Dismissed

Oberoi Restaurant v. Sheshu John

Kerala HC1 Aug 2022RCRev./1/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Eviction for bona fide need and possession of other reasonably sufficient buildings was upheld. The Court accepted the wife's testimony concerning the proposed joint business and declined revisional interference with concurrent findings. The revision was dismissed, with three months to surrender possession subject to conditions.

What did the court decide?

Tenants granted three months to surrender possession, subject to an undertaking, payment of arrears and continuing rent, no third-party induction, and valid business permissions.

Oberoi Restaurant Vs Sheshu John — Landlord and Tenant | Kerala HC (2022)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR

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MONDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF AUGUST 2022 / 10TH SRAVANA, 1944

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R.C.REV.NO.1 OF 2021

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AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.09.2020 IN R.C.A.NO.59 OF 2019
OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (II ADDIL. DISTRICT
JUDGE), ERNAKULAM ARISING OUT OF ORDER DATED 08.07.2019 IN
R.C.P.NO.54 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONROL COURT (III ADDITIONAL

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MUNSIFF), ERNAKULAM

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REVISION PETITIONERS:

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1 OBEROI RESTAURANT A PARTNERSHIP FIRM REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, DHANPAT RAI OBEROI, OPPOSITE TO CHENNAI SILKS, M.G.ROAD, KOCHI-682 035.

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2 DHANPAT RAI OBEROI, AGED 74 YEARS S/O PISHANDAS OBEROI, MANAGING PARTNER, M/S OBEROI RESTAURANT, OPPOSITE TO CHENNAI SILKS, M.G.ROAD, KOCHI-682 035.

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3 LALITHA OBEROI, AGED 65 YEARS D/O SRIRAM DHODY, PARTNER, OBEROI RESTAURANT, OPPOSITE TO CHENNAI SILKS, M.G.ROAD, KOCHI-682 035.

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4 VISHAL OBEROI, AGED 44 YEARS

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S/O DHANPAT RAI, OBEROI, PARTNER, OBEROI RESTAURANT,
OPPOSITE TO CHENNAI SILKS, M.G.ROAD, KOCHI-682 035.

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BY ADVS.
S.SREEKUMAR (SR.)
SRI.P.MARTIN JOSE
SRI.P.PRIJITH
SRI.THOMAS P.KURUVILLA
SRI.R.GITHESH
SRI.MANJUNATH MENON
SRI.SACHIN JACOB AMBAT
SHRI.HARIKRISHNAN S.

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RESPONDENT:

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SHESHU JOHN
AGED 42 YEARS

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BUSINESS, S/O T.I. JOHN @ JOHN ITTOOP THOLATH, THO-
LATH HOUSE , KUNNAMKULAM POST, PIN-680 503, AND NOW
RESIDING AT VILLA NO 3, WESTROCK-ONE P.J. ANTONY
GROUND ROAD, PACHALAM, KOCHI-682 012.

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BY ADVS.
BASIL MATHEW
SRI.NINAN JOHN
SMT.SANJANA SARA VARGHESE ANNIE

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THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
01.08.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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ORDER

Anil K. Narendran, J.

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The petitioners are the respondents-tenants in R.C.P.No.54 of 2016 on the file of the Rent Control Court (III Additional Munsiff), Ernakulam, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord, under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking an order of eviction of the tenants from the petition schedule building. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition, seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, is that of the landlord to start a business in ready-made garments, along with his wife, to augment their income. In order to seek an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act, the landlord pointed out that the tenants are in possession of three storied commercial building in Chittoor Road, close to Sudheendra Hospital and also to the petition schedule building, and

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that three stories building is having a carpet area of 5,000 sq.ft. Besides, the tenants own another three storied commercial building having a carpet area of 3,000 sq.ft. on the immediate northern side of the petition schedule building. Both the above buildings are situated within the limits of Corporation of Cochin. The monthly rent of the petition schedule building is Rs.800/-. The tenants have defaulted payment of monthly rent from 01.04.2012 onwards. Therefore, an order of eviction was also sought for under Section 11(2)(b) of the

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Act.

Before the Rent Control Court, the tenants entered

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appearance and filed objection in the Rent Control Petition, denying the need projected under Section 11(3) of the Act. Since the tenants

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paid arrears of rent during the pendency of the Rent Control Petition, the landlord did not press an order of eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Insofar as the order of eviction sought for under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is concerned, the tenants denied possession of a three storied building having a carpet area of 3,000 sq.ft. The averments to that effect are contained in paragraph 7 of the objection filed in the Rent Control Petition. Before the Rent Control Court, the wife of the landlord was examined as PW1; the Secretary of Cochin Corporation was examined as PW2; the Advocate Commissioner, who submitted Ext.C1 and C2 reports, was examined as PW3; and a business partner of the landlord was examined as PW4. Exts.A1 to A30 were marked on the side of the landlord. On the side of the tenants, the Managing Partner of the 1^st petitioner firm was examined as RW1. The tenants in the connected matter i.e., R.C.P.No.59 of 2016 was examined as RW2. Exts.B1 to B20 were marked on the side of the tenants. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court granted an order of eviction in R.C.P.No.54 of 2016 under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act. By the order dated

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08.07.2019, the Rent Control Court directed the tenants to surrender the vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord, within 30 days from the date of that order. Challenging the order of the Rent Control Court dated 08.07.2019 in R.C.P.No.54 of 2016, the tenants filed R.C.A.No.59 of 2019 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (II Additional District Judge), Ernakulam, invoking the provisions under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 30.09.2020, thereby confirming the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority dated 30.09.2020 in R.C.A.No.59 of 2019 and also the order of the Rent Control Court dated 08.07.2019 in R.C.P.No.54 of 2016, the tenants are before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act.

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On 05.01.2021, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court issued notice to the caveator. Thereafter, on 07.01.2021, in I.A.No.1 of 2021, this Court passed an interim stay of eviction for a period of one month on condition that the tenants shall

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pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- as monthly rent to the landlord till the disposal of this Rent Control Revision. Thereafter, on 01.02.2021, this Court admitted the matter on file. It was submitted before this Court that the tenants have complied with the condition in the order of this

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Court dated 07.01.2021. Therefore, this Court extended the interim order further, which is still in force. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order passed by this Court on 07.01.2021 has been complied with. The said interim order, which was granted on 07.01.2021, is still in force.

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Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord.

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The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted by the authorities below concurrent under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act.

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The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would contend that since the landlord has not chosen to adduce oral evidence in support of the claim for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority went

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wrong in granting an order of eviction, relying on the oral testimony of the wife and power of attorney holder of the landlord, who was examined as PW1. The learned counsel would also raise a contention

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that, in absence of any specific pleadings in the Rent Control Petition that the wife of the landlord who was examined as PW1 is a dependent family member in order to seek an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, the authorities below ought to have rejected the

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claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide need. Insofar as the order of eviction sought for under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is concerned, the learned counsel would contend that, the landlord has

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not succeeded in proving that the tenants have acquired possession of a building reasonably sufficient for his requirement in the very same locality. In the absence of any such materials, the authorities below went wrong in granting an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act.

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Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord would contend that the findings of the authorities below while granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. PW1 is none other than the wife of the landlord, who is also his power of attorney holder and the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the landlord to start business in ready-made garments, along with his wife, in order to augment their income. The need projected in the Rent Control Petition stands proved by the oral testimony of PW1. Insofar as the order of eviction granted under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is concerned, it has come out in evidence that the tenants have acquired possession of a building reasonably sufficient for their requirements

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in the very same city. The conduct of the tenants in suppressing the material facts regarding acquisition of reasonably sufficient buildings near the petition schedule building, in the objection filed in the Rent Control Petition has to be taken serious note of. At any rate, the findings of the authorities below on the ground of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference by this Court.

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8 . Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), no twithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member

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of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same

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city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in

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possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business.

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In Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools

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Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476] the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222] a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need

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to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and

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honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in

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Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705] bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.

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In Nalakath Saidali Haji v. Kalluparamba Musthafa and others [2015 (4) KHC 815] a Division Bench of this Court relied on the law laid down in the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra. The Division Bench also noticed the law laid down by the Apex Court in Kizhakkayil Suhara v. Manhantavida Aboobacker (dead) by Lrs. [(2001) 8 SCC 19] that, not merely the need of the landlord but also the need of the dependents for whom eviction is sought, should be established to be bona fide. On the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench noticed that, neither the Rent Control Court nor the Appellate Authority has considered the need put forward by the landlord in accordance with the principles laid down in the decisions referred to supra and in the manner in which, the same ought to have been considered. Both the authorities were influenced by the fact that the landlord was holding an employment visa. The Division Bench noticed that, there is absolutely no evidence available

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on record regarding the nature of the employment visa that the landlord was holding or the terms subject to which the said visa has been issued to him. The conclusions of both the authorities below are based on the admission made by the landlord, while he was crossexamined as PW1. Nothing precludes the landlord from going abroad for employment. The case of the landlord in the Rent Control Petition is that, he has left his employment abroad and has come back to his

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native place. The fact that he is still holding an employment visa, does not militate against the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord.

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In Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718] a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra .

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In Regy V. Edthil v. Hubert Leslie D'Cruz [2016 (2) KLJ 164] , a Division Bench of this Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705] , wherein the Apex Court held that, in order to order eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord, the statutory requirement is that there must be an actual pressing need, not a mere whim or fanciful desire; it must be in praesenti and also the landlord must not be in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. In the said decision, the Division Bench relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222] , wherein it was held that, the term 'bona fide' or 'genuinely' refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of Legislative intent is an outcome of a sincere and honest desire, in contra distinction with a mere desire, by the Rent Control Legislation.

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In Abdul Salam v. Sebastian [2013 (4) KLT 592] , a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the landlord has clearly admitted in his evidence that vacant rooms are in his possession, he has to attribute special reasons for not occupying it, as the need mentioned under Section 11(3) of the Act cannot be a mere desire. On the facts of that case, since there was no sufficient opportunity given in the absence of plea, the Rent Control Petition was remitted to the Rent Control Court to enable the landlord to adduce evidence on that aspect and for fresh consideration by the Rent Control Court. Therefore, if there is admission on the part of the landlord of coming into possession of vacant rooms, unless special reason is given for not occupying the same, the need cannot be said to be bona fide and he is not entitled to get an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.

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In Gireeshbabu T.P. v. Jameela and others [2021 (5)

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KHC SN 30] , a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us (Anil K. Narendran, J) was a party, held that, in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Once, on the basis of

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the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act but, of course, subject to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3).

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As already noticed hereinbefore, the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the landlord to start business in ready-made garments in the petition schedule building, along with his wife who was examined as PW1, to augment their income. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition stands proved by the oral testimony of PW1, who is also the power of attorney holder of the landlord.

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Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas [2005 (4) KLT 764] , the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the oral testimony of PW1, who is the power of attorney holder of the landlord cannot be the basis for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. Since the landlord has not chosen to mount the box, the authorities below ought to have declined an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act.

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In Joseph Mathew [2005 (4) KLT 764] , the Apex Court

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was dealing with a case in which the landlord filed Rent Control Petition seeking eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act on the ground that the landlord requires the petition schedule premises for his own occupation. The landlord has not chosen to mount the box. Instead, his son was examined. The Apex Court noticed that nowhere in the Rent Control Petition it is stated that the landlord required the premises in question for his son, who was his power of attorney holder. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the order of eviction granted under Section 11(3) of the Act based on the oral testimony of the landlord’s son, who was also his power of attorney holder, cannot be legally sustained.

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In Joseph Mathew [2005 (4) KLT 764] , the Apex Court has taken note of the law laid down in Ramkubai by Lrs. v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak [(1999) 6 SCC 540] , where the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which eviction on the ground of bona fide need, under Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, was sought for on the ground that the landlady require the tenanted premises for carrying on business by his son, who was her power of attorney holder, who deposed as a witness on behalf of her, in support of the ground of eviction. The Apex Court upheld the order of eviction, holding that the evidence of the power of attorney holder who was son of the landlady

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could be taken into consideration for passing the order of eviction, as the premises was required by the landlady for use of her son, whose evidence alone could form the basis of order of eviction, though the landlady herself did not come in the witness box.

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In the instant case, when the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is that of the landlord to start business in ready-made garments in the petition schedule building, along with his wife who was examined as PW1, to augment their income, the oral testimony of PW1 could be taken into consideration for granting an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants that, the authorities below went wrong in ordering eviction of the tenants under Section 11(3) of the Act, based on the oral testimony of the wife and power of attorney holder of the landlord, who was examined as PW1.

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Relying on the oral testimony of PW1, the authorities below concurrently found that the landlord is entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The findings of the authorities below on the ground of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal. It cannot also be said that while arriving at such a finding, the authorities below have committed any

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manifest error, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act.

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As per Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if the tenant already has in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village.

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As already noticed hereinbefore, in order to seek an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act, the landlord pointed out that the tenants are in possession of three storied commercial building in Chittoor Road, close to Sudheendra Hospital and also to the petition schedule building, and that three stories building is having a carpet area of 5,000 sq.ft. Besides, the tenants own another three storied commercial building having a carpet area of 3,000 sq.ft. on the immediate northern side of the petition schedule building. Both the above buildings are situated within the limits of Corporation of Cochin. In paragraph 7 of the objection filed in the Rent Control Petition, the tenants denied possession of any such building. In the evidence, it has come out that the tenants have acquired possession of buildings reasonably sufficient for their requirements, in the very same city. Ext.X2 series of documents were marked through the Revenue Officer

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of Corporation of Cochin, who was examined as PW2 to show that building with door numbers 66/4638 to 66/4646 of Corporation of Cochin is owned and possessed by Lalitha Obroi, Dhanpath Rai Obroi, Visal Obroi. Dhanpath Rai Obroi, who is the Managing Partner of Obroi Restaurant, who was examined as RW1, admitted during cross examination that he is using the first and second floors of the said building, which is on the northern side of the petition schedule building, to store wine and the third floor of the building is used for accommodation of his employees. RW1 has also admitted that the ground floor of another three storied building owned by him, which is at Chittoor Road is let out to Syndicate Bank for Rs.85,000/- per month and the other two floors of that building is in his possession.

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As held by this Court in Andrews v. Daisy Punnan

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[2016 (2) KLT SN 30] , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, a Division Bench of this Court held that once it is admitted by the tenant that he had come into possession of another building after taking into possession of the petition schedule building, the burden is on the tenant to prove that the new building is not sufficient for his purpose. In the absence of any such proof by the tenant, the landlord will be entitled for an order of eviction.

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In the instant case, the tenants who have acquired possession of reasonably sufficient building for their requirements, in

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the very same city, have suppressed the said material fact in their objection filed in the Rent Control Petition. The conduct of the tenants in this regard have to be deprecated in the strongest words.

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In Prestige Lights Limited v. State Bank of India [(2007) 8 SCC 449] the Apex Court reiterated that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. Therefore, in exercising extraordinary power, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

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In Prestige Lights the Apex Court held further that, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of

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material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.

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Paragraphs 33 and 34 of the said judgment read thus:

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“33. It is thus clear that though the appellant-Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.

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The object underlying the above principle has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R v. Kensington Income

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Tax Commissioners, [(1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] , in the following words:

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"It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts - facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it - the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside, any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement."

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26. In Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [(2010) 14

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SCC 38] the Apex Court held that, the principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Article 32, Article 226 and Article 136 of the Constitution of India but

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also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled

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but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issues arising in the case.

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The authorities below, after analysing the pleadings and materials on record concurrently found that the tenant is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act, on the ground that the tenants have acquired building reasonably sufficient for their requirement in the very same city. The reasoning of the authorities below while ordering eviction under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal. It cannot also be said that, while arriving at such a finding, they have committed material irregularity, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act.

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Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion.

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In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499] , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that,

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even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the

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entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

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In T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7

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SCC 275] the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to

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reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the

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High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below.

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In Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645] the Apex

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Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court,

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under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist.

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In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v.

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Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78] a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex

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Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

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In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412] c onsidering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma , Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction.

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Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions

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referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenants under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below under Sections

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11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act.

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35. The learned counsel for the petitioners-tenants would submit that considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, the tenants may be given at least six months' time to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building.

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36. O n the above request made by the learned counsel for the tenants, the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord would submit that, though the conduct of the tenants in suppressing material facts in the objection filed in the Rent Control Petition would disentitle them from seeking any indulgence of this Court, considering

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the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, a reasonable period of three months may be granted to the tenants for giving vacant possession of the petition schedule building, on condition that the tenants shall clear the entire dues towards

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arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month as ordered by this Court on 07.01.2021 and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default.

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The learned counsel for the tenants would submit that the tenants are prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and they shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till they give vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the landlord.

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In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision Petition is dismissed declining interference on the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority; however by granting three months' time to the petitioners-tenants, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the respondent-landlord, considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions:

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(i) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that they will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the petitioner-landlord within three months from the date of this order and that, they shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule

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building and further they shall conduct any business in the petition schedule building only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities;

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(ii) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent, if any, as on date, at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per month, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of

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this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default;

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(iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.

Sd/-

ANIL K.NARENDRAN

JUDGE

Sd/-

P.G. AJITHKUMAR JUDGE

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