A medicine supplier challenged three-year blacklisting for concealing prior debarment. The court upheld the blacklisting as proportionate, rejected the challenge to tender conditions knowingly accepted, and dismissed the writ appeal.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
' CR'
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY
WEDNESDAY, THE 04TH DAY OF MARCH 2020 / 14TH PHALGUNA, 1941
WA.No.2462 OF 2019
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 19.12.2018 IN WP(C) 30910/2018(K) OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANT/PETITIONER:
CENTURION LABORATORIES
(DIVISION OF CENTURION REMEDIES PVT.LTD.), PLOT NO.G/5, G/6 AND F/19, BIDC, GORWA, VADODARA, GUJARAT, PIN-390 016, REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR, MAHIPAT A.PATEL.
BY ADVS. SRI.P.CHANDRASEKHAR SRI.K.K.MOHAMED RAVUF SRI.D.SREEKANTH SHRI. ANOOP KRISHNA
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
R2 BY ADV. SRI.M.AJAY,STANDING COUNSEL
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 04.03.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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'CR'
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Dated this the 4th day of March, 2020.
JUDGMENT
SHAJI P. CHALY, J
This writ appeal is filed by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 30910 of 2018 challenging the judgment dated 19.12.2018, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition, thus upholding the order passed by the Medical Corporation of India blacklisting the appellant on account of the suppression of material facts while submitting the contract in the instant case, which was affirmed by the Government in an appeal preferred by the appellant.
Appellant, a pharmaceutical company, submitted its tender for the supply of pharmaceutical drugs to the second respondent. Kerala Medical Services Corporation Ltd. (KMSCL) i.e., the second respondent blacklisted the appellant for the reason that Gujarat Medical Services Corporation (GMSCL) and Haryana Medical Services Corporation (HMSCL) had debarred the appellant from participating in their tenders for three years. GMSCL passed a
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debarring order for the reason that the information given by the appellant in respect of one of the drugs for which the appellant had submitted tender was not in terms of the notice inviting tender. Appellant has a case that it had not produced any forged/fabricated/false documents. However, the said mistake was an inadvertent one. So also, according to the appellant, in the impugned order passed by the Medical Corporation of India, proper reasons are not assigned so as to understand the case put forth against the appellant which prevented the appellant from making appropriate objections to the same. Eventhough the said aspect was pointed out before the State Government, the State Government also overlooked the said contention put forth by the appellant. The learned single Judge, without taking into account the said submission made in the writ petition, has arrived at the conclusion that the orders passed by the KMSCL and the State Government were in accordance with law and therefore, no interference as sought for by the appellant was required. It is also submitted that eventhough the appellant has put forth the contentions before the learned single Judge in respect of the proportionality principle on the basis of the blacklisting awarded against the appellant for a period of three years, the learned single
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Judge has not answered the said question, even though a reference in regard to the contention was made in the judgment. It is thus, raising the following grounds that this writ appeal is preferred:
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case.
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account respective submissions, has concluded the judgment as follows:
“5.2.7. Tender should not be submitted for the product/products which has/have been blacklisted by KMSCL during the period of blacklisting. Tender should not be submitted for the product/products which has/have been blacklisted/debarred by any other State/Central Government's organization for reason of quality non compliances, GMP non-compliances, major violations of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and Rules. Concern/Company which has been blacklisted by Tender Inviting Authority for any reasons or blacklisted/debarred by any State Government or Central Government Organization for the above reasons or for reason of furnishing forged/fabricated/false document should not participate in the tender during the period of blacklisting/debarring. Where a product(s)/supplier is blacklisted in any other state or by a Central Government agency for situations as detailed above occur after the submission/opening of the bid/award of contract, the product(s)/bidder will be liable for blacklisting/ rejection/termination/ cancellation of contract/purchase order/LO1 etc. The product(s)/bidder will be liable for such action in the event of any conviction/initiation of prosecution action under the Drug and Cosmetics Act at any stage after submission/opening of bid.”
Clause 6.34.1.2 further provides as follows:
“6.34.1.2. Without prejudice to the provision of Clause 2.1.10 of this Tender Document “Fraudulent practice” means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement
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process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the Tender Inviting Auithority, and includes collusive practice among bidders (prior to or after tender submission) designed to establish tender prices at artificial non-competitive levels and to deprive the Tender Inviting Authority of the benefits of free and open competition. Suppression of facts such as blacklisting of the product/bidder elsewhere for reason of failure in quality/conviction under Drugs and Cosmetics Act/submission of fake document will be deemed as fraudulent practices. Making false/incorrect statement will also be treated as fraudulent practice.”
“2.1.10. Blacklisting/debarring - the event occurring by the operation of the conditions under which the bidders will be prevented from participating in the future bids of
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Tender Inviting Authority for a period up to 3 years, the period being decided on the basis of number/nature of violations in the tender conditions and the loss/hardship caused/likely to be caused to the Tender Inviting Authority on account of such violations, generally relating to supply of substandard, misbranded, adulterated or spurious or any drugs/products manufactured/imported in contravention of any of the laws of the land and for indulging fraudulent practices or having indulged in fraudulent practices at the time of making the bid or at any time during the validity of the tender or the contract thereof. The term will include, among all other things, making false/misleading declarations statements, presenting false/misleading/fabricated/forged document(s), trying to influence/affect/stall the tender/procurement/payment processes in any way, making false/baseless complaints about other bidders or bids or products or any person/organisation/related to the tender activities etc and such activities as specified in this Tender Document. Blacklisting/debarring etc by other State/Central Government departments/agencies shall also be ground for blacklisting by the TIA.”
It is stated that a declaration also sought for in the form of an affidavit that the petitioner does not suffer from any disqualification to participate in the tender including blacklisting.
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petitioner that the products for which the debarring was effected by the other Medical Services Corporations were different cannot make any difference, since the petitioner concern itself had been debarred by the said Medical Services Corporations and this fact was willfully suppressed by the petitioner while submitting it's tender. The petitioner's contention as to the proportionality of the debarring is also not sustainable, in view of the undertaking given in affidavit by the petitioner that they suffered no disqualifications.
In the above view of the matter, the prayers sought for cannot be granted. The writ petitions fail and are dismissed.”
the Bar and we are of the opinion that learned single Judge has taken into account the relevant provisions of the notice inviting tender in the instant case and has arrived at the conclusions. As per clause 2.1.10 quoted in the judgment, it is clear that if any blacklisting or debarring was done by other State/Central Government departments/agencies, the same shall also be a ground for blacklisting by the tender inviting authority. Admittedly, the appellant has not disclosed about the blacklisting done by the GMSCL. It was, thereupon, that the blacklisting order was passed by the KMSCL. Eventhough learned counsel for the appellant has put forth a contention that GMSCL has only debarred the appellant from participating in the tender, KMSCL
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has blacklisted the appellant, which, in turn, interferes with the proportionality principle laid down in various judgments of the Apex Court. It is true that eventhough the learned single Judge has taken note of such a contention raised by the appellant while dismissing the writ petition, the question raised so was not answered by the learned single Judge . However, from the counter affidavit filed by the KMSCL, it is quite clear and evident that the appellant was debarred/blacklisted by Gujarat Medical Services Corporation Ltd. (GMSCL) from, 02.09.2016 - 01.09.2019; Haryana Medical Services Corporation Ltd. (HMSCL) 28.12.2016 - 27.12.2019; Central Medical Service Society (CMSS) 23.02.201822,02,2020; and Rajasthan Medical Services Corporation Ltd. (RMSCL) 31.01.2018-30.01.2021. The contention so raised in the counter affidavit is relevant to context, and paragraph 19 reads thus:
Still further it is seen on a scrutiny of the websites of some other Medical Services Corporations that the petitioner is not only debarred by the GMSCL and the HMSCL, but has also seen disqualified by the Central Medical Service Society (CMSS) under the Central Government and the Rajasthan Medical Services Corporation Limited (RMSCL) for the periods 23.02.2018 to 22.02.2020 and 31.1.2018 to 30.01.2021 respectively. A table showing the debarment/blacklisting against the petitioner Company to the knowledge of the petitioner is as follows:
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| Agency | Period of debarment/ blacklisting |
Reason for debarment/ blacklisted |
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Gujarat Medical Corporation (GMSCL) |
Services Ltd. |
02.09.2016 - 01.09.2019 | Submission of wrong and fraudulent data/documents |
| Haryana Medical Corporation (HMSCL) |
Services Ltd. |
28.12.2016 - 27.12.2019 | False, fake, fabricated and fraudulent documents |
| Central Medical Society (CMSS) |
Service | 23.02.2018-22,02,2020 | Forge document/Information submitted in tender |
| Rajasthan Services Corporat (RMSCL) |
Medical ion Ltd. |
31.01.2018-30.01.2021 | Submission of false document |
It is therefore clear that the petitioner is persistent, repetitive practitioner of fraud and misrepresentation not only before the KMSCL but before other Government agencies across the country. The petitioner is thus unworthy of the trust KMSCL expects from its suppliers since the products tendered for are often life saving medicines. From the forgoing circumstances it is clear that the writ petition is devoid of merits, is unsustainable in law and on facts and deserves to be dismissed with costs to the answering respondent and it is so humbly prayed in the interests of justice in this case.”
blacklisting order upto this date may be treated as the
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punishment, and the appellant may be permitted to participate in the future tenders conducted by the KMSCL. Since the appellant has raised the question of proportionality principle, we deem it appropriate to discuss some of the relevant judgments of the Apex Court in that regard.
of West Bengal and Another [(1975) 1 SCC 70], paragraphs 15, 16 & 17 read thus:
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against the petitioners for alleged violation of provisions under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act.
8. In Kulja Industries Limited (M/s) v. Chief General
Manager, W.T. Proj.BSNL and Others [2014(14)SCC 731], it
is held in paragraphs 17, 25 & 26 thus:
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natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court.That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor whether the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court.
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respondent – corporation. Even so permanent debarment from future contracts for all times to come may sound too harsh and heavy a punishment to be considered reasonable especially when (a) the appellant is supplying bulk of its manufactured products to the respondent- BSNL and (b) The excess amount received by it has already been paid back.”
9. In Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors [(2017)13 SCC 621], it is held in paragraphs 24 to 27 thus:
“ 54 . … the proportionality of administrative action affecting the freedoms under Article 19(1) or Article 21 has been tested
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by the courts as a primary reviewing authority and not on the basis of Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles. It may be that the courts did not call this proportionality but it really was.”
This Court, thereafter took note of the fact that the Supreme Court of Israel recognised proportionality as a separate ground in administrative law to be different from unreasonableness.
27.This Court posed the question in Om Kumar case [ Om Kumar v. Union of India , (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] : (SCC p. 409, para 61)
“ 61 . When does the court apply, under Article 14, the proportionality test as a primary reviewing authority and when does the court apply the Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] rule as a secondary reviewing authority? From the earlier review of basic principles, the answer becomes simple. In fact, we have further guidance in this behalf.”
and concluded: (SCC pp. 410-11, paras 66-68)
“ 66 . It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the
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constitutional courts as primary reviewing courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator . Here the court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence, applying “proportionality” and is a primary reviewing authority.
67 . But where an administrative action is challenged as “arbitrary” under Article 14 on the basis of E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. [ E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. , (1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165] (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then is the Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] test. The courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken . If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council [ G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council , (1991) 3 SCC 91] (SCC at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ Tata Cellular v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 651] (SCC at pp. 67980), Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [ Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P)
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Ltd. v. Union of India , (1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] (SCC at pp. 691), Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [ Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India , (1989) 4 SCC 187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC at p. 241) and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. [ U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. , (1993) 2 SCC 299] (SCC at p. 307), while judging whether the administrative action is “arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] review always.
68 . Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury [ Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. , (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] principles applies.”
10. In Modern Dental College and Research Centre v.
State of M.P [(2016)7 SCC 353], it is held in paragraphs 63 to 65 thus:
“ 63. In this direction, the next question that arises is as to what criteria is to be adopted for a proper balance between the two facets viz. the rights and limitations imposed upon it by a statute. Here comes the concept of “ proportionality ”, which is a proper criterion. To put it pithily, when a law limits a constitutional right, such a limitation is constitutional if it is proportional. The law imposing restrictions will be treated as proportional if it is meant to achieve a proper purpose, and if the measures taken to
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achieve such a purpose are rationally connected to the purpose, and such measures are necessary. This essence of doctrine of proportionality is beautifully captured by Dickson, C.J. of Canada in R. v.O akes [ R. v. Oakes , (1986) 1 SCR 103 (Can SC)] , in the following words (at p. 138):
“To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures, responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be “of” sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional protected right or freedom … Second … the party invoking Section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves “a form of proportionality test…” Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be … rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means … should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question … Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”. The more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
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society and such an exercise involves the weighing up of competitive values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality i.e. balancing of different interests.
(1) The directive principles of State policy.
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(2) Restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general public.
(3) In order to judge the reasonableness of the restrictions, no abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down so as to be of universal application and the same will vary from case to case as also with regard to changing conditions, values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances.
(4) A just balance has to be struck between the restrictions imposed and the social control envisaged by Article 19(6).
(5) Prevailing social values as also social needs which are intended to be satisfied by the restrictions.
(6) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or reasonable connection between the restrictions imposed and the object sought to be achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions, and the object of the Act, then a strong presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise.”
House of Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Daly [(2001) 3 All ER 433]. Paragraphs 26 to 28 reads thus:
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particular the adaptation of that test in terms of heightened scrutiny in cases involving fundamental rights as formulated in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554E-G per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. There is a material difference between the Wednesbury and Smith grounds of review and the approach of proportionality applicable in respect of review where convention rights are at stake.
"whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective."
Clearly, these criteria are more precise and more sophisticated than the traditional grounds of review. What is the difference for the disposal of concrete cases? Academic public lawyers have in remarkably similar terms elucidated the difference between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach: see Professor Jeffrey Jowell QC,"Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards Constitutional Judicial Review" [2000] PL 671; Craig, Administrative Law, 4th ed(1999) , 561563 ; Professor David Feldman,"Proportionality and the Human Rights Act 1998" , essay in The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (1999), pp 117, 127 et seq . The starting point is that there is an overlap between the traditional grounds of review and the approach of
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proportionality. Most cases would be decided in the same way whichever approach is adopted. But the intensity of review is somewhat greater under the proportionality approach. Making due allowance for important structural differences between various convention rights, which I do not propose to discuss, a few generalisations are perhaps permissible. I would mention three concrete differences without suggesting that my statement is exhaustive. First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny test developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 is not necessarily appropriate to the protection of human rights. It will be recalled that in Smith the Court of Appeal reluctantly felt compelled to reject a limitation on homosexuals in the army. The challenge based on article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to respect for private and family life) foundered on the threshold required even by the anxious scrutiny test. The European Court of Human Rights came to the opposite conclusion: Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. The court concluded, at p 543, para 138:
"the threshold at which the High Court and the Court of Appeal could find the Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference with the applicants' rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national
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security and public order aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of the court's analysis of complaints under article 8 of the Convention."
In other words, the intensity of the review, in similar cases, is guaranteed by the twin requirements that the limitation of the right was necessary in a democratic society, in the sense of meeting a pressing social need, and the question whether the interference was really proportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued.
28 . The differences in approach between the traditional grounds of review and the proportionality approach may therefore sometimes yield different results. It is therefore important that cases involving convention rights must be analysed in the correct way. This does not mean that there has been a shift to merits review. On the contrary, as Professor Jowell [2000] PL 671, 681 has pointed out the respective roles of judges and administrators are fundamentally distinct and will remain so. To this extent the general tenor of the observations in Mahmood [2001] 1 WLR 840 are correct. And Laws LJ rightly emphasised in Mahmood, at p 847, para 18, "that the intensity of review in a public law case will depend on the subject matter in hand". That is so even in cases involving Convention rights. In law context is everything.”
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19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. True, the doctrine of proportionality is a vital feature and indispensable component of the several of the fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution. At the same time, the said doctrine could not be applied unmindful of the salutary principles evolved, basing on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In a situation like the one on hand, we have to bear in mind the rationality, reasonableness, absence of bias, fairness, gravity of the incident, nexus with the object sought to be achieved, the nature of offensive act, public policy, antecedent performance and conduct etc. etc. Therefore, taking into account the conduct of the appellant as is discussed above, it is a company indulged in successive misrepresentation and fraudulent acts while submitting the tender in the matter of supply of the medical products. Reckoning the facts and figures available on record, we are constrained to hold that the appellant submitted the contract without disclosing the requirements as is necessitated in the notice inviting tender. Therefore, the conduct of the appellant was lacking transparency and discipline, leading to suppression of a material aspect and thereby indulging itself in immoral activities disabling the authority to take a decision applying the principles of
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fair play and justice. That apart, the Kerala State Medical Services Corporation is a company owned by the State of Kerala involved in supplying medicines to the Government Hospitals and other allied institutions managed and controlled by the State Government and the people depending on such medical institutions are poor sections of the community, and taking into account the said aspect, it cannot be said that the action of the Corporation blacklisting the appellant for a period of 3 years is disproportionate to the gravity of the mischief or the mal practice employed by the appellant. To view the circumstances in a different angle, such an action was taken by the Corporation with the intention of protecting the larger public interest and welfare of the ordinary, poor and needy people of the community, to avoid any adverse circumstances affecting the interest of the Corporation and also as a deterrent and punitive measure to prevent such conduct in future. Therefore, in our view, no leniency can be extended so far as the supply of medicine is concerned and it should be ensured that it is done by the Contractor in a systematic, transparent and disciplined manner.
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legal infirmity in the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge, justifying interference in an intra-court appeal filed under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act.
Resultantly, writ appeal fails, accordingly it is dismissed.
sd/- S. MANIKUMAR, CHIEF JUSTICE.
sd/- SHAJI P. CHALY, JUDGE.
Rv
3 issues framed by the court
Was blacklisting justified under the tender conditions for suppressing debarment by another government agency?
Was three-year blacklisting disproportionate to the supplier's misconduct?
Could the supplier challenge tender conditions after participating with knowledge of their consequences?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Erusaian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd v. State of West Bengal and AnotherRelied on¶85
[(1975) 1 SCC 70] · Who else cites this
Kulja Industries Limited (M/s) v. Chief General Manager, W.T. Proj.BSNL and OthersRelied on¶93
[2014(14)SCC 731] · Who else cites this
Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and OrsRelied on¶105
[(2017)13 SCC 621] · Who else cites this
Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of M.PRelied on¶127
[(2016)7 SCC 353] · Who else cites this
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte DalyRelied on¶148
[(2001) 3 All ER 433]
2 provisions across 2 enactments
CENTURION LABORATORIES (DIVISION OF CENTURION REMEDIES PVT.LTD.)
THE STATE OF KERALA
THE KERALA MEDICAL SERVICES CORPORATION LIMITED
S.MANIKUMAR
SHAJI P.CHALY
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
