Allowed

Dr. Anirudhan K., v. Anil Kumar G.

Kerala HC28 Mar 2023WP(C)/27968/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court quashed an interim order of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission made against a retired college principal without notice or hearing. The court held the order violated the audi alteram partem principle under Section 16 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, and left the maintainability issue open.

What did the court decide?

The impugned interim order dated 06.10.2021 in HRMP No.5825/11/11/2020/KLM passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission is set aside.

Dr. Anirudhan K., Vs Anil Kumar G. — Service and Employment | Kerala HC (2023)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALI PURUSHOTHAMAN
TUESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF MARCH 2023 / 7TH CHAITHRA, 1945
WP(C) NO. 27968 OF 2021

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PETITIONERS:

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DR. ANIRUDHAN K.,
AGED 57 YEARS,
S/O. K. KUMARAN,
PRINCIPAL (RETD.),
SREE NARAYANA COLLEGE FOR WOMEN,
KOLLAM, RESIDING AT AVITTAM, NIN-133,
VADAKKEVILA P.O.,
KOLLAM DISTRICT-691 010.

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BY ADVS.
R.S.KALKURA
D.SAJEEV BABU
HARISH GOPINATH
M.S.KALESH
P.I.NAJUMAL HUSSAIN
ANJALI B CHANDRAN

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RESPONDENTS:

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1ANIL KUMAR G.,
LAB ASSISTANT,
S.N. COLLEGE,
KOLLAM DISTRICT-691 001,
RESIDING AT EDUTHUNDIL,
CHEMMAKKADU P.O., PERINAD,
KOLLAM-691601.

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2KERALA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
TURBO PLUS TOWERS,
PMG JUNCTION,
VIKAS BHAVAN P.O.,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695033,
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR.

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W.P(C).27968/2021

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3THE PRINCIPAL,
SREE NARAYANA COLLEGE,
PATTATHANAM, KOLLAM-691101.

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BY ADVS.
R.RAJESH (VARKALA)
RETNAKUMAR K.
M.KIRANLAL
MANU RAMACHANDRAN
T.S.SARATH
SAMEER M NAIR

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THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 28.03.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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W.P(C).27968/2021

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J U D G M E N T

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Dated this the 28^th day of March, 2023

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S. Manikumar, CJ.

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Before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, respondent No.1 has filed a complaint alleging that the amount recovered from his salary was not remitted in time, to different branches of KSFE and Kollam District Co-operative Bank, and thus, there is negligence on the part of the College officials.

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Complainant/1^st respondent herein has retired from service on 31.05.2020. For the alleged inaction or negligence, 1^st respondent has sought for disciplinary action against the officials.

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The Commission has entertained the complaint and sought for a report from the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam.

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Having perused the material on record, 2^nd respondent Commission passed an interim order, dated 6.10.2021 in HRMP No.5825/11/11/2020/KLM. Translated version of the same (Exhibit P3) reads as under:

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KERALA STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HRMP No. 5825/11/112020/KLM

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Present: V.K.Beenakumari Non Member, KSHRC

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Petitioner: Sri. Anil Kumar

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Saji Nivas, Chemmakkadu PO Perinadu, Kollam.

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INTERIM ORDER DATED 2021 OCTOBER 6

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The petitioner is working as the Lab Assistant of Sree Narayana College, Kollam. Dr. Anirudhan, the Principal of the said college did not remit the sums of rupees amounting to lakhs recovered from the petitioner's salary till date. The principal retired from service on 31/05/2020. The petitioner pleaded that disciplinary action is to be taken against him and other officials who were responsible for the lapse.

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The commission solicited a report from the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam. It is found in the report that Sri. G. Anil Kumar, the petitioner had availed many loans from various banks. Subsequently, many recoveries are being done from his salary. From the acquittance bills, it is evident that the due amounts are levied from his pay about recoveries for KSFE Sreekaryam, Chinnakkada, Kundara, KSBDC, and Kollam District Cooperative bank (Anchalummodu branch). However, the deducted amounts were not timely remitted in the same month to the said concerns. In addition to the aforesaid recoveries, the petitioner is subjected to a recovery of Rs. 10000/ for Kollam District Co-operative Bank. The same was deducted from his salary. But the bank found that the amount remitted was

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not related to them. The erroneously sent Cheque was returned by the bank. It indicates the negligence of the college officials. The recovered amount towards this loan was refunded to the petitioner on his request.

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Deduction of the sums for recovery to the different branches of KSFE was carried out every month from the complainant's salary, but the officials failed to remit them in the same month. Subsequently, the petitioner had to bear the financial loss for no fault of him. An explanation was sought from the Principal and at that time he remitted a sum of Rs.1,20,000/-, 2,40,000/on 15/09/2000 and relevant receipts were produced. The commission is convinced that the amount recovered from Sri. Anil Kumar's salary, not remitted properly.

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Considering the available information and evidence, the commission recommends the Deputy Director arrive at the following assumptions.

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Recoveries were done from Sri. Anil Kumar's salary, but not remitted timely.

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Subsequently, the petitioner had to face financial loss.

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The Commission examined the complaint and report and found that the Deputy Directors reports also confirmed the lapse. The Principal's report shows the late and onetime payment of Rs.1,20,000/-, 2,40,000/- on 15/09/2000 also indicate that the amounts were not remitted on time.

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However, from the report of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, it seems that no remarks regarding the action taken against the principal, who did serious financial irregularities. Hence, the commission

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intimates that within 15 days of receipt of this order, the Dy DCE has to submit a report on action taken against the principal, Sri. Anirudhan.

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Copies of this interim order may be forwarded to the petitioner and the Dy Director of Collegiate Education. Copy of this order may be forwarded to the Dy DCE for onward transmission to Sri. Anirudhan, Principal (Retired). The commission will consider this case in the next sitting.

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Sd/

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VK Beenakumari Member

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Kerala State Human Rights Commission

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Sd/

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Registrar.”

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Challenging the same, instant writ petition is filed.

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Short facts leading to filing of the writ petition are as under:

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5.1. The petitioner, joined services as a Lecturer on 31.1.1990 and with a teaching career spanning over 30 years 4 months finally retired from service as the Principal of Sree Narayana College for Women, Kollam. Petitioner has discharged his duties as the Principal of S.N. Colleges, all through Kerala from 2.6.2014 to 31.5.2020. The petitioner was the Principal of S.N. College, Kollam from 8.6.2017 to 28.5.2018.

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5.2. The petitioner came to understand on 8.11.2021 that the 2^nd respondent, Kerala State Human Rights Commission, Thiruvnanthapuram, represented by its Registrar, has passed an interim order on 6.10.2021 in the proceedings bearing No.5825/11/11/2020 KLM, filed by the 1^st respondent, making highly irresponsible and disparaging remarks on the conduct of the petitioner, as Principal of S.N. College, Kollam, as the records produced before it clearly indicated that the petitioner had not remitted to M/s. KSFE an amount of Rs.1,20,000/- and Rs.2,40,000/-, which were recovered from him from 1.9.2018 up to 1.8.2020, and that the 2^nd respondent was convinced and satisfied that the petitioner was guilty of not having remitted the amount in time, as per Exhibit P3 order dated 06.10.2021.

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5.3. Petitioner has contended that Exhibit P3 order dated 06.10.2021 was passed by the 2^nd respondent, without notice to the petitioner and without any opportunity of being heard, in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience.

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5.4. According to him, Exhibit P3 order is highly defamatory, derogatory observations have been made by the 2^nd respondent,

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and a press release was published, in all the leading newspapers whereby, reducing the estimation of the petitioner among the right thinking public and student community in particular.

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5.5. It is further contended that Exhibit P3 order was passed

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based on a false and frivolous complaint filed by the 1^st respondent.

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5.6. In this connection, it is submitted that the petitioner

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was not discharging his duties as Principal or in any other capacity in the year 2016 at S.N.College, Kollam.

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5.7. As already stated supra the petitioner was the Principal of Sree Narayana College, Kollam, from 8.6.2017 to 28.5.2018. During his tenure at Sree Narayana College for Women, Kollam, there were five recovery notices, which were received from different offices/banks/financial institutions which were duly acted upon by the petitioner.

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5.8. While so, the petitioner received a suit notice issued by the learned counsel for the 1^st respondent alleging falsehood against him, with regard to the above remittances, alleging delay, and claiming damages of Rs.5.00 lakhs, to which the petitioner had sent a detailed reply highlighting the true facts.

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5.9. Suppressing the reply notice, a complaint has been filed before the 2^nd respondent. It is further contended that the complaint relates to civil dispute/ service disputes, as the subject matter of the complaint relates to non-remittance of amount to various agencies, from which, the 1^st respondent has taken loan or was indebted to, which are governed by the terms and conditions of a contract/ service rules. Therefore, it is contended that Exhibit P3 interim order dated 06.10.2021 passed by the 2^nd respondent, is illegal and without jurisdiction. Hence, this Writ Petition (Civil).

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Earlier, when the matter came up on 7.12.2021, by inviting our attention to the decision of a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Mariyadas v. Revenue Divisional Officer reported in [2020 (1) KLT 254] , and also Regulation 17(f) of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulation – 2001, contention was made that Kerala State Human Rights Commission is not empowered to entertain the complaint relating to service matters.

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On the said day, contention is also made that no notice was given by the Commission to the writ petitioner and there are

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no materials to indicate that writ petitioner has been arrayed as a party in HRMP No.5825/11/ 11/2020/KLM.

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After considering the submissions and the statutory provisions, while issuing notice by special messenger to the respondents 1 and 3, a Hon'ble Division Bench, on 07.12.201, granted interim stay of the impugned proceedings.

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Respondent No.1 has filed a counter affidavit dated 21.03.2023, refuting the averments made by the petitioner and opposing the prayer sought for.

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Relevant portion of the said counter affidavit is extracted hereunder:

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“A. On first basis of approaching the court without bonafides of excluding the Director and Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam as party the writ is to be dismissed as they are necessary party to this writ petition. The said party is specifically excluded to suppress the findings against the petitioner on basis of which itself inlimine this writ petition is to be dismissed.

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B. The averments made by the petitioner in this writ petition is completely denied by this petitioner except which specifically admitted hereunder.

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C. I am working as a Lab Assistant at 3^rd respondent, SN College Kollam. I had secured loans from KSFE and other financial institutions, the petitioner was

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the principle of 3^rd respondent during the period 8.06.2017 to 28.05.2018. While the petitioner working as principle, he collected loan amounts from my salary account but had not deposited the said amount appropriately to concerned accounts of those financial institutions. Due to this misappropriation, fraud, negligent and lack of due diligence, I sustained reputational damages and injury to human dignity. Financial institutions began revenue recovery proceedings against me for an amount I believe to have been remitted. Due to the illegal acts of the petitioner, I suffered monetary loss of more than 2 lakhs.

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D. I filed complaint before the Deputy Director Collegiate Kollam About this grievance. There was no effective intervention from the part of the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education Kollam. A true copy of the complaint preferred by the 1^st respondent before Deputy Director of Collegiate Kollam as on 15.07.2020 is produced herewith may be marked as Exhibit R1(a). Copy of the English Translation of Ext. R1(a) is produced herewith as Exhibit R1(a)(a). There was very limited reaction and actions by the Deputy Director Collegiate Kollam’s office. The lack of action caused petitioner to make multiple representation to various authorities regarding violation met by him out of vengeance of his to me.

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E. Meanwhile, I had preferred a complaint before the 2^nd respondent. Stating the entire facts of the case with particular emphasis to the violation of my Human rights guaranteed as part of work place being at harm. After hearing me, 2^nd respondent called for a report from

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the Deputy Directorate of Collegiate Kollam. A true copy of the report submitted before 2^nd respondent is ExhibitR1b. Copy of the English Translation of Exhibit R1b is produced herewith as Exhibit-R1b(a). In the report the deputy director of Collegiate Education Kollam clearly reported the misappropriation and fraudulent act of petitioner before the 2^nd respondent. In the report the 3^rd respondent (Principal) clearly stated that there was a huge loss caused to the 1^st respondent and the acts of the petitioner against the first respondent is highly illegal and against the natural justice. The said act of vengeance evidently proven through the Exhibit-R1b points to the negligence committed by the petitioner in his capacity as a public servant.

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F. After hearing me and the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education Kollam, the 2^nd respondent issued an interim order to take departmental action against the petitioner for the injury made to me. In the report to the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam. The 3^rd respondent already admitted misappropriation and the negligent act of the petitioner in this matter.

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G. After hearing me, the 2^nd respondent issued an interim order stating that the recoveries done by the petitioner was not remitted appropriately before the financial institutions and thus I had faced financial losses and humiliation. 2^nd respondent also directed the deputy director of Collegiate Education Kollam to submit a report on action take against the petitioner within a period of 15 days.

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H. After receiving the copy of the order from the 2^nd respondent, the petitioner had filed this petition

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before this Hon’ble Court and obtained an interim stay of the impugned order

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I. The 2^nd respondent has every right to consider the grievance of mine. The regulation interpretation is wrongly done. The term is “may” and “shall”. The present dispute is not merely dispute of the misappropriation. The present case is a violation of my “right to work in just and favorable conditions”. This right is declared in second optional Protocol of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976. The article 42 and 43 of Constitution of India specifically emphasis on the said responsibility of state of which the petitioner was deemed to be a responsible officer.

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J. Further as per section 12 (a) (ii) of Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 the 2^nd respondent in enabled to inquire into “ negligence in the prevention of such violation by a public servant.”. the petitioner herein emphatically falls within the definition as per section 2 (1)(m) of Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. Further, the interim order is passed is well within the power of Commission under Section 18 of Protection of Human Rights Act 1993.

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K. The 2^nd respondent issued an interim order after receiving a detailed report from the 3^rd respondent through the Deputy Director of Collegiate Education, Kollam. The contention of the petitioner regarding the said dispute as mere service dispute is tactic of distraction. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the decision in Marydas and Ors. v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Adoor and Ors. [2020(1) KLT 254] has to be ignored, as the said adjudication was upon a pure case of

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possession, title and easement rights of person, which as rightly pointing to the fitting case of G. Manikyamma and Ors. v. Roudri Cooperative Housing Society limited and Ors. [(2014) 15 SCC 197 para 43]. Such an inference cannot be drawn in this particular case. My case is of a subordinate, who have suffered loss continuously by the vindictive act of his superior, who was statutorily, constitutionally, and through international covenants, bound to protect them.

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L. Due to continuity of the interim stay, further proceedings before the 2^nd respondent is now stalled in its entirety. The interim stay is to be vacated in consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case. Petitioner is not entitled for grant of any prayers sought for the absolute exclusion of important party as above mentioned.

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M. Hence, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to vacate the interim stay ordered in the above said writ petition and thus render justice.”

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On the basis of the averments made and the statements of facts filed along with the writ petition, Mr. Harish Gopinath, learned counsel for the petitioner, made submissions.

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Based on the averments made in the counter affidavit and the supporting materials, Mr.Sameer M. Nair, learned counsel for respondent No.1, made submissions.

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We have considered the rival submissions.

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One fact which remains unanswered from the pleadings

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is that, whether the writ petitioner was made a party in HRMP.No.5825/11/11/2020/KLM.

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We are of the view that unless and until the writ petitioner has been made a party and given an opportunity of hearing, as provided for in the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulation – 2001, no adverse orders can be passed against him.

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In this context, reference can be made to Section 16 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993:

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“ 16. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard .-- If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission--

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(a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or

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(b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,

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it shall give to the person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence:

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Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.”

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There is no material on record, to dispute that writ

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petitioner has been given an opportunity, as per the statutory

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provision. In the light of the statutory provision stated above, we

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are of the view that violation of the principles of natural justice is

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per se apparent.

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On the aspect of violation of the principles of natural justice, let us consider the following decisions:

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(i) In Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. The Designated Authority and Ors. [(2011) 2 SCC 258], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

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“65. More often than not, it is not easy to draw a line demarcating an administrative decision from a quasijudicial decision. Nevertheless, the aim of both a quasijudicial function as well as an administrative function is to arrive at a just decision. In A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [(1969) 2 SCC 262], this Court had observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power, regard must be had to: (i) the nature of the power conferred; (ii) the person or persons on whom it is conferred; (iii) the framework of the law conferring that power; (iv) the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and (v) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.

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It is trite that rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e. fair play in action. In A.K. Kraipak (supra), it was observed that the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.

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It is thus, well settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a strait-jacket nor is it a general rule of universal application.

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Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. As stated above, the question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined. (See: Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Anr. (1970) 2 SCC 458.)”

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(ii) In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Ors. [(2015) 8 SCC 519], the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

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“20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural justice is not a single theory-it is a family of views. In one sense administering justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural justice. It is also called 'naturalist' approach to the phrase 'natural justice' and is related to 'moral naturalism'. Moral naturalism captures the essence of commonsense moralitythat good and evil, right and wrong, are the real features of

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the natural world that human reason can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing ourselves with this connotation of natural justice here.

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In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice, particularly which is made applicable in the decision making by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed different connotation. It is developed with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and they must given to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as 'natural justice'. The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today were: (i) rule against bias, i.e. nemo judex in causa sua; and (ii) opportunity of being heard to the concerned party, i.e. audi alteram partem. These are known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle is added, which is of recent origin. It is duty to give reasons in support of decision, namely, passing of a 'reasoned order'.

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Though the aforesaid principles of natural justice are known to have their origin in Common Law, even in India the principle is prevalent from ancient times, which was even invoked in Kautilya's 'Arthashastra'. This Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. [AIR 1978 SC 851] explained the Indian origin of these principles in the following words:

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“Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy government,

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recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Indeed from the legendary days of Adam-and of Kautilya's Arthashastra-the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice, which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the AngloAmerican system.”

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It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and noninstrumental terms.

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It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem , have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not.

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From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in

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the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak's case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving opportunity of hearing to the notice is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Suvarna Board Mills and Anr. [(1994) 5 SCC 566], this aspect was explained in the following manner:

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“3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one factsituation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.”

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But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain

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circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even postdecisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.”

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If the writ petitioner had been made a party and provided no opportunity of hearing, before passing the impugned order, it is in violation of the principles of natural justice.

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Yet another aspect to be considered by us is, as to whether the issue raised before the Human Rights Commission falls within the definition of ‘service matter’, as referred to in Regulation 17(f) of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001.

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In this context, Regulation 17(f) of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001, reads

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as under:

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“ 17. Complaints not ordinarily maintainable .- The Commission may dismiss inlimine complaints of the following nature:

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(a) Illegible;

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(b) vague, anonymous or pseudonymous;

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(d) barred under sub-sections (1) or (2) of section 36 of the Act.

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(e) allegations do not disclose involvement of any public servant;

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(f) issue raised relates to civil disputes , service matters, labour or industrial disputes;

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(g) allegations do not raise any violation of human rights;

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(h) If the matter raised is subjudice before a Court of Tribunal;

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(I) the matter is covered by a Judicial verdict/ decision of the National Commission or a State Commission;

¶173

(j) Where the complaint is only a copy of the petition addressed to some other authority;

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(k) Where the petition is not signed or where the original petition is not sent to the Commission;

¶175

(l) Where the matter raised is outside the purview of the Commission or on any other ground.”

¶176

Giving due consideration to the facts, statutory provisions, and the decisions considered, we are inclined to set

¶177

aside the impugned interim order dated 06.10.2021, in HRMP

¶178

No.5825/11/11/2020/KLM. While doing so, we leave it open to

¶179

W.P(C).27968/2021

¶180

¶181

the parties, to raise the issue relating to maintainability of the

¶182

complaint, if the writ petitioner has been arrayed as respondent in the complaint.

¶183

Accordingly, writ petition is allowed.

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Sd/S. Manikumar, Chief Justice

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Sd/Murali Purushothaman, Judge

¶186

sou. xxxx

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W.P(C).27968/2021

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¶189

APPENDIX OF WP(C) 27968/2021

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PETITIONER EXHIBITS

¶191

`EXHIBIT P1`	`TRUE COPY OF BIO DATA OF THE PETITIONER.`
`EXHIBIT P2`	`TRUE COPY OF DETAILED BREAK UP OF SERVICE OF` `THE PETITIONER IN VARIOUS COLLEGES FROM` `31/01/1990 TO 31/05/2020 ISSUED BY THE` `MANAGER OF SREE NARAYANA COLLEGES DATED` `02/07/2020.`
`EXHIBIT P3`	`TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 06/10/2021 OF THE` `2`^ND`RESPONDENT IN PROCEEDINGS BEARING NO.` `5825/11/11/2020 KLM FILED BY THE 1`^ST `RESPONDENT BEFORE THE 2`^ND`RESPONDENT.`
`EXHIBIT P3(a)`	`TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P3.`
`EXHIBIT P4`	`TRUE COPY OF NEWSPAPER REPORT DATED` `17/11/2020 APPEARING IN MALAYALA MANORAMA.`
`EXHIBIT P4(a)`	`TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P4.`
`EXHIBIT P5`	`TRUE COPY OF NEWSPAPER REPORT DATED` `17/11/2020 APPEARING IN MATHRUBHUMI.`
`EXHIBIT P5(a)`	`TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P5.`
`EXHIBIT P6`	`TRUE COPY OF NEWSPAPER REPORT DATED` `18/11/2020 APPEARING IN KERALA KAUMUDI.`
`EXHIBIT P6(a)`	`TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P6.`
`EXHIBIT P7`	`TRUE COPY OF PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE 2`^ND `RESPONDENT IN RESPECT OF EXT.P3 ORDER.`
`EXHIBIT P7(a)`	`TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXTP7.`
`EXHIBIT P8`	`TRUE COPY OF SUIT NOTICE DATED 16/10/2020`
	`ISSUED BY THE 1`^ST`RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL TO THE` `PETITIONER.`

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W.P(C).27968/2021

¶193

¶194

EXHIBIT P9TRUE COPY OF REPLY DATED 30/10/2020 ISSUED BY
THE PETITIONER TO THE COUNSEL OF THE 1ST
RESPONDENT ALONG POSTAL RECEIPT.
EXHIBIT P10TRUE COPY OF EXPLANATION SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION, KOLLAM.
EXHIBIT P10(a)TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P10.
EXHIBIT P11TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 17/11/2021 ISSUED
BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P11(a)TRUE COPY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF EXT.P11

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RESPONDENT EXHIBITS

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`EXHIBIT R1a`	`A TRUE` `1`^ST`RES` `COLLEGI`	`COPY OF T` `PONDENT` `ATE KOLLA`	`HE CO` `BEFO` `M AS`	`MPLAINT PREFERRED BY THE` `RE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF` `ON 15.07.2020`
`EXHIBIT R1a(a)`	`A TRUE` `EXT. R1`	`COPY OF` `a`	`THE`	`ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF`
`EXHIBIT R1b`	`A TRUE` `2`^ND`RESP`	`COPY OF` `ONDENT DA`	`THE` `TED`	`REPORT SUBMITTED BEFORE` `25.08.2021`
`EXHIBIT R1b(a)`	`A TRUE` `EXHIBIT`	`COPY OF` `R1b`	`THE`	`ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF`

Dr. Anirudhan K., v. Anil Kumar G.

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Dr. Anirudhan K., v. Anil Kumar G.

Case brief

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