjectivity, but the material on record has to receive an objective consideration. The question as to whether a person was involved in a case of violating a mere traffic rule or was involved in a heinous offence would obviously weigh with the employer to assess as to whether his engagement would otherwise be sustainable or be detrimental for recruitment in a Uniformed Police Force or not. We, therefore, leave that open to the authority concerned for an independent assessment. But, on the facts of the present case, we find that the authority has simply rested its decision on the finding that the appellant did not deserve to be engaged on account of not having been honourably acquitted. Whether the fact of his involvement was such that this inference could be justified does not appear to have been discussed in the impugned order. To this extent, we accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant.
