whether high or low, has the same protection. The principle behind the Act is the same that it is in public interest that a person holding a judicial office should be in a position to discharge his functions with independence and without fear of consequences. The act came up for construction before the Supreme Court in Anwar Hussain v. Ajay Kumar (AIR 1965 SC 1651) and the following propositions follow from that case: (1) If an act done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in the discharge of his judicial duties is within the limits of his jurisdiction, he is protected whether or not he has discharged those duties erroneously, irregularly, or even illegally, or without believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do the act complained of; (2) If such an act is without the limits of the officers jurisdiction, he is protected if, at the time of doing or ordering it, he, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to order it; (3) The expression “jurisdiction” in S.1 of the Act does not mean the power to do or order the act impugned, but generally the authority of the judicial officer to act in the matter; (4) The Act protects a judicial officer only when he is acting in his judicial capacity and not in any other capacity; and (5) if a judicial officer arrests a person 'recklessly and maliciously' not in discharge of the duties of his office as a Magistrate but on the ground that he acted under the direction of his superior officer, he can be said to be acting in an executive capacity and not in a judicial capacity and therefore, he is not protected under the Act.