Partly allowed

Majeed v. C.I. of Police

Kerala HC7 Mar 2013CRL.A/2132/2003

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court upheld convictions for rape and abducting a minor but modified sentencing for the second accused. The Court held that delay in FIR was explained by trauma and accepted uncorroborated victim evidence supported by conduct, finding luring via deceit fulfilled Section 366.

What did the court decide?

Conviction upheld for both; sentence modified for Appellant 2 to one month simple imprisonment and fine; Appellant 1's appeal dismissed.

Majeed Vs C.I. of Police — Child Sexual Offences (POCSO) | Kerala HC (2013)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

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PRESENT:

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THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN

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THURSDAY, THE 7TH DAY OF MARCH 2013/16TH PHALGUNA 1934

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CRL.A.No. 2132 of 2003 ( )

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--------------------------SC.NO.351/2000 of ADDL.SESSIONS COURT, FAST TRACK COURT-11 (ADHOC), THRISSUR

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--------------------------------

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APPELLANT(S)/ACCUSED 1:

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MAJEED, S/O.KUNJUMOIDEEN, YAKKERI HOUSE, VELLIKULANGARA VILLAGE, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK.

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BY ADV. SRI.P.K.ANIL

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RESPONDENT(S)/COMPLAINANT & STATE:

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1. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, MALA

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2. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,

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HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM.

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BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI.ROY THOMAS

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THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 07-03-2013,ALONG WITH CRA.NO.118 OF 2004, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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sts

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P.BHAVADASAN, J.

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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Crl.A. Nos. 2132 of 2003 & 118 of 2004

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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Dated this the 07^th day of March, 2013

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J U D G M E N T

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Two persons were prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376 read with 34 of IPC. Both of them were found guilty for the said offences. The first accused among them was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- in default of payment of which he had to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC . He was also convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 366 of IPC. The second accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year on each count under Sections 376 and 366 of IPC respectively. In both cases, the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Set of as per law was allowed.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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PW1 is the victim in this case. The incident is said to have taken place on 04.08.1999 at about 10.00 am. PW2 is the mother of PW1. On the date of incident, PW1 who was in the house of the sister of PW2, started her journey for her house. By about 10.00 am on the said date, the son of brother of PW2 and her sister's son came to her house. PW2 then enquired why they did not bring PW1 along with them. They said that they had to go to Ernakulam and other places and therefore they left early and they were given to understand that PW1 would be accompanied to a bus by someone from the house of sister of PW2. PW2 immediately contacted her sister and enquired about her daughter and she was given to understand that at 9.30 am., PW1 had mounted a bus. Since PW1 did not turn up by 12.00 in the noon, PW2 informed others and they made a search for PW1. By about 5.00 PM in the evening, PW1 returned home. When she was asked for the delay, she replied that while she was waiting for a bus at Chalakkudy to Vellikulangara

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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she happened to meet the accused persons who were familiar and they told her that the bus which was going to Vellikulangara was not plying on the said day and they were going to Vellikulangara and she could join them and they would drop her. Believing their words, she mounted the jeep. She then narrated the incident when she was ravished by the first accused while the second accused was driving the jeep in which she had travelled.

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The records indicate that on 05.08.1999, a complaint was filed before the Superintendent of Police regarding the incident which is not produced by the prosecution in this case. But the evidence discloses that as authorized by the Superintendent of Police, the Circle Inspector of Police concerned conducted a mediation talk in which the first accused agreed to marry the victim and the marriage was fixed on 15.08.1999. PW2 and her relatives went to the Mosque for the marriage. But the first accused deserted them. Unable to bear the agony it seems that PW1

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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consumed poison and tried to commit suicide. But she fortunately survived. Later on 21.09.1999, PW2 laid Ext.P1, First Information Statement before Chalakkudy Police Station. PW13, the Sub Inspector of Police recorded Ext.P1, First Information Statement furnished by PW1 and he registered crime as per Ext.P1(a) FIR. PW15 took over investigation. He prepared Ext.P2, scene mahazar and seized MOs 1 to 4 as per Ext.P12 mahazar. He had the jeep in which the victim travelled seized as per Ext.P3 mahazar. He sent a report to the court indicating that the offence under Section 366 is also made out. The clothes worn by the accused were seized as per Ext.P5 mahazar and he also seized the trip sheet of the jeep as per Ext.P6 mahazar. He had the victim examined by PW9, the doctor who issued Ext.P7 certificate. He had the accused subjected to potency test and obtained Ext.P13 certificates. He recorded statements of witnesses, completed investigation and laid charge before the court.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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The JFCM Court, Chalakkudy before whom the final report was laid, took cognizance of the offence. On finding that the offences are exclusively triable by a court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court, Thrissur. The said court made over the case to Additional Sessions Court, Fast Track-II, (Adhoc Court), Thrissur for trial and disposal. The said court on receipt of records and on appearance of the accused, framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of IPC. To the charge, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The prosecution therefore had PWs 1 to 15 examined and Exts. P1 to P14 marked. MOs 1 to 7 were got identified and marked. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. They denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against them and maintained that they were innocent.

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The first accused stated that he belonged to

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Vellikulangara and that PW1 and her family were residing in Puramboke and that people of that locality did not have good opinion about them. He claimed that there was proposal from PW2 to marry PW1 but that was not to the liking of members of his family and so it did not come through. Therefore they nursed a grudge against him. He would further say that under the influence of PW3, a false case has been foisted on him. The second accused maintained that he was only an autorikshaw driver and he did not know how to drive a jeep and he did not have a licence to drive a jeep. He denied the incident in toto. Finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of Cr.P.C., they were asked to enter on their defence. They chose to adduce no evidence. On a consideration of materials before it, the trial court came to the conclusion that the evidence of PW1 is sufficient and inspires the confident in the mind of court and the conviction

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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can be safely based on it. Accordingly, accused were found guilty and conviction and sentence as already mentioned followed. The said conviction and sentence are assailed in this appeal.

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The learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailed the findings of the court below on several grounds. The first among them is that even as admitted by the prosecution and as seen from the evidence, on 05.08.1999, i.e., on the next day of the incident, the complaint has been lodged with the Superintendent of Police of Thrissur. Materials available show that it was pursued by the Circle Inspector of Police under the instruction of Superintendent of Police and a compromise talk was held. Strangely enough, according to the learned counsel, for the reason best known to the prosecution, they chose not to produce the said document which is a vital document as far as the prosecution is concerned. The learned counsel pointed out that the prosecution has deliberately concealed that

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document, an adverse inference needs to be drawn against the prosecution. It was then pointed out that even going by the materials on record, on 15.08.1999, when the first accused did not turn up for marrying PW1, PW2 and her family members knew that he was not willing to marry PW1. No complaint was laid immediately thereafter. Even assuming that since PW1 had consumed poison and was hospitalized from 16.08.1999 onwards till 23.08.1999, there was no justification or any reason given for not filing the FIS immediately thereafter. It took them another one month to lodge the complaint for which no explanation is offered. This long delay in lodging the complaint shows the hollowness of the allegations made against the accused persons. It is significant to notice that it was not the victim who had lodged the complaint but it was her mother. If as a matter of fact, the incident had occurred as alleged by the prosecution, it would have been the victim who would have laid the complaint and it shows that she was shy to lay a

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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complaint as according to the learned counsel, she was not sure about the consequences. Attention was drawn to the evidence of PW15 and it was pointed out that surprisingly enough, he never bothered to enquire and find out whether any complaint as claimed by PWs 2 and 3 was filed before the Superintendent of Police and action taken in pursuance there to.

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The learned counsel also pointed out that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case at all nor does the evidence of PW9, the doctor who had examined the victim. It was also pointed out that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 are inconsistent and contradictory and no reliance could be placed on their evidence to come to the conclusion that the offences have been made out. In support of their contention that since the delay in lodging the FIS has not been explained, it should prove fatal to the prosecution, the learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in 2011 (6) SCC 394 and State of Andra Pradesh

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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v. M. Madhusudhan Rao [2008 (15) SCC 582] . It was

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also contended that a reading of evidence of PW1 it could be seen that the ingredients to attract Section 376 are not spoken to by her and in the absence of such a narration, the accused could not have been found guilty of the said offence. These vital aspects have been omitted to be noticed by the court below and the findings of the court below therefore cannot be sustained.

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The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand pointed out that there is no substance in the above contentions at all. An impartial consideration of the evidence of PWs 1 to 3 would clearly reveal that soon after the incident, the affected family members were taking all steps to salvage the situation and they were even willing to give PW1 in marriage to the first accused. He agreed to marry her and PW1 and her family members had made all arrangements for their marriage. But the first accused betrayed them. Unable to bear the agony, PW1 tried to

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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commit suicide. She was in the hospital for a brief period and after her discharge, a short while thereafter, the FIS has been laid. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the facts and circumstances of the case and as a result of the agony and trauma which the family members were facing at the relevant time if they deliberated upon before laying the FIS, they could not be found fault with. In such cases, delay does not assume much significance and for the said purpose, the learned Public Prosecutor relied on the decision reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manoj Kumar Pandey [2009 (1) SCC 72].

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The learned Public Prosecutor went on to point out that there is no reason to disbelieve PW1 and the contention that she has not spoken about the details of the act committed by the first accused is ridiculous. The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the victim does say that she has been raped that is sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 376 of the IPC. It is not necessary for the victim

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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to give a graphic description of what transpired at the relevant time. She had given evidence to the effect that in spite her stiff resistance, she had been over powered and the sexual assault was committed. It is not correct to say, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case. PW9, the doctor who had examined the victim and who had issued Ext.P7 does not rule out a case of sexual assault and more important the doctor has stated that there is nothing to show that the victim was used to sexual intercourse.

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The contention based on the non production of the so called complaint before the Superintendent of Police is also of no significance according to the learned Public Prosecutor. In fact, the conduct of the affected members show the anxiety on the part of the victim and the members of her family to some how salvage the situation and for which, they made all efforts. If, at the first instance itself, they did not rush to the Police Station with a complaint with

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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the intention of taking action against the accused persons, they could not be found fault with. It is pointed out that it is only natural for the family members to see how the issue could be settled without making it public. It was under those circumstances, the complaint was laid and mediation talks had taken place. The learned Public Prosecutor drew attention of this Court to the fact that the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 are clear to the effect that there was a compromise talk in which the first accused had agreed to marry the victim and the marriage was fixed almost and was due to take place on 15.08.1999. But the accused refrained from participating the marriage and the marriage fell through. That resulted in the unfortunate incident of PW1 consuming poison. Under these circumstances, the claim that there is delay should be entertained.

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The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that it is well settled by now that if the evidence of PW1, the victim is found to be cogent and convincing, nothing prevents the

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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court from basing a conviction on the strength of that evidence. The learned Public Prosecutor cautioned this Court that it is very rare that a maiden would take upon herself such a humiliation and it is inconceivable that in the normal circumstances she would make an allegation which only reminds her of the trauma undergone and stigma that sticks to her. There is nothing to suspect the evidence of PW1 which passes scrutiny, according to the learned Public Prosecutor. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 support the evidence of PW1, at least in certain respects. Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is no reason to disbelieve PW1 and the court below had chosen to accept her evidence and found the accused guilty. Unless the findings are shown to be perverse, the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that this Court will not be justified in interfering with the findings even assuming that a different view is possible. Accordingly, it is contended that the conviction and sentence are only to stand.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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As usual, the evidence regarding the actual incident is confined to the victim namely, PW1. PW2 is her mother and PW3 is her uncle. PW4 is the president of the Mahal Committee at the relevant time. The court below has discussed the evidence of these witnesses and had come to the finding that the evidence of PW1 is sufficient to inspire confident in the mind of court.

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As already stated, PW1 is the victim. On the date of incident she was returning from her mother's sister's house to her house at Vellikulangara. It so happened that she could not get a direct bus which would take her to Vellikulangara and so she had to come to Chalakkudy and take another bus. It was while waiting for the bus that the accused had come along in a jeep and offered her a lift to Vellikulangara. Bonafide believing them, she mounted the jeep. On the way, when she found that they had taken a deviation, she questioned the act. But the accused replied that there is a shorter route and they could reach

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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Vellikulangara taking that route also. Then, she would say that a short while thereafter, the jeep stopped at a vacant place. The second accused, the driver of the vehicle left the jeep and the first accused ravished her. She does say that when she tried to cry aloud, her mouth was closed by the first accused and she was made to lay on the floor of the jeep and the act was committed.

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In cross examination, she admitted that she had not given a complaint to any of the authorities but her mother had done so. She then speaks about the various attempts made by the family to tackle the issue. Of course, certain contradictions and omissions are brought out in her evidence which are not of significance. For example, it was brought to her notice that she had not told the police that she had mounted the jeep because there was no bus for her to go to Vellikulangara. She denied the said statement and pointed out that what she had told the police was that since the accused was familiar to her, she had mounted the jeep.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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She was unable to give the precise time that the jeep travelled to the place of incident and from there to Vellikulangara etc. These omissions and contradictions do not have any bearing on the issue involved in the case. As regards the actual assault, she had given cogent and convincing evidence.

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PW2 is the mother of PW1. She would say about the frantic search made for her daughter when she was told that her daughter had left the house of her sister at 9.30 AM in the morning and till noon her daughter had not reached home. PW1 stated about the incident to her and she laid a complaint to the Superintendent of Police etc. The suggestion to her that the said complaint did not contain an allegation regarding the act committed by the accused was denied. She then says about the various steps taken by her family to see if the grievance could be redressed and the honour of the family maintained. She then deposed about the act committed by the accused after promising to marry

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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her daughter. Of course, in her evidence also, there are

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minor inconsistencies and contradictions which as in the case of PW1, do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case.

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Then there is the evidence of PW3. He is none other than the uncle of the victim. He says when he came to know about the incident, in the evening on the same day, he met the first accused and talked to him. Then he says about the compromise talk in the presence of superintendent of Police.

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The accused would say that he is behind the whole issue. According to them, he is the political rival and using his political influence he had implicated the accused persons.

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It is too difficult to believe that he would make his niece a target to wreck vengeance against the accused persons and there is nothing to show that there was any reason for him to nurse a grudge against the accused

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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persons. A wild allegation is simply thrown that he is behind the whole issue. There is nothing to show that he had any ill motive to do so.

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In the decision reported in Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2011

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(6) SCC 394] it was held as follows:

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“9. We have examined the evidence in the light of the above principle. We first see that the first information report had been lodged after about 60 hours of the incident. The prosecution case is that PW1 accompanied by her parents had gone to Police Post Pathriya attached to Police Station Unarasital immediately after the incident but had found no police official present therein and had then gone to Police Station Sironj and lodged a report at 12 noon the next day. We find that the explanation for this delay is somewhat difficult to believe. A police post may have a few police officials posted in it, but Police Station Unarasital was a full-fledged police station which would invariably be manned. Moreover, even if no one was found in the police post on the first day at that particular point of time, the effort of the prosecutrix ought to have been to lodge a

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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report later at the Police Station Unarasital, but she chose to go to Police Station Sironj and recorded her statement and the investigation was thereafter referred to Police Station Unrasital.”

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In the decision reported in State of Andra Pradesh v.

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M. Madhusudhan Rao [2008 (15) SCC 582] , it was held as follows:

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“30. Time and again, the object and importance of prompt lodging of the first information report has been highlighted. Delay in lodging the first information report, more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of a coloured version, an exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained.

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In the present case, as noted supra, the first information report in regard to the alleged occurrence on 19.04.1996 was lodged on 22.05.1996. Admittedly, after her discharge from

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the hospital on 22.04.1996, the complainant went to her parents' house and resided there. In her testimony, the complainant has deposed that since no one from the family of the accused came to enquire about her welfare, she decided to lodge the first information report. No explanation worth the name for delay in filing the complaint with the police has come on record. We are of the opinion that this circumstance raises considerable doubt regarding the genuineness of the complaint and the veracity of the evidence of the complainant (PW 1) and her father (PW 3), rendering it unsafe to base the conviction of the respondent upon it. Resultantly, when the substratum of the evidence given by the complainant (PW 1) is found to be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be rejected in its entirety. ”

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It is true that in the above two cases, the delay in lodging FIS was considered to be fatal. But one has to refer to the facts of the said cases to understand the context in which it was held that the delay was fatal. There was no satisfactory explanation offered for the considerable delay in lodging the FIS.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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On the other hand, in the case on hand, the sequence of event speak for themselves. The family after coming to know about the humiliating act committed on PW1, made all efforts to save their honour and that was followed by the unfortunate incident of PW1 trying to commit suicide. Misfortune continued to fall on the family one after the another and they had to recover from that before they could decide to lay the first information statement.

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In the decision reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manoj Kumar Pandey [2009 (1) SCC 72],

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the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question of delay in such cases. It was held as follows:

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“No evidence was led to show such consent. Apart from that normal rule regarding the duty of the prosecution to explain the delay in lodging FIR and the lack of prejudice and/or prejudice caused because of such delayed lodging of FIR does not per se apply to cases of rape. This has been the consistent view of this Court. The High Court was,

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therefore, clearly wrong in disposing of the appeal in such a cryptic manner. In the circumstances of the case, we set aside the order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh hearing so that it can consider the matter and hear in detail and dispose of the same by a reasoned judgment. Whatever has been expressed by us supra is only for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the manner of disposal of the appeal is not proper. ”

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It could thus be seen that in fact, there is no straight jacket formula regarding the principles to be applied in assessing the consequence of delay in filing the FIS especially in cases of rape. It depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. View from that angle, when we analyse 0the evidence in this case, it could not be said that there is considerable delay in lodging the FIS.

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Considerable reliance was placed on the decision reported in Santhosh Madhavan v. Circle Inspector of Police [2008 (3) KHC 362] for the contention that even if the evidence of PW1 is accepted in toto, no offence under Section 376 is made out. Dilating on the above contention,

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the learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that the victim has not given a vivid description of what had transpired and she had only stated “®æK ÌÜÞr¢·¢ æºÏñá” which according to the learned counsel, is not sufficient in law.

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It is difficult to accept the above contention. The word “ÌÜÞr¢·¢” has a definite connotation in malayalam and it needs no explanation as to what one means by“®æK ÌÜÞr¢·¢ æºÏñá”. That is equivalent to saying that “I was raped”. It is not necessary for the victim to give a graphic description of what had transpired. One should remember that the experience which the victim had undergone was not a pleasant one and forcing her to re-narrate it in court, will be an additional insult to injury. The issue regarding penetration can be resolved by looking into medical evidence.

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Crl.A.Nos. 2132/2003 & 118/2004

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In the case on hand, it is not correct to say that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case. Neither the evidence of PW9 nor the certificates issued which is marked as Ext.P7 rule out the possibility of sexual assault. However, the doctor has stated that there is nothing to show that the victim had habitual sexual intercourse. It is true that the FSL report does not support the prosecution case but it has been held in several cases that merely because semen and spermatozoa are not detected in the cloths worn either by the victim or by the accused that by itself is not a ground to doubt the version given by the prosecutrix.

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The court below has considered the evidence of PW1 in considerable detail and this Court has independently considered the same. This Court also finds no reason to disbelieve the version given by the PW1 and it passes scrutiny and it is cogent and convincing enough. Her evidence, viewed in the light of subsequent conduct of the

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members of the family and in the light of the evidence of PWs 2 and 3, inspires confident in the mind of court. One should also notice that at the time of giving evidence, she was married and she had a child of 2 ½ years of age.

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This Court therefore finds no reason to differ from

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the view taken by the court below that the first accused had committed sexual assault on the victim.

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It was very vehemently contended that the offence under Section 366 is not attracted as the victim had gone along on her own volition. At the first blush, the argument may look very attractive. But on a closer scrutiny, it can be seen to be without basis. The reason for her to mount the jeep was that she was given to understand that the bus for which she was waiting for was not plying on that day and that the accused were going directly to Vellikulangara so that she could join them in the journey. She was unaware of the evil design of the accused persons who had other ideas in their mind. She therefore mounted

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the jeep. It is clear that her presence was procured in the

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jeep by deceitful means and if that be so, provisions under Section 365 is attracted and the offence under Section 366 is made out.

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It could therefore be seen that the first accused was aided by the second accused in the commission of sexual assault and that both of them are guilty of the offence under section 365 of IPC. The conviction was rightly entered into by the court below. Coming to the sentence, the first accused has been given only a minimum sentence for the offence under section 365 and sentence awarded to him for the offence under section 365 seems to be reasonable.

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It is submitted before this Court that the victim has since been married and leading a happy married life and also that the marriage of the second accused is to take place soon. The victim has filed an affidavit before this Court that she does not intend to continue with the proceedings as

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against the second accused and she has no objection in taking a lenient view in his case by this Court . The victim is also present in this Court today. On the basis of the above facts, Sri. Ranjith Thampan, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that some leniency may be shown regarding the sentence.

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It is true that the offence under Sections 366 and 376 are not compoundable and therefore Section 320 cannot be invoked. But there have been instances wherein in such cases the court has shown leniency regarding the sentence. (See Judgment in Baldev Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab [AIR 2011 SCC 1231] and unreported decision of Crl.R.P. 1571/2002 dt. 24.11.2011).

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After having given anxious consideration to the above submission and also after having gone through the decisions, it is felt that that it would be just and proper that some leniency be shown regarding the sentence imposed on A2 especially when more than a decade has elapsed and

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circumstances have changed considerably. Thus, while upholding the conviction of the second accused for the offences punishable Sections 366 and 376, the sentence awarded to him is set aside and he is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for one month on both counts and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- for each of the offences, in default of payment of which he shall suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of two months for each of the offences. Substantive sentences shall run concurrently. If the fine amount is realized, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- shall be paid to the victim as compensation.

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The appeal shall stand dismissed as far as A1 is concerned but partly allowed as far as A2 is concerned to the extent of modification of sentence as stated above.

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P.BHAVADASAN, JUDGE

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Majeed v. C.I. of Police

Case brief

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Majeed v. C.I. of Police

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