Allowed

7 Cy of Pt Judmt Filed v. Mohammed Yakkub

Madras HC16 Jul 2013AS/827/1992

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed an appeal against the dismissal of a partition suit. It held that subsequent purchasers are not necessary parties whose absence warrants dismissal, especially where defendants failed to provide useful particulars. The suit should proceed to final decree for adducing the purchasers.

What did the court decide?

The appeal is allowed; the Trial Court's dismissal is set aside; final decree proceedings to be completed within 12 months.

7 Cy of Pt Judmt Filed Vs Mohammed Yakkub — Specific Performance | Madras HC (2013)

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IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

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Dated : 16.07.2013

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Coram

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The Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.S.Ramanathan

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A.S.No.827 of 1992

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and

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C.M.P.Nos.1389 to 1394 of 2009

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SHAKEELA BEGUM ...Appellant(Plaintiff)

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1. MOHAMMED YAKKUB (deceased) 2) JAFFAR SAIT 3) RAHUMAN SAIT 4) RAMMESHA BEGAM (DIED) 5) JOTHINISSA 6) KURSHEETHA BEGUM

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W/o Habib Raghuman

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( R-2,3, 5 and 6 are recorded as lrs of the deceased R4 as per order dt.13.10.2009, in C.M .P.Nos1383 to 1385/2009)

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1. BASHEERA BEGAM 8) YASMIN BEGUM (MINOR) REP. BY ITS GUARDIAN BASHEERA BEGAM

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1. KURSHEETHA BEGUM , W/o SHAJEEHAN 10) FATHIMUTHU JAGARE (deceased) 11) SYED ABUTHAHIR (deceased) 12) MOHAMMED ANSARI (deceased) (R11 & 12 recorded as lrs of the deceased R10 vide order dt. 13.10.2009, in C.M.P.No.1386 to 1388/2009)

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1. RAJEETHA BEGUM 14) WAHIDA BEGUM 15) FARISHA BEGUM 16) MANJURA (MINOR) (REP BY GUARDIAN MR.SYED ABUTHAHIR/R10

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fresh guardian appointed as per order dated 4.1.1996 in C.M.P.No.7009/95) 17. JAWAHARUNISHA (MINOR) (REP BY GUARDIAN MR.SYED ABUTHAHIR/R10, fresh guardian appointed as per order dated 10.4.2000 in C.M.P.No.7078/96)

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18.FATHIMA

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19.S.ABDUL HAKKIM

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20.S.RIYAZ AHAMED

21.M.MUMTAJ

22.M.FARVEEN

(R18 to R22 recorded as lrs of the deceased R11 & 12 as per order dt. 16.07.2013 passed in C.M.P.Nos.1389 to 1394 of 2009)

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..Respondents(Defendants 2,3,5

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to 9 13 to 17 and Lrs of the defendants 11 & 12)

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This Appeal has been filed under Section 96 of C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 30.10.1991 passed in O.S.No.32 of 1986, on the file of the Additional Sub Court, Cuddalore.

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The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.32 of 1986, on the file of the Sub Court, Cuddalore, is the appellant herein. She filed the suit for the relief of partition of her 1/8 share and also for mesne profit in the plaint 'A' to 'E' schedule properties, or, in the alternate, half share in 'F' schedule property and 1/8 share in 'C' to 'E' schedule properties and for mesne profit.

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a) One A.K.Pakkeer Mohammed had four sons, viz., 1) Khader-eAlam, 2) Mohammed Yakuub/first defendant, 3) Kamarudeen and 4) Abdul Azeez. The plaintiff was the daughter of Khader-e-Alam, the defendants 2 to 6 were the legal heirs of Kamarudeen and the defendants 7 and 8 were the daughters of Abdul Azeez. The grandfather of the plaintiff, viz., A.K.Pakkeer Mohammed was doing business in Grocery and after his death, his business was taken over by his aforesaid four sons and they were also running a Rice Mill business. The said Khader-e-Alam, viz., the plaintiff's father and another son by name Kamarudeen died in the year 1967 and Abdul Azeez died in the year 1980.

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b) The properties belonged to the sons of A.K.Pakkeer Mohammed, were not partitioned and were managed by the first defendant, and from and out of the income earned from the

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business, various other properties were purchased, and all the properties belonged to the four brothers and therefore, the plaintiff, as per the Muslim Law, claimed 1/8 share in the entire properties, and her mother, the ninth defendant, are entitled to 1/32 share.

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c) The first defendant, after the death of his three brothers, brought about a division of the properties, evidenced by Ex.52, the partition deed, dated 03.12.1981, which was confined only to the immovable properties. In the said partition, 'C' schedule property mentioned therein was allotted to the first defendant and the plaintiff in common and 'C' schedule property mentioned in the said partition deed has been mentioned as 'F' schedule property in the plaint. The said partition deed was not legally valid and even assuming that the partition deed was valid, the plaintiff was entitled to claim undivided half share in 'F' schedule property and therefore, the alternate prayer was made.

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The first defendant filed a written statement, wherein, he has contended as follows:-

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a) After the death of his father-A.K.Pakkeer Mohammed, in the year 1945, his four sons, viz., 1) the plaintiff's father/Khadere-Alam, 2) Mohammed Yakuub/first defendant, 3)Kamarudeen and 4) Abdul Azeez were carrying on business under the name and style "M/s.A.K.Pakkeer Mohammed Rowthar Sons" and certain properties were also acquired from and out of the business income. However, he contended that after the death of the plaintiff's fatherKhader-e-Alam and Kamarudeen, in the year 1967, the plaintiff can claim share only in respect of the properties, which were available on the date of death of her father and she cannot claim any share over other properties, which were acquired later.

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b) It was further contended by the first defendant that after the death of his two brothers, viz., Khader-e-Alam and Kamarudeen, the legal heirs of those deceased brothers were enjoying the properties only as tenants in common and therefore, they cannot claim any share in the properties acquired after 1967. The properties acquired prior to the year 1967 was appended to the written statement as Item Nos.1 to 9 and Item Nos. 10 to 16 were the properties, which were acquired after the death of Khader-eAlam and Kamarudeen and therefore, in respect of Item Nos.10 to 16, the plaintiff cannot claim any share and the plaintiff is entitled to claim 1/8 share in respect of the properties mentioned as Item Nos.1 to 9 in the list appended to the written statement.

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c) It was further contended by the first defendant that there was a partition of properties in the family on 03.12.1981, in which, the plaintiff and the first defendant were given certain properties jointly and the plaintiff can claim her share only in respect of the properties given in common and she cannot claim 1/8 share in all other properties. If the plaintiff claimed half share in 'F' schedule property, as per the partition deed dated

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03.12.1981, then, she was equally bound by other recitals in the partition deed and if she ignores the partition deed dated 03.12.1981, she can claim partition only in respect of the properties mentioned as Item Nos.1 to 9 in the list appended to the written statement

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The second defendant filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 3 and 4. The second defendant admitted the partition deed dated 03.12.1981 and after the partition, the plaintiff cannot claim any share in respect of other properties and she is also not entitled to claim any share in all the properties acquired after her father's death in the year 1967 and the plaintiff has to workout her remedy only against the first defendant, as the properties were allotted to the plaintiff and the first defendant jointly under the partition deed dated 03.12.1981.

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The fifth defendant filed a written statement, adopted by the defendants 6 and 7 and they reiterated that there was a partition on 03.12.1981 and the properties were divided and therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any right over the properties. They also contended that they are unnecessary parties to be impleaded in the suit and the dispute was between the plaintiff and the first defendant and therefore, the suit was bad for mis-joinder of parties.

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The eighth defendant filed written statement and claimed her share, declared as per the Muslim Law and the ninth defendant also filed written statement and claimed 1/32 share in the suit properties.

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The second defendant filed an additional statement, stating that after the partition deed dated 03.12.1981, there was a registered partition on 30.04.1984 between the defendants 2 and 3 on one side and defendants 7 and 8 on the other side and the same was also acted upon. As per the said partition deed dated 30.04.1984, the defendants 2 and 3 and the defendants 7 and 8 sold the properties to one Ganapathy Chettiar, Villupuram, who, in turn, converted those properties into house plots and sold the same to various persons and they are in possession of the properties and therefore, the subsequent purchasers are necessary parties to be impleaded in the suit.

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On the basis of the abovesaid pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following Issues:-

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i)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to 1/8 share in 'A' to 'E' plaint schedule properties and for separate possession of her share?

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ii)Whether the defendants are liable to render the accounts from the date of death of the plaintiff's father?

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Iii)Whether the partition deed dated 03.12.1981 is valid and binding upon the plaintiff?

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iv)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim any share over the properties acquired after the death of her father?

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v)Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties?

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vi)Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

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Vii)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to alternate relief prayed for?

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Viii)Whether the suit is properly valued and proper Court fee is paid?

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ix)Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profit under Order 20, Rule 18 of C.P.C.?

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x)Whether the ninth defendant is entitled to claim any share ?

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And

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xi)To what other relief the plaintiff is entitled to?

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The plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and marked 52 documents. On the side of the defendants, the twelfth defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and the second defendant examined himself as D.W.2 and another person, by name Uduman Ali was examined as D.W.3 and three documents were marked. A Commissioner was appointed and he submitted reports and inventory proofs and they were marked as C.1 to C.5.

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The Trial Court answered Issue No.iii) in favour of the plaintiff holding that the partition deed dated 03.12.1981 is not binding on the plaintiff and is also not valid. The Trial Court also tried Issue Nos.ii) and iv) and held that the plaintiff is entitled to claim partition in respect of the properties acquired, after her father's death and she is also entitled to claim accounts in respect of the income over the properties and answered Issue No.iv) in favour of the plaintiff. The Trial Court answered Issue No.v) in favour of the plaintiff, by stating that the suit is not bad for mis-joinder of parties. Issue No.i) was answered

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in favour of the plaintiff and held that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/8 share in the plaint 'A' to 'E' schedule properties and also entitled to claim mesne profit and answered Issue No.x) against the ninth defendant, holding that the ninth defendant married another person, after the death of her first husband and therefore, she cannot claim any right over the properties of her first husband-Khader-e-Alam and answered Issue No.viii) in favour of the plaintiff holding that the suit was properly valued and proper Court fee was paid. Issue No.vii) was answered against the plaintiff by the Trial Court, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to alternate relief and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to claim 1/8 share in respect of the properties purchased till 1967 and the partition deed was declared as invalid.

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Thus, having held all the issues in favour of the plaintiff, the Trial Court dismissed the suit by answering Issue No.vi) against the plaintiff and held that in the year, 1984, there was a partition between the defendants 2 and 3 and the defendants 7 and 8 and they gave power to one Ganapathy Chettiar,and under the power, the said Ganapathy Chettiar sold the properties to various third parties, after converting the same into house plots and those third parties are in possession of the properties and therefore, they are necessary parties to be impleaded in the suit and without impleading them, the suit is not maintainable and the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief prayed for. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present appeal is filed.

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Mr. S.V.Jayaraman, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court having held all the issues in favour of the appellant, ought not to have dismissed the suit on the ground of non-joinder of subsequent alienees. Either the Trial Court ought to have given an opportunity to the appellant to take steps to implead the subsequent alienees, if they are necessary parties according to it, or, it ought to have directed the second defendant to furnish the particulars of the subsequent alienees to enable the appellant to implead them in the suit. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that under Order 1, Rule 10 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ' C.P.C.) the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or even without any application of either party, direct that the name of any party, who ought to have been joined or, whose presence before the Court may be necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added and therefore, ought to have given one more opportunity to the plaintiff to implead the subsequent alienees.

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The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant further submitted that having regard to the facts of the case on hand, the Trial Court ought not to have dismissed the suit for non-joinder of subsequent alienees. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that, while filing the written statement in the year 1986, the second defendant did not raise any such plea. Only in the year 1991, he filed an additional written statement, stating that there was a partition on 30.04.1984 and as per the said partition deed, the defendants 2 and 3 and the defendants 7 and 8 sold the properties to one Ganapathy Chettiar, Villupuram, who, in turn, converted those properties into house plots and sold the same to some third parties and therefore, the subsequent purchasers are necessary parties to the suit. But, the second defendant did not furnish any particulars regarding the subsequent alienees and it was also not stated whether those alienations were made, after the filing of the suit, or, prior to the filing of the suit. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 1986, and, if those alienations were made after the filing of the suit, they were hit by doctrine of lis pendens. Moreover, no permission was obtained for alienating the subject matter of the suit properties and therefore, there was no need to implead the subsequent purchasers, as they cannot be considered as necessary parties. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submitted that in the absence of any particulars given by the second defendant in the additional statement filed in the year 1991, the Trial Court ought to have held that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and ought to have decreed the suit.

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Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. In a suit for partition, the subsequent alienees are necessary parties to be impleaded, as their interest would be affected by reason of the partition decree that may be passed.

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On the basis of the above submissions of the learned counsel, the point that arises for consideration in this Appeal is as follows :-

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i) Whether the Trial Court was right in dismissing the suit for partition on the ground of non impleadment of subsequent purchasers, after having held that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/8 share as prayed for in the suit?

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In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524 in the case of (Ramesh Hira Chand Kundan Mittal Mal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay), the scope and purpose of Order I Rule 10 (2) of C.P.C. has been explained in Para No.14, which reads as follows:-

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" It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some questions involved: that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, there must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, that is, he can say that the litigation may lead to a result, which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights."

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In the judgment reported in Volume 100 L.W 1987, page 485, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in AIR (1965) SC 271 in the case of (Kanakarathnammal Vs. Loganatha ) for the position that in a suit for partition, all the sharers are necessary parties and also for the position that the suit is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of any one of the parties. The Division Bench also took note of its earlier judgment rendered in the case of (T.Panchapakesan and others Vs. Peria Thambi Naicker and others) reported in 85 L.W. 841.

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In the judgment reported in (1965) S.C. 271 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:-

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" Para 15....It is true that under Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of the parties but there can be no doubt that if the parties who are not joined are not only proper but also necessary parties to it, the infirmity in the suit is bound to be fatal.

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Even in such cases, the Court can under O.1 R.10, sub rule2 direct the necessary parties to be joined, but all this can and should be done at the stage of trial and that too without prejudice to the said parties' plea of limitation. Once it is held that the appellant's two brothers are co-heirs with her in respect of the properties left intestate by their mother, the present suit fled by the appellant partakes of the character of a suit for partition and in such a suit clearly the appellant alone would not be entitled to claim any relief against the respondents. The estate can be represented only when all the three heirs are before the Court. If the appellant persisted in proceedings with the suit on the basis that she was exclusively entitled to the suit property, she took the risk and it is now too later to allow her to rectify the mistake..."

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Therefore, it is seen from the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court that non impleadment of all the sharers in a suit for partition will be fatal. But in the present case, the persons, who were not impleaded, were not sharers and they were subsequent purchasers. Further, no particulars were given by the second defendant regarding the subsequent purchasers, whether they purchased the properties before the filing of the suit or after the filing of the suit. If they had purchased the properties after the filing of the suit, their sales were hit by doctrine of lis pendens and in that context, the question whether they have to be impleaded as proper or necessary parties has to be considered.

¶76

In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 191 in the case of (Bibi Zubaida Khatoon Vs. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another) it is held that the subsequent transferee cannot, as of right, seek impleadment in the suit, though normally a person based on transfer pendente lite is permitted to enable the transferee to protect his interest. It is further held that when the suit is pending for a long time and alienation prima facie did not appear to be bona fide, the subsequent alienees cannot be impleaded. In the judgment reported in (1996) 5 SCC 539 in the case of (Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh and others) the same principle was laid down and held that the subsequent purchasers cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties.

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In the judgment reported in AIR (2010) SC 3109 : 2010 7 SCC 417 (Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court

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defined the terms "necessary party" and "proper party" as follows:-

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" A" necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be proper or necessary party, the court has not jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a property party to the suit for specific performance."

¶81

In the judgment reported in AIR (2005) SC 2209 in the case of (Amit Kumar Shaw Vs. Farida Khatoon) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the transferee pendente lite is not entitled to, as of right, to be made a party to the suit, though the Court has discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be added as a proper party, if his interest in the subject matter of the suit is substantial and not just peripheral.

¶82

In the judgment reported in (2012) 8 SC 384, in the case of (Vidux Impex and Traders Pvt Ltd., and others Vs. Tosh Apartments Pvt Ltd. and others) certain guidelines are laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding the impleadment of transferee pendente lite, which reads as follows :-

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"1)There must be a suit or proceeding pending in a court of competent jurisdiction.

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2)The suit or proceeding must not be collusive.

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3)The litigation must be one in which right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question.

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4)There must be a transfer of or otherwise dealing with the property in dispute by any party to the litigation.

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5)Such transfer must affect the rights of the other party that may ultimately accrue under the terms of the decree or order."

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According to me, in the reported judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, viz., (2010) 7 SCC 417, (2012) 8 SC 384 and AIR

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(2005) SC 2209 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court ordered impleadment of transferee pendente lite in a suit for specific performance holding that the transferee pendente lite has got a substantial interest in the suit property and any decree that may be passed would affect his rights also. But, in a suit for partition, the position is different. In the suit for partition, while passing a preliminary decree, the entitlement of a party to a share in the suit properties is determined. As stated supra, in the suit for partition, if sharers were not impleaded, then, the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. But, insofar as the subsequent purchasers are concerned, they cannot be considered as necessary parties and they may only be considered as proper parties.

¶91

In the judgment reported in (2010) 7 SCC 417 (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court defined the term 'proper party', as party, whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person, in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. It is held that the fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a property party to the suit for specific performance. Therefore, the transferee pendente lite secured right to work out equity in final decree proceeding and therefore, at the stage of passing preliminary decree, he is not a necessary party, as his interests are taken care of by his vendors. Therefore, the transferee pendente lite are necessary parties for complete, effective and adequate adjudication of the dispute while passing the final decree, as allotment of properties would be made only in the final decree. In such situation, it must be held that the suit is liable to be dismissed for non impleadment of transferee pendente lite and as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2007) 1 SC 519, (Dhanalakshmi and others Vs. P.Mohan and others), the transferee pendente lite are entitled to come on records in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. In that reported case, the persons purchased undivided share of a co-sharers, prior to the filing of the suit for partition and purchasers filed an application to get themselves impleaded in the suit for partition and in that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by reason of the purchase by a third party of the undivided share in the suit property, the rights of the plaintiff will not be affected and the purchasers, having purchased the property from some of the co-sharers are entitled to come on record in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. Though in that suit, preliminary decree passed was set aside, according to me, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the preliminary decree, as applications were filed by the subsequent purchasers to get themselves impleaded in the suit before the passing of the final

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decree. Nevertheless, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that judgment, the pendente lite transferees are entitled to get themselves impleaded in the final decree application to work out their equity while allotment of properties.

¶94

Further, as per Order 1, Rule 10 (2) of C.P.C., the parties can be added at any stage of the proceedings and in the judgment reported in (1970) 1 MLJ 243 in the matter of (Swayamprakasam @ Chidambaranathan Vs. R.Vijayarangam) this Court permitted the impleadment of parties at the stage of final decree proceedings also. In the judgment reported in AIR (1978) Kerala 153 in the matter of (N.P.R.Nair Vs.A.Pillai Kumara Pillai) it is held that the impleadment of parties after the passing of the preliminary decree is possible, only on the basis that none of the questions, already settled by the preliminary decree would have to be re-opened by the Court as a consequence of such impleadment, and that impleadment application could be filed, only on the condition that further proceedings will be only on the basis of the preliminary decree already passed.

¶95

Further, the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, in the judgment reported in 100 L.W 486, held that Order 1, Rule 9 C.P.C. provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties, and the Court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of parties actually before it and as per proviso, nothing in that rule will apply to non-joinder of necessary parties. It is further held that the main part of Order 1, Rule 9 is only an enabling provision and the Court shall deal with each case with reference to the particular facts in that case and held that sharers are necessary parties and without impleading them, the suit has to fail.

¶96

In this case, as stated supra, all the sharers were impleaded and they also contested the suit and the second defendant filed an additional written statement in the year 1991, long after the filing of the suit, making a vague plea regarding the sale to third parties, without giving any particulars and he did not give any particulars even during the trial and in the absence of any particulars given by the second defendant regarding the transferees pendente lite or transfer of properties prior to the filing of the suit, the appellant/plaintiff cannot be expected to implead them in the suit and the subsequent purchasers cannot be considered as necessary parties, as their vendors, who are sharers, are already parties to the suit proceedings and subsequent purchasers will have to work out their remedies through their vendors.

¶97

Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Trial Court ought

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not to have dismissed the suit for non-joinder of subsequent purchasers, in the absence of any details given by the respondents/defendants, and subsequent purchasers may be proper parties and their presence is required only at the time of final decree proceedings and those persons can also be impleaded at the stage of the final decree to work out their remedies. Therefore, the point for consideration is answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff, and, I hold that in a suit for partition, in the absence of any particulars provided by the defendants regarding the subsequent transferees, the suit cannot be dismissed on that ground and subsequent purchasers can be added in the final decree proceeding, as they will have to work out their rights with respect to the shares allotted to their vendors.

¶100

In the result, the findings of the Trial Court in respect of all other Issues, except, Issue Nos.vi and xi are sustained and the findings in respect of Issue Nos.vi and xi are set aside, the Appeal is allowed and the connected C.M.P.Nos.1389 to 1394 of 2009 are also allowed. No costs.

¶101

After judgment was pronounced by the court, at that time it was represented that the suit was of the year 1986 and was dismissed on 30.10.1991 and now the appeal is allowed and therefore the Trial Court may be directed to complete the final decree proceedings within the stipulated time.

¶102

As the appeal has been allowed and the suit has been decreed, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the final decree application within a period of twelve months from the date of service of the respondents in the final decree application.

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Sd/ Assistant Registrar

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/True Copy/

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Sub Assistant Registrar

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The Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuddalore. One cc to M/s.Sarvabhauman Associates Advocates SR.No.36037 two ccs to Mr.A.Muthukrishnan, advocates SR.No.35898 one cc to Mr.R.Subramanian, advocates SR.No.36154

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A.S.No.827 of 1992
JRG(CO)
SKY/3/9

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7 Cy of Pt Judmt Filed v. Mohammed Yakkub

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7 Cy of Pt Judmt Filed v. Mohammed Yakkub

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Radhakrishna Reddy (Died) Vs Ayyavoo G

S.Arunkumar Vs G.Menaga