under Order IX Rule 13 to its fullest extent. This was a conscious election that they exercised. The question, therefore, is whether, after exercising such an election, they would be justified in turning around and saying that their application to condone the delay in filing an appeal under Section 96 should be allowed because they were prosecuting an alternative remedy under Order IX Rule 13. To exacerbate the issue in this particular case, there are at least two periods of time, namely 122 and 108 days, which the court below and this Court have respectively found, in their orders, to be insufficiently explained holding that condonation of those periods of delay cannot be ordered because they are not believable. Obviously, since the period of 1433 days involved in this appeal includes those periods also, we will have to tread continuously in considering if these two spells should now be condoned. Of course, the appellants cannot explain the two spells of delay in a different manner; that being impermissible and impossible. They can only have the same explanation for the delay of 122 and 108 days respectively, as was offered by them earlier, which the court below and this
