A freedom fighter's widow challenged rejection of dependent family pension under the Central Scheme. The court upheld the requirement of scheme-compliant certificates and dismissed the appeal, finding no ground to interfere with denial of pension.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
MONDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF JANUARY 2021 / 21TH POUSHA, 1942
WA.No.1663 OF 2020
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 29076/2010(H) OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/S:
NARAYANI KRISHNAN AGED 82 YEARS W/O. KRISHNAN, MULLASSERIVELI, CHARAMANGALAM, MUHAMMA P.O, CHERTHALA, ALAPPUZHA
BY ADV. SMT.NAMITHA JYOTHISH
RESPONDENT/S:
1 THE UNION OF INDIA SECRETARY MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI PIN 110 001
2 THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, GENERAL, ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT, SECRTARIAT, THIRUVANNANTHAPURAM, PIN 695 001
R1 BY ADV. SHRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG OF INDIA OTHER PRESENT:
SRI.P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG FOR R1, SRI.TEK CHAND, SR GP FOR R2
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 11.01.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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“C.R”
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J U D G M E N T
Dated this the 11th day of January, 2021
S. Manikumar, CJ
Instant writ appeal is filed challenging the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 29076 of 2010 dated 01.11.2018, by which, a learned Single Judge, dismissed the writ petition.
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by the Union Government, as eligible for grant of Freedom Fighters' Pension under the Central Scheme.
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rejected her claim, on the grounds that the Co-prisoner Certificate submitted is unreliable and that the State Government has not recommended the grant of pension.
“7. The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Union of India v. Subhadra reported in [2016 (2) KLT 1 (W.A. No. 2538/2015 dated 11.6.2010), has held in paragraph 14 thereof that in order that the person who has issued with Personal Knowledge Certificate (PKC) under the Central Scheme to be eligible to issue such certificate, he should have sufered actualf imprisonment for not less than two years without any remission etc. The said dictum laid down by this Court in the context of the requirement of eligibility to issue Personal Knowledge Certificate (PKC) would also apply with equal vigour in the case of eligibility to issue Co-Prisoner Certificate (CPC). It is beyond dispute that, as per the Governing norms under the Central Scheme, a certifier to issue Co-Prisoner certificate should have necessarily sufered one yearf 's actual imprisonment without any remission, apart from the fact that he should have been awarded the freedom fghtersi ' pension under the Central Scheme. In the light of these aspects, it is only to be held
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that the stand taken by the respondents regarding the unacceptability of Ext. P-4 certificate is correct, in as much as the certifier was not eligible to issue such certificate. Hence, the impugned proceedings at Ext. P8 etc, does not deserve any legal interdiction. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the writ petition (Civil) will stand dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)
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interference.
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the material on record.
“ SALIENT FEATURES OF SWATANTRATA SAINIK SAMMAN PENSION SCHEME, 1980
During the Silver Jubilee year of Independence, a Central Scheme for grant of pension to freedom fighters and their eligible dependents (Where freedom fighters have already passed away) was introduced by Government of India with effect from 15.08.1972. In 1980, the Scheme was liberalized and renamed as “Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980” (the Scheme) and made effective from 01.08.1980. Several provisions of the Original Scheme have been modified and clarified since then through different orders and circulars of the Government of India. Salient features of the basic provisions of the Scheme as amended up to date, are as follows:
2. Who is eligible for Samman Pension :-
All the persons who participated in the freedom movement in some way or the other are not eligible for Samman Pension. Only following category of freedom fighters are eligible for the Samman Pension under the Scheme subject to furnishing of the specified evidences:-
2.1 Eligible dependents of martyrs :-A martyr is a person who died or who was killed in action or in detention or was awarded capital punishment due to participation in the freedom struggle of India. Relevant documents from official records and newspapers of the relevant time are considered as evidence in such cases.
2.2 Imprisonment :- A person who had suffered minimum imprisonment of six months (3 months in case of women, SC/ST freedom fighters) on account of participation in freedom struggle subject to furnishing of the following evidences:-
(a) Imprisonment/detention certificate from the
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concerned jail authority, District Magistrate or the State Govt. indicating the period of sentence awarded, date of admission, date of release, facts of the case and reasons for release.
2.3 Underground :- A person who on account of his participation in freedom struggle remained underground for more than six months provided he was;
C. one for whose detention order was issued but not served.
Explanation :
Voluntary underground suffering or self-exile suffering for party work under command of the party leaders, are not covered as eligible sufferings under the Scheme.
The claim of underground suffering is considered subject to furnishing of the following evidence:-
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concerned, after due verification of the claim and its genuineness, certifies that documentary evidences from the official records in support of the claimed suffering were not available.
2.4 Internment/Externment: - A person who, on account of participation in the freedom struggle, was interned in his home or externed from his district for a minimum period of 6 months is eligible subject to furnishing of order of internment or externment issued by the competent authority, from official records. In absence of the official records, NARC from the State Govt./ UT Administration concerned, along with a certificate from prominent freedom fighter, who had proven jail sufferings of at least two years; who belonged to the same administrative unit and whose area of operation was same as that of the applicant, should be furnished.
2.5 Loss of property :- A person whose property was confiscated or attached and sold due to participation in the freedom struggle is eligible subject to furnishing of orders of confiscation and sale of property, provided that the persons whose property was restored are not eligible for Samman Pension.
2.6 Permanent incapacitation :- A person who on account of participation in freedom struggle, became permanently incapacitated during firing or lathi charge subject to furnishing of:-
2.7 Loss of Government Job: - A person who lost his Govt. job for participation in freedom struggle is eligible subject to furnishing of orders of dismissal or removal from service. However, persons who were reinstated in service before expiry of two years from their dismissal or removal from service and were in receipt of benefits or pay and allowances are not eligible.
2.8 Canning/Flogging/Whipping :- A person who was awarded the punishment of 10 strokes of caning/flogging/whipping due to his participation in freedom
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struggle is eligible subject to furnishing of copies of orders passed by the competent authority from official records.
3. Procedure
Persons who consider themselves eligible for Samman Pension under the Scheme and desire the Samman Pension, should apply in duplicate on the prescribed application form. The application, duly filled in and supported with required documents as proof of claim of suffering, should be sent to the Chief Secretary of the Concerned State Government/Union Territory Administration. A copy of such application should be sent to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, FF Division, MHA, New Delhi as an advance copy. However, claims can be processed by the Central govt. only on receipt of verification & entitlement to pension report from the State Govt./U.T. Administration concerned. In case the requirements of the Scheme are fulfilled, Samman pension is granted to the applicant.
4. Acceptability of Secondary Evidence
Secondary evidence can be considered only if supported by a valid Non-Availability of Records Certificate (NARC). The provisions of the Scheme were clarified to the State Governments in several circulars of the Govt. of India, gist of which is available in the Appendix attached herewith. The Instructions on NARC were reiterated by the Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, vide Circular No. 8/12/95-FF (P) dated 2.11.98, relevant extracts of which are reproduced as follows:-
“As per the scheme, claims of the applicants for samman pension are required to be supported by the duly verified official records of the relevant times. Only in case of nonavailability of such records, secondary evidence, as specified in the scheme, can be made based on such claims. However, due care and caution is required in such cases in view of several instances of bogus/ forged claims which have come to the notice of the Central Government. It is of utmost importance that before recommending such cases, complete facts of the case in which the applicant claims involvement, are verified from all the agencies which could have been concerned with the matter. These may include the police station concerned, the District administration, the jurisdictional court, competent authority
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issuing detention order, the advisory board/appellate court, prison authorities, and intelligence agencies. Discrete enquiry should also be made to ascertain genuineness of the claims. The NARC should be issued only after the above verification. It is reiterated that the NARC should invariably be worded as follows:
All concerned authorities of the State Government who could have relevant records in respect of the claim of the applicant, have been consulted and It is confirmed that the official records of the relevant time are not available. ”
Secretary to the Government of India, impugned in the writ petition, reads thus:-
“File No 52/CC/K/65/2010-FF(SZ) Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya
Lok Nayak Bhawan, Khan Market, New Delhi - 110 003, Dated the 28th April, 2010.
To
Dr. P. Prabhakaran
Additional Chief Secretary, General Administration & Fisheries Department, Government of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram – 695 001, Kerala.
Subject:- Grant of pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 - Compliance of judgment dated 22nd January, 2010 in Writ Petition (C) No. 2248 of 2010 (E) filed by Smt. Narayani Krishnan, W/O late M.S. Krishnan - regarding.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to the above mentioned subject and to state that in its judgment dated 22nd January, 2010, Hon'ble High Court of Kerala has directed the State
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Government to forward the application along with annexures and verification-cum-entitlement to the pension report of the petitioner to the Central Government.
Imprisonment Suffering:
A person who had suffered minimum imprisonment of six months (3 months in case of women, SC/ST freedom fighters) on account of participation in freedom struggle subject to furnishing of the following evidence:- (a) Primary Evidence:- Imprisonment/detention certificate from the concerned jail authority, District Magistrate or the State Government indicating the period of sentence awarded, date of admission, date of release, facts of the case and reasons for release.
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fighters who have proven jail suffering of minimum 1 year and who were with the applicant in the jail could be considered provided the State Government/Union Territory Administration concerned, after due verification of the claim and its genuineness, certifies that the documentary evidence from the official records in support of the claimed suffering are not available. In case the certifier happens to be a sitting or ex.M.P./M.L.A., only one certificate in place of the two is required.
Where records of the relevant period are not available, a Non-Availability of Record Certificate (NARC) from the concerned authority could be considered as secondary evidence. The NARC should not be general or vague and should confirm to the instructions issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. The instructions, inter-alia, require the State Governments to issue NARC only after due verification from all sources. The NARC is treated valid only when it is furnished by the State Government in the following manner:-
"All concerned authorities of the State Government who could have relevant records in respect of the claim of the applicant, have been consulted and it is confirmed that the official records of the relevant time are not available."
The claims of Central Samman Pension can be considered by the Central Government only when these are duly verified and recommended by the State Governments/Union Territory Administrations concerned in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme. As per the
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Scheme, the verification and recommendation report of the State Government is mandatory in view of the fact that the evidence of the claims are in the possession of the State Governments/Union Territory Administrations concerned and not of the Central Government. However, it is also to mention that the Central Government has to keep all documents/reports/ evidence in view and to take a decision strictly in accordance with the eligibility criteria and evidentiary requirements of the Central Scheme. A positive recommendation of the State Government is, therefore, not binding on the Central Government (if the claim does not satisfy the eligibility criteria and evidentiary requirements prescribed in the Central Scheme)
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sources, who may have such records which establish the imprisonment suffering of the applicant's husband. No such certificate has been issued by the State Government or the petitioner.
(iii) In case of imprisonment suffering, the applicant is required to submit two Co-prisoner Certificates (CPCs) from prominent freedom fighters who have proven jail suffering of minimum one year and who were with the applicant in the jail. These CPCs are accepted only when these are supported along with a valid NARC. Since the petitioner has not produced valid NARC under the provisions of the Scheme, the CPCs are also not acceptable and cannot be the basis for sanction of pension. Even otherwise certificate issued by Shri M.N. Govindan Nair is not in the prescribed format. Shri P.A. Solomon, Ex MP has imprisonment suffering less than one year and as such he is not an eligible certifier. Moreover, he has been found to be issuing such certificates indiscriminately and the same cannot be relied upon. In any case, these CPCs cannot be accepted in the absence of the valid NARC. The secondary evidence has to be reliable enough to induce a reasonable belief that the applicant fulfills the eligibility conditions of the Scheme. The CPCs cannot be taken to be always genuine conclusive proof for granting pension under the Central pension Scheme. Further, it cannot be denied that the CPCs can be obtained without much effort.
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(iv) State Government vide its letter No. 4940/FFP.A2/2010/GAD dated 24th March, 2010 has not recommended the claim.
Yours faithfully, (D.K. Goel) Deputy Secretary to the Government of India”
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aspect, we consider the following decisions:
(i) A Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas Keshavji Gandhi reported in AIR 1962 Guj 128 , has considered the question as to the binding nature of judicial precedents. K. T. Desai, CJ. in his judgment, observed:
“Judicial precedents are divisible into two classes, those which are authoritative and those which are persuasive. An authoritative precedent is one which judges must follow whether they approve of it or not. It is binding upon them. A persuasive precedent is one which the Judges are under no obligation to follow, but which they will take into consideration and to which they will attach such weight as they consider proper. A persuasive precedent depends for its influence upon its own merits.... A decision of a High Court Judge of a State is regarded as binding on all the subordinate courts in that State. A decision of a Division Bench of a High Court is regarded as binding on Judges of the same High Court sitting singly in the High Court. A decision of a Full Bench, i. e. a Bench of at least 3 Judges of a High Court is considered binding on all Division Benches of the same High Court.... A decision of a High Court Judge sitting singly is not legally binding on another Judge of the same High Court sitting singly. So also a decision of a Division Bench of a High Court is not legally binding on another Division Bench of the same High Court. A decision of a Full Bench is not legally binding on another Full Bench of the same Court. One Judge of a High Court has, however, no right to overrule the decision of another Judge of the same High Court nor has one Division Bench of a High Court the legal right to overrule another decision
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of a Division Bench of the same High Court.... The rule that a court should follow the decision of another Court of coordinate jurisdiction is subject however to several exceptions which have been dealt with in Salmond's Jurisprudence, 11th Edn. at page 199 to 217.
(1) A decision ceases to be binding if a statute or statutory rule inconsistent with it is subsequently enacted, or if it is reversed or overruled by a higher court.
(2) A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of statute.
(3) A precedent loses its binding force if court that decided it overlooked an inconsistent decision of higher court.
(4) xx xx xx xx xx
(5) Precedents sub silentio are not regarded as authoritative. A decision passed sub silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind.”
(ii) In Sundaradas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane reported in AIR 1991 SC 1893 , the law is stated thus:
“17. It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember the pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge Court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be
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referred to a larger Bench. It is subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.”
(iii) In S.I.P. Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd. v. Arputharaj , [(1991) 469 MLJ 1], a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court reiterated the law of precedents in the following words:
“In such a contingency, sitting as we do, as Judges of a Division Bench of this Court, we are bound by the interpretation and preference given by the Full Bench of this Court. This will be in consonance with the decorum of our judicial functioning. It is well settled that an interpretation (and equally a misinterpretation) by a larger Bench of the High Court, of a decision or decisions of the Supreme Court is binding on a smaller Bench of the same Court, and the latter cannot refuse to follow the decision of larger Bench, on the ground that the larger Bench has wrongly understood or construed the decisions of the Supreme Court. Taking note of this principle, we are obliged to hold that the appellants could not be held to have locus standi to prefer and prosecute these writ appeals.”
(iv) A Hon'ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court in CIT v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. , [(1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bombay)], held as follows:
“(a) The law declared by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts in India, the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, except, however, the Supreme Court itself which is free to review the same and depart from its earlier opinion if the situation so warrants. What is binding is, of course, the ratio of the decision and not every expression found therein.
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(b) The decisions of the High Court are binding on the subordinate courts and authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
(c) The position in regard to the binding nature of the decisions of a High Court on different Benches of the same court may be summed up as follows:
(i) A single judge of a High Court is bound by the decision of another single judge or a Division Bench of the same High Court. It would be judicial impropriety to ignore that decision. Judicial comity demands that a binding decision to which his attention had been drawn should neither be ignored nor overlooked. If he does not find himself in agreement with the same, the proper procedure is to refer the binding decision and direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question (see Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor AIR 1982 SC 1302).
(ii) A Division Bench of a High Court should follow the decision of another Division Bench of equal strength or a Full Bench of the same High Court. If one Division Bench differs from another Division Bench of the same High Court, it should refer the case to a larger Bench.
(iii) Where there are conflicting decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if reached after full consideration of the earlier decisions.
(d) The decision of one High Court is neither binding precedent for another High Court nor for courts or Tribunals outside its own territorial jurisdiction. It is well settled that the decision of a High Court will have the force of binding precedent only in the State or territories on which the court
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has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have only persuasive effect.”
(v) Single Judge is bound by the opinion of the Division Bench. Merely because some other view may also be possible, cannot be the basis to question settled legal position. Such an approach is not only counterproductive but also against the public policy. [See : Farooq Mohammad v. State of M.P. , [AIR 2016 MP 10 (FB)].
Court in Union of India v. Subhadra and Others reported in 2016 (2) KLT 1, is also binding on us, in the light of the following decisions:
“(i) In Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 3 SCC 25], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
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(ii) In State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 637], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
“4. We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court which has delivered the impugned judgment being a coordinate Bench could not have taken a view different from that taken by the earlier Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Durgadas Purkayastha (Supra). If the latter Bench wanted to take a view different than that taken by the earlier Bench, the proper course for them would have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We have perused the reasons given by the learned Judges for not referring the matter to a larger Bench. We are not satisfied that the said reasons justified their deciding the matter and not referring it to the larger Bench. In the circumstances, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of inter se seniority of the Judicial Officers impleaded as respondents in the writ petition.”
(iii) In S.I. Rooplal and Ors. v. Lt. Governor Through Chief Secretary, Delhi and Ors. [(2000) 1 SCC 644], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
“12. At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a coordinate Bench of the tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another coordinate Bench of the same tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the coordinate Bench of the same tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two coordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents. Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of
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administration of justice under our system. This is a fundamental principle which every Presiding Officer of a Judicial Forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our judicial system. This Court has laid down time and again precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate court is bounded by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A coordinate Bench of a Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.
This Court in the case of Tribhuvandas Purshottamdas Thakur v. Ratilal Motilal Patel [AIR 1968 SC 372] while dealing with a case in which a Judge of the High Court had failed to follow the earlier judgment of a larger Bench of the same court observed thus:
"The judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court was binding upon Raju, J., If the learned Judge was of the view that the decision of Bhagwati, J., in Pinjare Karimbhai's case [1962 (3) Guj LR 529] and of Macleod, C.J., in Haridas's case (AIR 1922 Bom 149(2) : 23 Bom LR 802) did not lay down the correct law or rule of practice, it was open to him to recommend to the Chief Justice that the question be considered by a larger Bench. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that he should not ignore it. Our system of administration of justice aims at certainty in the law and that can be achieved only if Judges do not ignore decisions by Courts of coordinate authority or of superior authority. Gajendragadkar, C.J., observed in Lala Shri Bhagwan and Another v. Shri Ram Chand and Another (AIR 1965 SC 1767).
It is hardly necessary to emphasis that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice
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to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety.”
(iv) In Lily Thomas v. Union of India , reported in (2000) 6 SCC 244, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reiterated the principle that rulings of Larger Bench should be followed and those of Coordinate Bench of equal strength not to be different from and most be followed.
(v) In Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Ors. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Ors. [(2003) 5 SCC 480], the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering a threeJudge Bench decision in State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1494), held thus:
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“13. Before parting with the case we would like to point out one disturbing feature which has been brought to our notice. On 13.12.2001 a Division Bench dismissed an application containing identical prayers. Even before the ink was dry on the judgment, by the impugned judgment, another division Bench took a diametrically opposite view. It is not that the earlier decision was not brought to the notice of the subsequent Division Bench hearing the subsequent applications. In fact, a reference has been made by the submissions made by the Commission where this decision was highlighted. Unfortunately, the Division Bench hearing the subsequent applications did not even refer to the conclusions arrived at by the earlier Division Bench. The earlier decision of the Division Bench is binding on a Bench of coordinate strength. If the Bench hearing matters subsequently entertains any doubt about the correctness of the earlier decision, the only course open to it is to refer the matter to a larger Bench.
14. xx xx xxx
(vi) In Jayaswals Neco Limited v. Commissioner Of Central Excise, Nagpur , [(2007) 13 SCC 807], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
“10. Assuming even if it were to disagree with the test laid down in Hindustan Gas and Industries case! in order to maintain the judicial propriety in decision-making, the Tribunal ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench, which it did not do. ........................................”
(emphasis supplied)
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(vii) In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has criticized the decisions of Coordinate Benches, which have not followed the earlier judgments by another Coordinate Bench. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and others, [(2008) 10 SCC 1], wherein at paragraph Nos.90 and 91, held thus:-
"90. We are distressed to note that despite several pronouncements on the subject, there is substantial increase in the number of cases involving violation of the basics of judicial discipline. The learned Single Judges and Benches of the High Courts refuse to follow and accept the verdict and law laid down by coordinate and even larger Benches by citing minor differences in the facts as the ground for doing so. Therefore, it has become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have grave impact on the credibility of judicial institutions and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty is an important hallmark of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country in the last six decades and increase in the frequency of conflicting judgments of the superior judiciary will do incalculable harm to the system inasmuch as the courts at the grass roots will not be able to decide as to which of the judgments lay down the correct law and which one should be followed.
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and rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law.”
(viii) Judicial discipline envisages that a coordinate Bench follow the decision of an earlier coordinate Bench. If a coordinate Bench does not agree with the principles of law enunciated by another Bench, the matter may be referred only to a larger Bench. [See Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 01 , at paras 6 and 7; followed in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, reported in (2002) 7 SCC 01, at para 2.] But, no decision can be arrived at contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the coordinate Bench. Kalyani Stores, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1686 and K.K. Narula, reported in AIR 1967 SC 1368 , both have been rendered by the Constitution Benches. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be thrown out for any purpose whatsoever; more so when both of them if applied collectively lead to a contrary decision proposed by the majority.
(ix) In Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Ors. v. G. Jayarama Reddy and Ors . [(2011) 10 SCC 608], the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“34. That apart, we find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to approve the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge in dealing with Writ Petition Nos. 2379 and 2380 of 1993 filed by the brothers of Respondent No. 1. He distinguished the judgments of the Division Bench in Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (ILR 1991 KAR 3556) and Smt. H.N. Lakshmamma and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (Writ Appeal No.2605 of 1991 decided on 3.10.1991) without any real distinction and did
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not adhere to the basic postulate of judicial discipline that a Single Bench is bound by the judgment of the Division Bench. Not only this, the learned Single Judge omitted to consider an order dated 3.10.1991 passed in Writ Petition Nos. 19812 to 19816 of 1990. Annaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors . (Writ Petition Nos.19812 to 19816 of 1990 decided on 3.10.1991) in which the same Division Bench had quashed notifications dated 28.12.1981 and 16.4.1983 in their entirety.
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produced in complete form alone can be treated as a certificate. In such a view of the matter, it cannot be said that the respondents have committed a mistake.
(i) In Union of India (UOI) v. Mohan Singh and Ors. reported in 1996 (6) SCALE 783, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:
“4. This Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1990 CriLJ 2148] had held, as regards the sufficiency of the proof, that the Scheme itself mentions the documents which are required to be produced before the Government. It is not possible for this Court to scrutinize the documents which according to the petitioners they had produced in support of their claim, and pronounce upon their genuineness. It is the function of the Government to do so. We would, therefore, direct accordingly.”
(ii) In Union of India v. Bikash R. Bhowmik and Ors.
W. A. No. 1663 of 2020
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reported in (2004) 7 SCC 722, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
“Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India relied upon two decisions of this Court viz., Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India [1990 CriLJ 2148] and Union of India v. Mohan Singh (cited supra) to the effect that pension could be sanctioned only as per proof as required in the Pension Scheme and in no other manner. We think there is great force in the submission made by the learned Additional Solicitor General. We find that the High Court could not have travelled beyond the Pension Scheme to find that there was substantial compliance with the prerequisites as to suffering of imprisonment. In order to get the benefit of the Pension Scheme, the proof required must be as provided in the Pension Scheme itself. As long as such proof was not available, the benefit could not have been granted. Therefore, we set aside the order by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by Respondent 1. The appeal is allowed accordingly.”
(iii) In Union of India (UOI) v. K. Indrasena Reddy and Ors. reported in (2007) 14 SCC 305, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
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W. A. No. 1663 of 2020
that the concerned person on account of his participation in the freedom struggle, had to remain underground for more than six months. However, the same would be subject to the conditions laid down therein, namely,
25. Giving due consideration to the pleadings and material
on record, we are of the view that the appellant has not made out a case for interference with the impugned judgment.
In the light of the above, this writ appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-
S. MANIKUMAR CHIEF JUSTICE
Sd/-
SHAJI P. CHALY JUDGE
Eb
///TRUE COPY/// P. A. TO JUDGE
2 issues framed by the court
Could dependent family pension be granted on co-prisoner certificates that did not satisfy the Central Scheme's evidentiary requirements?
Was the Division Bench bound by the earlier coordinate Bench decision governing eligibility to certify imprisonment?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas Keshavji GandhiRelied on¶147
AIR 1962 Guj 128 · Who else cites this
Sundaradas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, ThaneRelied on¶157
AIR 1991 SC 1893 · Who else cites this
S.I.P. Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd. v. ArputharajRelied on¶162
[(1991) 469 MLJ 1]
CIT v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd.Relied on¶164
[(1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bombay)]
Farooq Mohammad v. State of M.P.Relied on¶177
[AIR 2016 MP 10 (FB)] · Who else cites this
Union of India v. Subhadra and OthersFollowed¶179
2016 (2) KLT 1
Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of MaharashtraRelied on¶180
[(1977) 3 SCC 25] · Who else cites this
State of Tripura v. Tripura Bar Association and Ors.Relied on¶184
[(1998) 5 SCC 637] · Who else cites this
S.I. Rooplal and Ors. v. Lt. Governor Through Chief Secretary, Delhi and Ors.Relied on¶186
[(2000) 1 SCC 644] · Who else cites this
Lily Thomas v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶199
(2000) 6 SCC 244 · Who else cites this
Rajasthan Public Service Commission and Ors. v. Harish Kumar Purohit and Ors.Relied on¶200
[(2003) 5 SCC 480] · Who else cites this
Jayaswals Neco Limited v. Commissioner Of Central Excise, NagpurRelied on¶206
[(2007) 13 SCC 807] · Who else cites this
Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and othersRelied on¶211
[(2008) 10 SCC 1] · Who else cites this
Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra PatnaikRelied on¶217
(2003) 7 SCC 01 · Who else cites this
Union of India v. Hansoli DeviRelied on¶217
(2002) 7 SCC 01 · Who else cites this
Kalyani StoresReferred¶217
AIR 1966 SC 1686 · Who else cites this
K.K. NarulaReferred¶217
AIR 1967 SC 1368 · Who else cites this
Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Ors. v. G. Jayarama Reddy and OrsRelied on¶218
[(2011) 10 SCC 608] · Who else cites this
Union of India (UOI) v. Mohan Singh and Ors.Relied on¶231
1996 (6) SCALE 783
Union of India v. Bikash R. Bhowmik and Ors.Relied on¶233
(2004) 7 SCC 722 · Who else cites this
Union of India (UOI) v. K. Indrasena Reddy and Ors.Relied on¶238
(2007) 14 SCC 305 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
NARAYANI KRISHNAN
THE UNION OF INDIA
THE STATE OF KERALA
S. MANIKUMAR
SHAJI P. CHALY
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
