The State of Kerala Vs Cadburys India Ltd.

¶1

2025:KER:27652

¶2

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶3

1

¶4

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

¶5

PRESENT

¶6

THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

¶7

¶8

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.

¶9

WEDNESDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 12TH CHAITHRA,

¶10

¶11

LA.APP. NO. 268 OF 2019

¶12

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 19.06.2019 IN
LAR NO.73 OF 2002 OF SUB COURT, SULTHANBATHERY

¶13

APPELLANT/CLAIMANT NO.3:

¶14

GEORGE POTHAN,
AGED 63 YEARS

¶15

S/O LATE P.G.GEORGE, HOPE ESTATE, VELLARIMALA,
VYTHIRI TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT-673 121.

¶16

BY ADVS.
BIJU ABRAHAM
SRI.B.G.BHASKAR

¶17

RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS 1& 2 & CLAIMANTS 1 & 2:

¶18

1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY COLLECTOR, WAYANAD-673 121.

¶19

2 KERALA INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, VELLARANKODE, WAYANAD673 123.

¶20

3 M/S CADBURYS INDIA LTD., CADBURY’S HOUSE, 19/3 DESAI ROAD, MUMBAI-400026.

¶21

2025:KER:27652

¶22

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶23

2

¶24

4 GENERAL MANAGER,
COCOA OPERATIONS, CADBURY’S INDIA LTD., P.B.NO
17, VADUVATHUR, KOTTAYAM-686 010.

¶25

BY ADV.SMT.N.SUDHA DEVI, SPL. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
FOR R1
ADV P.U.SHAILAJAN, SC FOR R2

¶26

THIS LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD
ON 19.02.2025, ALONG WITH LA.App..23/2021, THE COURT ON
02.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

¶27

2025:KER:27652

¶28

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶29

3

¶30

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

¶31

PRESENT

¶32

THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

¶33

¶34

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.

¶35

WEDNESDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 12TH CHAITHRA,

¶36

1947

¶37

LA.APP. NO. 23OF 2021

¶38

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 19.06.2019 IN
LAR NO.73 OF 2002 OF SUB COURT, SULTHANBATHERY

¶39

APPELLANT/1ST RESPONDENT:

¶40

THE STATE OF KERALA

¶41

REP.BY DEPUTY COLLECTOR, WAYANAD

¶42

BY ADVS.

¶43

SMT.N.SUDHA DEVI, SPECIAL GOVERNMENT PLEADER
(LA)

¶44

RESPONDENTS/CLAIMANTS&SUPPLEMENTAL 2ND RESPONDENT IN

¶45

LAR:

¶46

1 M/S.CADBURYS INDIA LTD., CABDURY'S HOUSE, 19-3, DESAI ROAD

¶47

2 GENERAL MANAGER

¶48

COCOA OPERATIONS, CADBURYS INDIA LTD., PB NO.17, VADUVATHOOR, KOTTAYAM - 686 010.

¶49

3 GEORGE POTHEN S/O.GEORGE, HOPE ESTATE, VELLARIMALA, VYTHIRI

¶50

2025:KER:27652

¶51

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶52

4

¶53

TALUK, WAYANAD (POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER OF SRI.
GEORGE JOHN AND SRI. P.C. MATHEW), PIN - 673 576

¶54

4 KERALA INDUSTRICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PIN - 673 123

¶55

BY ADVS.
SRI.BIJU ABRAHAM FOR R3
SRI.B.G.BHASKAR FOR R3
SRI.P.U.SHAILAJAN, SC FOR R4

¶56

THIS LAND ACQUISITION APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR
HEARING ON 19.02.2025, ALONG WITH LA.App..268/2019, THE
COURT ON 02.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

¶57

2025:KER:27652

¶58

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

5

“C.R”

J U D G M E N T

[LA.App. Nos.268/2019, 23/2021]

¶63

Easwaran S., J.

¶64

These appeals arise out of the judgment and decree dated 19.06.2019 in L.A.R No.73/2002 on the files of Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery. Both the 3^rd claimant as well as the State have come up in appeal.

¶65

The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeals are as follows:

¶66

An extent of 20.25 Hectares (50 Acres) of dry land comprised in re-survey No.266/3 of Kalpetta Village of Vythiri Taluk was acquired at the instance of KINFRA for the purpose of establishment of an Industrial Estate. Section 4(1) notification was issued on 27.1.2000. The award was passed on 30.9.2000 and the land acquisition officer awarded a total amount of Rs.2,54,31,752/-. While fixing the land value, the land acquisition officer relied on sale deed No.1296/1999 dated 14.7.1999 (Ext.R4). However, while fixing the market value, the land acquisition officer split the property into two blocks, one having an extent of 1.5535 Hectares, wherein the land value was fixed at Rs.3,013/- per cent, and for the remaining

¶67

2025:KER:27652

¶68

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶69

6 18.6965 Hectares of land, the land acquisition officer adopted the capitalisation method and awarded a total amount of Rs.1,85,85,251.16 towards the market value for the entire 20.25 Hectares.

¶70

Aggrieved by the award passed by the land acquisition officer, the claimants preferred an application under Section 18 of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 stating that the land acquisition officer ought to have adopted a comparative sales method. In support of his claim, Exts.A1 to A5 documents were produced and CW1 to CW4 were examined. The respondent/State, on the other hand, produced Exts.R1 to R14 documents and examined RW1 in support of their claim. The claimants also sought compensation under the head severance and injurious affection for the remaining 67.48 Acres of land in possession since a check dam, which was constructed inside the 50 Acres of land acquired, was also taken over in the acquisition proceedings.

¶71

The reference court on appreciation of evidence found that the market value fixed by the land acquisition officer is dismally low and thus proceeded to enhance the market value of the land acquired. However, the reference court rejected the contention of the claimants that the land acquisition officer could not have split

¶72

2025:KER:27652

¶73

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶74

7

¶75

the property into two by adopting the belting system. Discarding the evidence produced by the claimants, the reference court proceeded to grant compensation towards severance and injurious affection at the rate of Rs.500/- per cent for the remaining extent. Aggrieved by the insufficiency in the grant of compensation, the 3^rd claimant has approached this Court in L.A.App.No.268/2019, while the State has come up in L.A.App.No.23/2021 aggrieved by the enhancement granted by the reference court in the market value.

¶76

Heard Sri.B.G.Bhasker, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/3^rd claimant and Smt.N.Sudha Devi, the learned Special Government Pleader (LA) appearing for the State and Sri.P.U.Shailajan, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority, KINFRA.

¶77

Submissions on behalf of the appellant/claimant

¶78

Sri.B.G.Bhaskar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/3^rd claimant raised the following submissions:

¶79

(a) The reference court failed to appreciate the true evidentiary value of Exts.A1, A3 and A4 sale deeds, which were produced as exemplars. The properties covered under Exts.A1, A3 and A4, though paddy land, were sold to Kalpetta Municipality, which had expended considerably in order to reclaim the land for the

¶80

2025:KER:27652

¶81

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶82

8 purpose of construction of an indoor stadium. At the time of the trial of the reference, the claimants had substantiated the fact that nearly Rs.9 Lakhs was expended by the Municipality for the purpose of reclamation, but however, during the pendency of the appeal, in response to a query under the Right to Information Act, the appellant received an intimation that the total amount expended by the Municipality was Rs.43,52,752.28 over an extent of 19500 sq.m. Therefore, it is the case of the appellant/3^rd claimant that the development cost which was incurred by the Municipality ought to have been taken into consideration by the reference court while determining the exact market value of the exemplars.

¶83

(b) Equally so, the reference court erred in rejecting the evidentiary value of Ext.A2 sale deed. Though Ext.A2 sale deed is of the year 1986, the reference court should have noticed the fact that an extent of 47 cents was sold for a sum of Rs.4,23,000/- and the same is in favour of Life Insurance Corporation, which will certainly add credence to the document. Referring to the report of the Advocate Commissioner, the learned counsel would further point out that the property covered by the relied on document is One (1) k.m. away from the town and the said land cannot be equated with the land acquired.

¶84

2025:KER:27652

¶85

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶86

9 (c) The land acquired was maintained as a demonstrative estate by M/s.Cadbury’s India Limited with well formed roads, quarters for staff and also sufficient electric connections for the purpose of lighting the surroundings.

¶87

(d) The claimants despite successful in proving that the remaining 67.48 Acres of land was rendered useless because of the acquisition of the 50 Acres, inclusive of the check dam maintained for the purpose of irrigation of the coffee estate, the reference court went wrong in discarding the evidence of CW2 and granting only Rs.500/- per Cent towards the severance compensation.

¶88

(e) It is further contended that the land acquisition officer could not have adopted the belting system and split up the land acquired into two blocks of 1.5535 Hectares and 18.6935 Hectares by fixing the land value of Rs.3013/- per cent to the first block and applying the capitalisation method in respect of the second block for the purpose of compensation.

¶89

(f) The fact that the importance of the land acquired is proved by the fact that the land acquired abutting the National Highway, was completely lost sight by the reference court.

¶90

(g) Reason for rejection of Ext.A2 sale deed is that the property mentioned in Ext.A2 is situated within the town. The

¶91

2025:KER:27652

¶92

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶93

10 concept of “town” has to be understood as a single word and there cannot be any further sub-division from the town.

¶94

(h) The value reflected in an exemplar for a smaller part can always be considered for the purpose of arriving at the value of a larger extent of land sought to be acquired, subject to the exception that if the land has already been developed, the development charges will have to be deducted.

¶95

(i) Lastly, it is contended that the appeal filed by the State is not maintainable since the acquisition is for KINFRA and the primary responsibility to pay the compensation is on the requisitioning authority.

¶96

Submissions on behalf of the State

¶97

The learned Special Government Pleader (LA), Smt.N.Sudha Devi, appearing on behalf of the State, the appellant in L.A.App.No.23/2021, primarily contended that the reference court went wrong in relying on Exts.A1, A3 and A4 which cannot be construed as similar documents. She would further submit that the best evidence available before the reference court was in the form of Exts.R13 and R14 documents, which are the documents reflecting purchase of jenmom right by the 3^rd claimant. Going by the aforesaid documents, only Rs.55,000/- is fixed for the 117.48 Acres of land and

¶98

2025:KER:27652

¶99

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶100

11

¶101

therefore, the reference court exceeded in its jurisdiction by relying on the other exemplars which ought not to have been taken as best evidence. It is further submitted that the reference court also erred in granting severance compensation, especially when no evidence was adduced by the claimants to prove that they are unable to cultivate the remaining 67.48 Acres of land. Finally, it is contended that the reference court ought not to have granted interest for the period from 2008 to 2015, since the reference proceedings were stayed by the order of the High Court in WP(C) No.18484 of 2008 and the writ petition was disposed of only on 15.01.2016.

¶102

Submissions on behalf of the requisitioning authority

¶103

Sri.P.U.Shailajan, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority, vehemently opposed the submissions of Sri.B.G.Bhaskar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/3^rd claimant, and pointed out that the claimant had paid a sum of Rs.2,70,00,000/- for purchase of tenancy right and also Rs.55,000/- for the purchase of Jenmom right. If the total consideration is taken, the market value of the land acquired per cent would come to around Rs.2,303/- per cent. According to him, the best evidence available is Exts.R13 and R14 sale deeds and, therefore, the reference court could not have ignored the same and

¶104

2025:KER:27652

¶105

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶106

12

¶107

granted the compensation as done. Insofar as the severance compensation is concerned, no evidence had been adduced by the claimant to prove that the remaining 67.48 Acres of land remains unutilised. According to the learned counsel, evidence of CW2 could not be relied on, especially in the absence of any specific finding entered by the Advocate Commissioner, who filed the report. The learned counsel would further submit that although the requisitioning authority has not preferred an appeal, it is entitled to raise such contentions in order to support the State in their endeavour to assail the findings of the reference court to prove that the enhancement granted by the reference court is on a higher side.

¶108

We have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar and have perused the records. Maintainability of the Appeal by the State

¶109

We deem it appropriate to consider this question at first, since the entire consideration of the appeal by the State hinges on the question of its maintainability. According to Sri.B.G. Bhaskar, the learned counsel for the 3^rd claimant, the appeal preferred by the State is not maintainable for the reason that the acquisition is for a company. In support of his contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in V.N.Krishna Murthy and another

¶110

2025:KER:27652

¶111

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶112

13

¶113

Vs Ravikumar and others [(2020) 9 SCC 501], wherein the Supreme Court held that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies that he falls within the category of aggrieved person.

¶114

10.1. We have no doubt regarding the principles laid down by the Supreme Court as above. But the pointed question is whether it applies to land acquisition proceedings. We are afraid that it will not. The primary liability to pay compensation for forcible acquisition of land is on the State, since it invokes the power under eminent domain. We notice that under the old regime as well as under the new regime, the primary liability is on the State to pay the compensation. This principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court in Ultra Tech Cement Limited Vs Mast Ram and others [(2025) 1 SCC 798]. Therefore, we hold that the appeal preferred by the State is maintainable and thus answer the point against the claimant. Evaluation of the submissions of the State

¶115

Though one cannot dispute the power of the State to invoke the power of eminent domain to acquire the properties of private individuals, this Court cannot but notice the fact that 117.48 Acres of land which was being primarily cultivated with coffee was all on a sudden, sought to be acquired for the purpose of

¶116

2025:KER:27652

¶117

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶118

14 establishment of an industrial park at the instance of KINFRA. Though we have no doubt regarding the public purpose behind the acquisition, we are slightly surprised with the vehemence with which the State as well as the requisitioning authority oppose the plea of the claimant for enhancement, while assailing the findings of the reference court. It is in this context, we felt that it would be expedient for us to consider the claim of the State at first instance, before proceeding with the claim under respective heads for enhancement at the instance of the claimant.

¶119

The primary contention raised by the State is that the best evidence available before the reference court was Exts.R13 and R14 documents, by which the claimant purchased the property. In support of this contention, the learned Government Pleader placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Special Deputy Collector v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao [(1997 (6) SCC 41] . The contention that the reference court ought to have relied on the said documents instead of the exemplars, at first blush, looks appealing. However, when we delve deep into this issue, we find the argument has its own inherent infirmities. Exts.R13 and R14 are the two registered documents by which the claimant was stated to have purchased the tenancy right as well as the jenmom right on

¶120

2025:KER:27652

¶121

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶122

15 16.01.1998 and 11.10.1999, respectively. Though the requisitioning authority did not prefer an independent appeal on its behalf, the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority seriously attacked the findings of the reference court on an assumption that it is entitled to raise such contentions in an appeal preferred by the State, on the ground that the reference court erred egregiously in not looking into those documents. According to him, the price for the purchase of jenmam right of 117.48 Acres of land was fixed at Rs.55,000/-. When this argument was raised, we were primarily concerned about the question as to whether either the State or the requisitioning authority had raised the aforesaid argument before the reference court. Though the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority asserts before us that the same was raised, we find that no such argument had been advanced before the reference court. Be that as it may, in order to find out whether there is any substance in the argument raised by the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority, we decided to explore further into the arguments in detail.

¶123

The details of purchase of the jenmom right as well as the tenancy right were no doubt raised in the objection preferred by requisitioning authority before the reference court. A perusal of the

¶124

2025:KER:27652

¶125

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶126

16

¶127

objection shows that the requisitioning authority had given the details regarding the transactions. Therefore, it is admitted that by the two documents, the tenancy right as well as the jenmom right were separately purchased by the appellant/claimant No.3. However, the question would be whether either the State or the requisitioning authority can raise this question at all.

¶128

Under the old regime of determination of the compensation for the land acquired, i.e. the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, we find that under Section 11 thereof, the District Collector is bound to determine the market value of the land acquired considering the extent and the nature of the land. Thus, while the Land Acquisition Officer proceeds to fix the market value he does it by taking into consideration the documents in respect of similar land for the said purpose. The sustenance of the argument of the State will depend as to whether the land acquisition officer took note of the aforementioned document while fixing the market value. If he has not, then probably we may have to delve deep into this argument. On the other hand, if he has considered the document, the further question would be whether the State can question his wisdom in these proceedings?

¶129

2025:KER:27652

¶130

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶131

17

¶132

We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the findings rendered by the land acquisition officer in order to see whether there was any omission on the part of the land acquisition officer to consider the documents, Exts.R13 and R14. Surprisingly, we find that the land acquisition officer after taking note of those documents, did not deem fit to accept those documents nor to refer the same while determining the market value of the land acquired. Therefore, in our considered view, when the land acquisition officer himself was not satisfied about the genuineness of Exts.R13 and R14 and was clearly of the view that the same did not reflect the true market value, the State and the requisitioning authority cannot contend otherwise.

¶133

When the Land Acquisition Officer did not deem fit to consider a particular piece of evidence while fixing the market value and proceeds to fix the market value and aggrieved by the same the claimant seeks reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the reference court enhances the market value, can the State in appeal contend that the value fixed by Land Acquisition Officer is incorrect? Answer would be an emphatic “No”. If that be so, we find that the requisitioning authority cannot place itself in a better pedestal than the State. It must also be remembered that the Land

¶134

2025:KER:27652

¶135

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶136

18 Acquisition Officer is not bound to consider an undervalued document while fixing the compensation. Hence, we are of the view that the Land Acquisition Officer rightly discarded the title document while fixing the land value of the acquired land.

¶137

Although the primary liability is on the State to compensate the land owner, it is conceded before us that the requisitioning authority is also an instrumentality of the State. But, even if we are to assume that the requisitioning authority is an instrumentality of the State, it has nevertheless used the machinery of the State for the purpose of acquiring the claimant’s land, and if it wanted to challenge the findings of the reference court, then it ought to have preferred a separate appeal and in the absence of the same, the requisitioning authority cannot raise contentions which are not raised by the State.

¶138

The next contention raised before us by the learned Senior Government Pleader is regarding the value by the reference court. Though it is contended that the land value fixed by the reference court is on the higher side, we must notice the fact that despite having shown the proximity of the land acquired with that of the National Highway and the availability of other exemplars, the land acquisition officer chose to rely on a document, which is 7.4 k.m.

¶139

2025:KER:27652

¶140

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶141

19

¶142

away from the land acquired. We must also equally note that the claimant was successful in proving that the sale of the basic land by Ext.R4 document was a distress sale by two age old persons who were residing in the property with an intention to settle along with their son. It is in this context, that the evidence of CW3 assumes significance. On a scrutiny of the oral testimony of CW3, we find that the State miserably failed to discredit the evidence of CW3 and thereby leading to an irresistible conclusion that what was projected by the claimant regarding the value of Ext.R4 document is genuine. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the assessment of the market value by the land acquisition officer with reference to Ext.R4 document is completely wrong, and the reference court rightly found that the value fixed by the land acquisition officer was dismally low warranting enhancement.

¶143

Evaluation of the submissions of the claimant

¶144

Once we have found that the market value arrived at by the land acquisition officer with reference to Ext.R4 document is wrong, the decision of the reference court to enhance the market value must necessarily be sustained. However, before finally doing so, we must take note of certain glaring infirmities pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the claimant. According to

¶145

2025:KER:27652

¶146

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶147

20

¶148

Sri.B.G.Bhasker, the learned counsel for the claimant, the reference court could not have rejected Ext.A2 document, which is a sale deed executed in favour of Life Insurance Corporation during the year 1986. No doubt, the learned counsel is justified in contending that since the purchase is by a statutory corporation, the purchase of the property must be viewed with due credibility. We are unable to subscribe to the said contention especially since the sale in favour of Life Insurance Corporation took place in the year 1986, whereas the notification for acquisition is of the year 2000. The exemplar for smaller plots can be applied for the purpose of arriving at market value of larger tracts of land and there is no absolute rule against that. However, we cannot remain oblivious of the fact that in the present case there are other exemplars available and that reliance on Ext.A2 need be done only if other exemplars are not available. Accepting the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the claimant would lead to an incongruousness situation, where an exemplar executed 14 years ago will have to be considered for the purpose of arriving at the market value.

¶149

In General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Limited vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and Another [2008 (14) SCC 745], the Supreme Court held that exemplars beyond five

¶150

2025:KER:27652

¶151

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶152

21 years cannot be considered for the purpose of determining the market value in an acquisition proceeding. Therefore, we do not find any reason as to why we should interfere with the findings of the reference court in rejecting Ext.A2 document.

¶153

However, that may not be the case insofar as Exts.A1, A3 and A4 documents are concerned. The report of the Advocate Commissioner shows that the property covered by those documents are situated within an outer perimeter of 1-1.7 k.m. away from Kalpetta town. The properties covered by Exts.A1, A3 and A4 are also lies in close proximity to the land acquired. The Advocate commissioner specifically found that the land acquired is situated 3.7 k.m. away from Kalpetta town. Considering the terrain of the area and the predominant existence of the plantations, we can envisage the natural difficulty of the claimant to produce an exemplar exactly in the nature of the land sought to be acquired. It is in this context; we must consider the endeavour undertaken by the reference court to find out the appropriate market value for the purpose of arriving at a just and equivalent compensation. No doubt, the reference court found that the property covered under Exts.A1, A3 and A4 documents are not similar to that of the land acquired, but we cannot remain oblivious to the peculiar nature of the property

¶154

2025:KER:27652

¶155

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶156

22 involved in the acquisition. Though the State contends before us that the finding of the reference court was that Exts.A1, A3 & A4 documents are not similar in nature and, therefore, it ought to have rejected the same, we have already found that the land acquisition officer completely went wrong in taking Ext.R4 document as the basic land for the purpose of calculating the market value. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances, we find that the reference court was perfectly justified in taking Exts.A1, A3 & A4 as the exemplars.

¶157

We also find that the exemplars produced in this case is that of a paddy land and the land acquired is garden land. Therefore, the question is how do we compare the lands covered by Exts.A1, A3 and A4 and arrive at the market value of the land acquired. While undertaking the above exercise, we are required to resort to a certain extent of guesstimation.

¶158

Resort to guesstimation

¶159

The principle of guesstimation is a heuristic device that enables the court, in the absence of direct evidence and relevant sale exemplars, to make a reasonable and informed guess or estimation of the market value of the land under acquisition, and concomitantly the compensation payable by the appropriate Government. In that sense, guesstimation hinges on the court's ability to exercise

¶160

2025:KER:27652

¶161

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶162

23 informed judgment and expertise in assessing the market value of the land, especially when the evidence does not tender a straightforward answer. (See New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs Harnand Singh (deceased) Through L.R’s [2024 SCC Online 1691] ).

¶163

Even if the exemplars are not similar in nature, we hold that by applying the principle of guesstimation and applying circle rate the appellate court can redetermine the compensation.

¶164

In Madhukar Vs Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation & Ors [(2022)13 SCC 344] , the Supreme Court held that it is not the nature of land which is determinative of the market value of the land. The market value must be determined keeping in mind the proximity of the land acquired to the nearby roads or the development in the area.

¶165

In Shabia Muhammed Yusuf Abdul Hamid Mulla (dead) by L.R’s and others VS Special Land Acquisition Officer and others [(2012) 7 SCC 595], the Supreme Court laid down several criteria for determining the market value of the land in an acquisition. We deem it appropriate to extract paragraph No.16 of the judgment.

¶166

“16. We have considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the record. It is settled law that while fixing the market value of the acquired land, the Land

¶167

2025:KER:27652

¶168

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶169

24

¶170

Acquisition Collector is required to keep in mind the following factors:

¶171

(i) Existing geographical situation of the land.

¶172

(ii) Existing use of the land.

¶173

(iii) Already available advantages, like proximity to National or State High Way or road and/or developed area. (iv) Market value of other land situated in the same locality/village/area or adjacent or very near the acquired land.”

¶174

That takes us to the next question. How do we determine the market value of the land acquired in this case? No doubt, there is no direct evidence in the form of exact exemplars. The prominence of the land acquired is brought out in evidence adduced by the claimant. At the same time, the non-comparability of the land covered by the basic document is clearly established by the report of the Advocate Commissioner, wherein it is stated that the said land is situated 7.4 k.m. away from the land acquired. That leaves us with Exts.A1, A3 and A4 documents. Admittedly, the land covered by these documents are paddy land. Of course, after purchase, it was reclaimed by the Municipality and an indoor stadium was constructed. Thus, the commercial importance of the land covered by the exemplars stood proved beyond doubt.

¶175

2025:KER:27652

¶176

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶177

25

¶178

In Lalchand Vs Union of India & Anr [AIR 2010 SC 170], the Supreme Court considered the question of determining the value of agriculture land by taking the garden land as exemplar and applying a deduction of 25% to 40%. We see no reason as to why the principle cannot be applied conversely to determine the value of the garden land, when the only available exemplar before the court is that of a paddy land. Therefore, we find that interest of justice would subserve, if we apply an escalation of 25% on the value of the land as reflected in Exts.A1, A3 and A4. Though the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/claimant strenuously contended that while determining the market value of the land covered by Exts.A1, A3 & A4, due weightage has to be given to the development cost which was incurred by the Municipality for the purpose of reclamation of the land, we are unable to agree with the said contention for the reason that whatever steps undertaken by the vendor after purchase of the land to enhance its value cannot be the basis of determination of the market value of the land as on the date of purchase and, therefore, we have no hesitation to reject the aforesaid argument.

¶179

The land value as reflected from Exts.A1, A3 and A4 documents is Rs.7,400/- per cent. The records further reveal that

¶180

2025:KER:27652

¶181

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶182

26 the documents were executed in the year 1998, whereas the acquisition proceedings were in the year 2000. The exact period between the date of execution of Exts.A1, A3 &A4 and that of Section 4(1) notification is 1½ years and, therefore, we deem it appropriate to take a two-year period for escalation for the purpose of determining the market value, which we arrive as thus:

¶183

7400+ (7400x25%) for 2 years = 12,138.02 (rounded to Rs.12,140/-).

¶184

Adoption of belting system

¶185

In Andra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd Vs G. Mohan Reddy [(2010) 15 SCC 412] , the Supreme Court held that belting system is permissible only when the land in different survey numbers and in different locations belonging to different owners are acquired.

¶186

In Besco Limited v. State of Haryana [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1071], Supreme Court while considering the principle of adopting belting system held as follows.

¶187

“24. The subject lands are acquired under one notification and the plan brought on record evidences the location and proximity to development in and around the acquired land. The belting of area for valuation would be incorrect. We reject the argument of the State. Since we have not applied incremental

¶188

2025:KER:27652

¶189

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶190

27

¶191

value on the exemplar, we deem it just to determine uniform market value to the lands under acquisition.”

¶192

In State of Kerala and Others v. Sarasamma and Others [L.A.App.Nos.558/2022 & conn. dated 12.2.2025 : 2025 KLT OnLine 1308] following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, this Court held that if the land acquired are lying contiguously and are acquired for the same purpose under same notification, the land owners will certainly be discriminated if the land value is fixed by adopting belting system, and that therefore, the land acquisition officer as well as the reference court could not have adopted the belting system.

¶193

Applying the principles laid down as above, we find that the belting system adopted by the Land Acquisition officer is unsustainable. We cannot remain oblivious of the fact that 50 Acres out of the 117.48 Acres of land, having a well-built Check-Dam for the purpose of retention of water to be used through sprinkler system for the purpose of irrigating the entire 117.48 Acres, was acquired for the purpose of establishment of an industrial park. The requisitioning authority must provide continuous water supply to the industries, which are sought to be established by the grant of lease of the plots dividing the land acquired having an extent of 50 Acres

¶194

2025:KER:27652

¶195

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶196

28

¶197

and it is precisely for that purpose that the Check-Dam was also acquired. Land acquisition officer decided to split up the land into two blocks, 10 Acres and 40 Acres. While the land acquisition officer fixed Rs.3,013/- per Cent for the 10 Acres, he adopted the capitalisation method for the other 40 Acres for the purpose of determination of compensation. We fail to see the rationale behind such adoption. We find that a splitting up would deprive the claimant of a just and fair compensation for the land acquired. Coming to the findings of the reference court regarding the adoption of the belting system, the reasoning given by the reference court does not find support of law. A close reading of the findings of the reference court as regards the adoption of the belting system, we find that the only reason given by the reference court was that considering the lay out of the land splitting it up into two sections of 10 Acres and 40 Acres is just and proper. The reference court also found that the availability of internal road is a good ground to hold that the back belt of the land is also suitable for the proposed purpose. But the court held that there will be no willing buyer in an open market who would prepare to purchase the land abutting the road and the land beneath the road at the same rate. Such dichotomous finding cannot be appreciated. No doubt, the entire extent of the land is not

¶198

2025:KER:27652

¶199

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶200

29 abutting the highway, but since it is having a larger extent, the portion near the highway may not have the same benefit of those portions internally. But we cannot ignore the compelling fact that the reference court had found that there is well built and maintained internal roads in the coffee plantation. Therefore, considering the facts in a wholesome perspective, we hold that the findings of the reference court upholding the belting system adopted by the land acquisition officer is clearly erroneous and is liable to be set aside. Entitlement for severance compensation

¶201

The entitlement for severance compensation or injurious affection is contained under Section 23(1) of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act 1894, which reads as under :

¶202

“ 23. Matters to be considered in determining compensation.

¶203

(1) In determining the amount or compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration-

¶204

first, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1);

¶205

secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof;

¶206

2025:KER:27652

¶207

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶208

30

¶209

thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land;

¶210

fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings;

¶211

fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change, and

¶212

sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.”

¶213

The third and fourth clauses provide for compensation for severance of land and for injurious affection. The severance compensation is granted for the severance of the unacquired land from that of the land acquired while injurious affection is granted as compensation for the damages sustained by the claimant at the time of the Collector taking possession. The entitlement of severance compensation has to be judged in the context of the loss sustained

¶214

2025:KER:27652

¶215

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶216

31

¶217

by the claimant as a result of the acquisition. It has come out in evidence that the land acquired having an extent of 50 Acres was inclusive of a Check-Dam. There need not be an opinion of an expert to appreciate the perennial problems faced in maintaining a plantation in respect of coffee and other hill produces. But still the claimant adduced evidence in the form of CW2, who was an expert in agriculture. The reference court simply discarded the evidence on the ground that he is an interested testimony. However, we must note that neither the requisitioning authority nor the State chose to adduce contra evidence to that of CW2. When the evidence of CW2 is closely analysed, we find that the plantation which was owned by the appellant/claimant was having a sprinkler system for the purpose of irrigating the same and the water was derived from the CheckDam which was built inside the 50 Acres of the land acquired. The presence of the Check-Dam is an irresistible conclusion that the water retained in it was meant for irrigating the entire 117.48 Acres.

¶218

In Walchandnagar Industries VS State of Maharashtra and another (2022) 5 SCC 71, the Supreme Court considered the parameters for the grant of severance compensation and held that the benefit under the third clause of Section 23(1) of the Land

¶219

2025:KER:27652

¶220

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶221

32 Acquisition Act 1898 cannot be read in isolation with that of the fourth clause. Both the clauses have to be read together.

¶222

However, we must note that while determining the compensation under clause thirdly and fourthly of Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, there is no definite guidelines. Compensation can go up to 50-60% of the amount fixed by the court as market value. Be that as it may, on facts we feel that since the remaining extent of land affected due to the acquisition being 67.48 Acres, it may not be expedient in granting severance compensation up to 60%. It must be remembered that in such cases the determination becomes purely factual depending upon the evidence adduced by the claimant to prove the entitlement of the severance compensation and injurious affection. In the present case, evidence discussed by us clearly shows that the claimant was successful in adducing evidence regarding the severance of the property. Hence, we are of the view that in such cases the courts can always grant severance compensation on a reasonable basis. In the present case we feel the claimant is entitled up to 30% of the land value as severance compensation/injurious affection. This is more so when we take into account the fact that due to the acquisition the appellant was unable to continue with the plantation.

¶223

2025:KER:27652

¶224

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶225

33 Entitlement for Interest for the delay in disposal of the reference case?

¶226

It is vehemently contended by Smt.Sudhadevi, the learned Senior Government Pleader for the State, and Sri P.U.Shailajan, the learned Counsel for requisition authority, that the reference court erred in granting interest for the period of 8 years when the reference case was stayed by the High Court. We must notice that in the year 2008 certain third parties sought impleadment in the reference case and that the court had permitted the third parties to implead in the reference case which is impermissible under law. The said order was challenged by the claimant in WP(C) No.18484 of 2008 and by Judgment dated 15.1.2016 , the Single Bench of this court authored by one of us { Justice Dr.A.K. Jayashankar Nambiar} allowed the writ petition setting aside the orders of the reference court. During the pendency of the writ petition, this Court had stayed the proceedings before the reference court. It is the specific case of the State that due to the order of stay, the claimant is not entitled to get interest from 2008 to 2016. We find that the said contention is wholly untenable since this Court had not stayed the land acquisition proceedings in the said writ petition. To ascertain the said fact, we called for the Judges Papers relating to WP(C) No.18484 of 2008 and found that the interim relief sought for

¶227

2025:KER:27652

¶228

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶229

34

¶230

by the claimant was against the proceedings of the reference court alone. The claimant was thus clearly not in fault for the delay caused in the disposal of the writ petition. Still further, we find that the reference court had passed the order for impleadment without any authority of law, thus causing the claimant to approach this Court with the writ petition. Therefore, we are of the view that the claimant was at not fault. Moreover, it is now settled that the act of the court shall not prejudice the party - actus curiae neminem gravabit," . Therefore, we find no substance in the argument and, hence, we reject the same.

¶231

Conclusion

¶232

As an upshot of these discussions, we are of the view that there is no merit in the appeal preferred by the State. Accordingly, we dismiss L.A.App.No.23/2021 preferred by the State. As a necessary corollary, we find that the claimant is entitled to succeed in his appeal. Accordingly, we allow L.A.App.No.268/2019 and re-fix the land value at Rs.12,140/- per cent. The appellant/claimant will be entitled to all statutory benefits flowing out of the said fixation together with proportionate cost in the appeal. In addition to that, the claimant will also be entitled to get 30% of the total land value

¶233

2025:KER:27652

¶234

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶235

35

¶236

towards severance compensation for the remaining 67.48 Acres of land.

¶237

Ordered accordingly.

¶238

Sd/-

¶239

DR.A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, JUDGE

Sd/-

EASWARAN S., JUDGE

jg

2025:KER:27652

¶244

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶245

36

¶246

APPENDIX OF LA.APP. 23/2021

¶247

RESPONDENT ANNEXURES

¶248

Annexure 1 CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN
W.P(C)NO.18484 OF 2008 DATED 15.1.2016
OF THIS HON'BLE COURT

¶249

2025:KER:27652

¶250

LA.App.Nos.268/19 & 23/21

¶251

37

¶252

APPENDIX OF LA.APP. 268/2019

¶253

PETITIONER ANNEXURES

¶254

Annexure A1 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION
SUBMITTED UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION
ACT TO THE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER,
KALPETTA MUNICIPALITY DATED 05-08-2022

¶255

Annexure A2 A TRUE COPY OF THE DIRECTION GIVEN BY
THE SECRETARY TO STATE PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICE, DISTRICT SPORTS
COUNCIL, WAYANAD DATED 01-09-2022

¶256

Annexure A3 A TRUE COPY OF THE INFORMATION
RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER THROUGH HIS
EMPLOYEE NOUSHAD FROM THE INFORMATION
OFFICER OF WAYANAD DISTRICT SPORTS
COUNCIL DATED 17-10-2022

The State of Kerala v. Cadburys India Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

The State of Kerala v. Cadburys India Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

State of Kerala Vs Oberon Edifices and Estates Pvt. .Ltd

Salitha Susan Thomas Vs State of Kerala

M/S Cochin Engineering Constructions, Vs the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax

The State of Kerala Vs the Secretary

Hafsathabi M K, Vs Executive Engineer

Dr. P.N. Rajamony Vs State of Kerala