The dispute concerned whether synthetic woven fabric was exempt from sales tax or taxable as a plastic product. The Court upheld exemption under item 8(ii) of Part A of the Third Schedule and dismissed the revenue's tax revision.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 13.02.2018
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR and THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE V.BHAVANI SUBBAROYAN
T.C.(R).No.14 of 2018 The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Deputy Commissioner (CT), Chennai (North) Division, Chennai - 6. .. Petitioner Vs. Tvl. Oswal Wire Netting, No.23, V.M.Street, Chennai - 600 003. .. Respondent
Prayer: Tax Case Revision Petition filed under Section 38 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to revise the order dated 19.04.2007, passed in S.T.A.No.266 of 2002, on the file of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Chennai.
For Petitioner : Mr.V.Haribabu Additional Govt. Pleader (Taxes) For Respondent : Mr.T.P.Pramodkumar Chopda
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ORDER
(Order of this Court was made by S.MANIKUMAR, J.)
Tax Case Revision Petition is filed to revise the order dated 19.04.2007, passed in S.T.A.No.266 of 2002, on the file of the Tamil Nadu
Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Chennai.
respondent herein, dealing in wire products, were finally assessed for the year 1998-99 on a total and taxable turnover of Rs.27,42,960/- and Rs.4,45,330/- respectively, under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, by the Commercial Tax Officer, Evening Bazaar Assessment Circle, Chennai, which included tax of Rs.17,280/- levied on the sale of filler
cloth and monofilament tapes for Rs.2,15,299/-. The Assessing Officer has assessed the turnover, treating the synthetic woven fabric as plastic product.
http://www.judis.nic.in of Rs.2,15,895/-, on the ground that the goods sold by the respondent-
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assessee are synthetic woven fabric and hence, they are eligible for exemption. Relevant portion of the appellate authority's order is extracted hereunder:
"I have heard the arguments of both the sides with connected records. The Assessing Officer has assessed the turnover of Rs.2,15,995/-, at 8% being the sale of synthetic cotton fabric under entry 33-A of Part-C of First Schedule. The Advocate who has appeared at the time of final hearing has argued that the sale synthetic cotton fabric is exempted from tax which falls under entry 8(II) of Third Schedule of the Act. The Advocate has produced purchase and sale bills and he has also argued that the Assessing Officer has exempted the same sales of synthetic cotton fabric for the previous years. He has also produced the assessment order of the previous years. A perusal of the documents produced by the Advocate shows that the appellants have dealt in synthetic cotton fabric and they are eligible for exemption towards the sale of synthetic cotton fabric. Therefore, the assessment made by the Assessing Officer cannot be sustained and the same is set aside."
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Chennai, vide order, dated 19.04.2007, the Tribunal held as follows:
"7. We have heard the arguments of both sides and perused the connected records. At the time of hearing, the learned Assistant Additional State Representative (Incharge) has forcefully argued that the order of the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner is not based on facts of this case on hand. The order of the Assessing Officer is based on facts of this case and therefore, prayed to restore the assessment order in its entirety and setting aside the order of the first Appellate Authority in respect of this appeal and thus render justice.
The learned Counsel for the respondent-assessee has vehemently argued by filing written submissions and argued that the commodity dealt by the respondent-assessee is in synthetic woven fabric which cannot be considered as plastic product. The learned Counsel for the respondent-assessee has further stated that synthetic woven fabric is an exempted goods falling under item 8(ii) of Part A of III schedule hence not liable to tax under Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. But the learned Assessing Officer assessed the sales turnover on the basis of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes clarification and levied tax. This is not correct. The plastic product falling under Item 33 of Part C of Ist Schedule as per the Commissioner of Commercial Tax's clarification relates to HDPE Woven fabric (Filter cloth) and monofilament Nivar (Tape). Hence treating synthetic woven fabric as plastic product is not correct. He further submitted that the item 33
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of Part C relates to Plastic product which is as follows:-
"Plastic Products, including melamine Wear and break resistant plastic other than those specified elsewhere in this schedule".
Therefore, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes clarification cannot be the basis to classify the goods and more so, the alleged clarification do not relate to goods in question viz. synthetic woven fabric. The learned Counsel for the respondent/assessee has further added that the Assessing Officer himself allowed exemption on sale of goods in question in the previous year and subsequent year assessment order. Therefore, the appeal order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowing exemption on the sale of synthetic woven fabric falling under Item 8(ii) of Part A of Third Schedule is based on facts of this case on hand and hence correct. The respondent-assessee while filing the written submissions, he also enclosed copy of purchase bill, sale bill, previous and subsequent year's assessment orders wherein the synthetic woven fabric was allowed and exempted by the Assessing Officer. Finally, the learned Counsel for the respondent-assessee has respectfully prayed to sustain the orders of the first Appellate Authority and thus render justice.
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clarified that HDPE woven fabric (Filter Cloth) and Monofilament Nivar (Tape) fall under Entry 33 of Part C of the First Schedule as plastic product. as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, under no stretch of imagination, the goods sold by teh respondent-dealer can be equated with the goods clarified in the "Commissioner's Clarification so as to treat it as Plastic product falling under Item 33 of Part C of the First Schedule instead of exempted goods. The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner after analysing all these facts and taking into account the purchase and sale bills as well as subsequent year, wherein the sale of synthetic woven fabric was allowed exemption, had held that the goods sold by the Dealer will fall under Item 8(ii) of Part A of third Schedule and hence, eligible for exemption and therefore, set aside the assessment made on the same. We find that the reasoning of the Appellate Authority is based on facts and there is no material to contradict the same, except the Circular relied by the Appellant, which is not applicable to the case on hand. The appeal order of the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner is found correct and there is no compelling reason to interfere with the same and accordingly, the same is sustained and the appeal is dismissed.
In the result, the State Appeal is dismissed."
http://www.judis.nic.in Revision, on the following substantial question of law:-
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“Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is legally correct, in having decided that the synthetic fabric dealt with by the petitioners would be eligible for exemption under the third schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 inspite of the fact that there was no entry in the said schedule to cover those goods for allowing such exemption? ”
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused all the materials available on record.
http://www.judis.nic.in General Sales Tax Act, 1959, include tobacco, sugar, cotton and woolen
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fabrics, handloom cloth and few other commodities. Besides, conditional exemption, effected through special notifications, is also accorded to the
sale/purchase of a number of goods by certain persons or institutions.
Hon'ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 9 of the judgment, explained what
fabric is,
"What is a fabric? The "Mercury" Dictionary of Textile Terms defines "fabric" as a term which covers "all textiles no matter how constructed, how manufactured, or the nature of the material from which made," and the expression "textile" is described as "any product manufactured from fibres through twisting, interlacing, bonding, looping, or any other means, in such a manner that the flexibility, strength, and other characteristic properties of the individual fibres are not suppressed." The Man-Made Textile Encyclopaedia (1959) defines fabric as "a collective term applied to cloth no matter how constructed or manufactured and regardless of the kind of fibre from which made. In structure it is planar produced by interlacing yarns, fibres or filaments. Textile fabrics include the following varieties, bonding, felted, knitted, braided and woven." The Fairchild's Dictionary of Textiles (1959) says that fabric is "a cloth that is woven or knit, braided, netted, with any textile fibre.....", and "textile" is
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said to refer to "a broad classification of any material that can be worked into fabric, such as fibres and yarns including woven and knitted fabric, felt, netted fabric, lace and croched goods." In "Textile Terms and Definitions" (1960) the word cloth is defined as "a generic term embracing all textile fabrics and laminar felts" and "textile" is applied in its modern sense" to "any manufacture from fibres, filaments, or yarns, natural or artificial, obtained by interlacing." The 1967 Annual Book of ASTM Standards defines cloth as "any textile fabric but specially one designed for apparel domestic or industrial use," and textile fabric as "a planar structure consisting of interlaced yarns or fibres." The 1973 Annual Book of ASTM Standards reproduces those definitions."
Court observed :
"The question is whether it can be regarded as artificial
silk. It would appear that polyethylene is a synthetic resin falling under the category of thermoplastic in the same way as nylon or polythene or synthetic plastic resin. In this country, high density polyethylene is imported in granule form. The granules are passed through several processes and stretched into fibres of varying thickness. They are
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subsequently woven into cloth on looms. The nature of the substance and the manner in which it is made into a fibre to be used as such in the manufacture of fabrics shows that high density polyethylene must be brought under the genus 'artificial silk'."
"Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently
argued that the fabric manufactured by the appellant from HDPE is ‘artificial silk’ and thus falls within exempted good from payment of tax in terms of Section 2(1) (p) of the Act. The reliance is placed upon a Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court reported as (1982) 51 STC 364 titled as ‘The State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Polyweb Private Ltd.”. The Madras High Court was considering Item 4 of the Third Schedule to Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and the question whether High-Density Polyethylene woven fabrics is ‘artificial silk’. The entry under consideration in the aforesaid Act reads as “Cotton fabrics, woolen fabrics and
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rayon or artificial silk fabrics, as defined in items 19, 21 and 22 respectively of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Central Act 1 of 1944)”. Item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 defines “Rayon or artificial silk fabrics’ means all varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly from rayon or artificial silk and includes embroidery in the piece, in strips or in motifs and fabrics impregnated or coated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials.”
The Hon’ble Division Bench noticed that such item 22 does not precisely define either rayon or artificial silk. The Court examined that what is the sense in which rayon and artificial silk are understood by the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The Court noticed that rayon is understood by technologists and traders, as a fibre made from regenerated cellulose, cellulose being the substance in living plants out of which the skeletal structure of plant cell walls are formed. The expression ‘artificial silk’ denotes that it is the opposite of natural silk. This term was originally used to refer to rayon because rayon was the only kind of artificial silk but so many other varieties of artificial silk have subsequently been invented and perfected by scientists and technologists. Thus, artificial silk is not a mere synonym for rayon. The two are not just interchangeable expressions. Artificial silk must be regarded as a genus of which rayon is the species. The artificial silk would seem to be a man-made fibre. In this background the Court held to the following
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effect:-
“4. The claim in the present case for exemption from sales tax is in respect of high density polyethylene. The question is whether it can be regarded as artificial silk. It would appear that polyethylene is a synthetic resin falling under the category of thermoplastic in the same way as nylon or polythene or synthetic plastic resin. In this country, high density polyethylene is imported in granule form. The granules are passed through several processes and stretched into fibres if varying thickness. They are subsequently woven into cloth on looms. The nature of the substance and the manner in which it is made into a fibre to be used as such in the manufacture of fabrics shows that high density polyethylene must be brought under the genus “artificial silk”. The sales tax authorities would be hard put to it to maintain the proposition that while high density polyethylene is manufactured out of a substance which itself is not natural silk, the same substance when it becomes a fibre and is used for being made into fabrics, somehow ceases to be artificial silk. We have no doubt that this article must be regarded as artificial silk as defined in item 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act.”
Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon an order passed by the Allahabad High Court reported as [1984] 57 STC 188 titled as ‘Commission of Sales Tax Vs. Kanpur Plastic Pack (P.) Ltd.’ wherein it has been held that HDPE fabric falls within notification dated 25.11.1958 and is artificial silk. Reliance is placed upon order of the Hon’ble Supreme
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Court reported as (1981) 2 SCC 528, titled as ‘ Indo International Industries Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. ’ that while interpreting items in statutes like the Excise Acts or Sales Tax Act, resort should not be to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them.
On the other hand, Mr. Poonia relies upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as (2008) 31 PHT 74 (P&H) titled as ‘Lakshmi Polyfab Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and another’ wherein while examining Entry 52 reading ‘textile fabric including terry towels’ of Schedule A appended to Punjab VAT Act, 2005. It has been held that sale of sale of High-Density Polyethylene fabric is not covered by entry 52.
We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. A perusal of Schedule B would show that the exempted good in terms of Section 2(1) (p) of the Act are the agricultural implements, the food articles and other consumer goods. Schedule C is list of articles which are basically inputs for manufacturing of other products.
We find that the judgment in Lakshmi Polyfab (supra) does not deal with the issue in question. The entry under consideration was ‘textile fabric including terry towels’. The Court held that HDPE falls in the list of industrial inputs attracting VAT at the rate of 4% under Section 8 of the Act. It was also not disputed that goods in question were merely used as packaging material in its present form or even in its
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changed form i.e. bags etc. which again falls in item 162 and 202 of entry 58 of Schedule B. On the other hand, in Polyweb Private Ltd. case (supra), the definition of ‘artificial silk fabric’ was relating to entry 22 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Madras High Court has found that entry 22 of First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 precisely define what is rayon and what is artificial silk. It thus proceeded to decide that artificial silk manufactured with the manufacturer of fabrics from High-Density Polyethylene must be brought under the genus “artificial silk”. Therefore, the judgment of the Madras High Court in Polyweb Private Ltd. case (supra) also does not deal with the question as is raised in the present appeal. In the Act in question again, neither rayon nor artificial silk or nylon are defined.
Entry 51 of the Schedule B of the Act is in two parts. The first part deals with all varieties of cotton, woolen or silken textiles including rayon, artificial silk or nylon. Therefore, all varieties of textiles may be cotton, woolen or silken including rayon, artificial silk or nylon fall within entry 51 of Schedule B. The second part excludes certain categories on which additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax is not levied. For the purposes of present appeal, it is a first part of entry 51 which is relevant.
Similar entry in the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 came up for examination before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported as (1979) 1 SCC 82 ‘Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana’. The Court observed
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that in a taxing statute words of everyday use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance. It observed as under:-
“3. Now, the word 'textiles' is not defined in the Act, but it is well settled as a result of several decisions of this Court, of which we may mention only a few, namely, Ramavatar Budhaiprasad vs. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, AIR 1961 SC 1325 and M/s. Motipur Jamindary Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660 and The State of West Bengal v Washi Ahmed, (1977) 2 SCC 246 that in a taxing statute words of every day use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance. The question which arose in Ramavatar's case (supra) was whether betel leaves are vegetables and this Court held that they are not included within that term. This Court quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants’ Association, Santra Market, Nagpur v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 7 STC 99.
In our opinion, the words "vegetables'' cannot be given the comprehensive meaning the term bears in natural history and has not been given that meaning in taxing statutes before. The term "vegetables' is to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and are used for the table.
and observed that the word 'vegetables' in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class
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of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table." This meaning of the word.. 'vegetables' was reiterated in M/s Motipur Jamindary case where sugarcane was held not to fall within the definition of the word 'vegetables' and the same meaning was given to the word 'vegetables’ in Washi Ahmed's case (supra) where green ginger was held to be 'vegetables' within the meaning of that word as used in common parlance.
So also the Supreme Court of Canada said in Planters Nut and Chocolate Co. Ltd v.'The King, (1951) 1 DLR 385 while interpreting the words 'fruits' and 'vegetables' in the Excise Act. “They are ordinary words in every day use and are, therefore, to be construed according to their popular sense". The same rule was expressed in slightly different language by Story, J., in 200 Chests of Tea, (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 430, 438 where the learned Judge said that;
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"the particular words used by the Legislature in the denomination of articles are to be understood according to the common commercial understanding of the terms used, and not in their scientific or technical sense, for the Legislature does "not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists.".
In terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indo International Industries case (supra) and Porritts & Spenscer's case (supra), the meaning attached to the entries should be those dealing in them and not the scientific or technical meaning. The word ‘artificial silk’ is not defined in the statute. Silk is a thread which is commonly made from fibre produced by silk worms. Therefore, the meaning of such expression is what the common meaning of such expressions is in the normal usage. As per Chambers Dictionary the word ‘artificial’ means made by man; synthetic; fictitious, made in imitation, whereas the word ‘silk’ also includes artificial silk to be made by forcing a viscous solution of modified cellulose through small holes. In the present case, the issue to be examined is that what is rayon, artificial silk or nylon.
The fibre, an essential ingredient for manufacturing of cotton, wool or silken textile, is either natural or man-mad.
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The natural fibres include those of plant (cellulose based, animal protein based or mineral based). Cotton is a plant based natural fibre whereas wool and silk are animal based fibre. On the other hand, man-made fibres are manufactured by alteration of natural fibres for example rayon from cellulose, or by synthesis of polymers for example nylon. Most man-made fibres are made by a chemical process called polymerization (q.v.), in which many units of simple chemical substances combine to form large molecules whose properties are quite different from those of the basic units. By selecting suitable simple compounds and controlling the degree of polymerization, it is possible to produce new substances whose properties can be predicted. When certain types of simple compounds are polymerized under special conditions the units form long chains. Long-chain polymers can be manufactured into fibres; in nature, cellulose (consisting of long chains of glucose) and wool (consisting of long chains of amino acids) are formed into fibres. This means that it is possible to produce entirely new fibre types with desired combinations of properties. Nylon is the generic name for a group of fibres formed from long-chain polyamides. It was the first synthetic polymer fibre to be produced commercially and can now be made in a number of ways from carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. (Ref : Encyclopaedia Britannica 1969 Edition Volume 9 Page 226233).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Porritts & Spencer’s case (supra) was considering the same entry as in the
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present case and held that the word “textiles” is derived from Latin ‘texere’ which means ‘to weave’ and it means any woven fabric. The Court held to the following effect:-
“5……… The word textiles is derived from the Latin “texere” which means “to weave” and it means any woven fabric. When yarn, whether cotton, silk, woollen, rayon, nylon or of any other description as made out of any other material is woven into a fabric, what comes into being is a 'textile' and it is known as such. It may be cotton textile, silk textile, woollen textile, rayon textile, nylon textile or any other hind of textile. The method of weaving adopted may be the warp and woof pattern as is generally the case in most of the textiles, or it may be any other process or technique. There is such phenomenal advance in science and technology, so wondrous i.. the variety of fabrics manufactured from materials hithereto unknown or unthought of and so many are the new techniques invented for making fabric out of yarn that it would be most unwise to confine the weaving process to the warp and woof pattern. Whatever be the mode of weaving employed, woven fabric would be 'textiles'. What is necessary is no more than weaving of yarn and weaving would mean binding or putting together by some process so as to form a fabric. Moreover a textile need not be of any particular size or strength or weight. It may be in small pieces or in big rolls: it may be weak or strong, light or heavy, bleach or dyed, according to the requirement of the purchaser. The use to which it may be put is also immaterial and does not bear on its character
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as a textile. It may-be used for making wearing apparel, or it may be used as a covering or bedsheet or it may be used as tapestry or upholstery or as duster for cleaning or as towel for drying the body. A textile may have diverse uses and it is not the use which determines its character as textile.”
In the aforesaid case, Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the use does not determine the character as textile. Therefore, an argument that “dryer felts” are used only as absorbents of moisture in the process of manufacture which does not fall within the category of “textiles”, was rejected. Referring to rayon and nylon fabrics, the Court observed as under:-
“6………..Take for example rayon and nylon fabrics which have now become very popular for making wearing apparel. When they first came to be made, they must have been intruders in the field of 'textiles' because only cotton, silk and woollen fabrics were till then recognized as 'textiles'. But today no one can dispute that rayon and nylon fabrics are textiles and can properly be described as such.”
In view of the judgment in Porritts & Spencer’s case (supra) and keeping in view the test that in a taxing statute words of everyday use must be construed not in their scientific or technical sense but as understood in common parlance and the fact that textile means any woven fabric and therefore the fabric manufactured out of HDPE by warp and weft pattern is a textile falling within entry 51 of Schedule B. It will thus be a good exempted from payment of tax. The entry 51 is inclusive entry. It includes all varieties
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of cotton, woolen or silken textiles and also rayon, artificial silk or nylon. Thus any textile may be cotton, woolen or silk either from natural fiber or man made fiber falls within the scope of exempted goods.
It may be mentioned that in respect of similar entry No.14 in Schedule B, in appeal of the present appellant itself under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, the Haryana Tax Tribunal in ‘M/s A.R. Plastics Private Limited, Gurgaon Road, Jhajjar Vs. State of Haryana,[2004] 24 PHT 130’, has returned a finding that the appellant is a manufacturer of a fabric. It was observed as under:-
“6. In State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Polyweb Private Ltd., 51 STC 364, the Hon’ble High Court of Madras held that artificial silk is not a mere synonyan for rayon. The two are not just inter changeable expressions. Artificial silk must be regarded as the genus of which rayon is a species. The modern appellation for ‘artificial silk’ would seem to be ‘man made fibre’. Therefore, it is proper to include within the scope of the expression ‘artificial silk’ and silk like substance which is not natural silk, but which is produced by human agency out of any product or a combination of products by any process. All that is necessary is that ‘artificial silk’, like natural silk, must be a fibre. Accordingly, high density polyethylene must be regarded as falling within the generic term ‘artificial silk’ and fabrics made out of high density polyethylene, either wholly or in part, whether they are hundred per cent pure or not, qualify for exemption from sales tax as goods falling within the
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description ‘artificial silk fabrics’ set out in item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. In the understanding of an expression, courts will not be doing violence to the principles of statutory construction if they pay regard to how such an expression is understood not only by the trade or by high technology in general, but also by the concerned departments of Government, part of whose task it is to put a correct interpretation on the expression in question for the purpose of running their departments. It was submitted by the Learned Counsel for the appellant relying upon the aforesaid judgments that the rejects/wastes is a necessary concomitant of the processes which plastic dana has to undergo for the emergence of HDPE fabrics and therefore rejects/wastes of HDPE fabrics has also to be treated as ‘tax free’ on the same footing as HDPE fabrics is falling in entry 14 of Schedule B.”
The said judgment has attained finality.
The clarification issued by the Financial Commissioner-
cum-Principal Secretary, Government of Haryana, Excise and Taxation Department on 10.12.2009 that the products manufactured by similar manufacturers are not covered under entry 52 and 53 of Schedule B nor under Schedule C of the Act, therefore, an unclassified good is liable to be taxed at the rate of 12.5%. We find that such clarification runs counter to meaning of the expression “textile” including “artificial silk” given by Supreme Court. In view of the interpretation of the similar provision, in respect of the present assessee itself, we find that the clarification could
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not be issued against an order passed by the competent authority interpreting similar provision.
Consequently, in respect of question of law it is held that HDPE woven fabric falls within entry 51 of Schedule B of Haryana VAT Act, 2003 and is exempted from payment of tax.
All the aforesaid VAT Appeals are disposed of accordingly."
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S.MANIKUMAR, J.
AND
V.BHAVANI SUBBAROYAN, J.
dm
12. In the result, the substantial question of law raised is
answered against the revenue and this tax case revision is dismissed. No
costs.
[S.M.K., J.] [V.B.S., J.]
13.02.2018
Index: Yes
Internet: Yes
skm/dm
To
The Deputy Commissioner (CT),
State of Tamil Nadu,
Chennai (North) Division,
Chennai - 6.
T.C.(R).No.14 of 2018
1 issue framed by the court
Was the synthetic woven fabric sold by the assessee exempt under item 8(ii) of Part A of the Third Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., v. State of RajasthanRelied on¶48
(1980) 46 STC 256 : AIR 1980 SC 1552, · Who else cites this
State of Tamil Nadu v. Polyweb Pvt. Ltd.,Relied on¶55
(1982 ) 51 STC 364,
M/s.A.R.Plastic Pvt. Ltd., Gurgaon v. State of HaryanaRelied on¶62
2014 SCC Online P&H 9597, · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
The State of Tamil Nadu
Tvl. Oswal Wire Netting
S.MANIKUMAR
V.BHAVANI SUBBAROYAN
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
