The doctrine of estoppel applies to admissions in pleadings. Where a plaint clearly alleges that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract, and the defendant merely offers a vague and evasive denial in the written statement without specifically traversing this material fact under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC, the allegation is deemed admitted. Consequently, the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, commences only if the admission is challenged substantively.
A power of attorney holder who has personally negotiated the transaction, managed the funds, and represented the principal in the litigation is competent to testify regarding the principal's readiness and willingness. The court below erred in rejecting this evidence solely because the specific transaction details were not pleaded in the plaint, as pleadings disclose material facts while evidence clarifies them.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy governed by Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Mere inadequacy of consideration, the passage of time (laches), or market inflation following the filing of the suit are insufficient grounds to deny the decree. Discretionary refusal is permissible only if the non-performance causes foreseeable hardship to the defendant or if the plaintiff obtained an unfair advantage.
In cases where time has significantly elapsed causing a drastic rise in property value, making performance of the original consideration inequitable, the court may decree specific performance only for that portion of the property corresponding to the advance payment actually made by the plaintiff, thereby balancing the equities between the parties without granting unjust enrichment.
