facie this Court is of the view that the request of the petitioner to furnish immovable property in compliance with the depositing 40% is untenable and therefore cannot be considered much less a direction could be issued to respondents to receive immovable property security towards compliance with 40% condition imposed in the conditional stay order. The other objection that the 40% condition is also onerous is not fully correct. The appellate authority to the extent required, as it appears from Ext.P4 examined the case and exercised of the discretion. In normal circumstances this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 may not interdict the orders passed by exercising discretion and power of the authority, unless the admissible legal grounds are made out in this behalf. However, in the case on hand, no special reason is assigned for 40% deposit and instead of 20% of demand which is a norm mostly looked at pending appeal. Though this Court shall not be understood as substituting its discretion for the power already exercised in the 1st respondent, to meet the ends of justice and in the circumstances of