Partly allowed

Dr.P.Manorama v. Mrs.Shaila Samuel

Madras HC10 Jan 2014A/69/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This court adjudicated a dispute where the Official Assignee sought rent arrears from a tenant occupying insolvents' properties even after an agreement of sale was executed by the insolvents with the tenant's wife. The court held that the tenant was not exempt from paying rent as the agreement did not terminate the tenancy or put him in possession as part performance. Rent was ordered from March 2

What did the court decide?

Directed third respondent to pay rent at Rs.11,000/- p.m. from March 2011 and continue payments until suit disposal; arrears from March 2011 to September 2021 to be paid by December 31, 2021.

Dr.P.Manorama Vs Mrs.Shaila Samuel — Insolvency and Bankruptcy | Madras HC (2014)

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A.No.69 of 2014 in IP No.94 of 2010

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

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Reserved on Delivered on
27.09.2021 08.10.2021
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN
Application No.69 of 2014
in IP No.94 of 2010
The Official Assignee,
High Court, Madras. ... Applicant/1 st Respondent
Vs.
1. Mrs. S.M.Maria Dorch ... Insolvent / Petitioner
2. Mrs. Rosline ... 3 rd Party / 2 nd Respondent
3. Mr. Susai Raj ... 3 rd Respondent/Tenant

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Prayer: Petition filed under Section 68 (d) read with Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909, praying to

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(i) an order directing the third respondent to pay a sum of

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Rs.5,28,000/- to the Official Assignee, High Court, Madras, towards rental arrears for the period from May 2009 to April 2013 (48 months x Rs.11,000/-);

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(b) an order directing the third respondent to pay a sum of Rs.2,25,000/- to the Official Assignee, High Court, Madras, being the rental arrears for the period from May 2013 to January 2014 (9 months x Rs.25,000/-);

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(c) an order directing the third respondent to pay monthly rent @ Rs.25,000/- to the Official Assignee, High Court, Madras, per month from February 2014 onwards.

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For Applicant : Mr.K.V.Ananthakrushnan for Official Assignee For Respondents : Mr.R.Venkataraman M/s.Tatva Legal, for R1 Mr.V.Ayyadurai, Senior Counsel for Mr.R.Rajmmohan, for R2 & for Mr.A.Durai Easwar, for R3

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O R D E R

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This application has been filed by the Official Assignee under

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Section 68(d) read with Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act,

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1909, seeking direction to the third respondent to pay rent for the premises, belonging to the insolvents, in his occupation.

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The insolvents sought for adjudication under Section 9(f) read with

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Sections 10, 11, 14 and 15 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, on the ground of inability to pay the debts. Being a debtors’ petition an order of adjudication was passed by the learned Master of this Court on 21.10.2010. Thereafter, the Official Assignee took charge of the property. The third respondent in this application one Mr.Susai Raj, claimed to be a tenant under the insolvents on a monthly rent of Rs.11,000/-, pursuant to a tenancy agreement dated 19.08.2004. He had also claimed that he has paid an advance of Rs.2,00,000/-.

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Apart from the above, the wife of the third respondent Mrs.Rosline,

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who figures as the second respondent in this application, filed a Claim Petition before the Official Assignee in Claim No.244 of 2013, seeking adjudication of her claim for Rs.69,00,000/- paid as advance under a sale

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agreement dated 06.01.2010. Apart from making a claim before the Official Assignee the said Rosline, the second respondent herein, had also filed a suit in CS No.397 of 2013 on the file of this Court seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale, the said suit is pending. In the interregnum, the said Rosline also filed Applications in the above IP 94 of 2010, in Application Nos.141 of 2013 and 119 of 2014 seeking condonation of delay of 1247 days in filing a petition to set aside the adjudication order dated 21.10.2010 and for stay of the public auction. A third Application in Application No.256 of 2013 was also filed by her seeking execution of Sale

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Deed, pursuant to the Agreement of Sale dated 06.01.2010.

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All the above applications were dismissed by the Insolvency Court

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on 01.06.2015. Aggrieved, the second respondent herein filed three Appeals in OSA Nos.154 to 156 of 2015. The said appeals came to be disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court on 01.11.2016, the Division Bench reserved the rights of the second respondent to be decided in the Civil Suit, namely CS No.397 of 2013 filed by her. The Appeals were

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disposed of with the above reservation. The dismissal of the application for condonation of delay in seeking to set aside the adjudication was confirmed.

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Even during the pendency of the above applications, the Official Assignee had filed the instant application seeking (i) to pay a sum of Rs.5,28,000/- towards rent for the period between May 2009 and April 2013 (48 months) at Rs.11,000/- per month; (ii) to pay a sum of Rs.2,25,000/being the rental arrears for the period from May 2013 to January 2014 at Rs.25,000/- per month; and (iii) to continue to pay rent at Rs.25,000/- per month.

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This application is resisted by respondents 2 and 3, who are the

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husband and wife, contending that the occupation of the third respondent of the premises being in part performance of the agreement dated 06.01.2010,

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the liability to pay rents had ceased. It is also claimed that the second respondent had parted with a huge sum of Rs.69,00,000/- in favour of the insolvents to enable them to discharge the Bank loan and redeem the

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property. Therefore, the third respondent cannot be directed to pay the rent for his occupation of the premises belonging to the insolvent.

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I have heard Mr.K.V.Ananthakrushnan, learned counsel appearing

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for the applicant/Official Assignee, Mr.Venkatraman, learned counsel appearing for M/s.Tatva Legal for the insolvent/first respondent, Mr.V.Ayyadurai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.R.Raj Mohan,

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learned counsel appearing for the second respondent/the agreement holder and Mr.Durai Easwar, for third respondent.

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Mr.K.V.Ananthakrushnan, learned counsel appearing for the

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applicant namely the Official Assignee would vehemently contend that the

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fact that the wife of the third respondent had entered into an agreement with the insolvents for purchase of the subject property will not determine the

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tenancy between the insolvent and the third respondent. If the tenancy is not determined and the possession of the third respondent is not referable to

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the agreement of sale, the liability to pay the rent will subsist and hence the

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third respondent cannot continue in occupation of the property without payment of rent. He would also lay considerable stress on the language of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, to contend that unless the possession is referable to the agreement, an agreement holder cannot be

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deemed to be in possession of the property in part performance of the

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agreement. 9. According to Mr.K.V.Ananthakrushnan, two essential conditions

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must be satisfied before an agreement holder in possession could invoke the benefit of the protection granted under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

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● (i) The first being that the transferee should have been put in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement or where the transferee already in possession of the property he/she should be shown to continue in possession in part performance of the contract; and

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(ii) he/she should have been ready and willing to perform his/her part of the contract.

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Taking me through the contents of the agreement dated 06.01.2010 Mr.K.V.Ananthakrushnan, would submit that there is nothing to show that

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the second respondent the agreement holder was put in possession of the property, pursuant to the agreement or that she continued in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement. The fact that the third respondent is a tenant and the second respondent is an agreement holder is also pressed into service by the learned counsel to buttress his submission that the liability on the part of the third respondent to pay rent does not cease. He would also rely upon the judgment of this Court in P. Subramani Udayar v. Eswari and 4 others, reported in 2001 (1) CTC 559 .

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Mr.Venkatraman, learned counsel appearing for the insolvent/first

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respondent would submit that unless there is clear evidence of intention on

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the part of the parties to put an end to the lessor-lessee relationship the liability to pay rent will not cease and therefore, in the absence of such recital in the sale agreement dated 06.01.2010, the determination of tenancy or the fact that the possession of the third respondent is in part performance of the agreement cannot be a matter for presumption. He would invite my attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.K.Sharma v. Ramlal, reported in 2019 (4) SCC 153 . He would also rely upon the judgment of this Court in B . Kuppulal v. D.Sagunthala and another reported in 1987 (1) MLJ 242 and Jessie Thavamani v. Liakath Basha, reported in 1996 (1) CTC 398 , in support of his contentions.

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Contending contra, Mr.V.Ayyadurai learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second and third respondents would submit that the insolvency proceeding itself have been launched with the sole object of frustrating the agreement of sale. Pointing out the proximity between the date of the agreement and the date of the institution of the insolvency proceedings, Mr.Ayyadurai, would submit that the very proceeding is

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fraudulent and therefore, this Court has the power to annul the insolvency under Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that once an agreement is entered into and the tenant has paid a substantial advance, the possession of the tenant would be one in part performance of the agreement and the tenant would be entitled to the protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel the

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liability to pay rent ceases on and from the date of the agreement.

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Arguing further Mr.Ayyadurai, would submit that in view of the

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specific direction of the Division Bench that the rights of the agreement holder will have to be decided only in the suit, namely CS No.397 of 2013,

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the application filed by the Official Assignee in the Insolvency proceeding

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is not maintainable. In order to claim the benefits under Section 53-A of the

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Act, for the third respondent, who is a tenant, Mr.Ayyadurai would submit that the definition of tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, would include the spouse of the tenant also and

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therefore, the possession of the third respondent as a tenant would be referable to the second respondent agreement holder also. The learned Senior Counsel would rely upon the definition of the term tenant under Section 2(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. He would also rely upon a few judgments of this Court in order to

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buttress his submissions.

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I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions.

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The fact that the first respondent was adjudicated as an insolvent by order dated 21.10.2010 is not in dispute. The execution of the sale agreement dated 06.01.2010 is also not in dispute, but the insolvent would take a plea that the terms of the agreement were different than what has

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been recorded in the agreement dated 06.01.2010. The question whether the insolvents would be entitled to take such a plea is foreign to the scope of

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this application under consideration and hence I am not going into that. The

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tenancy is also admitted, the second and third respondents the agreement holder and the tenant would contend that rent was paid by them till November 2009 and thereafter since they had entered into an agreement dated 06.01.2010, they had not paid the rents.

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The non-payment of rent having been admitted the only question that has to be decided in this application is, as to whether, the possession of the third respondent could be said to be in part performance of the agreement dated 06.01.2010. In order to invoke the benefits of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement purchaser or the agreement vendee must be able to show that his/her possession is in part performance of the agreement having been put in possession under the agreement or having continued in possession under the agreement. It is not enough for an agreement vendee to just show that he/she in possession of the property

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agreed to be conveyed. They should go a step further and demonstrate that such possession is in part performance of the agreement of sale. In order to decide whether such possession, either delivered or continued is in part

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performance of the agreement sale one has to necessarily fall back on the terms of the agreement of sale.

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As I had already found the execution of the agreement of sale is

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admitted. Clause 8 of the agreement reads as follows:

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“ The Vendor agrees to give vacant possession of the schedule mentioned property at the time of registration of the Sale Deed or Sale Deeds at the time of receipt of the entire payment due under this agreement.”

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Clause 11 of the agreement reads as follows:

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“ The vendor shall pay the property tax and other public charges if any in respect of the schedule mentioned property up to the date of the Sale Deed.”

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A combined reading of these two clauses in the agreement would show that possession was not delivered in part performance of the agreement nor was

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it the intention of the parties that the tenant or the third respondent who is

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already in possession is to continue in possession in part performance of the agreement. Attempting to take advantage of the last portion of Clause 8, which reads as follows:

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“…at the time of receipt of the entire payment due under this

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agreement.”

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Mr.V.Ayyadurai, would vehemently contend that he had tendered the balance of consideration of Rs.11,00,000/- on 04.02.2010 and therefore from the said date the possession must be deemed to be continuing under the agreement of sale. Reliance is also placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamzabi and

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others v. Syed Karimuddin and others, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 414 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has pointed out that a mortgagor’s agreement of sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee would result

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in extinguishment of the mortgagor’s right of redemption if the conditions under Section 53-A are fulfilled. On the facts of the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also concluded that the conditions under Section 53-A stood

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satisfied and hence concluded that the mortgagor who had agreed to sell the property to the mortgagee and the mortgagee having been put in possession of the property in pursuant to the said agreement loses his right to seek redemption.

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The learned counsel would also place reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. K.C.Sharma and Company and others, reported in (2020) 15 SCC 209 , wherein the doctrine of part performance was applied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of a contract of lease. The Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to hold that a person put in possession pursuant to a understanding or a contract of lease would be entitled to resist a claim for possession, even though a proper lease deed has not been executed. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, reads as follows:

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53-A. Part performance .—Where any person contracts

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to transfer for consideration any immovable property by

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writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms

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necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with

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reasonable certainty,

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and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract,

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taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the

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transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done

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some act in furtherance of the contract,

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and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,

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then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of

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transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the

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manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in

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force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall

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be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and

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persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in

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possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms

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of the contract:

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Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of

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the contract or of the part performance thereof.”

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As rightly pointed out by Mr.Ananthakrushnan, learned counsel appearing for the Official Assignee, in order to avail protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the agreement vendee must either have been put in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement or being in possession he/she should be able to show that he/she continues in possession in part performance of the contract. The later part of

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the Section may not be very relevant for our purposes.

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I have already extracted the relevant clause relating to possession

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in the agreement dated 06.01.2010. It specifically recites that possession will be delivered on the date of execution of the sale. Therefore it is clear

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that the agreement vendee was not put in possession of the property on the

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date of the agreement. The agreement does not also say that the agreement vendee is already in possession and he/she continues in possession in part performance of the agreement. In order to avail of the benefit under Section 53-A of the Transfer of property Act, it is mandatory for the agreement

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vendee to show that the possession is referable to the agreement. If that element is absent then I do not think the person in possession could claim

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the benefits of Section 53-A and resist an attempt to take possession or avoid payment of rent. The fact that the sale agreement is between the second respondent and the insolvent and the tenancy agreement is between

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the third respondent and the insolvent also would militate against the claim of respondents 2 and 3.

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20. The reliance placed by the learned counsel on the definition of the

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term ‘Tenant’ under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)

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Act, 1960, is far from convincing. The term ‘Tenant’ is defined under Section 2(8) of the said Act and it reads as follows:

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“ 2 (8) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose

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account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse , or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who-

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(i) in the case of residential building, had been living

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with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant, and (ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant up to the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter, and a person continuing in the possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom

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the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been formed out or leased by a Municipal Council or a Panchayat Union Council

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or the Municipal Corporation of Madras or the Municipal

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Corporation of Madurai. ”

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A very reading of the definition shows that it is a surviving

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spouse or any son or daughter or the legal representative of a deceased

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tenant who would be a tenant and not a living spouse. To put it in other

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words wife of a tenant who is alive cannot be treated as a tenant. The Tamil

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Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, has been replaced by

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the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Rights and Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants Act, 2017, the term tenant has been defined under Section 2(n) of the said Act and it reads as follows:

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account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a

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contract express or implied, would be payable for any

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premises and includes any person occupying the premises as

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a sub-tenant and also, any person continuing in possession

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after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after

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the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any

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person against whom any order or decree for eviction has

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been made; ”

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The surviving spouse or son or daughter of the deceased tenant is not

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included. Therefore, either under the T amil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, or under the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Rights and

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Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants Act, 2017, a spouse of a tenant is

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not included in the definition of the term ‘Tenant’.

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22. The decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel in this

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regard are do not pronounce upon the point directly. In G.Sathish Bhatia v.

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N.S.Gnaneswaran, reported in 2017 (1) CTC 750 , the question considered

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was that whether a person in possession claiming that he was continuing the

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business along with the tenant could be impleaded as a party to the Rent

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Control proceedings. This Court held that when there are prima facie

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materials available to show that the proposed party has been carrying on

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business along with the original tenant, the impleading could be allowed. The Hon’ble Mr.Justice K.K.Sasidharan, who had rendered the judgment had also specifically observed that a mere order impleading the petitioner therein shall not be construed as an admission that the petitioner is a tenant and that he is entitled to the benefits of the T amil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Therefore, this judgment cannot be treated as a precedent to conclude that any intermeddler in possession could be termed as a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(8) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.

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Adverting to the decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 on the protection offered by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, heavy reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Kanthimathi and another v. Beatrice Xavier, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 339 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a particular clause in the agreement, which reads as follows:

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“I shall be proceeding to Coimbatore and shall

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execute the Sale Deed and present the same for admission

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and registration before the Registration Authority, accepting

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and acknowledge payment of the balance of consideration of

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Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) at the time of registration and shall complete the transaction of sale and conveyance as the property demised has already been surrendered to your possession.”

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This clause, according to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, satisfied the requirements of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, however in H.K.Sharma v. Ramlal,

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reported in 2019 (4) SCC 153, after referring to R.Kanthimathi and another v. Beatrice Xavier, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 339 , held that the

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same is distinguishable on facts. In H.K.Sharma ’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had after referring to the agreement that was produced as Ex.P1 observed that a perusal of the same which contains nine conditions

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does not provide, much less in specific terms, as to what will be the fate of the tenancy. In other words none of the conditions set out in the agreement dated 13.5.1993 can be construed for holding that the parties intended to surrender tenancy rights. Paragraph 29 and 30 of the judgment in

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H.K.Sharma would be relevant and they read as follows:

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the tenancy rights despite entering into an agreement of sale

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of the tenanted property. In other words, if the parties really intended to surrender their tenancy rights as contemplated in

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clauses (e) or (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act while entering

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into an agreement to sell the suit house, it would have made necessary provision to that effect by providing a specific clause in the agreement. It was, however, not done. On the other hand, we find that the conditions set out in the agreement do not make out a case of express surrender under

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clause (e) or implied surrender under clause (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court had specifically referred to the terms of the agreement in R.Kanthimathi' s case and held that the language of the agreement in R.Kanthimathi 's case supported the conclusion in the said case. Therefore, the essential inference is that the entitlement to protection under Section 53-A cannot be put in any straight jacket formula, but the same has to be deduced from the language of the agreement in each and

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every case.

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In Subramanian Udayar v. Eswari and 4 others, reported in

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2001 (1)CTC 559 , this Court had considered the effect of the protection offered under Section 53-A vis-à-vis the protection offered to an tenant under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. After referring to the language of the agreement which reads as follows:

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“,d;W Kjy; 1 ,yf;fkpl;lth; ,e;j xg;ge;jg;gofpuak; bgWth; vd;w me;j!;jpy; ,jdoapy; fz;l brhj;Jf;fis mDgtpj;J tuntz;oaJ.”

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This Court concluded that the possession of the tenant on and from the date of the agreement would be referable to the agreement and he cannot go back on it and seek protection as a statutory tenant under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. What has been insisted upon is the termination of the jural relationship of tenancy upon entering into the

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agreement. Therefore, it is incumbent upon a tenant, who claims that he is in possession pursuant to the agreement to show that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant got snapped upon entering into the agreement of sale.

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This is precisely what the Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed in H.K.Sharma ’s case, cited supra. The very same position of law has been reiterated in B.Kuppulal v. D.Sagunthala and another, reported in 1987 (1) MLJ 242 , wherein it has held that a mere agreement of sale will not terminate the landlord tenant relationship and the liability of the tenant to continue to pay the rent. The learned Judge further went on to observe the tenant will have to continue to pay the rent unless there was a specific recital to the contrary in the agreement of sale. Even in Jessie Thavamani v. Liakath Basha, reported in 1996 (1) CTC 398 , Hon’ble Mr.Justice AR.Lakshmanan, has reiterated the very same principle.

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The argument of Mr.V.Ayyadurai, relying upon the last few

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words of Clause 8 to contend that once it is shown that he has offered the balance of sale price his possession would become one under the agreement

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has to be stated only to be rejected. It is the consistent view of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in order to avail the protection under Section 53-A, a person who claims such protection must show that the

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possession is in part performance of the agreement or that he/she continues in possession in part performance of the agreement. An additional requirement is also insisted upon by the Courts in cases were a tenant claims protection under Section 53-A. It is made incumbent upon the tenant to show that there is something in the agreement which would result in termination of the tenancy so as to enable the tenant to contend that he is not

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liable to pay the rent. In my considered opinion neither of these requirements have been satisfied by the respondents 2 and 3 in the case on hand.

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Adverting to the other contention of Mr.Ayyaduthurai, that the rights of the parties will have to be decided only in the Civil Suit, in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Division Bench made in OSA Nos.154 to 156 of 2015, I am unable to accede to the said submission also. No doubt

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the Division Bench has said the plaintiff in the suit can work out her rights in the Civil Suit. The Division Bench was concerned with the right of the purchaser vis-à-vis the insolvency. The Division Bench had not adjudicated

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upon the rights of the tenant vis-à-vis the landlord/Official Assignee.

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A perusal of the plaint in the said suit shows that the tenant

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namely the husband/third respondent is not made a party to the said suit. Originally it was only the first insolvent Mario Dorch, who has been made a

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party and I am informed that the Official Assignee has been impleaded in the said suit. Therefore in the absence of Mr.Susai Raj, the third respondent as a party to the suit, the Official Assignee cannot make this claim for rent in the suit.

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The prayer in the application is three folds. The first part of the prayer relates to the payment of rent up to April 2013, the second part relates to rent between May 2013 and January 2014. The Official Assignee has claimed rent at different rates for the two periods. The contractual rent

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as per the lease agreement is only Rs.11,000/- per month. The Official Assignee cannot seek enhanced rent without there being any agreement or

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any determination of the rent as between the parties. It is not in dispute that

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the tenant has paid rents up to November 2009. This application has been filed on 21.02.2014. Therefore the Official Assignee can claim rents only for a period of three years prior to the filing of the application i.e., From March 2011.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Application No.69 of 2014 stands

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partially allowed and there will be a direction to the third respondent/tenant to pay rent at the rate of Rs.11,000/- p.m. from March 2011 and continue to pay at the same rate till the disposal of the suit. The arrears of rent that is the rent for the period from March 2011 till September 2021 is Rs.13,86,000/shall be paid on or before 31.12.2021.

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