namely, affording a hearing before an order is passed, cannot be permitted if it is likely to result in defeating the administrative action required to be taken with promptitude, having regard to the circumstances of the case on hand. Inflexible and rigid application of the rule of audi alteram partem to Rule 5 of the rules would have the effect of setting at naught the very object or purpose of placing a civil servant under suspension. If a civil servant charged of committing an act involving moral turpitude cannot be placed under suspension unless he is given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order, he would continue in service till the hearing is contemplated which would not be in public interest. To continue a civil servant who is alleged to have betrayed a tendency to demand and accept illegal gratification would be against public interest and! would defeat the very object of prompt action, i.e., suspension in public interest if the procedure of giving a hearing before such an order is passed is required to be undergone. We are, therefore, in agreement ‘ with the view taken in Lakshman ‘ s case (supra). We, therefore, do not think that Rule 5 is ultra vires theon the plea that the procedure prescribed thereunder is in violation of the principles of natural justice. ”
