Dismissed

A.M.Antony v. Valiyakath Kunjimuhammed

Kerala HC14 Sept 2022RCRev./66/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Eviction for the landlords’ proposed garment business was upheld. The court rejected the tenant’s claims under both provisos to Section 11(3), declined interference with the concurrent findings and dismissed the revision. It granted six months to surrender possession, subject to conditions.

What did the court decide?

Six months to surrender vacant possession, conditional on an undertaking, payment of arrears and continuing rent, no third-party induction, and valid business permissions.

A.M.Antony Vs Valiyakath Kunjimuhammed — Landlord and Tenant | Kerala HC (2022)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR

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WEDNESDAY, THE 14^TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2022 / 23RD BHADRA, 1944

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R.C.REV. NO. 66 OF 2021

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AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 29.11.2019 IN R.C.A.NO.146 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDITIONAL DISTRICT

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JUDGE), THRISSUR AND THE ORDER DATED 23.12.2015 IN

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R.C.P.NO.99 OF 2010 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (ADDITIONAL

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MUNSIFF), THRISSUR

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REVISION PETITIONER:

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A.M.ANTONY,

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S/O. AMBAKKADAN MATHU, PROPRIETOR, 'BABY WORLD', PARK HOUSE BUILDING, THRISSUR ROUND, THRISSUR VILLAGE, THRISSUR TALUK.

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BY ADV K.PAUL KURIAKOSE

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RESPONDENTS:

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1 VALIYAKATH KUNJIMUHAMMED S/O. KARAPPAMVEETTIL ABDULLA HAJI, EDAKKAZHIYUR VILLAGE, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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2 VALIYAKATH SIDDIQUE, S/O. KARAPPAMVEETTIL ABDULLA HAJI, EDAKKAZHIYUR VILLAGE, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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3 VALIYAKATH SHAMSUDDIN, S/O. KARAPPAMVEETTIL ABDULLA HAJI, EDAKKAZHIYUR VILLAGE, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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4 VALIYAKATH NADEERA, W/O. LATE VALIYAKATH VATTACHIRA MOOSA, ORUMANAYUR AMSOM, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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5 NASHITHA

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LATE D/O. VALIYAKATH NADEERA AND LATE VALIYAKATH VATTACHIRA MOOSA, ORUMANAYUR AMSOM, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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6 NIMISHITH,

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S/O. VALIYAKATH NADEERA AND LATE VALIYAKATH VATTACHIRA MOOSA, ORUMANAYUR AMSOM, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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7 NISHAD, S/O. VALIYAKATH NADEERA AND LATE VALIYAKATH VATTACHIRA MOOSA, ORUMANAYUR AMSOM, DESAM,CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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8 NIVAS, S/O. VALIYAKATH NADEERA AND LATE VALIYAKATH VATTACHIRA MOOSA, ORUMANAYUR AMSOM, DESAM, CHAVAKKAD TALUK.

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BY ADVS.

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A.MUHAMMED MUSTHAFA M.P.SREEKRISHNAN

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THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR FINAL HEARING ON 14.09.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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O R D E R

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Ajithkumar, J.

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The petitioner is the tenant. He filed this revision petition under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Thrissur in R.C.P.No.99 of 2020 in favour of the respondents, which stands confirmed by the judgment dated 29.11.2019 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge), Thrissur in R.C.A.No.146 of 2016. Eviction was ordered under Section 11(3) of the Act.

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This revision was admitted to file on 29.03.2021. On that day, The order of eviction was stayed as per order in I.A.No.1 of 2021 for a period of three months. The interim order of stay was extended from time to time and is still in force.

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Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

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Eviction was sought on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation. The respondents-landlords set forth the need that they wanted to start a garment business in the petition schedule premises. The petitioner resisted the claim for eviction by filing an objection. It was contended that the need urged was not bona fide. The petition schedule premises comprises four rooms. The rooms are situated not contiguous. Therefore, it is not feasible and practical to conduct a garment business in the said shop rooms. The respondents are in possession of other buildings, which can be used for the said purpose. They demanded exorbitant rent; the petitioner did not heed. That is the reason for the plea for eviction. The petitioner is depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business in readymades and toys being conducted in the petition schedule premises and no other alternative building suitable to shift his business is available in the locality.

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At trial before the Rent Control Court PW1 was

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examined and Exts.A1 to A7 were marked on the side of the

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respondents. RWs.1 and 2 were examined on the side of the petitioner. Exts.C1 and C2 are two commission reports. After considering the said evidence, the Rent Control Court concluded that the need urged by the respondent was bona fide and the petitioner was not entitled to get the benefit of either the first proviso or second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. An order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act was accordingly granted by the Rent Control Court. The challenge to that order by the petitioner in the appeal filed by him under section 18(1)(b) of the Act before the Appellate Authority was not successful.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the need urged by the respondents cannot be held to be bona fide inasmuch as the evidence let in by PW1 is insufficient to substantiate the plea, and the explanation offered by them for not occupying the vacant rooms in their possession in the same building for the proposed business, is not convincing. The learned counsel further would submit that from the admission of PW1 itself, it

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is evident that the respondents let out at least two rooms immediately prior to or after filing of the Rent Control Petition, but the respondents did not choose to furnish any special reasons for not occupying such rooms, and that disentitles them from getting eviction on account of the bar contained in

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the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. As regards the second proviso, the learned counsel would submit that the oral testimony of RW1 together with Ext.B1 prove the first limb and facts evinced from Exts.C1 and C2 would substantiate that there has not been any vacant room or building available in the locality. Thus, the finding of the courts below leading to the order of eviction are strenuously assailed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.

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The learned counsel appearing for the respondents,

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on the other hand, would submit that the landlords, who were employed abroad, have now at home remaining without any

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job and their proposal to start a garment business in the petition schedule shop rooms where the petitioner has been successfully conducting a garment business is genuine and

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bona fide. The evidence of PW1, in his view, has sufficiently substantiated the special reasons, and therefore, the first proviso can have no application in this case. As regards the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the evidence let in by the petitioner is totally insufficient to prove either limb.

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Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants.

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As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except

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where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his

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livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business.

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In Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476] the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222] a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing

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himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705] bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.

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In Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718] a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra .

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In Gireeshbabu T. P. v. Jameela and others [2021 (5) KHC SN 30] this Court reiterated that in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide

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need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Once, on the basis of the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, of course, subject to the first and second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.

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The 2^nd respondent is PW1. He deposed regarding the requirement of the respondents to start a garment business. Four rooms are let out to the petitioner. Two rooms, which bear door Nos.26/579 and 581 were joined together, where the showroom of the petitioner’s readymade business is accommodated. Other two rooms are used by the petitioner as godown. The assertion of PW1 is that the proposal is to

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house the show room of the garment business in the space where the petitioner has accommodated his show room and other two rooms are to be used as godown. RW1 deposed in court that without there having space for godown, a garment business cannot be conducted successfully. In the light of the

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said evidence, the authorities below concurrently held that the need urged by the respondents is genuine and honest. When the said evidence is considered in the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, we are of the view that the

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said findings are legal and proper, and not liable to be interfered with.

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The main plank of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that admissions by PW1 is enough to bring the case within the mischief of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. It is contended that the respondents should have pleaded availability of vacant rooms with them and further to established special reasons by adducing convincing evidence, if to get an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.

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13. In Kunhamina K v. V.K.T.Aboobacker Haji

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[2016 (3) KLJ 247], this court held that the primary burden is on the tenant to prove that the landlord is in possession of another building and if it is proved, the burden shifts to the landlord to give special reasons as to why he has not chosen to occupy that building to the satisfaction of the court. In Kunju T.P v. Fathima and others [2014 (3) KLT 563] this court held that the landlord need not give the particulars of all

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the premises under his possession to claim an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.

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14. In Dineshan Pillai P.B v. Joseph @ Jose [2019

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(3) KLT 104] the view taken is that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has not discharged the initial burden of proof under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. In Lainakalillath Kooliyangal Kamarunnisa and others v. A.

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Shabeer [2019 (4) KLJ 508] , this Court endorsed the said view. However, it was explained that it may be fair and reasonable, though not imperative, for a landlord to disclose in his pleadings specific details of any vacant building in his possession and explain the special reason, as to what prevented him from occupying the building for the purpose of satisfying his alleged bona fide need.

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In Chethil Tharemmal Rasheeda v. Peedikayilakath

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Muhammad [2021 (6) KLT 751] , the view that taken is that it is the burden of the tenant to prove the availability of vacant rooms with the landlord, and only on such proof, the landlord has the liability to show special reasons if to get an order of eviction. While considering a similar question, this Court in Kakkottakath Puthiyapurayil Muhammad Ali and others v. Kakkottakath Puthiyarambath Mahamood and others [2022(4) KLT 221] held that the tenant is bound to disclose the identity of vacant building in the possession of the landlord in order for him to pursue his claim for the benefit of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.

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In the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, the respondents did not have any obligation to plead availability of any vacant room with them even if there was and it was for the petitioner-tenant to point out availability of suitable building in the possession of the landlord.

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What PW1 admitted is that the respondents let out one room to conduct one “books and books” shop, four years before. He further admitted that another room was also vacated subsequently and the same was let out to a different tenant. Those facts were not pleaded by the tenant. It appears that such rooms were let out subsequent to filing of the rent control petition and if so, it was not possible for the petitioner to plead such vacancies. The question then is whether such subsequent event is relevant while considering the plea for eviction.

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In Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103] the Apex Court held that, if the

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tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement of

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the landlord no more exists because of some subsequent event, it would be open to the tenant to point out such events and the court, including the Appellate Authority, has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Similarly, in

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Sheshambal (dead) through LRs. v. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building and others [(2010) 3 SCC 470] , the Apex

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Court held that while the position is that the right to relief in a litigation must be judged by reference to the date of commencement of the proceedings, it is equally true that if subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, certain developments take place that have a bearing on the right to the relief claimed by the party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from consideration. In view of that legal position, the authorities below were expected to examine the facts pointed out by the petitioner and decide whether the same has an impact on the relief claimed by the respondents. Such a contention cannot simply be brushed aside as a subsequent event.

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In M.L.Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2 SCC 355] , the Apex Court, after referring to the principle laid down in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta

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[(1999) 6 SCC 222] held that,-

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“14. The availability of an alternative accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 14, which speaks of nonavailability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available then the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need.”

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The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that this Court failed to follow the said principle laid down by the Apex Court in several decisions, especially Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592] , Kunhamina K.V. v. V.K.T.Aboobacker Haji [2016 (3) KLJ 247] and Vasantha Mallan v. Aboobacker Siddique [2020 (3) KLT 524].

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In Abdul Salam (supra) what was held is that in a case where the landlord admitted in evidence that vacant rooms are in his possession which are having independent entries, the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act obliges him to attribute special reasons for not occupying it, if he has to get an order of eviction. In Kunhamina K.V. (supra) also a similar view was taken. It was held that once it is shown that the landlord is in possession of another building of his own in the same town or village, the burden swings over to the landlord to establish special reasons. This also says that the primary burden is on the tenant to prove that the landlord is in possession of another building, and if it is

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proved, then burden shifts to the landlord to give special reasons as to why he has not chosen that building, to the satisfaction of the Court.

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The same is the principle laid down in Vasantha Mallan (supra) also. However, the court proceeded to hold that the observation in Bhargavi Amma P. v. K. P. Ajayakumar [2016 (1) KHC 347], “the rooms in his possession were vacant throughout. The admission that has been made by the landlord as PW1 is clear and categoric. It is not a statement made under a mistake. This is for the reason that, he is very specific about the door numbers of the rooms that are in his possession. He has also specifically stated that they are being kept locked. Therefore, this is a case where the landlord has filed the Rent Control Petition without disclosing a very relevant fact to the Court. The non - disclosure of the said fact as already held above is a circumstance that casts doubt on the bona fides of the need that has been put forward by him” is against the principle laid down in M.L.Prabhakar (supra) .

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The observations at paragraph No.10 in Bhargavi Amma P. (supra) are extracted below to understand the law laid down therein and also to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel of the petitioner that there occurred wrong application of the law in M.L Prabhakar (supra),-

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“10. It cannot be understood from the First Proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act that the landlords need to plead the particulars of all the premises under their ownership and possession to claim an order of eviction. xx xx xx A combined reading of the provision and the proviso would indicate beyond doubt that it is only when it is established that the landlord has another building of his own in his possession for his occupation for the proposed need, he need satisfy the Rent Control Court the special reasons for not occupying the said premises.”

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Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Court

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Act reads,-

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“(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.”

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Section 11(3) of the Kerala Act and its first proviso

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read as follows:-

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“(3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him:

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Provided that the Rent control court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so:”

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The Apex Court in M.L.Prabhakar (supra) held in

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the context of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act that non-availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and available other vacant building is not reasonably suitable for residential accommodation to the landlord are the facts to be established for getting an order of eviction. It may be noted that such conditions are ingrained in Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Court Act itself; whereas in the Kerala Act availability of other vacant building and its suitability for the purpose of the

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landlord as reasons to deny eviction are part of the proviso.

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Under Section 11(3) of the Act what the landlord is

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to establish is a genuine bona fide need. The same is the ingredient contained in the first part of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act also. In that context, the Apex Court held “Firstly, the availability of another accommodation suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to the bona fides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need”. Apropos that observation only this Court in Bhargavi Amma (supra) held that if the landlord filed the Rent Control Petition without disclosing a very relevant fact, the non - disclosure casts doubt on the bona fides of the need that has been put forward by him. Such an observation was not made in the context of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that said observation is not in conflict with the law in M.L.Prabhakar (supra). Also, it is not inflict with the consistent view taken by this Court or that it is

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the burden of the tenant to prove the availability of vacant rooms with the landlord, and only on such proof, the landlord has the liability to show special reasons, if to get an order of eviction. (See: Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592] , Kunhamina K.V. v. V.K.T.Aboobacker Haji [2016 (3) KLJ 247] and Vasantha Mallan v. Aboobacker Siddique [2020 (3) KLT 524], Kunhamina K v. V.K.T.Aboobacker Haji [2016 (3) KLJ 247], Kunju T.P v. Fathima and others [2014 (3) KLT 563], Dineshan Pillai P.B v. Joseph @ Jose [2019 (3) KLT 104], Lainakalillath Kooliyangal Kamarunnisa and others v. A. Shabeer [2019 (4) KLJ 508] , Chethil Tharemmal Rasheeda v. Peedikayilakath Muhammad [2021 (6) KLT 751] , and Kakkottakath Puthiyapurayil Muhammad Ali and others v. Kakkottakath Puthiyarambath Mahamood and others [2022(4) KLT 221]).

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Considering the need urged by the respondents that they have to accommodate the showroom of the garment business in the space being occupied by the petitioner as his

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showroom and the other rooms as godown, letting out of other rooms which are situated at different parts of the building, of course, in the first floor itself, cannot be a reason for denying eviction. It may be noted that the two rooms got vacated and were let out at various points of time. That itself is enough to establish that there is sufficient reason for not occupying the same for their purpose. Therefore the plea of the petitioner with reference to the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is untenable.

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PW1 deposed that he has been depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business from the petition schedule shop room. He, while examined in court, admitted that his sons have been conducting other similar shops. Only document produced is Ext.B1, which is relating to his business and is not relating to his income and expenses personally. The oral testimony of RW1, which is self-serving, together with Ext.B1 would not prove that he can depend only on the income gained from his business in the petition schedule premises for his livelihood.

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Regarding non-availability of alternative buildings in the locality for the petitioner to shift his business, the evidence is scanty. CPW2 is the Commissioner. Her report would show that the enquiry regarding availability of vacant buildings was confined to 100 metre area. When the second proviso says about availability of the building in the ‘locality’, a term which is wide enough to take in an area larger than the vicinity of the building sought to be recovered, as held in

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the report cannot be based on to find that there is no vacant building available in the locality for the petitioner to get on rent. ln such circumstances, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.

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In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499] , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex

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Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

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In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited

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v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78] a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After

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referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

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In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412] after considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma , Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh (supra) the Apex Court held that when the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not be said to be perverse in any way, the High Court could not re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the

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concurrent findings by the courts below while exercising revisional jurisdiction.

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Viewed in the light of the aforesaid decisions, we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings in the judgment of the Appellate Authority and the order of the Rent Control Court, on the ground of illegality, irregularity or impropriety. Hence this Revision Petition fails. We, accordingly, dismiss it.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner has made a request to afford one year for vacating the premises pointing out the difficulty in finding out another room and making necessary arrangements for shifting his business. The learned counsel for the respondent is agreeable to grant three months’ time.

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Having considered all the aspects, we deem it appropriate to grant six months’ time to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms, subject to the following conditions:

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(i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall

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R.C.Rev.No.66 of 2021

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file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the petitioners-landlords within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop rooms and further they shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop rooms only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/ consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities;

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(ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default;

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(iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioners-landlords will be at liberty to proceed

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with the execution of the order of eviction.

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Sd/-

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ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

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Sd/P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE

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dkr

A.M.Antony v. Valiyakath Kunjimuhammed

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

A.M.Antony v. Valiyakath Kunjimuhammed

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

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