Allowed

Siji Antony, v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.

Kerala HC21 Oct 2022CO/21/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court, in a cross objection, allowed the cross objection and dismissed the insurance company's appeal. The court confirmed that no contributory negligence existed on the part of the deceased due to the crater's negligent parking on the tanned road. The court enhanced the compensation by reworking the monthly income and awarding Rs. 40,000 each for consortium to five heirs, while striking

What did the court decide?

Cross objection allowed; appeal dismissed. Monthly income enhanced to Rs. 11,500; Consortium compensation awarded at Rs. 40,000 per heir; heads for pain and suffering and love and affection removed.

Siji Antony, Vs United India Insurance Company Ltd. — Motor Accident Claims | Kerala HC (2022)

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'C.R.'

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C. JAYACHANDRAN FRIDAY, THE 21^ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 29TH ASWINA, 1944

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MACA NO. 3352 OF 2019

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AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP(MV) 975/2016 OF MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL ,PERUMBAVOOR DATED 4.8.2018 APPELLANT/R3:

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UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED PERUMBAVOOR NOW REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL MANAGER, REGIONAL OFFICE, SHARANYA, HOSPITAL ROAD, KOCHI-11. BY ADVS. MATHEWS JACOB (SR.) SRI.P.JACOB MATHEW

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RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS:

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1 SIJI ANTONY W/O. ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544. 2 AKHILA ANTONY D/O. ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544.

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3 ALINA ANTONY (MINOR) D/O. ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544.

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4 ANSA ANTONY (MINOR) D/O. ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544.

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5 GARVASIS S/O. PAULOSE, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544.

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6 LEELAMMA D/O. GARVASIS, ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR P.O., PIN-683 544. (MINOR RESPONDENTS 3 AND 4 ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER IST RESPONDENT).

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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*ADDL. R7 ADDL. R7 : ABDUL SAMAD, PROPRIETOR, M/S. A ONE STEELS, NEDUMTHODE, MUDICKAL P.O., ERNAKULAM, PIN- 683 547.

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*ADDL. R8 RINO ABRAHAM,

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S/O. ABRAHAM THOMAS, KOTTAKKAKATHUM MALAYIL HOUSE, EDAYARANMULA P.O., PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT - 689 532.

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*ADDL. R7 & ADDL. R8 IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 28/06/2022 IN I.A 2/2022 IN MACA 3352/2019. BY ADV SRI.A.N.SANTHOSH

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THIS CROSS OBJECTION/CROSS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 21.10.2022, ALONG WITH CO.21/2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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'C.R.'

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C. JAYACHANDRAN

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FRIDAY, THE 21^ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 29TH ASWINA, 1944 CO NO. 21 OF 2020

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AGAINST MACA 3352/2019 FILED AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP(MV) 975/2016 OF MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL,

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PERUMBAVOOR DATED 4.8.2018

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CROSS OBJECTORS/RESPONDENTS:

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1 SIJI ANTONY, AGED 45 YEARS W/O. LATE ANTONY, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOORE, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.

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2 AKHILA ANTONY, D/O. LATE ANTONY, AGED 19 YEARS, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOORE, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.

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3 ALINA ANTONY, D/O. LATE ANTONY, AGED 16 YEARS, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOORE, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.

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4 ANSA ANTONY, D/O. LATE ANTONY, AGED 14 YEARS, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOOR, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, CROSS OBJECTORS 3 AND 4 MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR NATURAL GUARDIAN MOTHER 1ST CROSS OBJECTOR.

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5 GARVASIS, S/O. PAULOSE AGED 83 YEARS, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTVA, CHERANALLOORE, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.

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6 LEELAMMA, D/O. GARVASIS, AGED 59 YEARS, PARAYIL HOUSE, THOTTUVA, CHERANALLOORE, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT. BY ADV A.N.SANTHOSH

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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RESPONDENTS/APPELLANT:

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1 UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. REPRESENTED BY ITS REGIONAL MANAGER, REGIONAL OFFICE, SHARANYA, HOSPITAL ROAD, KOCHI - 682 011.

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*ADDL.R2 ABDUL SAMAD, PROPRIETOR, M/S. A1 STEELS, NEDUMTHODAI, MUDICKAL P.O., ERNAKULAM - 683 547.

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*ADDL.R3 RINO ABRAHAM,

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S/O. ABRAHAM THOMAS, KOTTAKKAKATHUM MALAYIL, EDAYARANMULA P.O.,PATHANAMTHITTA, 689 532.

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*ADDL. R2 & R3 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 01/07/2022 IN I.A 1/2022 IN C.O. 21 /2020 IN MACA 3352/2019.

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BY ADV P.JACOB MATHEW

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THIS CROSS OBJECTION/CROSS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 21.10.2022, ALONG WITH MACA.3352/2019, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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'CR'

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C.JAYACHANDRAN, J.

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-----------------------------------MACA No.3352 of 2019 and Cross Objection No.21 of 2020

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------------------------------------Dated this the 21^st day of October, 2022

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J U D G M E N T

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The appeal is preferred by the third respondent/ Insurance Company in O.P(M.V) No.975/2016 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor. The claimants preferred the above cross objection. The fatal accident occurred on 10.4.2016, at the mid night, when the motor cycle driven by the deceased hit on the rear side a crane, which was parked on the road side.

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Heard Sri.Mathews Jacob, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Smt.Preethy R. Nair on behalf of the appellant and Sri.A.N.Santhosh, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 6 (petitioners in the cross objection). Perused the records.

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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Learned Senior Counsel for the

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appellant/Insurance Company contended that the deceased was under the spell of alcohol at the time of accident, as could be seen from the wound certificate, where the smell of alcohol is recorded. However, the Tribunal attributed entire negligence on the driver of the crane, based on the final report and awarded compensation. Neither the driver nor the owner of the crane contested the matter. Although the policy is admitted, the Tribunal should have found that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased; or at least should have found contributory negligence as against him, is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the Insurance Company.

¶58

The second contention is based on the quantum of compensation granted. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Rs.9,500/- was taken as monthly income, without any supporting proof. Two other heads, which are not liable to be reckoned in cases of death, namely 'pain and suffering' and 'love and affection', have been reckoned at Rs.15,000/- and Rs.50,000/-

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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respectively, which is contrary to the prevailing law, is the submission.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents (petitioners in the cross objection) submitted that the Tribunal rightly found negligence on the driver of the crane relying upon Ext.A5 final report in the crime registered, warranting no interference by this Court. It was submitted that the monthly income reckoned is grossly insufficient. The claimants sought for a monthly income of Rs.30,000/- in the capacity of the deceased as the owner cum driver of a tipper lorry, his driving licence being produced as Ext.A10 and the R.C particulars of the lorry as Ext.A11. Despite these, the Tribunal only reckoned Rs.9,500/as monthly income, which is less than the index available in Ramachandrappa v. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. [(2011) 13 SCC 236] even for a Coolie. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Minu Rout & Another v. Satya Pradyumna Mahopatra & Others [(2013) 10 SCC 695] to point out that in respect of an accident which took place in 2004 and in

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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a case where a sum of Rs.5,000/- alone was claimed as monthly income, the Honourable Supreme Court took note of the fact that the claimant therein, being a driver and skillfully employed, is entitled to a monthly income at Rs.6,000/- per month.

¶66

Another contention of the petitioners in the cross objection is that no compensation was awarded under the head 'consortium'. Learned counsel submitted that the deceased, a 47 year old man, is survived by his wife, three children and father, each being entitled to Rs.40,000/- towards consortium.

¶67

Having heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides, this Court will first address the issue of contributory negligence, the main issue involved in this appeal.

¶68

In Swadling v. Cooper [(1931) A.C 1], the House of Lords defined contributory negligence as the rule that although there may have been negligence on the part of the plaintiff, yet unless he might, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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consequences of the defendant's negligence, he was entitled to recover, but if by ordinary care he might have avoided them, he was the author of his own wrong. In Halsbury's Laws of England [3^rd edition, Volume 28, paragraph 92], the concept of contributory negligence is lucidly depicted thus:

¶72

“In an action for injuries arising from negligence, it was a defence at common law if the defendant proved that the plaintiff, by some negligence on his part, directly contributed to the injury in the sense that his negligence formed a material part of the effective cause thereof. When this is proved the plaintiff's negligence is said to be contributory. It is now enacted by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 that where any person suffers damage the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage is not to be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof are to be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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share in the responsibility for the damage.”

¶76

In Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Company Ltd. [(1951) AC 601] , it was held that what was necessary to establish the defence of contributory negligence was to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed by this want of care, to his own injury, for, when contributory negligence was set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's claim, the principle involved was that, where a man was part author of his own injury, he could not call upon the other party to compensate him in full.

¶77

Before addressing the facts, it is necessary to refer to Regulation 15(1) of the Rules of Road Regulations, 1989, which provides that every driver of a motor vehicle parking on any road shall park in such a way that it does not cause or is not likely to cause danger, obstruction or undue inconvenience

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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to other road users and if the manner of parking is indicated by any sign board or markings on the road side, he shall park his vehicle in such manner. Clause (iv) of Regulation 15(2) provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall not park his vehicle in a main road or one carrying fast traffic.

¶81

With this, the attendant facts are to be taken note of. The fatal accident took place on 10.4.2016, at 00.15 hours. The motor cycle driven by the deceased collided on the rear side of a crane parked on the road, with the result, the deceased succumbed to the fatal injuries sustained. The deceased was proceeding in the Vallam-Aalattuchira public road, which is lying in the east-west direction, the deceased moving towards east from west. There exists evidence in the form of Ext.A5 final report in Crime No.456/2016 of the Kodanad Police Station, a crime registered in connection with the instant incident. The following contents of the final report are relevant and extracted herein below:-

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“tdmUn³sd hS¡äw SmÀ FânÂ \n¶pw 3 þ10 aoäÀ t\sc sX¡v amdnbpw ImWp¶ mKw SmÀ tdmUv mK¯v P·wIpfw ho«nÂ hnPb³ hI

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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¹mkvänIv I¼\nbnÂ anjy\dnIÄ Cd¡nbtijw Sn s{Ibn³ bmsXmcp hn[ ap¶dnbn¸pIÄ CÃmsXbpw s{Ibn³sd ]n³mKw tdmUn³sd a[ymK¯v hc¯¡hn[w aXnbmb knáÂ sseäpIÄ CÃmsXbpw A{i²ambn ]mÀ¡v sNbvXXnÂ h¨v Sn tdmsU ]Snªmdp\n¶pw Ingt¡m«v Bdmw km£nbpsS `À¯mhv 47 hbÊpÅ B³vdWn HmSn¨p h¶Xmb KL-17-C-7984-Bw \¼À tamt«mÀ ssk¡nÄ Sn s{Ibn\n³vsd ]n³ CSXv hi¯Xmbn CSn¡p¶Xn\mbn CSbm¡nbXnÂ h¨v þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ þ"

¶86

It is thus clear from Ext.A5 final report that the rear side of the vehicle was parked encompassing the middle portion of the road and that there were no signal light put on. There is no evidence to show that a separate sign board was exhibited behind the crane, which was parked on the road side, with onehalf of the vehicle being in the limits of tarred portion of the road. The fact that the vehicle was so parked in the midnight adds gravity to the negligence. The above facts would clearly establish the negligence on the part of the driver of the crane.

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What requires to be ascertained now is whether there was any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. This Court may straight away observe

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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that once the parking of the vehicle on the tarred portion of the road is established, which, in turn, establishes the negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle so parked, the burden indubitably lies on the defendant, who sets up contributory negligence as a defence. In the written statement, the third respondent/insurance company specifically sets up the defence of contributory negligence, though as an alternative to the complete negligence sought to be attributed to the deceased.

¶91

There is no material before this Court to show that the deceased was under the spell of alcohol, although learned counsel for the appellant canvassed for such a factual position. According to the learned counsel, reference to smell of alcohol is available in the wound certificate, which, however, is neither produced before the Tribunal, nor before this Court. In such circumstances, negligence cannot be attributed to the claimant/deceased. This Court notice that the burden has not been assumed by the third respondent/insurance company, inasmuch as it did not

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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chose to adduce any evidence, oral or documentary, whatsoever. The claimants produced documentary evidence in Exts.A1 to A11, of which Ext.A5 is the charge sheet. There exists no evidence to show that the deceased was driving the motor cycle in a very high speed; or that his motor cycle was having any inherent defect, so as to contribute to the accident caused. Ext.A3(a) is the report of the Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, who certifies that the vehicle was not having any mechanical defect. It could thus be seen that there exists no evidence, whatsoever, to indicate that there was any negligence on the part of the deceased.

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This Court will now refer to the binding precedents on the point. The issue fell for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court very recently in Jumani Begam v. Ram Narayan and Others [(2020) 5 SCC 807] . The facts are similar that the motor cycle driven by the deceased collided with a truck trailer, which was parked on the road. The Tribunal assigned contributory negligence @ 50% on

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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the deceased, which was confirmed by the High Court. On the evidence adduced, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that no reflectors were exhibited at the spot. The evidence also did not suggest that the truck trailer had been parked outside the area of pakka road. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased could have avoided the accident by exercising due diligence is nothing but a mere surmise. The following observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is relevant and extracted herein below:-

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“7. ….....Once the substantive evidence before MACT established that the truck trailer had been parked on the road at night without any reflectors, we are of the view that there was no reason or justification for MACT to proceed on the basis of conjecture in arriving at a finding of contributory negligence.”

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A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the question in Ramachandran V. and Another v. Narendra Sinh and Others [2016 (2) KHC 318] . In

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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this case, the deceased, who was driving a Maruthi800 car, while attempting to overtake a bus, dashed against a lorry, which was parked on the side of the National Highway. This Court found that the lorry was parked on the tarred surface of the road to an extent of at least one meter. On the basis of such finding, the Division Bench overturned the decision of the Tribunal holding that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the deceased alone. It was also found that the deceased, as also, the driver of the lorry, both, were negligent.

¶104

A detailed discussion encompassing the law on the subject can be found in a decision of Delhi High Court in Pushpa Rani Chopra & Others v. Anokha Singh & Others [1975 ACJ 396] . Morris v. Luton Corporation [(1946) 1 KB 114] was relied upon to find that there was no rule of law that a person driving in the dark must be held to be negligent, if he was driving at such a speed that he was not able to pull up within the limits of his vision. The Delhi High Court held that the excessiveness of the speed has to be

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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determined as a question of fact in the circumstances of each case on the basis of evidence on record. After elaborate discussion, the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence was reversed. The liability was fixed on the driver of the truck and its insurance company. It is relevant to note that the facts at hand are more or less similar to the decision in Pushpa Rani Chopra (supra), where also, a truck was parked in the main road and the motor cyclist dashed against the stationary truck. P ushpa Rani Copra (supra) was followed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Nirmal Bhutani and Others v. Haryana State and Another [AIR 1983 Punjan & Haryana 188], where also, the facts are comparable that a Fiat Car ran into a road roller, which was parked on the road, resulting in the death of two occupants in the car. Reference was made to Section 81 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which deals with leaving a vehicle in a dangerous position and it was held as follows, in paragraph no.16 of the judgment:

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“16. There is a basic fallacy in the argument of the learned Advocate-General. Where a motor vehicle is left parked on a highway in such a manner that it constitutes a hazard or danger to road users, the onus must be held to be upon one who seeks to avoid liability arising from an accident with such vehicle, to establish that despite such parking of the motor vehicle, the accident took place due to a fault or negligence of the other party or that such other party could have avoided the accident by reasonable care and caution. No such evidence or circumstances exist in the present case.”

¶111

In paragraph 18, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana recognised the right of a person travelling in a highway to proceed at a reasonable speed, unless there is a traffic and other obstruction in the road to slow it down. The court found that in the course of such travel, a road roller standing in the road was a grave and unexpected hazard for road users and it constituted a breach of duty of care on the part of the driver of the road roller to other road users.

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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In the light of the above precedents, this Court finds that unless there exists specific evidence pointing to contributory negligence, if any, on the part of the deceased/injured, liability has to be fastened solely on the driver of the vehicle, who parked the same in the road limits of a Highway/public road. The legal position will certainly change, if it is established that the vehicle was parked outside the limits of the tarred portion of the road. This Court is of the definite opinion that the tarred portion of a road is specifically meant to ply the vehicles and not to park vehicles, either temporarily or for a considerable duration. If such parking is necessitated by a break down or the like, sufficient indication should be given by lighting necessary indicators/reflectors, besides placing the sign boards behind the parked vehicle. No contributory negligence can be fastened on the deceased/injured merely for the reason that the offending vehicle was parked/stationed. Per contra, such parking in the road limits comes to the notice of the road users

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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quite belatedly, especially at nights, leaving little room for applying the breaks and avoiding the collision. In the light of the above discussion, the finding of the Tribunal repelling contributory negligence is hereby confirmed.

¶118

Coming to quantum of compensation, the appellant would contend that reckoning Rs.9,500/- itself is on the higher side and the petitioners in the cross objection would contend that Rs.9,500/- is grossly insufficient. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners in the cross objection, the deceased was the owner cum driver of a tipper lorry, in respect of which claim, supporting evidence has been adduced by virtue of Exts.A10 and A11, the driving licence and R.C particulars of the lorry. However, it remains a fact that no proof with respect to the income has been adduced.

¶119

In this context, it is relevant to take note of the finding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph nos.19 and 20 of Minu Rout (supra), wherein the facts are more or less similar. There, the deceased was a

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driver, who claimed Rs.5,000/- per month for the purpose of computing loss of dependency. As in this case, no documentary evidence was adduced in proof of the specific income of the claimant. In Minu Rout (supra), the claimant however mounted the box and asserted his income as Rs.5,000/-. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.20 held that the post of a driver is a skilled job and, therefore, the Tribunal ought to have taken the monthly income at Rs.6,000/-, de hors the fact that the claimant had claimed only Rs.5,000/-. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is in fact the duty of the Tribunal and the appellate court to assess and arrive at a just and reasonable monthly income based on attendant facts.

¶123

In this case, this Court, at any rate, should reckon the income specified in Sri Ramachandrappa v. The Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. [(2011) 13 SCC 236] , which is Rs.10,500/- for the year 2016. This, coupled with the fact that the deceased was a driver, a skilled job, this Court is of the opinion that it would be just and reasonable to fix the compensation at Rs.11,500/-. It is so done.

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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The next ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the Cross Objection is that no amount has been granted under the conventional head of 'consortium'. Learned counsel submitted that inasmuch as the deceased is survived by five legal heirs, including wife, three children and father, all are entitled to Rs.40,000/- each. It was also pointed out that while granting consortium, the amounts granted under the heads' pain and suffering' and 'love and affection' has to be obliterated. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in the cross objection appears to be reasonable and within the limits of law, and hence, liable to be accepted. Therefore, the compensation granted under the heads 'pain and suffering' and 'love and affection' are done away with, while granting compensation under the head 'consortium' for five persons, at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each.

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In the result, this appeal is dismissed and the Cross Objection is allowed. The petitioners in the Cross Objection will be entitled to compensation as indicated in the tabular statement shown hereinbelow:

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MACA 3352/2019 and Cross Objection 21/2020

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Sl. No.	Head of Claim	Amount awarded by the Tribunal (Rs.)	Total amount after enhancement in appeal (Rs.)
1	Loss of dependency	1389375	1681875*
2	Expenses for transport	8000	8000
3	Damage to clothes	1000	1000
4	Funeral expenses	15000	15000
5	Love and affection	50000	-
6	Loss of consortium	40000	200000
7	Pain and suffering	15000	-
8	Extra nourishment	1000	1000
9	Loss of estate	15000	15000
10	Medical expenses	39036	39036
		1573411	1960911
	Amount enhanced =Rs.3,	87,500/-(19609	11 - 1573411)

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(14375x12x13x3/4)

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The Insurance Company shall pay interest for the amounts awarded by the Tribunal at the rate directed in the impugned award; and for the enhanced amounts at the rate of 5% from the date of petition. If any amounts have already been paid, the same shall be granted set off. The claimant/s shall produce the details of the Bank account before the Insurance Company/Tribunal within one month from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment and amount shall be transferred to the Bank account

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directly through NEFT/RTGS mode, within a period of one month thereafter. If the Bank account is not furnished within the time stipulated, it is made clear that no interest shall run on the enhanced amount after the period stipulated by this Court. However, if the Insurance Company fails to deposit the amount as directed, interest on enhanced amount shall also run at the rate ordered by the Tribunal from the date of petition.

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Siji Antony, v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

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Siji Antony, v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.

Case brief

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