Dismissed

Rr Donnelley Publishing India v. M/S.Canara Traders & Pvt.Ltd.

Madras HC9 Dec 2014OP/717/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Two petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenged a majority arbitral award of damages for breach of a printing supply agreement, one by the party against whom the award was passed and one by the claimant over refusal of pre-award and pendente lite interest. Both petitions and the connected deposit application were dismissed.

What did the court decide?

O.P.No.717 of 2011, O.P.No.433 of 2012 and A.No.3752 of 2012 dismissed; parties directed to bear their respective costs.

Rr Donnelley Publishing India Vs M/S.Canara Traders & Pvt.Ltd. — Arbitration | Madras HC (2014)

¶1

¶2

In the High Court of Judicature at Madras

¶3

Reserved on 25.7.2014 & Delivered on : 09.12.2014

¶4

Coram :

¶5

The Honourable Mr.Justice V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN

¶6

Original Petition Nos.717 of 2011 and 433 of 2012
and A.No.3752 of 2012
R.R.Donnelley Publishing India Private
Limited rep.by its Director and Finance
Controller Mr.G.Madhan Kumar

¶7

...Petitioner in
O.P.No.717/2011 & R1
in O.P.No.433/2012 &
R1 in A.No.3752 of 2012
Vs
... Petitioner in
O.P.No.433/2012 & R1 in
O.P.No.717/2011 &
applicant in A.No.3752/12

¶8

1.M/s.Canara Traders and Printers
Private Limited Thiruvanmiyur,
Chennai-41.
2.Hon'ble Mr.Justice B.P.Jeevan Reddy
Hyderabad - 500 033.

¶9

3.Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.A.Swami, Bangalore - 560 080.

¶10

4.Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.P.Sivasubramaniam Chennai - 600 030.

¶11

...Respondents 2 to 4 in
O.P.Nos.717/2011 & 433/
2012 & A.No.3752/2012

¶12

PETITIONS under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking (i) to set aside the impugned award dated 19.9.2011 and for costs; and (ii) to set aside that portion of the award dated 19.9.2011 in as much as for not having awarded interest for the period prior to the date of the award and direct the first respondent to pay the interest at 12% https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ per annum on the amount on the amount of Rs.16.50 Crores from May 2007 till the date of award i.e. 19.9.2011.

¶13

¶14

Application to direct the first respondent to deposit the following amounts awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal : (i) the award amount of Rs.16,50,00,000/-; (ii) interest amount of Rs.1,71,96,164/- from the date of award dated 19.9.2011 to 31.7.2012 at 12% per annum; and (iii) Rs.88,76,390/- towards the cost of the arbitral proceedings to the credit of O.P.No.717 of 2011 and to permit the applicant to withdraw the said amounts as and when the amounts are deposited after furnishing bank guarantee for 50% of the amount pending disposal of O.P.No.717 of 2011.

¶15

COMMON ORDER

¶16

These petitions are filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an award

¶17

passed by the Arbitral Tribunal comprising of a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, a retired Chief Justice of this Court and a

¶18

retired Judge of this Court. While the first petition is by the respondent before the Arbitrators, against whom, an award has been passed, the second petition is by the claimant, who is aggrieved by the refusal of the Tribunal to grant interest for the pre-reference and pendente lite period.

¶19

I have heard Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior Counsel

¶20

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appearing for the petitioner in the first original petition, who

¶21

suffered the award and Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel

¶22

¶23

appearing for the petitioner in the second original petition, who was the claimant before the Tribunal. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to the parties, only by their status before the Arbitral tribunal.

¶24

between the parties to arbitration are as follows :

¶25

(a) M/s.Canara Traders and Printers Private Limited, whom I

¶26

shall refer to hereinafter as the claimant for the purpose of convenience, is engaged in the business of printing;

¶27

(b) M/s.R.R.Donnelley Publishing India Private Limited,

¶28

which is the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal and which

¶29

suffered an arbitration award, is a group company of M/s.R.R.Donnelley Inc. registered in the United States of

¶30

America and having its operations in several countries such as

¶31

China, Poland, etc. I shall refer to the said company as the respondent hereinafter;

¶32

(c) According to the claimant, the respondent entrusted with the claimant, under an agreement dated 20.5.2006, the task of

¶33

printing user guide manuals on a regular basis, for the ultimate end user namely NOKIA. This agreement was preceded by an

¶34

inspection of the factory premises of the claimant by one Colin J. Fletcher, the Project Manager of the respondent and a series of correspondence in the form of e-mails;

¶35

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶36

(d) In pursuance of the said agreement, the claimant appears

¶37

¶38

to have purchased a few machines and enhanced the facilities available in its factory. The claimant also placed an order on 3.5.2006 on a company by name Indo European Machine Company for

¶39

the purchase of a Kolbus patent binding line. This was purportedly for increasing the production capacity. An advance of Rs.20 lakhs was paid for the purchase of the machine.

¶40

However, the respondent indicated subsequently that they may not

¶41

be able to provide enough business to support Kolbus line and

¶42

they wanted the claimant to cancel the order. When it was

¶43

pointed out that the cancellation of the order would result in

¶44

forfeiture of a part of the advance amount already paid, the respondent agreed to refund the said amount;

¶45

(e) According to the claimant, they also invested in a huge

¶46

property adjoining their existing unit and put up a construction to the extent of about 18,000 sq.ft., by availing loans from

¶47

banks for the purpose of segregating the unit that would exclusively serve the respondent;

¶48

(f) The claimant also purchased additional machinery such as SM 74 Heidelberg, SM 102 Heidelberg, Three Way Knief Trimmer etc., for the exclusive purpose of serving the respondent;

¶49

(g) It appears that NOKIA, for the benefit of which, the user guide manuals are to be printed, proposed to conduct an audit on 19.7.2006. According to the claimant, the respondent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ was obliged to place orders for the printing of 3 Million user

¶50

guides per month. But, they did not. Therefore, when the

¶51

¶52

overheads started mounting on the claimant, the first signs of friction appeared;

¶53

(h) Therefore, claiming that the huge investments made by them in expanding their capacity have actually started crushing them under its very weight, the claimant invoked the arbitration

¶54

clause. While the claimant nominated the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.P.Sivasubramaniam, a retired Judge of this Court, the respondent nominated the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.A.Swami, a retired Chief Justice of this Court. Both of them nominated the Hon'ble Mr.Justice B.P.Jeevan Reddy, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court as the Presiding Officer and the Arbitral Tribunal commenced proceedings on 22.6.2008.

¶55

Before the Arbitral Tribunal, the claimant filed a

¶56

statement seeking various reliefs, which are as follows :

¶57

"A. Directing the Respondent to pay the amounts detailed below towards the actual loss suffered by the Claimant on account of repaying loans, interest on loans, meeting administrative expenses, other wages and salaries (cost of production), insurance premiums, AMC charges, preferential dividend, tax on dividend, all together referred to as loss on account of commitment expenditure and interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the same. DETAILS:

¶58

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶59

(i) To pay a sum of Rs.53,75,791/- (Rupees Fifty three Lakhs seventy five thousand

¶60

¶61

seven hundred and ninety one only) towards the loss on account of commitment expenditure for the period from June 2006 to May 2007, as per Exhibit C38.

¶62

(ii) To pay a sum of Rs.4,69,52,240/(Rupees Four Crores Sixty nine Lakhs fiftytwo thousand two hundred and forty only) towards the loss on account of commitment expenditure for the period from June 2007 to May 2008, as per Exhibit C38.

¶63

(iii) To pay a sum of Rs.2,72,54,385/(Rupees Two Crores seventy-two Lakhs fiftyfour thousand three hundred and eighty-five only) towards the loss on account of commitment expenditure for the period from June 2008 to May 2009, as per Exhibit C38. (iv) To pay interest of Rs.9,67,642/(Rupees Nine Lakhs sixty seven thousand six hundred and forty two only) calculated at 18% p.a on Rs.53,75,791/- for the period June 2007 to May 2008.

¶64

(v) To pay interest at 18% p.a. on Rs.5,32,95,673/(Rs.53,75,791/+ Rs.4,69,50,240/- + Rs.9,67,642/-) for the period May 2008 till the date of realization.

¶65

(vi) To pay interest at 18% p.a. on Rs.2,72,54,385/- for the period May 2009 till date of realization.

¶66

B. (i) Directing the Respondent to pay a sum of Rs.2,37,58,524/- (Rupees Two Crores Thirty seven lakhs fifty eight thousand five

¶67

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶68

¶69

hundred and twenty four only) towards actual loss suffered on account of making margin money contribution as per Exhibit C38 and (ii) To pay interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on Rs.2,37,58,524/- for the period from June 2007 to till the date of realization.

¶70

C. (i) Directing the Respondent to pay of Rs.6,43,95,000/- (Rupees Six Crores Forty three lakhs ninety five thousand only) towards actual loss on account of loss of net profits for the period from June 2006 to May 2007, as per Exhibit C38.

¶71

(ii) To pay a sum of Rs.15,45,48,000/(Rupees Fifteen Crores forty-five Lakhs forty-eight thousand only) towards the loss

¶72

on account of loss of net profit for the period from June 2007 to May 2008, as per Exhibit C38.

¶73

(iii) To pay a sum of Rs.15,45,48,000/(Rupees Fifteen Crores forty-five Lakhs forty-eight thousand only) towards the loss on account of loss of net profit for the period from June 2008 to May 2009, as per Exhibit C38.

¶74

(iv) To pay interest of Rs.1,15,91,100/(Rupees One Crore Fifteen Lakhs ninety-one thousand one hundred only) calculated at 18% p.a. on Rs.6,43,95,000/- for the period June 2007 to May 2008.

¶75

(v) To pay interest at 18% p.a. on Rs.23,05,34,100/(Rs.6,43,95,000/+ Rs.15,45,48,000/- + 1,15,91,100/- for the

¶76

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶77

¶78

period May 2008 till the date of realization.

¶79

(vi) To pay interest at 18% p.a. on Rs.15,45,48,000/- for the period May 2009

¶80

till date of realization.

¶81

D. Directing the Respondent to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,00,000/(Rupees Two Crores and Fifty Lakhs only) towards mental agony, hardship, inconvenience and irreparable loss caused to the Claimant.

¶82

E. Directing the respondent to pay the cost of the Arbitration."

¶83

The respondent filed a detailed defence statement along

¶84

with a claim for set off. Though the caption given by the

¶85

respondent to the statement of defence read as 'Defence Statement and Claim to Set Off filed by the Respondent', the

¶86

prayer appeared to be actually one of counter claim. This can be

¶87

well appreciated only if the relevant paragraph in the defence statement namely paragraph 99 is extracted in full. Therefore,

¶88

paragraph 99 of the defence statement filed by the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal is extracted as follows :

¶89

"The Respondent has also filed a typed set of documents a list whereof is placed at Annexure-B to this defence statement. The

¶90

Respondent craves the leave of this Hon'ble

¶91

Tribunal to treat the Annexure-A and the documents referred in Annexure-B as part and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ parcel of the defence statement and claim to set-off. The Respondent also craves the

¶92

¶93

leave of this Hon'ble Tribunal to file any additional documents if the circumstances so warrant.

¶94

A. In the circumstances it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to dismiss the claims of the Claimant in these proceedings in the entirety and levy exemplary costs upon the Claimant for setting up the claims.

¶95

B. In the circumstances it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to award to the Respondent the cost of these proceedings and pass such further or other orders and thus render justice.

¶96

C. In the circumstances it is also prayed in the alternative:-

¶97

(i) to direct the Claimant to pay to the Respondent the sum of Rs.13,49,52,458.22 (Rupees Thirteen Crore Forty Nine Lakh Fifty two thousand four hundred and fifty eight and paise twenty two only) deemed to have been paid by the Respondent towards the cost of machinery and land and building up to March 2008 along with profit and interest thereon upto 18.04.2008 according to Annexure-A and to allow set off of the amount represented by the claim or any part thereof as found due against the amount due to the Respondent.

¶98

(ii) to direct the Claimant to pay interest at the rate of 18% p.a. on the sum of Rs.13,49,52,458.22 ((Rupees Thirteen Crore

¶99

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶100

¶101

Forty Nine Lakh Fifty two thousand four hundred and fifty eight and paise twenty two only) from 19.04.2008 until the date of realisation and to allow set off of the amount represented by the claim or any part thereof as found due against the amount due to the Respondent by way of such interest;

¶102

(iii) to direct the Claimant to pay to the Respondent the sum of Rs.3,09,37,523.12 (Rupees three Crore nine Lakh thirty seven thousand five hundred and twenty three and paise twelve only) deemed to have been paid by the Respondent towards the cost of machinery and land and building from April 2008 to May 2009 along with profit thereon according to Annexure-A to allow set off of the amount represented by the claim or any part thereof as found due against the amount due to the Respondent;

¶103

(iv) to direct the Claimant to pay interest severally at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of each demand payment for the machinery and the land and building in April, May, June, July, August, September, October, November and December (all 2008) and in January, February, March, April and May (all 2009) until the date of realization and to allow set off of the amount represented by the claim or any part thereof

¶104

as found due against the amount due to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Respondent by way of such interest;

¶105

(v) to direct the Claimant to pay the profits

¶106

¶107

for the year 2008-09 and to allow set off of the amount represented by the claim or any part thereof as found due against the amount due to the Respondent towards the said profit;

¶108

until the date of realization;

¶109

framed the following issues on 18.4.2009:

¶110

"1. Whether the agreement dated 20.5.2006 is liable to be impounded and dealt with in accordance with the Stamp Act, 1899 ?

¶111

2. Whether all the disputes raised by

¶112

the claimant are subject matter and arise from the agreement dated 20.5.2006 ?

¶113

3. (a) Whether the claimant and the respondent had discussions and

¶114

correspondence regarding printing of user guides by the claimant to be supplied to the respondent during the months February 2006 to May 2006 ?

¶115

affirmative, whether in such discussions and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in the correspondence exchanged, the respondent had indicated that the claimant

¶116

¶117

should purchase additional/new machinery and improve their infrastructure for establishing business relationship between the claimant and the respondent for printing and supply of user guides by the claimant to

¶118

the respondent?

¶119

(c) Whether the claimant and the respondent had entered into a written agreement dated 20.5.2006 pursuant to the discussions, wherein the respondent, according to the claimant, had committed to place orders for specific quantity of user guides as mentioned in Appendix 4 of the agreement ?

¶120

(d) Whether the correspondence,

¶121

communications, arrangements and agreements of the parties prior to the agreement dated (i.e. 20.5.2006) cannot be considered by the Tribunal in view of the provisions of Clause 27 of the agreement?

¶122

4. (a) Whether the respondent had informed the claimant prior to the agreement dated 20.5.2006 that the said agreement was subject to approval by NOKIA in their audit ?

¶123

(b) Whether the working and

¶124

enforceability of the agreement dated 20.5.2006 was subject to the claimant's facilities being approved by NOKIA in their audit as claimed by the respondent ?

¶125

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶126

(c) Whether the claimant was ever rejected by NOKIA and whether the alleged

¶127

¶128

rejection was informed to the claimant as claimed by the respondent ?

¶129

(d) Whether the claimant's facility was not approved by NOKIA for printing of user guides ?

¶130

5. (a) Whether the agreements to supply user guides had become otiose as claimed by the respondent in paragraph 5(a) of their defence statement ?

¶131

(b) Whether the agreement dated 20.5.2006 continues to be in force till May 2009 and is binding on the parties ?

¶132

(c) Whether Appendix 4 to the agreement dated 20.5.2006 became otiose and non functional and the claimant acquiesced thereto ?

¶133

6. Whether the respondent had terminated the agreement at that point in time when allegedly the claimant was rejected by NOKIA in their audit ?

¶134

7. Whether the respondent had continued to place orders for user guides and accepted supply of the same from the claimant even after the alleged rejection of the claimant by NOKIA ?

¶135

8. Whether the respondent is not guilty of committing fraud, cheating and deceit in the event of the agreement being otiose pursuant to the alleged rejection of the claimant by NOKIA ?

¶136

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶137

9. (a) Whether the claimant proves that the respondent had failed to place orders to

¶138

¶139

the entire quantity as per commitments in Appendix 4 during the months when partial orders were placed and thereby committed a breach of contract ?

¶140

(b) Whether the respondent had breached

¶141

the contract by not placing orders in contravention of the commitment in Appendix 4 as alleged by the claimant ?

¶142

(c) Assuming Appendix 4 subsists, whether the claimant breached the conditions in the said Appendix?

¶143

10. (a) Whether the respondent was satisfied with production and process capabilities of the claimant and if so, whether the respondent not placing orders is for reasons other than this ?

¶144

(b) Whether the claimant had the 'process capability' to print 3 Million user guides per month ?

¶145

11. (a) Whether the quality issues raised by the respondent were only occasional feed-backs for correctional exercise, in the normal course of this business and huge volume of work executed ?

¶146

(b) Whether the claimant failed to supply products according to the quality and quantitative requirements of the respondent ?

¶147

12. (a) Whether the respondent has willfully breached the terms of the contract https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dated 20.5.2006 ?

¶148

(b) Whether the claimant had suffered

¶149

¶150

loss of income/revenue because of the respondent breaching the terms of the contract and not placing orders ?

¶151

(c) Whether the claimant is entitled to recover the cost of machinery and other incidental expenses incurred for performing its obligation under the agreement from its revenue/income to be generated by doing business with respondent as per the agreement ?

¶152

(d) Whether the claimant is entitled to the profits that it has earned and it would have earned if the respondent had not willfully breached the contract and continued to place orders as per Appendix 4 of the agreement ?

¶153

(e) Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs/ prayer sought for in the claim statement ?

¶154

(f) Whether the claimant is entitled to claim (i) for loss of profits and opportunities; (ii) compensation; and (iii) interest under the agreement dated 20.5.2006 ?

¶155

13. Whether the agreement dated 20.5.2006 prescribes any conditional obligation on the claimant to obtain loans or purchase of machinery, immovable property, etc. ?

¶156

14. Whether the respondent is entitled https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to set off ?

¶157

15. Whether the respondent is entitled

¶158

¶159

to interest on the set off ? and

¶160

16. To what other reliefs ?

¶161

The claimant examined its Managing Director by name

¶162

Manjunath V.Shanbhag as their first witness - C.W.1. They also

¶163

examined one B.Chandramouli, who was the Finance Manager as

¶164

C.W.2 and Mr.M.Krishnasamy, who was the Cost Accountant as C.W.3. The Deputy General Manager of the respondent company by

¶165

name Sanjeev K.Sharma was examined as R.W.1. on the side of the

¶166

respondent. A total of about 149 documents were filed on the

¶167

side of the claimant. The respondent produced about 80 documents. Thereafter, the Hon'ble Mr.Justice B.P.Jeevan Reddy and the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.P.Sivasubramaniam, by a majority

¶168

award passed on 19.9.2011, directed the respondent (i) to pay damages to the claimant to the tune of Rs.16.5 Crores; (ii) to

¶169

pay interest at 12% per annum from the date of the award till the date of payment; and (iii) to pay Rs.88,76,390/- towards costs.

¶170

But, by a separate award dated 19.9.2011, the Hon'ble Mr.Justice K.A. Swami assessed the quantum of damages payable by the respondent to the claimant at Rs.9,43,33,320/-. However, even the minority award directed payment of interest at 12% per annum from the date of the award and assessed costs of Rs.88,76,390/-.

¶171

Aggrieved by the award in entirety, the respondent has https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶172

come up with the petition in O.P.No.717 of 2011. The claimant

¶173

¶174

has come up with O.P.No.433 of 2012 on the ground that the Tribunal was wrong in not awarding interest for the period upto the date of the award.

¶175

As seen from paragraph 19 of the majority award, the majority took up the following issues first for consideration :-

¶176

ii. Whether the claimant failed to pass the NOKIA Audit ?

¶177

intimated by the respondent to the claimant ? and

¶178

v. Further, whether the claimant had acquiesced in the said situation ?"

¶179

Towards the end of paragraph 19, the majority of the Arbitral Tribunal indicated that the above issues taken up first

¶180

for consideration are covered by issues 3(a), (b), (c), (d), 4 (a), (b), (c), (d), 5(a), (b), (c) and 6 and 7. The discussion on all the above issues is found in paragraphs 19 to 37 of the majority award.

¶181

In paragraph 38, the majority considered issue No.3 in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ entirety. In paragraph 39 of the award, the majority dealt with

¶182

¶183

issues 10 and 11. From paragraph 43 onwards, the majority

¶184

discussed issue 12(a). Thereafter, the majority proceeded to deal with the quantum of damages, the claim for interest and costs.

¶185

The minority award is also equally elaborate running to

¶186

about 100 pages. It appears that the learned Arbitrator had the benefit of the majority award before pronouncing his minority award. On issue No.8, which related to the question as to

¶187

whether the respondent was guilty of committing fraud, cheating and deceit, the minority had something to say specifically. In paragraphs 59 to 61 and 63 of his separate minority view, the learned Arbitrator held as follows :

¶188

"59.Hence, I am of the view that there was no willful misconduct or dishonest intention or any hidden agenda of the respondent in entering into agreement Ex.C.17 with the claimant. Failure to place orders by the respondent would only amount to gross negligence as pointed out earlier.

¶189

60. On these grounds only, I agree with the findings recorded by our esteemed Third & Presiding Arbitrator Hon'ble Mr.Justice Jeevan Reddy that there was breach of the agreement committed by the respondent by gross negligence.

¶190

61. This conclusion of mine would also be

¶191

sufficient to answer Issue No.8 by holding https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the respondent was not guilty of

¶192

¶193

committing fraud, cheating and deceit in entering into an agreement Ex.C.17. The mere fact of failure to inform the claimant about its rejection by Nokia would not amount to either fraud or cheating or deceit but it is only gross negligence. Further, as it was pointed out earlier Nokia Audit of the Claimant Facility was not a condition precedent for continuing the agreement.

¶194

........... 63. Mere fact that the respondent informed the claimant that it was establishing in-house facility for binding Nokia User Guides, if at all the claimant was serious and sincere to conform to the terms of the agreement and claim damages on the basis that 30 lakhs Nokia User Guides; it was required of the claimant to possess process capabilities as required by Appendix 4, and maintain quality control as required by Appendix 3. To this extent, the claimant cannot also be held to have complied with the terms of the agreement so as to claim as of right, damages on the basis of 30 lakh Nokia User Guides. This aspect also belies the contention of the claimant that there was willful misconduct or malicious intention or fraudulent conduct, cheating and deceit on the part of the respondent. Therefore, Issue No.8 has to be held against the claimant. Accordingly, it is, answered that the respondent is not guilty of committing

¶195

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶196

¶197

fraud, cheating and deceit."

¶198

After so holding, the learned Arbitrator, who

¶199

constituted the minority, proceeded to give a finding in respect of some of the issues, which can be tabulated for easy appreciation as follows :

¶200

*Issue* *No.*	*Issue*	*Finding of Minority*
3(b)	(b) If 3(a) is answered in the affirmative, whether in such discussions and in the correspondence exchanged, the respondent had indicated that	The claimant had to purchase additional/new machineries to comply with the undertaking and to meet the conditions of
	the claimant should purchase	the agreement for which
	additional/new machinery and improve their infrastructure for establishing business relationship between the	the respondent cannot be held responsible nor it can be held that it was the respondent who
	claimant and the respondent	insisted upon the
	for printing and supply of user guides by the claimant to the respondent?	claimant to purchase additional /new machineries. All that the
		claimant did was to comply with the
		undertaking in Ex.C10 and the terms and conditions of agreement Ex.C17.

¶201

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶202

¶203

*Issue* *No.*	*Issue*	*Finding of Minority*
4(c) and 4 (d)	(c) Whether the claimant was ever rejected by NOKIA and whether the alleged rejection was informed to the claimant as claimed by the respondent ? (d) Whether the claimant's facility was not approved by NOKIA for printing of user guides ?	The respondent had not informed the claimant prior to or after the agreement that approval by Nokia Audit was necessary for the enforceability of the agreement, but it is proved that the Nokia has rejected the claimant's Facility for Nokia User Guides. However, this fact was not informed to the claimant. It was not a condition precedent for enforceability of the agreement.
5(b)	Whether the agreement dated 20.5.2006 continues to be in force till May 2009 and is binding on the parties ?	In the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence of termination of the agreement by the respondent, the agreement was in operation till the end of the period mentioned therein. The issue No.5(b) is answered accordingly. Accordingly, the second part of period of damages would be from May 2007 to 20th May 2009 which comes to 24 months and 20 days.

¶204

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶205

¶206

*Issue* *No.*	*Issue*	*Finding of Minority*
7	Whether the respondent had continued to place orders for user guides and accepted supply of the same from the claimant even after the alleged rejection of the claimant by NOKIA ?	Though, the claimant did not execute any agreement pursuant to Ex.C19, however, orders came to be placed by the respondent for Nokia UGs on ad-hoc basis as stated in Ex.C19. Thereafter the respondent appears to have stopped placing orders due to QC problems in processing the product and the lack of process capability of the claimant.
9(c)	(c) Assuming Appendix 4 subsists, whether the claimant breached the conditions in the said Appendix?	As such, claimant committed breach of Appendix 4 and Appendix 3 and also warranty clause
		as contained Section 16 of the agreement. The respondent also committee breach of Appendix 4 as it failed to place orders as per Appendix 4. Thus, in this way, both the parties committed breach of the terms of the agreement. Issue No.9(c) is answered accordingly.
10(a) & 10 (b)	10. (a) Whether the respondent was satisfied with production and process capabilities of the claimant and if so, whether the respondent not placing orders is for reasons other than this ? (b) Whether the claimant had the 'process capability' to print 3 Million user guides per month ?	There was no other reason for the respondent except those mentioned above i.e., absence of quality control and lack of processing capability, for not placing orders as per Appendix 4.

¶207

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶208

¶209

*Issue* *No.*	*Issue*	*Finding of Minority*
11(a) and	11. (a) Whether the quality issues raised by the	Admittedly, the claimant did not possess the
11(b)	respondent were only occasional feed-backs for correctional exercise, in the normal course of this business and huge volume of work executed ? (b) Whether the claimant failed to supply products according to the quality and quantitative requirements of the respondent ?	required processing capability as peer Appendix 4. Consequently, it follows that the claimant failed to supply products according to the required quality and quantity of the respondent as per the terms of the agreement Ex.C17. Thus, issue No.11 (a) and 11(b) are answered accordingly and against the claimant.
12(a)	(a) Whether the respondent has willfully breached the terms of the contract dated	Accordingly it is held that there was no willful breach of the terms of
	20.5.2006 ?	the agreement by the respondent, it was only due to gross negligence.
		Issue No.12(a) is answered in the negative.

¶210

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶211

¶212

*Issue* *No.*	*Issue*	*Finding of Minority*
12(b) to 12 (f)	(b) Whether the claimant had suffered loss of income/revenue because of the respondent breaching the terms of the contract and not placing orders ? (c) Whether the claimant is entitled to recover the cost of machinery and other incidental expenses incurred for performing its obligation under the agreement from its revenue/income to be generated by doing business with	Accordingly these issues will be taken up under the heading "Damages".
	respondent as per the agreement ?(d) Whether the claimant is entitled to the profits that it has earned and it would have earned if the respondent had not willfully breached the contract and continued to place orders as per Appendix 4 of the agreement ? (e) Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs/ prayer sought for in the claim statement ? (f) Whether the claimant is entitled to claim (i) for loss of profits and opportunities; (ii) compensation; and (iii) interest under the agreement dated 20.5.2006 ?

¶213

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶214

¶215

*Issue* *No.* *Issue* *Finding of Minority*
13 Whether the agreement dated 20.5.2006 prescribes any conditional obligation on the claimant to obtain loans or purchase of machinery, immovable property, etc. ? It cannot be said that the agreement placed any conditional obligation on the claimant to obtain loans for purchase of machinery/immovable property etc. If, in fulfilling these conditional obligations the claimant had raised loans, purchased machineries/immovable properties, it cannot be interpreted that the
agreement imposed such conditional obligations. Accordingly, Issue No.13
is answered in the negative and against the claimant.
14 Whether the respondent is entitled to set off ? For the reasons stated in the award and the damages awarded to the claimant,
the respondent is not entitled to set off as claimed by it. Issue No.14 is answered in the negative.
15. It is on the basis of the above findings that the minority Arbitrator awarded a lesser amount of compensation than
what was awarded by the majority. However, there were
substantial differences in the findings between the majority and
the minority. While the majority found that the respondent was
guilty of fraud, the minority rejected the allegation of fraud.
While the majority held that there were willful misconduct and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶216

¶217

gross negligence on the part of the respondent within the meaning of Section 24 of the agreement entitling the claimant to seek damages, the minority held that there was only gross negligence.

¶218

Keeping the above factual matrix in mind, I shall now

¶219

consider the grounds of challenge of the respondent to the award.

¶220

GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE OF THE RESPONDENT :

¶221

Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

¶222

the respondent, assailed the award of the Arbitral Tribunal primarily on the following grounds :

¶223

(i) the Arbitral Tribunal failed to answer several issues such as issue Nos.1, 2, 9(a), 9(b), 9(c), 10(a), 10(b), 11(b),

¶224

12(b), 12(c), 12(d), 13, 14 and 15. The Tribunal did not also

¶225

consider the counter claim. Therefore, the award is not a considered and complete award, as pointed out by the Supreme

¶226

Court in K.V.George Vs. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department [1989 (4) SCC 595];

¶227

(ii) The agreement Ex.C.17 dated 20.5.2006 was not duly

¶228

stamped and despite the same being pointed out, the Tribunal proceeded to hear the matter and passed an award without the deficiency being removed;

¶229

(iii) The award goes beyond the terms and conditions of the contract and hence, it is vitiated;

¶230

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (iv) When it is established by evidence and also accepted by

¶231

the minority Arbitrator that the claimant did not even have the

¶232

¶233

capacity to manufacture the volume allegedly promised under Appendix 4 to the agreement, the award of the majority proceeding on the basis that a minimum quantity was assured and that the failure to place orders for the supply of minimum quantity would result in the award of damages, is not correct;

¶234

and

¶235

contrary to law and the public policy.

¶236

appearing for the claimant contended -

¶237

(i) that all the issues have been answered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the course of discussion;

¶238

(ii) that even if a party to an arbitration feels that any

¶239

of the claims presented in the proceedings has been omitted to

¶240

be considered, he must have taken recourse to the procedure

¶241

prescribed by Section 33(4) of the Act, without which, a challenge cannot be made under Section 34;

¶242

(iii) that in so far as the issue of stamp duty is concerned, the same should be taken to have been given up, in

¶243

view of the fact that the respondent also filed the copy of the agreement as Ex.R.9 on their side;

¶244

(iv) that the majority recorded a clear finding of gross

¶245

negligence and wilful misconduct on the basis of the pleadings https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and evidence on record and hence, the award was strictly in

¶246

terms of the contract between the parties;

¶247

¶248

(v) that the majority rightly found that a minimum quantity was assured and that the respondent failed to honour the commitment; and

¶249

(vi) that the principles of damages adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal were in tune with the law.

¶250

I have carefully considered the rival submissions. I shall now take up the contentions one after another.

¶251

CONTENTION NO.1 :

¶252

The first contention of Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent is that the Arbitral

¶253

Tribunal did not even answer many of the issues such as 1, 2, 4

¶254

(d), 9(a) to (c), 10(a), 10(b), 11(b), 12(b) to (d), 13, 14 and

¶255

There was a counter claim by the respondent and the same was

¶256

also not considered. Therefore, Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the

¶257

whole award is vitiated as held by the Supreme Court in K.V.George.

¶258

But in response, Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel

¶259

appearing for the claimant presented a tabulation containing the

¶260

issues and the paragraphs of arbitral award where they were specifically dealt with.

¶261

In other words, the contention of the learned Senior

¶262

Counsel appearing for the respondent is seriously challenged https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ even on facts by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

¶263

claimant.

¶264

¶265

I do not think it is necessary to tabulate each of the issues and the findings recorded in relation thereto. To the extent that is sufficient, I have indicated in my discussion supra, the paragraphs, in which, both the majority and the minority had recorded findings in relation to many of the issues.

¶266

There can be no quarrel about the proposition that the

¶267

procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to the proceedings before an Arbitral Tribunal. Under the Civil Procedure Code, a civil court is obliged to frame issues under Order XIV Rule 1. Order XIV Rule 2, CPC mandates that a court shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-Rule (2) of

¶268

Rule 2, pronounce judgment on all issues. Even an appellate court is obliged under Order XLI Rule 31 to state the points for consideration, the decision thereon and the reasons for the

¶269

decision. These mandatory requirements that are applicable to civil courts are not applicable to arbitral proceedings.

¶270

Therefore, the fact that each of the issues is not separately tabulated and a finding separately recorded against each one of them, is not a ground to conclude that the award is vitiated.

¶271

The decision of the Supreme Court in K.V.George, cannot be applied to the facts of the case. The said case arose out of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It was a case where the arbitrator https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ passed an award in the first instance, allowing the main claim

¶272

of the claimant but keeping in reserve the counter claim Nos. 1

¶273

¶274

and 2 to be dealt with and considered separately. The claimant filed an application under Section 14 of the 1940 Act, for making the award, a rule of the Court. When the respondent

¶275

objected on the ground that the counter claims had not been considered, the Court remitted the Reference back to the Arbitrator for a fresh consideration. In the meantime, a second arbitration was initiated with regard to the termination of the contract. A separate award was passed, leading to the filing of a fresh petition before the Court for making the second award also a rule of Court. The matter ultimately landed up before the Supreme Court raising very serious issues such as res judicata as well as principles behind Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is in that context that the Supreme Court considered in para 12, the validity of the order of the trial Court allowing an application for Review by which the

¶276

earlier order of remand was recalled and a decree in terms of the award passed. Therefore, the principles on the basis of which the Supreme Court rendered its decision in K.V.George, cannot be invoked in the present case. Hence, the first

¶277

contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent is liable to be rejected.

¶278

In so far as the counter claim made by the respondent is

¶279

concerned, the respondent themselves committed a mistake. In the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ defence statement, the respondent claimed that they were

¶280

actually seeking a set off. I have already extracted a portion

¶281

¶282

of the written statement of defence filed by the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal. It can be found from the same that what the respondent sought was not set off, but only a counter claim.

¶283

When the whole claim of the claimant was for the award

¶284

of damages, the question of seeking set off would not arise. But unfortunately, the respondent themselves proceeded to brand their claim as set off.

¶285

The Tribunal framed issue Nos. 14 and 15 in relation to

¶286

the counter claim made by the respondent. Though the Majority

¶287

Award was not very specific in its finding with regard to issue Nos. 14 and 15, paragraph 60 of the Majority Award contains an indication which reads as follows:-

¶288

"he also spoke to the plea of set off put forward by the respondent. From his crossexamination, no particular portions are brought to our notice as being relevant on the issue".

¶289

However, the Minority was categorical in its finding. In

¶290

paragraph 92 of his independent award, the Minority Arbitrator specifically rejected the claim for set off. Therefore, this is not a case where no finding was recorded with respect to set off

¶291

or counter claim. In Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen [AIR

¶292

1963 SC 1677] , relied upon by Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ counsel for the claimant, it was held that once an award, on its

¶293

face, intended and purported to decide all disputes raised for

¶294

¶295

adjudication, the Court will presume that every claim made or defence raised was considered. Though the said decision arose under the 1940 Act, under which the Arbitrators were not even obliged to record reasons, the underlying principle is that Arbitrators, unlike Judges, are privileged to pass brief awards, that could be sustained in proceedings challenging the same.

¶296

On this issue, Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel for the Claimant also relied upon the provisions of Section 33 of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 33 enables a party to the arbitration proceedings, to request the Arbitral Tribunal within

¶297

30 days from the receipt of the Arbitral Award, to make an additional award as to claims presented in the Arbitral Tribunal but omitted in the Arbitral Award. Sub-section (5) enables the

¶298

Arbitral Tribunal to consider such a request, if it is justified and to make the additional Arbitral Award within sixty days of the receipt of the request.

¶299

As a matter of fact, the respondent could not have invoked Section 33(4) and made a request to the Arbitral Tribunal to consider the claims that were omitted from the Award. This is on account of the fact that in paragraph 60 of

¶300

the Majority Award and in paragraph 92 of the Minority Award, the Arbitral Tribunal had rejected the counter claim. At least the award of the Minority is very clear to this effect and hence

¶301

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the respondent could not have invoked Section 33(4) of the Act.

¶302

As a matter of fact, Section 33(4) of the Act is not

¶303

¶304

intended to provide a remedy of Review. Perhaps, it is intended to deal with situations where a finding is recorded with regard to a particular claim, but the same is not carried into effect in the form of a specific award. A careful look at the language of Section 33(4) of the Act would show that it does not use the expression "non-consideration" or "failure to consider" . The last portion of sub-section (4) reads as follows:-

¶305

Ltd., [2006 (11) SCC 181] , the Supreme Court laid down the conditions under which Section 33(4) could be invoked as

¶306

follows:-

¶307

"(1) There is no contrary agreement between the parties to the Reference;

¶308

(2) A party to the Reference makes a request to the Arbitral Tribunal after notice

¶309

days; and

¶310

(4) The Arbitral Tribunal considers the request to be justified".

¶311

The very reason why the respondent had not invoked

¶312

Section 33(4) of the Act is that rightly or wrongly issue Nos.14 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶313

and 15 have been answered against them, though not in the manner

¶314

¶315

one would have expected a quasi judicial Tribunal to do. Therefore, the first ground of attack to the Arbitration Award cannot be sustained.

¶316

CONTENTION NO.2 :

¶317

The second ground of attack to the arbitration award is

¶318

that the agreement between the parties marked as Ex.C.17 was not

¶319

duly stamped and that therefore, the proceedings could not have

¶320

gone on, without the agreement being impounded and the deficiency rectified.

¶321

But, as rightly contended by Mr.G.Masilamani, learned

¶322

Senior Counsel appearing for the claimant, both parties filed copies of the same agreement dated 20.5.2006 as exhibits. While

¶323

the claimant marked it as Ex.C.17, the respondent also marked it as Ex.R.9. It was marked on the side of the claimant, through C.W.1. At that time, there was no protest. There was also no

¶324

cross examination of C.W.1., on the question of admissibility of the document. In any case, the respondent also referred to and

¶325

relied upon the very same agreement in their defence statement. A copy of the agreement was also produced by the respondent

¶326

along with the defence statement. The proof affidavit of R.W.1

¶327

referred to the agreement and consequently, the agreement was marked as Ex.R.9 even on their side. The claimant did not object

¶328

to the marking of this document even on the side of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respondent.

¶329

Under Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, once an

¶330

¶331

instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. Section 61(1) of the Act provides for a suo motu power of revision upon an appellate court. Such a contingency has not arisen in this case.

¶332

In Hindustan Steel Ltd vs M/S. Dalip Construction

¶333

Company [ 1969 (1) SCC 597], it has been held that the Stamp

¶334

Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State

¶335

on certain classes of instruments. It is not enacted to arm a

¶336

litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the case of his

¶337

opponent. The stringent provisions of the Act are conceived in the interest of the revenue. Once that object is secured

¶338

according to law, the party staking his claim on the instrument will not be defeated on the ground of the initial defect in the instrument.

¶339

In any case, the agreement in question, according to the respondent, ought to have been made on stamp papers of the value of Rs.60/-. It was typed on stamp papers of the value of

¶340

Rs.20/-. Therefore, it is contended by the claimant that under

¶341

Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, the claimant can, at the most, be called upon to pay the deficit stamp duty with penalty, which may not exceed 10 times the deficit duty.

¶342

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 40. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent

¶343

places reliance upon a decision of this Court in Yasodammal Vs.

¶344

¶345

Janaki Ammal [AIR 1968 Madras 294] and two decisions of the

¶346

Supreme Court, one in Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra [2009 (2) SCC 532] and another in S.M.S. Tea Estates Private Limited Vs. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited [2011 (14) SCC 66].

¶347

In Yasodammal, a Division Bench of this Court was

¶348

concerned with an appeal arising out of a suit for title. The defendant resisted the suit on the basis of an agreement of sale and the benefit of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.

¶349

It was in that context that the Division Bench held that in the

¶350

case of an unstamped document, the prohibition contained in Section 35 was absolute and wide. But, the Division Bench did

¶351

not deal with the effect of Section 36. In any case, the case before the Division Bench was not one where both parties had marked the very same agreement as exhibits on their sides.

¶352

In Avinash Kumar Chauhan, the Supreme Court was

¶353

concerned with a mere suit for recovery of money. The claim was based upon an unregistered and insufficiently stamped sale agreement, that could not be enforced on account of the refusal

¶354

of the District Collector to grant permission for such a sale,

¶355

as it was a protected tribal land. The District Court, upon production of the agreement of sale, impounded the document directing the plaintiff to deposit the unpaid duty along with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ penalty. The plaintiff filed a revision before the High Court,

¶356

but the same was dismissed. It was his special leave petition

¶357

¶358

that came up before the Supreme Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan. An argument was advanced in the said case that the document was admissible for collateral purposes. But, rejecting the said contention, the Supreme Court held that the purpose for which a

¶359

document is sought to be admitted in evidence, is not a relevant factor for invoking Section 35.

¶360

But again, Avinash Kumar Chauhan is not a case where

¶361

both parties marked the very same document as exhibits on their

¶362

respective sides and both parties allowed the proceedings to conclude in the Court/Tribunal of first instance. Therefore, the situation is not comparable.

¶363

where both parties marked the copies of the very same document as exhibits.

¶364

As a matter of fact, the respondent had also relied upon

¶365

the very same agreement, in support of the core defence taken by them before the Arbitral Tribunal. The respondent was not merely

¶366

a defendant in the Arbitral proceedings. They were also plaintiffs in the sense that they made a counter claim.

¶367

Therefore, Ex.R-9 was marked on the side of the respondent, not merely as a shield but also a sword. All the contentions of the respondent revolved around Appendix 4 to the agreement and some of the sections such as section 5 and 20 of the agreement. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Therefore, after having marked the very same agreement as Ex.R.9

¶368

and after having invited the Arbitral Tribunal to the various

¶369

¶370

covenants in the agreement, for the purpose of establishing not only their defence, but also their claim for set off/counter claim, it is not open to the respondent now to contend that the arbitral award is vitiated in view of Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. Therefore, even the second ground of attack to the award cannot be sustained.

¶371

CONTENTION NO.3 :

¶372

The third ground of attack is that the award goes beyond

¶373

the terms and conditions of the agreement. This argument is advanced on the ground that under Section 20 of the agreement dated 20.5.2006, liability is restricted only in cases of gross negligence and willful misconduct. According to the respondent, this Section 20 does not entitle the claimant for loss of profits.

¶374

The grievance of the respondent is that after

¶375

reproducing the argument of the claimant on gross negligence and willful misconduct respectively in paragraphs 42 and 44, the

¶376

Arbitral Tribunal reached a conclusion in paragraph 45, without reference to the submissions of the respondent. Therefore, the

¶377

contention of Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent is that there is no consideration of the defence raised by the respondent to the plea of gross negligence and willful misconduct.

¶378

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 48. If the majority award suffered from non-consideration of

¶379

the contentions of the respondent, the minority award actually

¶380

¶381

recorded a finding in favour of the respondent that there was no willful misconduct or dishonest intention. Still, the minority held that the respondent is liable on account of gross negligence.

¶382

Therefore, the conclusions of the majority as well as

¶383

the minority are assailed by the respondent primarily on the following grounds namely (a) that the majority failed to consider the defence of the respondent, before coming to the conclusion that there were gross negligence and willful misconduct; and (b) that the minority, after holding that there was no willful misconduct and after holding that the claimant did not have the capacity to produce 3 Million user guides and

¶384

that the claimant did not even have quality control requirements, passed an award for payment of damages, based upon the available capacity of 1.72 Million user guides.

¶385

In response to the above contentions, it is argued by

¶386

Mr.G.Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

¶387

claimant that there were specific pleadings in the claim statement of the claimant accusing the respondent of gross negligence and willful misconduct; that at least on the question of gross negligence, there was concurrence of opinion between the majority and the minority; that in paragraph 43 of the

¶388

majority award, the Arbitral Tribunal considered the defence of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the respondent before arriving at a finding; that the finding of

¶389

the minority both with regard to the capacity of the claimant to

¶390

¶391

make 3 Million user guides and with regard to quality control requirements, are not in tune with the evidence on record; that no quality control issues were ever put forth by the respondent as a reason for not placing orders or for committing breach of

¶392

contract; that quality control issues were raised for the first

¶393

time in the defence statement; and that therefore, the third contention is not well founded.

¶394

I have carefully considered the above submissions.

¶395

At the outset, it should be pointed out that the very

¶396

fact that the majority recorded a finding against the respondent

¶397

both with regard to gross negligence and willful misconduct and

¶398

that the minority recorded a finding that there was gross negligence alone would go to show that the evidence on record as

¶399

well as the rival contentions were meticulously taken into account. Time and again, Courts have held that arbitral awards

¶400

are not like judgments of civil courts, covering each and every aspect, with reference to each and every material placed before the Tribunal. What falls for consideration in a petition under

¶401

Section 34 is as to whether or not, there was overall

¶402

appreciation of the crucial material on record by the Arbitral Tribunal for arriving at a finding.

¶403

It is seen from paragraph 39 of the majority award that

¶404

the issue relating to quality control was taken up despite the

¶405

fact that it was raised for the first time in the defence https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶406

statement. In paragraph 40, the Tribunal took into account the

¶407

¶408

letter dated 25.4.2006 marked as Ex.C.12 and the Audit Inspection Report as well as the letter dated 11.5.2006 marked as Ex.C.14, to come to the conclusion that the claimant passed the ISO Audit. In paragraph 41, the majority took into account Ex.R.79 and came to the conclusion that the suggestion for improvement made therein was not in respect of a major defect. One observation was found to have been made not against the claimant, but against the respondent. It is only after analyzing all these that the majority came to the conclusion in paragraph 42 that issues relating to quality and quantity did not

¶409

constitute the basis for denying the work to the claimant as contemplated by Ex.C.17.

¶410

In paragraph 43 of its award, the majority took note of Section 20 of the agreement. In the same paragraph, the majority listed out certain defects, from which, gross negligence could be inferred. It was in one of the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 43, the majority recorded a finding that there was no indication

¶411

of NOKIA Audit being a pre-condition for the agreement. Consequently, the majority concluded that the contention of the respondent could not be true.

¶412

As a matter of fact, the majority has pointed out that

¶413

there was a discrepancy between what was pleaded by the

¶414

respondent in the defence statement and what was argued in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ course of hearing. Towards the end of paragraph 43, the majority

¶415

has pointed out that while the defence statement raised a plea

¶416

¶417

of failure on the part of the claimant with reference to the first audit conducted on 15.6.2006, the respondent shifted their stand at the time of arguments by attributing the failure, to the audit held on 19.7.2006. Therefore, I do not think that

¶418

there is any non-consideration on the part of the majority, of the defence raised by the respondent.

¶419

It is true that the minority differed from the majority

¶420

in so far as the finding with regard to willful misconduct is

¶421

concerned. Still, the minority arrived at the very same conclusion that the claimant was entitled to damages. In such

¶422

circumstances, I am of the view that the third contention cannot

¶423

be upheld especially in the light of the scope of enquiry under Section 34.

¶424

The reliance placed by Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned Senior

¶425

Counsel appearing for the respondent on the decision of the

¶426

Supreme Court in Seth Thawardas Pherumal Vs. Union of India [AIR

¶427

1955 SC 468] in this regard, does not appeal to me. The said

¶428

case concerned mutual obligations. It arose out of a contract

¶429

entered into by a contractor with the Dominion of India (pre-

¶430

independence days) for the supply of bricks to the Central Public Works Department. There was a delivery schedule for the

¶431

contractor and a reciprocal promise on the part of the Public Works Department to remove the bricks as soon as they were ready https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for delivery. The Arbitrator found that there was a failure on

¶432

the part of the Central Public Works Department to remove the

¶433

¶434

baked bricks. Consequently, there was delay in the contractor supplying the material. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the contractor had a duty under Section 73 of the Contract Act

¶435

to minimize the loss by removing the bricks by himself. While holding so, the Court pointed out that under the terms of the

¶436

contract, the Government was made not liable for any loss occasioned by a consequence that was remote. The Court held that

¶437

if there is an express term in the contract, the contractor must

¶438

be tied down to it.

¶439

But, in the case on hand, the majority found that it was

¶440

a case of both gross negligence and willful misconduct. The

¶441

minority award did not go to the rescue of the respondent in full. Therefore, I am of the view that the third ground of attack cannot also be upheld.

¶442

CONTENTION NO.4 :

¶443

The next contention of the respondent is that there was

¶444

a gross mis-interpretation of the contents of Appendix 4 to the

¶445

agreement dated 20.5.2006. According to the respondent, Section 5 of the agreement dated 20.5.2006 made it clear that what was

¶446

contemplated under the agreement was only a forecast. It was

¶447

made clear in Section 5 of the agreement that the forecasts indicated therein are not to be taken as offers for the purchase of products. But, the majority proceeded on the basis that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 5 and Appendix 4 are to be treated as mutually exclusive

¶448

and that there was no obligation to place orders on the part of

¶449

¶450

the respondent.

¶451

In this connection, the respondent raises one more argument that even assuming that the respondent is obliged to place orders as per Appendix 4, the claimant was obliged to ramp up its capacity and that these terms of the agreement constituted reciprocal promises in terms of Sections 51 and 52 of the Indian Contract Act. The respondent contends that once it is found that the claimant never ramped up the capacity to reach 3 Million user guides at any point of time, the question of enforcement of the promise, even if there was one under Appendix 4, did not arise.

¶452

For finding out whether the above contentions would hold good, it is necessary to take a look at Section 5 of and Appendix 4 to the agreement. Hence, they are extracted as follows :

¶453

"Section 5 : Ordering, Logistics and Term of Delivery :

¶454

The parties shall comply with the separate mutually agreed ordering and logistics procedure(s). R.R.D. provides Canara Printers with forecast(s) of R.R.D's anticipated need for products. Canara Printers agrees to use the forecast(s) to determine its manufacturing capacity requirements for products. Canara

¶455

Enterprises shall, without delay, confirm in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ writing to what extent Canara Printers

¶456

¶457

agrees to meet such forecast(s). Canara Printers agrees that forecasts referred to in Section 5 and other forecasts are not offers to purchase products and are not binding on R.R.D., unless otherwise mutually agreed. R.R.D. shall not have any minimum ordering and/or purchase commitment for products. Canara Printers agree not to refuse to deliver products in accordance with purchase orders that have been placed in accordance with this agreement. Appendix 4 - Start up Conditions Monthly user guide capacity ramp up at Canara Printers : 2006 July 3,00,000 August 6,00,000 September 10,00,000 October 15,00,000 November 20,00,000 December 25,00,000

¶458

January 2007 30,00,000

¶459

Thereafter 3,000,000 every month. Canara Printers agrees to reserve this capacity for R.R.D., for a minimum period of 36 months from the date of agreement.

¶460

R.R.D. will fill this capacity providing that Canara Printers pricing remains competitive and that R.R.D.'s client's demands remain significantly above this capacity level.

¶461

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶462

¶463

R.R.D. recognise the investment in equipment Canara Printers has made to enable the technical documentation production.

¶464

R.R.D. will assist Canara Printers with

¶465

a forward payment on orders to the value of $100,000. This will be covered by separate agreement.

¶466

Pricing : Prices will be set as per Price Matrix. The first pricing/cost review will take place in July 2006 and will be on an 'open book' basis during which Canara Printers will share the costs of production with R.R.D."

¶467

If we have an independent look at Section 5 and Appendix 4, it will be clear that Section 5 contains a general condition. But, in Appendix 4, specific quantities are indicated for every month commencing from July 2006. In Appendix 4, there is also an obligation imposed upon the claimant to reserve the entire capacity ramped up as per Appendix 4, for a minimum period of 36 months from the date of the agreement. Though the respondent was given an option either or not to fill up this capacity, the

¶468

exercise of that option was confined only to two contingencies namely (a) that of the pricing of the claimant remaining competitive; and (b) that of the demands of the respondent's client remaining significantly above the capacity level.

¶469

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 63. It was not the case of the respondent that the above two

¶470

contingencies arose, forcing them not to fill up the capacity as

¶471

¶472

stipulated in Appendix 4 as Start- up Conditions. Therefore, despite the fact that this Court, under Section 34, will not engage in independent appreciation of evidence, I have done that and found out that I could not have reached a different conclusion than what the Arbitral Tribunal had done.

¶473

I have one more reason to reject the fourth ground of attack. As I have earlier indicated, the fulcrum of this contention of the respondent is that Section 5 of the agreement eclipsed Appendix 4 and that the Arbitral Tribunal wrongly held both to be mutually exclusive.

¶474

Assuming for a minute that the Arbitral Tribunal had

¶475

wrongly construed the effect of Section 5 of and Appendix 4 to

¶476

the agreement upon each other, even then, it is not a case for

¶477

interference under Section 34. In a catena of decisions, the

¶478

Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction under Section 34

¶479

does not extend to the correction of an erroneous interpretation

¶480

of an agreement between the parties. Even if the Tribunal

¶481

interprets a contract erroneously, it is not a case for interference under Section 34.

¶482

Keeping this in mind, if we have a look at the award of the majority and the minority, it is seen that the majority considered this aspect in paragraphs 36, 37 and 38. The majority found that the respondent never took a stand that they could not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ place orders as per Appendix 4 on account of the failure of the

¶483

claimant to ramp up capacity. Even the minority recorded a

¶484

¶485

finding that the claimant was fully geared up to meet the contingency. There was no evidence or even pleading to show that the two contingencies, under which, the respondent was entitled not to place orders to the extent of the quantity indicated in Appendix 4, ever arose.

¶486

The reliance placed upon Sections 51 and 52 of the

¶487

Indian Contract Act, is of no avail to the respondent. This is

¶488

for the reason that the respondent had always taken a stand that

¶489

they were not obliged to go by the prescriptions contained in Appendix 4. At no point of time before the reference of the

¶490

dispute to arbitration, did the respondent ever come up with a plea that they could not place orders as per Appendix 4 only on

¶491

account of the failure of the claimant to ramp up their capacity. Hence, the fourth contention of the respondent is also liable to be rejected.

¶492

Incidentally, one more contention is raised by the

¶493

respondent, as a fall out of the fourth contention. This relates

¶494

to the NOKIA Audit and the mystery surrounding the same. The majority held that the claim of the respondent that the claimant failed NOKIA Audit, was fraudulent.

¶495

It is contended by Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned senior counsel for the respondent that the fact that the claimant had

¶496

to pass NOKIA Audit was clearly borne out by Exx.C18 and C19 as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ well as by Exx.R79 and R80. According to the learned senior

¶497

counsel, Exx.R13, which is a mail sent on 16.6.2006, clearly

¶498

¶499

mentioned about the rejection of the claim by NOKIA. But, the majority award rejected Ex.R13 on the ground that it was an internal communication and that it was not forwarded to the claimant. The grievance of the learned senior counsel for the respondent is that the same yardstick as applied to Ex.R13 was

¶500

not applied to Ex.C22. Therefore, the learned senior counsel

¶501

contends that the finding with regard to NOKIA Audit was completely perverse.

¶502

But, it is seen from paragraph 44 of the majority award

¶503

that the plea with regard to NOKIA Audit was rejected by the

¶504

majority, as a new and untrue story. The finding was actually a

¶505

sequel to the fact that the oral evidence of RW1 did not inspire the confidence of the majority at all.

¶506

The Arbitral Tribunal had the advantage of witnessing

¶507

the demeanor of RW1. The answers given by him to various

¶508

questions, which are discussed in paragraph 44(ii) of the award and the inference drawn by the majority from those answers show

¶509

that the arbitrators found it difficult to believe his theory.

¶510

There was also one more thing. Under Ex.C2, the

¶511

respondent had warned the claimant never to communicate with NOKIA. There was also a Non Disclosure Agreement. In none of the documents filed as Exx.C1 to C16, which constitute the pre-

¶512

contract correspondence between the parties, was there any https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mention about NOKIA Audit. Therefore, there was nothing wrong in

¶513

the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting the theory of NOKIA Audit as

¶514

¶515

false and unfounded. If the view taken by the majority is a possible view, this court will not upset the same on the ground that another view is also possible.

¶516

As rightly pointed out by Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the claimant, the majority dealt with the communication dated 21.7.2006, by which Ex.R79 was communicated to the claimant along with Ex.C19. The majority came to the conclusion that the said letter did not put an end either to Appendix IV or to the agreement itself. Therefore, I do not think that the respondent can now make much ado about the failure of the claimant in NOKIA Audit.

¶517

CONTENTION NO.5

¶518

The last ground of attack to the award revolves around

¶519

the claim for damages and the manner in which the claim was dealt with by the Arbitral Tribunal and an award passed. Before proceeding to consider the submissions of the learned senior counsel on both sides on this aspect, it is necessary to take note of the fact that while the majority assessed the quantum of damages at Rs.16.5 crores, the minority assessed the damages at Rs.9,43,33,320/-. The majority arrived at the quantum of damages

¶520

with reference to two distinct periods, namely (i) May 2007 to May 2009 constituting a period of 25 months, and (ii) July 2006 to April 2007. In paragraph 68, the majority held that if 3 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Million user guides per month is taken as the basis, the loss

¶521

that the claimant could be stated to have suffered could be

¶522

¶523

estimated at Rs.1.6 to 1.7 Crores per month. But, even then, the majority did not award a compensation of Rs.1.6 to Rs.1.7 Crores per month. The majority took nearly 1/3rd of what would have been the probable loss and awarded only Rs.60.00 Lakhs per month, for a period of 25 months from May 2007 to May 2009.

¶524

Insofar as the period from July 2006 to April 2007 is concerned, the majority found in paragraph 69 of the award that the loss could be quantified between Rs.1.07 to Rs.1.43 Crores

¶525

for the months of January to April 2007. But, the majority reduced the said probable loss to a net figure of Rs.1.5 Crores for the entire period from July 2006 to April 2007.

¶526

While the majority took 3 Million user guides per month

¶527

as the basis, the minority took 1.72 Million user guides per

¶528

month as the basis, on the basis of the actual capacity made available in the factory of the claimant. The minority awarded

¶529

Rs.20.00 Lakhs per month for the first period, namely from January 2007 to April 2007 and Rs.35.00 Lakhs per month from May 2007 onwards.

¶530

The grievance of the respondent is that the Arbitrators

¶531

failed to consider the audited accounts of the claimant from

¶532

April 2006 to March 2007. According to the respondent, the audited balance sheet showed only a profit of Rs.54.81 Lakhs on a sales turnover of Rs.28.00 Crores. Drawing my attention to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ explanatory note submitted on the last date of hearing, when

¶533

arguments were heard and award reserved, it is contended by

¶534

¶535

Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned senior counsel for the respondent

¶536

that for the period from July 2006 to April 2007, the amount claimed by the claimant themselves was only Rs.1,05,76,531/-. But, the majority awarded Rs.1.50 Crores. Therefore, it is contended that there was total non application of mind.

¶537

It is also contended that the Arbitral Tribunal

¶538

erroneously shifted the burden of proof in this regard.

¶539

Another contention of the learned senior counsel for the

¶540

respondent is that as per the audited balance sheet as on 31.3.2008, the claimant had incurred a loss of Rs.1.13 Crores, though the provisional accounts showed a profit of Rs.1.34 Crores. Therefore, it is contended that when the actual loss showed in the audited balance sheet was only Rs.1.13 Crores, the probable loss noted by the Arbitral Tribunal at Rs.7.2 Crores was completely contrary to Section 73 of the Contract Act.

¶541

But, I do not think that a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 can hardly do anything about the above grievances. I am not dealing with a regular appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Time and again, the Courts have cautioned against any adventurous pursuit that one may tend to take while dealing with a petition under Section 34.

¶542

Though perversity of claim may be one of the grounds for interference, the same proves to be a razor's edge many times.

¶543

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 82. In the case on hand, the claimant had pleaded the nature

¶544

of loss that they had sustained. They also specifically pleaded

¶545

¶546

the method of calculation of such loss. In paragraphs 39 to 42 and 47 to 50 of the claim statement, the claimant had pleaded sufficient facts for establishing a claim for damages.

¶547

I do not wish to deal with each head of claim, as it would be outside the purview of the jurisdiction under Section 34. Suffice it to point out that the Tribunal took note of the pleadings as well as the evidence on record. They took note of the calculations provided in Ex.C97, which showed the commitment made by the respondent as per the agreement, in terms of quantities, the actual quantity for which orders were placed, the fixed cost, the variable cost and the gross profit. Therefore, nothing could be done beyond verifying whether the Arbitral Tribunal based its conclusions upon some material on record or not.

¶548

As pointed out earlier, the Arbitral Tribunal actually

¶549

recorded a finding with respect to the notional loss at an amount of Rs.1.6 to Rs.1.7 Crores per month. Yet, the Tribunal awarded only 1/3rd of the same and fixed it at Rs.60.00 Lakhs per month. Therefore, if at all anyone could be aggrieved, it is

¶550

the claimant who could have come up and said that no reason was attributed by the Tribunal to take only 1/3rd of what they actually found to be a probable loss.

¶551

Though there was a variation between the majority and

¶552

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the minority with respect to the quantum of damages, there was

¶553

no disagreement between them with regard to the entitlement of

¶554

¶555

the claimant to compensation.

¶556

The reliance placed by the respondent on the balance

¶557

sheet of the claimant, in my considered view, is misplaced. The loss of profit that the claimant incurred in their actual business transactions, during the period in question is of no

¶558

relevance to arrive at the damage suffered by them on account of the breach of contract by the respondent.

¶559

Section 73 of the Contract Act, on which heavy reliance

¶560

is placed by the learned senior counsel for the respondent

¶561

merely states that the party who suffers a breach of contract is

¶562

entitled to receive compensation for any loss or damage which

¶563

naturally arose in the usual course of things. Section 73 cautions that the compensation is not to be given for any remote or indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.

¶564

I do not know how the award is in violation of the

¶565

provisions of Section 73. There is nothing on record to show that the compensation claimed by the claimant was for any remote

¶566

or indirect loss. The fact that the claimant was lured to invest

¶567

huge sums of money, mostly through borrowings, for the purpose

¶568

of capacity utilisation by the respondent, is not in doubt. The

¶569

fact that the claimant was obliged even under Appendix IV to the

¶570

Agreement, to reserve its entire capacity for utilisation by the

¶571

respondent, is also not in doubt. Therefore, all that the

¶572

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ claimant did was to make a claim for what they would have

¶573

actually earned, had the respondent fulfilled their promise.

¶574

¶575

No one can point out with precision the quantum of loss that a person could have suffered on account of non fulfillment of an obligation by a contracting party, especially if it is in the nature of a business transaction. If the contract is one for sale of some property, movable or immovable, the loss for the breach of the contract could be arrived at with some amount of

¶576

precision. But, in the case on hand, the agreement is for the

¶577

placement of orders for the production of user guides. Therefore, a mathematical precision is impossible while arriving at the quantum of damages.

¶578

As an argument incidental to the last contention, Mr.Arvind P.Datar, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the entire claim for damages was based upon the calculations provided by a Cost Accountant. During crossexamination, he conceded that he prepared the statement of loss on the basis of the information submitted by him. The minority award rejected the tabular statements provided by the Cost

¶579

Accountant. Therefore, it is contended that the Arbitral Tribunal ought not to have proceeded on the basis of the

¶580

evidence of the Cost Accountant.

¶581

But, I do not think that the above argument will advance the cause of the respondent any further. Despite holding that the evidence of the Cost Accountant cannot be accepted, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ minority also concurred with the majority with respect to the

¶582

entitlement of the claimant for damages. The minority differed

¶583

¶584

from the majority only on the question as to whether 3 Million user guides per month should be taken as the basis or 1.72 Million user guides should be taken as the basis for calculation.

¶585

Therefore, the findings recorded by the minority in paragraph 79 of his award that CW3 had not gone through the accounts and that no value can be attached to the Cost Accountant, who was only a name lender, cannot tilt the balance in favour of the respondent.

¶586

If at least the respondent is in agreement with the minority award, on the ground that the some of the findings

¶587

therein are in their favour, I could have appreciated the stand of the respondent. But, the respondent wants to make use of some

¶588

of the findings of the minority for assailing the correctness of

¶589

the findings of the majority. But, in respect of the ultimate conclusion, the respondent wants both the majority and the minority awards to be set aside.

¶590

Therefore, the fact that the minority rejected the

¶591

evidence of Cost Accountant, cannot really save the respondent from the inevitable.

¶592

OBJECTIONS AS TO THE AWARD OF COSTS

¶593

The last submission of the respondent is as to the award of costs. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel for

¶594

the respondent that the Arbitral Tribunal reserved orders on 10.8.2010 and that the counsel for the claimant filed a memo of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

¶595

costs on 02.12.2010 and that the copy of the same was not

¶596

¶597

furnished. Therefore, the learned senior counsel for the respondent contends that Section 24(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is violated.

¶598

But, I do not think that on the above ground, the entire award could be set aside. Even in civil proceedings, costs are assessed not on the basis of rival contentions. A Schedule of costs is filed only after judgment is delivered, even in civil proceedings. Therefore, the question of opportunity with regard to the quantum of costs and a hearing on the same, is farfetched.

¶599

It is true that in civil proceedings, the costs are not what parties can claim as far as their imagination could go. It is also true that costs in arbitral proceedings are prohibitively high. But, it does not alter situation. I do not

¶600

know what was the cost implication for the respondent themselves. Therefore, the last contention is rejected.

¶601

In view of the above, the challenge made by the

¶602

respondent to the arbitral award is bound to fail. Accordingly, O.P.No.717 of 2011 is dismissed. O.P.No.433 of 2012

¶603

This is a petition filed by the claimant themselves, finding fault with the Arbitral Tribunal for not awarding interest for the period prior to the date of the award.

¶604

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 100. Section 31(7)(a) of the Act contemplates the award of

¶605

interest for (i) the pre-reference period, (ii) the pendente

¶606

¶607

lite period, and (iii) the post award period. This is subject to the condition that there is no prohibition for the award of interest under the terms of the contract.

¶608

The grievance of the claimant is that there was no

¶609

agreement to the contrary, under the contract dated 20.5.2006. The Supreme Court has held in Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan

¶610

Copper Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 462] that the Arbitral Tribunal has

¶611

the power to grant interest both for the pre-reference period

¶612

and the pendente lite period.

¶613

However, by a memo filed during the course of hearing,

¶614

the claimant restricted their claim in the main petition O.P.No.433 of 2012 to the pendente lite period alone.

¶615

The arbitration proceedings commenced on 18.4.2008 and

¶616

the first hearing was held on 22.6.2008. The award was passed on

¶617

19.9.2011. Therefore, Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel

¶618

for the claimant contends that the Tribunal ought to have awarded interest for the pendente lite period.

¶619

But, what is sauce for the goose is the sauce for the gander. What applies to the respondent with regard to the scope

¶620

of the jurisdiction under Section 34 would equally apply to the claimant.

¶621

In paragraphs 71 and 72 of their award, the majority

¶622

took note of the general principles with regard to the award of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ interest, under the Indian Contract Act and the Specific Relief

¶623

Act, compared them with the provisions of Section 31(7)(a) and

¶624

¶625

came to the conclusion that they were not inclined to award

¶626

interest for the period up to the date of the award. Though it is not stated explicitly, the rationale behind such a conclusion is that what was awarded was only damages. As I have pointed out, damages have been awarded by the majority for two distinct periods, one from July 2006 to April 2007 and another from May 2007 to May 2009. Admittedly, the arbitration had commenced in April 2008 itself. The damages awarded to the claimant had run up to May 2009, during which period the proceedings were already

¶627

in progress.

¶628

Therefore, the non awarding of interest for the

¶629

pendente lite period, especially when the award itself was only for damages, cannot be found fault with. Hence, the petition filed by the claimant also deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, O.P.No.433 of 2012 is also dismissed.

¶630

A.No.3752 of 2012

¶631

This is an application taken out by the claimant, seeking a direction to the respondent to deposit the award amount, pending disposal of the main O.P. This application was

¶632

necessitated on account of the fact that the very admission of the petition under Section 34 was treated as an automatic stay of execution of the award.

¶633

Now that the main O.P. under Section 34 is dismissed,

¶634

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ there is no question of issuing a direction to the respondent to

¶635

deposit the award amount. It is up to the claimant to execute

¶636

¶637

the award. Hence A.No.3752 of 2012 is dismissed. However in the special facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs in the proceedings before me.

¶638

Sd/- V.R.S.J.
9.12.2014
//CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE COPY//
DATED THIS THE DAY OF 2015.
COURT OFFICER
TPY / 16/02/2015
From 25 th Day of September 2008 the Registry is issuing certified
copies of the Orders/Judgments/Decrees in this format.

¶639

https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

Rr Donnelley Publishing India v. M/S.Canara Traders & Pvt.Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Rr Donnelley Publishing India v. M/S.Canara Traders & Pvt.Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

M/s.Senai Thalaivar Samudaya Vs The District Superintendent

D.Rajamannar Vs The Commissioner

S.Somasundharam Vs The Thasildar

P.Thirumalaisamy Vs the Textile Control Officer/

G.Yuvaraj, Vs The District Collector

Venkatesan, Vs The District Collector