14.No doubt, it is true that an extension agreement was entered into on 04.11.1993 extending the period upto 16.11.1994. It is not pleaded and established as to under what circumstances, such extension of time was given. Even though an attempt is made by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs to contend that it is only at the instance of the defendant such extension of agreement was entered into, in the absence of any such specific pleadings and evidence, the learned counsel for the appellants is not justified in making such submission before this court. The suit was filed on 04.10.1994, after issuing a notice only on 11.03.1994. Therefore, it shows that even assuming that the agreement was entered into for the purpose of selling the property, the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of contract by making any earnest attempts. When such mandatory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act on the part of the plaintiffs has not been established in this case, more particularly, when the same was not specifically pleaded and proved, this court is of the view that the plaintiffs are not entitled for specific performance, which both the courts below have rightly denied. Also by considering the fact that the agreement is of the year 1992 and in between a long period has lapsed and that the value of the property would have also been increased by this time, this court is of the view that such discretionary relief of specific performance need not be granted in this case, when the plaintiffs have been granted the other relief of refund of the advance amount with interest. I find both the courts below have rightly considered all these aspects on appreciation of facts and circumstances and the evidence let in by the parties.
