Para 1608 at pages 744 and 745 we find the words: “An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed “interlocutory”. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate; matter with which it deals.” The Court further observed in Para 13 that: —“…..The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined. In our opinion, if this strict test were to be applied in interpreting the words “interlocutory order” occurring in S. 397(2), then the order taking cognizance of an offence by a Court, whether it is so done illegally or without jurisdiction, will not be a final order and hence will be an interlocutory one. Even so, as we have said above, the inherent power of the High Court can be invoked for quashing such a criminal proceeding. But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application/of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will, render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by S. 397(1). On such a strict interpertation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapter XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature, when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code………………”The Court further said:—“………… On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words “final order”. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswamy's case AIR 1949 FC 1 : (1950-49 Cri LJ 625) (supra) but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order, pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-s. (2) of S. 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be
