learned Judge was conscious of the fact that by condoning the inordinate delay, the respondents therein (appellants herein) will be put to great hardship, instead of compensating them, directed for the payment of Rs. 10,000/- to the State Legal Services Authority, Chennai, admittedly, which is not a party in this proceedings. We are unable to share the above view. Having found that by condoning the inordinate delay only on the ground that the applicant should be given an opportunity and having found that the said act will cause great hardship to other side, viz., respondents therein, it is but proper to compensate them by awarding reasonable costs to them. The learned Judge has not resorted to such recourse. It is not in dispute that the Courts are here to render justice to both parties. We are unable to understand how the respondents will be compensated by payment of Rs. 10,000/- to the State Legal Services Authority, Chennai. Equally, we are conscious of the fact that the length of delay is no matter, and acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes the delay of shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation therefor is satisfactory. In every case of delay, there may be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack the mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should not lean towards acceptance of the explanation. We are also aware that refusal to condone the delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. Now, even the higher court of this land have interpreted that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice . Accordingly, in order to give one opportunity to the respondent/applicant and at the same time, to compensate the