The court dismissed a writ petition challenging termination of a works contract and forfeiture of EMD/security deposit, holding that disputes arising from a non-statutory contract governed purely by its terms are matters of private law, not enforceable under Article 226, and the proper remedy is a civil suit.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF FEBRUARY 2023 / 12TH MAGHA, 1944
W.P.(C)NO.8407 OF 2022
PETITIONER:
SITCO ASSOCIATES,HEAVENLY PLAZA, 6TH FLOOR, CS 6,
D. NO.11/275-J121, VAZHAKKALA, THRIKKAKARA P. O.,
KAKKANAD, KOCHI -21, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING
PARTNER, M. P. SIDHEEK, S/O. PAREEKUNJU, AGED 55
YEARS, MATHRAKKAT HOUSE, PINARMUNDA, PERINGALA
P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 683 565.
BY ADVS.
BABU JOSEPH KURUVATHAZHA
K.S.ARCHANA
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE (DEVASWOM), GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001.
2 HIGH POWER COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SABARIMALA MASTER PLAN TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, DEVASWOM HEADQUARTERS, NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695003, REPRESENTED BY ITS MEMBER SECRETARY/ DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER.3 DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, DEVASWOM HEADQUARTERS, NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695003.4 EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SABARIMALA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD BUILDING, KUMBAZHA ROAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, PIN - 689 645.5 CHIEF ENGINEER, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD, DEVASWOM HEADQUARTERS, NANTHANCODE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695003.BY ADV N.RAGHURAJ
SRI S.RAJMOHAN- SR GOVERNMENT PLEADER ; SRI G.BIJU - STANDING COUNSEL -TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
01.02.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
“CR”
JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The petitioner submitted a tender pursuant to an e-tender notification issued by the 2nd respondent High Power Committee for Implementation of Sabarimala Master Plan, for the construction of a straight walkway including side drain and utility ducts along the trekking path of Chandranandan Road, for a length of 800 meters, in Sabarimala. On 31.01.2018, when the bids were opened, the petitioner was the lowest bidder, who quoted 7.86% below the sanctioned estimate rate, which works out to contract PAC of Rs.3,43,79,519/- against the sanctioned estimate PAC of Rs.3,73,12,263/-. Accordingly, the petitioner was issued with Ext.P1 selection notice dated 25.02.2018 of the 2nd respondent, awarding the contract. By Ext.P1 selection notice, the petitioner was directed to produce a performance guarantee (security deposit) of Rs.17,19,000/- along with a micro-level PERT Chart indicating the milestones of various activities. As per Ext.P1, the petitioner shall complete the work in all respects, on or before 30.09.2018, as per the instructions of the Chief Engineer (General), Travancore Devaswom Board, the Executive Engineer, Sabarimala Development Project and the Assistant Engineer, Sabarimala Master Plan. In terms of Ext.P1 selection notice, the
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
petitioner executed Ext.P2 agreement dated 31.03.2018 with the 2nd respondent High Power Committee. The document marked as Ext.P3 is the schedule of items to Ext.P2 agreement.
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent High Power Committee and also the learned Standing Counsel for Travancore Devaswom Board for respondents 3 to 5.
filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent High Power Committee is regarding the maintainability of this writ petition, in view of Article 6.1 of Ext.P2 agreement. The said Article in Ext.P2 agreement reads thus;
“6.1. If the dispute and/or difference whatsoever arising under the Agreement or in connection therewith including any question relating to existence, meaning and interpretation of the Agreement or any alleged breach thereof, if not settled, the same may be adjudicated by the competent court of law.”
issue raised in this writ petition involves adjudication of disputed question of facts, which cannot be undertaken in writ proceedings
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
agreement, the proper course open to the petitioner is to challenge Ext.P16 and P17 proceedings, whereby that contract stands terminated and the EMD and security amount stand forfeited, before the competent civil court.
Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] the Apex Court reiterated that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the proper procedure for adjudicating disputes relating to the enforcement of contractual obligations. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ, but ordinarily, that would be a good ground for refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of an
alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
permits by the appellants would justify a breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs.
13. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the respondent had filed a writ petition before
the High Court for refund of the amount. The High Court posed two questions, namely, (a) whether the forfeiture of the security deposit is without the authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of breach of contract. While dealing with the said issue the Apex Court opined that it is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293] , State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India)
9
W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116] . This is settled law. The dispute in the case before the Apex Court was regarding the terms of an offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. The Senior Counsel for the respondent relied upon the decisions in Verigamto Naveen
v. State of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247] . The Apex Court noticed that those are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus, on the ground of maintainability, the writ petition should have been dismissed.
14. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Apex Court opined that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because in considering the petitioner's right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. It is true that exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
questions of fact of a complex nature, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition. Rejection of a petition in limine will normally be justified, where the High Court is of the view that the petition is frivolous or because of the nature of the claim made dispute sought to be agitated, or that the petition against the party against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it would be inappropriate to try it in the writ jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.
15. In ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the Apex Court, after referring to various judgments as well as the pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal
Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] , held that, merely because one of the parties to the litigation raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the Court entertaining such a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties
to a suit. In Gunwant Kaur [(1969) 3 SCC 769] the Court even
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
went to the extent of holding that in a writ petition, if the facts
require, even oral evidence can be taken. This clearly shows that
in an appropriate case, the writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition involving disputed questions of fact and there is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the
same arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some disputed questions of fact.
16. In ABL International Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] the Apex Court laid down the following legal principles;
While laying down the principle, the Apex Court sounded a word
of caution as under in paragraph 28;
“28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
having regard to the facts of the case, has the discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. See: Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] . And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction.”
433] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which t he respondent had earlier challenged the order of termination of the contract before the High Court by filing in W.P.(C)No.22541 of 2013. That writ petition ended in dismissal. He filed W.A.No.1912 of 2013. The Division Bench, by the judgment dated 24.02.2014, allowed that writ appeal. The Division Bench, on the basis of the report of the Advocate Commission, came to the conclusion that
the order of termination was founded on erroneous facts, inasmuch as the competent authority had opined that more than 50% of the work remained to be done. The Division Bench opined that, as there was a factual defect, which was evident from the report of the Advocate Commission, the order of termination of
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
the contract is liable to be quashed. After quashing the said order, the Division Bench directed the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department (Roads and Bridges) to consider and dispose of the matter afresh after affording the contractor an opportunity of being heard. It also directed that the Commission's report and the Engineer's report and the accounts shall be produced by the Contractor before the competent authority, who shall take the same into account before taking a final decision in the matter. The State and the official respondents took up the matter before the Apex Court. The Apex Court, after referring to the law laid down in Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] and Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] , reiterated that a writ court should ordinarily not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if there is a breach of contract involving disputed questions of fact. The High Court appointed a Commission to collect the evidence, accepted the same without calling for objections from the respondent, and quashed the order of termination of the contract. The Apex Court observed that the procedure adopted by the High Court is quite unknown to the exercise of powers under Article 226 in a contractual matter.
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
noticed that in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] a Two-Judge Bench after referring to various judgments as well as the pronouncement in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] and Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] granted the relief as the facts were absolutely clear from the documentary evidence brought which pertain to interpretation of certain clauses of contract of insurance.
The issue that had arisen in ABL International was that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was interpreting the contract differently. The Court thought it apt, merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. Similarly, if the materials that come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ court may exercise the power of judicial review.
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
instrumentality, the precondition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is a public duty. In a dispute based on a purely contractual relationship, there being no public duty element, a writ of mandamus would not lie.
Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116] the Apex Court noticed that, even conceding that Bareilly Development Authority has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority' or its agent
after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity. Thereafter, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of Bareilly Development Authority in the said contractual field.
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and Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC 238] is that, where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple.
238] the Apex Court considered the question of maintainability of a writ petition in respect of a claim arising out of the contractual rights and obligations flowing from the terms of a lease. The Apex
Court held that, it is undoubtedly true that High Court can entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is a denial of equality before law or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. On the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd., the respondent company, was merely trying to enforce a contractual obligation. The obligation to pay royalty for timber cut and felled and removed is prescribed by the relevant
17
W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
regulations. The validity of regulations is not challenged. Therefore, the demand for royalty is unsupported by law. What the respondent claimed was an exception that in view of a certain term in the indenture of lease, i.e., clause 2, the appellant is not entitled to demand and collect royalty from the respondent. This is nothing but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease. Hence, the question was whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Ordinarily, where
a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if the contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognisable by the civil court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific performance of a contract or for recovering damages. A right to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a civil court where a suit for specific performance of a contract or for damages could be filed.
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
obligations are matters of private law and a writ would not lie to
enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper remedy in such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming damages, injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate reliefs in a competent civil court. Pure contractual obligation in the absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable through a writ.
or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. In paragraph 69 of the decision, the Apex Court summarised the circumstances in which the Court would not normally exercise such discretion. In paragraph 70 the Apex Court summarised different situations/ aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties. Paragraphs 69 and 70 of the said decision read thus;
“69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of the
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discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion:
70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under:
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obligations of fairness.
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with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.
the 2nd respondent High Power Committee and the petitioner is of
a non-statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in terms of the contract between the parties, i.e., Ext.P2
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agreement dated 31.03.2018. In such situations, the contractual obligations are matters of private law and a writ under Article 226
of the Constitution of India would not lie to enforce a civil liability
arising purely out of that contract, since a pure contractual obligation in the absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable through a writ. S eriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to
be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which
may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather
than by a court exercising the prerogative of issuing writs. I n such
cases, the proper remedy of the person aggrieved would be to
approach the competent civil court seeking appropriate reliefs.
In the result, this writ petition fails on the ground of
maintainability and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE
Sd/-
P.G. AJITHKUMAR
JUDGE
yd
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APPENDIX
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 |
TRUE COPY25.02.2018 |
OF THE SELECTION NOTICE DATEDISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
|---|---|---|
Exhibit P2 |
TRUE COPYNO.15/CA/H31.03.2018RESPONDENT |
OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENTPC/SMP/2017-18 DATEDEXECUTED BETWEEN THE 2NDAND PETITIONER. |
Exhibit P3 |
TRUE COPYWORK ATTAC |
OF THE SCHEDULE OF ITEMS OFHED TO EXT.P2 AGREEMENT. |
Exhibit P4 |
TRUE COPY14.08.2018BEFORE THE |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P5 |
TRUE COPY13.10.2018BEFORE THE |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P6 |
TRUE COPY03.01.2019BEFORE THE |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P7 |
TRUE COPYISSUED BY |
OF THE LETTER DATED 15.03.2019THE 4TH RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P8 |
TRUE COPY21.03.2019BEFORE THE |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER4TH RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P8(a) |
TRUE COPY14.06.2019 |
OF THE PROCEEDING DATEDISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P9 |
TRUE COPY1.07.2019BEFORE THERESPONDENT |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERCHAIRMAN OF THE 2ND. |
Exhibit P10 |
TRUE COPY22.07.2019 |
OF THE PROCEEDING DATEDISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P11 |
TRUE COPY19.02.2020BEFORE THE |
OF THE REPRESENTATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P12 |
TRUE COPYHON'BLE CONO.6282/20 |
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THISURT DATED 3.3.2020 IN WP(C)20. |
Exhibit P13 |
TRUE COPY28.09.2020 |
OF THE PROCEEDING DATEDISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P14 |
TRUE COPY06.10.2020BEFORE THE |
OF THE EXPLANATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P14(a) |
TRUE COPY10.12.2021 |
OF THE APPLICATION DATEDSUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER |
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W.P.(C)No.8407 of 2022
UNDER THE RIGHT T2005. |
O INFORMATION ACT, |
|
|---|---|---|
Exhibit P15 |
TRUE COPY OF THEISSUED BY THE STAOFFICER ATTACHED |
RESPONSE DATED 7.1.2022TE PUBLIC INFORMATIONTO THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P16 |
TRUE COPY OF THE08.02.2022 ISSUED |
PROCEEDING DATEDBY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P17 |
TRUE COPY OF THE23.02.2022 ISSUED |
PROCEEDING DATEDBY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P18 |
TRUE COPY OF THENO.20/HPC/SMP/201ISSUED BY THE 2ND |
ORDER NO.ROC8 DATED 06.06.2019,RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P19 |
TRUE COPY OF THEBY THE PETITIONERFORWARDING OF EXTTHROUGH EMAIL TO |
EMAIL DATA MAINTAINEDPURSUANT TO THE.P4 REPRESENTATIONTHE 2ND RESPONDENT. |
Exhibit P20 |
TRUE COPY OF THEWORKS DULY EXECUT |
DETAILS OF SOME OF THEED BY THE PETITIONER. |
Exhibit P21 |
TRUE COPY OF THEONGOING WORKS OF |
DETAILS OF SOME OF THETHE PETITIONER. |
RESPONDENT EXHIBI |
TS |
|
ANNEXURE.R2[A] |
True Photocopy ofdated 21.06.2019petitioner withou |
the representationsubmitted by thet annexures. |
ANNEXURE.R2[B] |
True Photocopy of12.06.2020. |
the letter dated |
ANNEXURE.R2[C] |
True Photocopy ofSD-5/6/2018 SDDatThe Under SecretaIndia |
Order Bearing F No.ed.19.10.22 issued byry to the Government of |
3 issues framed by the court
Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge termination of a non-statutory contract and forfeiture of security deposit where disputed questions of fact exist.
Whether the remedy for breach of a purely contractual obligation lies before the civil court rather than the writ court.
Whether Article 6.1 of the agreement providing for adjudication by a competent court bars the writ jurisdiction.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd.Relied on¶12
State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. [(2002) 1 SCC 216] · Who else cites this
National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga EnterprisesRelied on¶13
National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] · Who else cites this
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. KalathilReferred¶13
Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293] · Who else cites this
State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd.Referred¶13
State of U.P. v. Bridge and Roof Company (India) Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] · Who else cites this
Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal SinghReferred¶13
Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116] · Who else cites this
Verigamto Naveen v. State of A.P.Referred¶13
Verigamto Naveen v. State of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] · Who else cites this
Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of IndiaReferred¶13
Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247] · Who else cites this
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, BhatindaReferred¶14
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda [(1969) 3 SCC 769] · Who else cites this
ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd.Referred¶16
ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. [(2004) 3 SCC 553] · Who else cites this
Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal CouncilReferred¶15
Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582] · Who else cites this
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade MarksReferred¶16
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] · Who else cites this
State of Kerala v. M.K. JoseRelied on¶17
State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose [(2015) 9 SCC 433] · Who else cites this
Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶24
Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India [(2015) 7 SCC 728] · Who else cites this
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of BiharReferred¶21
Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar [(1977) 3 SCC 457] · Who else cites this
Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development AuthorityReferred¶21
Premji Bhai Parmar v. Delhi Development Authority [(1980) 2 SCC 129] · Who else cites this
Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd.Referred¶21
Divisional Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. [(1981) 3 SCC 238] · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
SITCO ASSOCIATES
STATE OF KERALA
HIGH POWER COMMITTEE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SABARIMALA MASTER PLAN
DEVASWOM COMMISSIONER
EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, SABARIMALA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CHIEF ENGINEER, TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD
Anil K. Narendran
P.G. Ajithkumar
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court