established or any other Church en bloc, but if the voluntary association has adopted rules which differ materially from those of what may be called the parent body, the members of that association will not be members of the parent Church, but will be an independent organization with their own rules. It seems to us that the appellant in this case is in a dilemma. If his Church is part and parcel of the Universal Catholic Church, as apparently he wishes it to be regarded, he must be assumed to be governed by the law of the Church in the Canon Law, and if that be so, it is clear that the control of the temporalities vested in the Bishop, since the Canon Law recognized no distinction between the spiritual and temporal powers of the Papacy and its local representatives the episcopate. If this Church is to be regarded as an independent voluntary association, which, while adopting in the main the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, has yet enacted certain rules contrary to the rules of the Catholic Church in matters of discipline and management, then those rules must be proved in the same way that a custom would have to be proved in a Court of Law. Questions of custom may often in the end become questions of law, as in the familiar instances where the Courts have to say whether a custom is reasonable, is legal or is not inconsistent with the terms, e.g., of some document such as a contract. But at the outset they must necessarily be questions of fact. You must first prove that the thing is done before you can go on to inquire whether it legally may be done. Looking at the case from this point of view, it seems sufficient to say that the learned Judge has found that the evidence put forward has failed to support the contention that the junta has established a recognized custom as holding in its hands the appointment of a moktessor. He has found as a fact that such appointments as they have made have been merely permissive as a matter of convenience and that
