16. If one reads Section 473 Cr.P.C. carefully, it can be seen that condonation of delay by the court should precede the taking of cognizance. In other words, after taking cognizance of an offence, which is barred under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the court cannot retrace its steps and condone the delay at a post cognizance stage. In the instant case, there is no dispute that there was no speaking order by the trial Judge under Section 473 Cr.P.C. condoning delay in taking cognizance for offences under S. 465 and S.471 I.P.C. As mentioned earlier, the trial Judge is not legally competent to condone the delay in taking cognizance in respect of offences under S. 465 and S.471 I.P.C. after taking cognizance of all the offences, including the above mentioned offences. The learned trial Judge before taking cognizance must have applied his mind as required under S. 473 Cr.P.C. and should have condoned the delay in respect of offences under S. 465 and S.471 I.P.C. It is also indisputable that there should have been a speaking order for condoning delay before taking cognizance. Non-compliance of the mandatory requirements certainly makes the cognizance bad in law. An option available for the trial Judge was to leave alone the offences under S.465 and S.471 I.P.C. and take cognizance for other offences which were not barred by the provisions of S. 468(2) Cr.P.C. But that will surely affect the strength of the prosecution case in view of the fact situation in this case. As stated above, the learned trial Judge without any application of judicial mind took cognizance of all the offences, including the time barred ones, and permitted the prosecution to adduce evidence on all the charges, causing serious prejudice to the appellant, because the essential ingredients for attracting the barred offences and other offences are identical.”
