is true, passed in June 1957, and liability to pay compensation arises in respect of all undertakings closed on or after November 28, 1956. But, if liability to pay compensation is not a condition precedent to closure, by failing to discharge the liability to pay compensation and wages in lieu of notice, the employer does not contravene Section 25-FFF(1). A statute may prohibit or command an act and in either case, disobedience thereof will amount to contravention of the statute. If the statute fixes criminal liability for contravention of the prohibition or the command which is made applicable to transactions which have taken place before the date of its enactment the protection of Article 20(1) may be attracted. But Section 25-FFF (1) imposes neither a prohibition nor a command. Under Section 25-F, there is a distinct prohibition against an employer against retrenching employees without fulfilling certain conditions. Similar prohibitions are found in Sections 22 and 23 of the Act. If this prohibition is infringed, evidently, criminal liability may arise. But there being no prohibition against closure of business without payment of compensation, Section 31(2) does not apply. By Section 33(c) liability to pay compensation may be enforced by coercive process, but that again does not amount to infringement of Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Undoubtedly for failure to discharge liability to pay