M/S. G.R.C. Infra Pvt. Ltd. Vs the State of Karnataka

M/S. G.R.C. INFRA PVT LTD HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.161/A, 7^TH CROSS, TEACHERS COLONY, 1^ST STAGE, KUMARSWAMY LAYOUT, BANGALORE - 560 078 REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, SRI. G.RAMANABABU, S/O SRI. G.V.MUNISWAMY NAIDU, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,

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...PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. G.V. SUDHAKAR., ADVOCATE)

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AND

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Digitally signed by SHWETHA RAGHAVENDRA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT VIKAS SOUDHA, DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BANGALORE - 560 001. REP BY ITS SECRETARY 2. THE COMMISSIONER BANGALORE BRUHAT BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE N.R.SQUARE BANGALORE - 560 002. 3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (LAND ACQUISITION AND TDR) BANGALORE BRUHAT BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE N.R.SQUARE, BANGALORE - 560 002. 4. THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER GOVINDARAJANAGAR SUB-DIVISION, BBMP OFFICE COMPLEX

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BANGALORE BRUHAT BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE

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4^TH MAIN ROAD, M.C.LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGARA

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BANGALORE - 560 040.

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THE BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY KUMARA PARK WEST, BANGALORE - 560 020

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REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER.

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…. RESPONDENTS

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(BY SMT. CHANDINI SINGH S., HCGP FOR R1; SRI. N.R. JAGADEESWARA., ADVOCATE FOR R2 TO R4; SRI. G. LAKSHMEESH RAO., ADVOCATE FOR R5)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION RESTRAINING THE R-2 AND 3 FROM LAYING/FORMING ROAD ON THE SCHEDULE B PROPERTY, WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE FOR ACQUISITION AS LAID DOWN BY THE KARNATAKA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1976 AND ETC.

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THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 26.02.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ

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CAV ORDER

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The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs:

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a. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Respondents No.2 and 3 from laying/forming Road on the schedule B property, without following the procedure for acquisition as laid down by the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976;

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b. Direct the Respondents No.2, 3 and 5 to grant the Transferable Development Rights (TDR) in the form of Development Right Certificate (DRC) as per present

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policy, if the Schedule B property has to be utilised by the Respondent No.2 for formation of the Road.

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b.(i) In alternate to direct the respondents to grant the monetary compensation to the Petitioner in respect of the Schedule B Property as per The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

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(This prayer added as per order dated 1.4.2021)

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c. Direct the Respondent No.2 to 4 not interfere with the enjoyment of their properties until the Respondent No.1 permits for acquisition of the Schedule B property under the applicable law for land acquisition and Respondent No.3 grants TDR rights to the petitioners.

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d. Pass any such order or orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant in the case to meet the ends of equity and justice.

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Ramakrishnaiah, Shobhavathi and Sowmya Shree (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “owners”) were the absolute owners of land bearing Sy. No. 25/4 situated at Nayandahalli Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, measuring 4 acres and 33 guntas. The said land had been converted for nonagricultural residential purposes pursuant to the Official Memorandum dated 29.01.2010. The property falls within the jurisdiction of the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (hereinafter referred to as “BBMP”), which had issued khata in favour of the owners, pursuant to which property taxes were regularly paid.

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Thereafter, the owners entered into a Joint Development Agreement dated 16.04.2010 with Petitioner No.1 for development and construction of a multi-storied residential building on the aforesaid property. In furtherance thereof, the owners also executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of Petitioner No.1 on 16.04.2010. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner No.1 secured licence and plan sanction from BBMP on 03.07.2012 bearing LP No. JDTP (S) LP/42/2010-11 (hereinafter referred to as the “plan sanction”), and thereafter commenced and completed the construction.

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It is the case of the Petitioner that the residents residing on the rear portion of the aforesaid property, namely on the northern and western sides, approached BBMP seeking the formation of an access road through the Petitioner’s property for ingress and egress. The local Corporator and officials of BBMP are stated to have requested the Petitioners to leave a portion of the land for road formation. Believing the representations allegedly made by the BBMP officials that compensation would either be paid at prevailing market value or Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) certificates would be issued, the Petitioner

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agreed to leave a portion of the land for formation of the road.

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The Petitioner contends that, based on representations made by local residents, the local Corporator addressed a communication dated 14.02.2012 to the Joint Commissioner, BBMP, West Zone, stating that the Petitioner was willing to relinquish a 30-feet-wide strip of land for road formation and recommending issuance of TDR certificates in respect thereof. Thereafter, by communication dated 12.03.2012, the Petitioner informed BBMP of its consent to surrender the land for formation of the road, subject to grant of TDR certificates in the ratio of 1:3 or payment of compensation at the prevailing market value of Rs.7,000/- per square foot. A survey of the property was subsequently conducted and the extent of land required for formation of the road was identified.

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Respondent No.4 – Executive Engineer, BBMP, thereafter submitted a report recommending acquisition of the relevant portion of the Petitioner’s land, which was forwarded to the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, on 25.06.2014. Since no further action ensued, the Petitioner

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submitted a representation dated 29.05.2015 to Respondent No.4, asserting that despite utilisation of the land for public purpose, the same had neither been formally acquired nor had compensation been paid. Under the very same communication dated 29.05.2015, the Petitioner also expressed readiness to execute a relinquishment deed in favour of Respondent No.2 – BBMP.

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It is further stated that the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, issued directions to the Commissioner, BBMP, calling upon the latter to furnish particulars relating to acquisition of the subject land. Despite such directions, Respondent No.2 allegedly failed to furnish the requisite information to Respondent No.1. Subsequently, on 15.02.2018, BBMP sought to proceed with laying of the road over the demarcated portion of the property. It is in the aforesaid background that the petitioners have approached this Court seeking the reliefs prayed for.

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During the pendency of the matter, there being no interim order, the BBMP is stated to have laid the road, installed sanitary and water pipelines. It is in that background that the amendment application was filed which came to be allowed by order dated 1.4.2021 by

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virtue of which Prayer b(1) was inserted which reads as under:

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b.(i) In alternate to direct the respondents to grant the monetary compensation to the Petitioner in respect of the Schedule B Property as per The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

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It is claimed that the road has been illegally formed and as such compensation is required to be paid as per the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

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The submission of Shri G.V.Sudhakar, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that:

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10.1. The entire action of the respondents is wholly without authority of law. According to him, the respondents have forcibly usurped and utilised the land belonging to the petitioners for formation of a public road without initiating acquisition proceedings and without payment of any compensation whatsoever.

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10.2. He submits that the forcible utilisation of the petitioner’s land for a public purpose squarely amounts to acquisition in the eye of law. Without following due process and without formally

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acquiring the land, the respondents could not have formed or laid a road over the petitioner’s property. He further contends that once the local Corporator had recommended acquisition of the land and issuance of Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) certificates in favour of the petitioner, it was incumbent upon the respondents to either acquire the land in accordance with law or issue the requisite TDR certificates.

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10.3. Learned counsel further submits that the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, had specifically called upon the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike to furnish details relating to the proposed acquisition. However, BBMP failed to furnish the requisite information and failed to take any further steps in the matter. In that view, he contends that the conduct of the respondents is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to law, and that the respondents, having utilised the petitioner’s land for a public purpose, are necessarily liable to compensate the petitioners in accordance with law.

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10.4. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sri.D.V.Venkateshappa vs. The

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Commissioner and others¹ , more particularly, Paragraphs 24 to 30, (e), (f) and (h), which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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(e) The contention of respondent BBMP that it has not taken the possession of surrendered lands in question, is bit difficult to countenance for more than one reason: firstly, the Relinquishment Deeds that are placed on record are registered instruments to which BBMP is a party signatory and they specifically mention about delivery of possession. Secondly, it is the specific case of petitioners that all they have given up the possession of subject lands simultaneously with the execution and registration of Relinquishment Deeds. In fact, some of the petitioners have dismantled their structures that existed in few of these lands and thereafter handed the same to BBMP. Thirdly, petitioners specifically state that they are not in the possession of these lands. It is not the case of BBMP that the petitioners obstructed or otherwise interfered with the BBMP utilising these lands for any purpose. Even now, petitioners in all fairness state that the BBMP is free to do whatever it wants in the subject lands and that they shall be miles away from all that. If any of the petitioners or any one claiming under them takes up plea/contention in any proceeding before any Court/authority inconsistent with what is stated herein above they can not only be prosecuted for trespass but tried for the offence of perjury and contempt.

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(f) Petitioners acting on the statutory policy of the State and believing the words of Government and BBMP have surrendered valuable lands and thereby altered their position to their disadvantage and to the great benefit of BBMP. Thus, there is a fool-proof case for the invocation of doctrine of estoppel as enacted in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. There is a State policy namely, the Government Notification dated 18.01.2005 promulgated under Section 14B of 1961

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Act. Added, the government vide letter dated 12.12.2011 specifically assured about the TDR facility on the land being surrendered. It is pursuant to this the BBMP got these lands from the Petitioner without paying any compensation or consideration. Years have lapsed since these lands have been surrendered. Thus a classic case is made out by the petitioners for invoking promissory estoppel as well. There is a choate cause of action for the grant of relief. The Apex Court in MOTILAL PADAMPAT SAGAR MILLS vs. UTTAR PRADESH, AIR 1979 SC 621 expounding on the doctrine of promissory estoppel observed:

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“The doctrine called 'promissory estoppel, 'equitable estoppel', 'quasi estoppel', and 'new estoppel' is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice where a promise is made by a person knowing that it would be acted on and it is person to whom it is made and in fact it is so acted on and it is inequitable to allow the party making the promise to go back upon it. … The basis of the doctrine is the inter position of equity, which has always true to its form stepped into mitigate the rigours of strict law…”

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(h) The contention of BBMP that the lands being no longer required, it would reconvey the same to the owners thereof, is thoroughly unjustified and unconscionable. As already mentioned above, petitioners gave up their lands years ago and free of cost, of course, the TDR being the assured recompense. They did it, not for getting the lands back that too at this length of time. No law nor any ruling is brought to the notice of this court which supports such a stand of BBMP. It was open to the BBMP to stipulate a condition of reconveyance in the Relinquishment Deed itself, specifying the circumstances on which it could have structured defense of the kind. Such a condition conspicuously being absent in the deeds, this contention has to fail. The action of BBMP falls short of constitutional morality. This statutory authority which answers the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be permitted to resile from the its promise of issuing TDR Certificates more particularly in the teath of amended law. The Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021 which came into force pendente lite (w.e.f. 05.07.2021) also supports the case of petitioners. Sub–section 4A of the Amendment Act introduces a proviso to sub–section 10 of Section 14B of the principal Act, which reads as under:

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“(4A) after sub-section (10), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-

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“Provided that, in cases where land has been procured and possession has been taken by the Public Authority five years or more prior to the date of commencement of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021 for the purpose specified above but no Development Right Certificate has been issued till the commencement of the said amendment Act, in such procurement process land owners shall be eligible for benefit of Development Rights as per the said amendment Act.”

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10.5.By relying on D.V.Venkateshappa’s¹ case, he submits that the facts of the present case stand on an even stronger footing inasmuch as the petitioner had consented to surrender the land only on the clear understanding and assurance that compensation would be paid or TDR certificates would be issued. He submits that the respondents, having taken over and utilised the land for formation of a public road, cannot now resile from their obligation either to compensate the petitioner or to issue TDR certificates in accordance with law. According to him, the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and fairness in State action squarely apply to the facts of the present case and bind the respondents to honour their representations and assurances.

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10.6.He relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of The Commissioner, BBMP and another vs. A.Babu and others² , more particularly, Paragraph 6 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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6. The respondent No.1 in compliance of the directions of the learned Single Judge has filed an affidavit stating that BBMP is in possession of the land in question and he shall not interfere with the same. The BBMP cannot be permitted to utilise the land belonging to the respondent No.1 without payment of compensation. A direction has been issued by the State Government to BBMP to take the land in question in the year 2011. The respondent No.1 has executed a relinquishment deed in favour of BBMP which is in force till today.

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10.7. By relying on A.Babu's² case, he submits that the Hon’ble Division Bench has categorically held that the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike cannot utilise private property for public purposes without payment of compensation. He contends that even in cases where relinquishment deeds have been executed in favour of BBMP, the obligation to compensate the land owner or extend the promised TDR benefits continues to subsist. According to him, in the present case, the respondents having admittedly utilised the petitioner’s land for formation of a public road cannot evade their statutory and

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constitutional obligation to compensate the petitioner merely on the ground that formal acquisition proceedings were not initiated. He therefore submits that the petitioners are entitled either to grant of TDR certificates in accordance with law or payment of compensation equivalent to the market value of the land utilised by the respondents.

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10.8. He refers to the decision of this Court in the case of Dr.Arun Kumar B.C., vs. State of Karnataka and others³ , more particularly, Paragraphs 24 to 26, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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24. The Circular dated 29.2.2016 requiring the owners to surrender the properties earmarked for widening of road free of cost at the time of sanctioning of building plans violates Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the case of KT Plantation (supra) has held that the owner of immovable property cannot be deprived of his property by mere executive order without any specific legal authority or support by competent legislation. In the absence of specific legal authority or support by competent legislation, the impugned Circular issued by the respondent - BBMP violates Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

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25. Even otherwise, the impugned endorsements and circulars issued by BBMP is arbitrary and discriminatory since the owners of the properties earmarked as Road in Master Plan 2015 and who have not applied for sanctioning of building plan for developing their properties will be entitled for compensation under Section 71 of KT & CP Act, if the said properties are

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acquired for implementing the Master Plan. The petitioners cannot be deprived of their properties earmarked as road in the revised Master Plan, 2015 merely because they intend to develop their properties by obtaining sanctioned building plan.

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26. In view of preceding analysis, I am of the considered view that the impugned endorsements issued by the respondent - BBMP requiring the petitioners to relinquish the properties in question free of cost as a condition precedent for processing their applications for sanctioning of building plans is without authority of law and the same violate Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, I pass the following:

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ORDER

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i) Writ petitions stand allowed:

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ii) The Circular dated 29.2.2016 issued by the 2^nd respondent vide Annexure-A & endorsement dated 20.5.2020 issued by respondent No.3 vide Annexure-B in WP No.9408/2020, endorsement dated 24.6.2021 issued by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-G in WP No.14095/2021, the order dated 18.12.2020 passed by respondent No.2 vide Annexure-A in WP No.14975/2021 and Circular dated 29.2.2016 vide Annexure-E issued by respondent No.2 in W.P. No.19737 of 2021 are hereby quashed;

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iii) The respondent - BBMP is directed to process the applications submitted by the petitioners for sanctioning the building plans and pass appropriate order in accordance with law within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

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10.9. By referring to Dr.Arun Kumar's³ case, he submits that the Coordinate Bench has categorically held that the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike cannot compel surrender of private property free of cost as a condition either for sanction of building plans or for implementation of public projects, in the

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absence of authority of law. He submits that the right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution protects a citizen from being deprived of property except by authority of law, and that executive action unsupported by statutory acquisition proceedings cannot divest a person of his property rights.

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10.10. He further submits that in the present case, admittedly no acquisition proceedings were initiated and no compensation was paid despite the respondents having utilised the petitioner’s land for formation of a public road. Therefore, according to him, the action of the respondents is ex facie arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. He contends that the petitioners, at the very least, are entitled either to compensation in accordance with law or grant of TDR benefits as assured by the respondents.

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10.11. He refers to and relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike and others vs. Dwarkaprasad Sharada and

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another⁴ , more particularly, Paragraph 7 thereof which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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7. The learned Single Judge has quashed the circular issued by the appellants and the endorsement issued based on the said circular on the ground that the said documents are without authority of law and therefore, they are in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise, it cannot be countenanced that a citizen can be asked to surrender or relinquish his right over his property free of cost in favour of a statutory authority. In the present case, the endorsements were issued by the appellants asking respondent No.1 to surrender/relinquish his right in the property based on the circular dated 18.12.2020 and the said circular and endorsement have rightly been quashed by the learned Single Judge since the same were not supported by any statutory provisions as contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1.

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10.12. By relying on Dwarkaprasad Sharada’s⁴ case,

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he submits that the Hon’ble Division Bench has unequivocally held that no statutory authority, including the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike, can compel a citizen to surrender or relinquish his proprietary rights free of cost in the absence of express statutory sanction. He submits that the action of the respondents in the present case, namely utilisation of the petitioner’s land for formation of a public road without acquisition proceedings and without payment of compensation, is directly contrary to

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the principles laid down by the Division Bench and amounts to infringement of the petitioner’s constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

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10.13. He further contends that the respondents cannot seek to justify their action on the basis of administrative directions, internal communications or alleged consent, particularly when no valid relinquishment deed has been executed and no compensation or TDR benefit has been extended to the petitioners. According to him, the respondents having appropriated and utilised the land for a public purpose are legally bound either to acquire the land in accordance with law and pay compensation or to extend TDR benefits as assured.

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10.14. He refers to the decision of this Court in the case of K.Srinivas Murthy vs. The Bangalore Development Authority⁵ ' , more particularly, Paragraph 10 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference:

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10. A perusal of the sanction plan, though Sri.Unnikrishnan, learned counsel submits that actual layout has not been made as per the sanctioned plan indicates that the location where the land of the

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Petitioner is situate there are certain sites which have been formed, there is no land around the property of the Petitioner which has been shown as vacant without a site being shown thereon. The entire land being covered by either road or a site with a particular site number, it does not now lie for the BDA to state that the said land has not been utilised and/or that the BDA has nothing to do with the same since it has at no point of time exercised domain or ownership to the extent of land or further contend that the onus lies with the Petitioner. When the statutory authority like the BDA has forcefully, unauthorisedly, without sanction of law encroached upon and formed a road on a private property, it cannot be expected of a citizen like the Petitioner to protect the same and for the BDA to contend that onus of protecting the same would lie on the Petitioner. As such, separate directions are being issued in relation thereto.

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10.15. By referring to Srinivas Murthy's⁵ case, he submits that once a statutory authority has entered upon private property and utilised the same for formation of a public road, such authority cannot thereafter disclaim responsibility or contend that the land has not been formally acquired. He submits that the observations made in Srinivas Murthy squarely apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the respondents have admittedly formed and utilised a public road over the petitioner’s land without acquisition proceedings and without payment of compensation.

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10.16. He further contends that it cannot be expected of the petitioner to prevent or obstruct the respondents from utilising the land once the

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respondents, acting as statutory authorities, assumed control and formed the road. According to him, the respondents, having exercised de facto dominion and control over the land for public use, are estopped from contending either that possession was not taken or that the petitioner is not entitled to compensation or TDR benefits.

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10.17. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions and the judgments relied upon, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the land in question admittedly belonged to the owners, who had entered into a Joint Development Agreement with Petitioner No.1. Pursuant thereto, developmental activities were undertaken and the project has since been completed. According to him, the petitioner, being the developer and beneficiary under the Joint Development Agreement, is therefore entitled to seek compensation in respect of the portion of land utilised by the respondents for formation of the road.

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10.18. He submits that utilisation of the petitioner’s land for formation of a public road without

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initiating acquisition proceedings and without payment of compensation is wholly illegal and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further contends that though the petitioners had approached this Court even prior to actual utilisation of the land, in the absence of any interim order restraining the respondents, the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike proceeded to form and utilise the road over the subject property, thereby necessitating amendment of the writ petition and consequential reliefs.

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10.19. He however fairly submits that, since the road has already been formed and is presently being utilised for public purposes, the petitioners do not seek restoration of possession or removal of the road. The limited grievance of the petitioners is that they are entitled to just compensation for the land utilised by the respondents, either by payment of monetary compensation in accordance with prevailing market value or by issuance of Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) certificates in accordance with law.

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10.20. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submits that the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the reliefs sought for by the petitioners are liable to be granted.

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Sri.N.R.Jagadeeswara, learned counsel appearing for the BBMP-Respondents No.2 to 4 submits that:

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11.1. While granting conversion of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes under the Official Memorandum dated 29.01.2010, a specific condition had been imposed to the effect that the areas required for road margins, roads, parks, civic amenity (“CA”) sites and other public purposes were required to be relinquished in favour of the planning authority/local body. According to him, the conversion order itself contemplated surrender of portions of the property required for public infrastructure and civic amenities.

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11.2. He further submits that at the time when the conversion order was issued, there was no proper road providing ingress and egress to the subject property and surrounding areas. Therefore, according to him, provision for road

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access formed an integral component of the development and conversion process itself.

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11.3. It is in the aforesaid background, he submits, that the property owners and the petitioner were fully aware of the requirement to leave portions of the land for formation of roads and other civic infrastructure at the time of undertaking development of the property.

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11.4. It is in that background that the property owner Eshwar Naidu, who had submitted the plan had also submitted an undertaking on 10.5.2012 which reads as under:

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“I hereby undertake that if the plan is sanctioned by the BBMP, I shall improve the footpath / skywalks in front of the premises for which the building plan is sought for within 3 months from the date of sanction as per the direction of the Executive Engineer, BBMP of the corresponding zone and I further undertake that the entire road will be taken up for improvement at my cost. If I fail to improve the said road, the BBMP may take up the work, and cost of executing shall be recovered from me as arrears of land tax on land / building.”

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11.5.Placing reliance on the aforesaid undertaking, learned counsel submits that the owners and the petitioner had consciously undertaken obligations relating to road formation and improvement as a condition associated with the

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development of the property and sanction of the building plan. According to him, the petitioner, having voluntarily agreed to undertake and facilitate road improvement works, cannot now contend that the utilisation of land for road purposes was either unauthorised or contrary to the conditions governing the development of the property.

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11.6.Learned counsel further submits that it was only in view of the aforesaid undertaking furnished by the property owner that the building plan came to be sanctioned by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. According to him, at the relevant point of time there was no proper road providing ingress and egress from Mysore Road to the subject property. Hence, it was incumbent upon the petitioner and the landowners to form and improve the access road from Mysore Road up to the subject property and further beyond, so as to provide access to the properties situated behind the apartment complex.

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11.7.He submits that upon construction of the apartment complex, the residents occupying the properties situated behind the apartment would

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otherwise have been deprived of access. Therefore, unless a connecting road from Mysore Road up to and beyond the subject property was formed, there could neither have been proper access to the developed property nor could a building plan have been sanctioned in accordance with law. He contends that despite the undertaking given by the owners and the petitioner, the road was allegedly formed only up to a particular extent and not in its entirety, thereby adversely affecting ingress and egress of the residents situated behind the apartment complex. It is in that background, according to him, that complaints came to be lodged by members of the public, necessitating intervention by BBMP.

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11.8. Learned counsel further submits that a statutory and contractual duty, obligation and responsibility rested upon the petitioner and the landowners to provide a proper access road in terms of the undertaking furnished by them and thereafter transfer the road portion in favour of the local authority. According to him, it was only on account of the petitioner and landowners having failed to honour the undertaking that

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BBMP, being under an obligation to ensure access to the residents situated behind the apartment complex, proceeded to form the road by utilising its own funds.

¶183

11.9. He submits that the said action was taken strictly in terms of the undertaking furnished by the owners themselves, wherein it had been agreed that in the event of failure on their part to execute the road and allied works, BBMP would be entitled to undertake the same and recover the expenses incurred from the owners/petitioner as arrears of land revenue.

¶184

11.10. It is further contended that the petitioner, despite being fully aware of its obligations and liabilities arising out of the undertaking and conditions of sanction, sought to involve political representatives and exert political pressure upon BBMP, initially to prevent completion of the road work and subsequently to claim compensation in respect thereof. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner had already derived substantial benefit by obtaining sanction of the building plan on the basis of the undertaking furnished to BBMP.

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11.11. According to him, had such undertaking not been furnished, the building plan itself would not have been sanctioned. He further submits that noncompliance with the conditions of sanction and the undertaking could entail cancellation of the sanctioned plan itself. In such an event, the entire construction would become unauthorised and liable for demolition, which would seriously prejudice hundreds of residents presently residing in the apartment complex.

¶189

11.12. Learned counsel further submits that in this background, BBMP issued a communication dated 06.03.2019 calling upon Eshwar Naidu to form the road and footpath in terms of the undertaking. In response thereto, the petitioner, by reply dated 11.03.2019, sought time till the end of March 2019 on the ground that there had been a reshuffle in the Board of Directors. However, subsequently, Eshwar Naidu, by communication dated 21.03.2019, denied execution of the undertaking itself. It is therefore submitted that BBMP was constrained to issue a further notice dated 23.06.2019 informing Eshwar Naidu that if compliance was not effected in terms of the earlier notice dated 06.03.2019,

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action would be initiated under Section 470 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976.

¶194

11.13. Section 470 is reproduced hereunder for easy

¶195

reference:

¶196

470. Recovery of sums due as taxes .- All costs, damages, penalties, compensation, charges, fees, rents, expenses, contributions and other sums which under this Act or any rule, bye-law or regulation made thereunder or any other law or under any contract including a contract in respect of water-supply or drainage made in accordance with this Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations are due by any person to the corporation shall, if there is no special provision in this Act for their recovery be demanded by bill, containing particulars of the demand and notice of the liability incurred in default of payment and may be recovered in the manner provided in Chapter X unless within fifteen days from the date of service of the bill such person shall have applied to the District Court having jurisdiction, under section 471.

¶197

11.14. Placing reliance on the aforesaid provision, learned counsel for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike submits that once the petitioner and landowners had undertaken to execute and improve the road at their own cost, BBMP was legally entitled to execute the work upon their failure and thereafter recover the expenditure incurred from them in the manner contemplated under Section 470 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. According to him, the statutory scheme itself recognises recovery of expenses incurred by the

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Corporation pursuant to obligations arising under contracts, undertakings and statutory conditions, and therefore the present claim for compensation by the petitioners is wholly misconceived.

¶202

11.15. Learned counsel further submits that Eshwar Naidu, by reply dated 21.03.2019, admitted that an undertaking had in fact been furnished to the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. In the said reply, Eshwar Naidu stated that the undertaking related to improvement of the footpath and skywalk in front of the premises and sought three months’ time to complete the said work.

¶203

11.16. Learned counsel submits that though at an earlier point of time Eshwar Naidu had denied execution of the undertaking, he subsequently admitted the same. However, according to learned counsel, an attempt was thereafter made to narrowly construe the undertaking as being confined only to the frontage of the building, whereas the undertaking, properly understood, related to formation and improvement of the entire access road so as to

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provide ingress and egress to the persons residing behind the apartment complex as well.

¶208

11.17. It is therefore contended that once Eshwar Naidu himself admitted execution of the undertaking, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to contend to the contrary. Learned counsel submits that the very basis on which the building plan came to be sanctioned was the undertaking furnished by the owners/petitioner. Having derived the benefit of plan sanction and having completed construction on that basis, the petitioner cannot now resile from the undertaking and deny access to the general public residing behind the apartment complex.

¶209

11.18. According to him, the action taken by BBMP in forming the road and enforcing compliance with the undertaking was lawful, justified and in discharge of its statutory obligations towards the public at large. He therefore submits that no interference is called for by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

¶210

Ms. Chandni Singh, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for Respondent No.1 – State of Karnataka, submits that the Secretary, Urban

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Development Department, had merely sought certain particulars and information from the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike upon receipt of a complaint in relation to the subject matter.

¶215

12.1. She submits that the communication issued by the Secretary, Urban Development Department, calling for details, was only in the nature of an administrative enquiry initiated upon receipt of the complaint and did not amount to any adjudication of rights or determination of liability. According to her, once the requisite particulars and details were furnished by BBMP, no further action came to be initiated by the State Government in the matter.

¶216

Learned HCGP therefore submits that no relief can be claimed against Respondent No.1 and that the dispute, if any, essentially pertains to the inter se claims between the petitioners and BBMP.

¶217

Sri G. Lakshmeesh Rao, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.5 – Bangalore Development Authority (“BDA”), submits that the BDA has no role whatsoever in the controversy involved in the present proceedings. According to him, the dispute essentially concerns the petitioners, the landowners and the

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Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike, and therefore BDA has neither any factual involvement nor any statutory obligation in relation to the subject matter of the writ petition.

¶222

He further submits that Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) or Development Right Certificates under the relevant statutory framework are ordinarily issued by the BDA only in relation to lands acquired or surrendered in favour of BDA for implementation of development schemes undertaken by it. According to him, insofar as the present case is concerned, the alleged utilisation of land is by BBMP and not by BDA.

¶223

Learned counsel therefore contends that no direction can be issued against BDA for grant or issuance of TDR certificates in relation to land allegedly utilised by BBMP. He submits that if at all any liability exists, the same would have to be examined only qua BBMP and not against BDA.

¶224

Heard Shri G.V.Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, Ms.Chandini Singh, learned HCGP for Respondent No.1, Shri N.R.Jagadeeswara, learned counsel for Respondents No.2 to 4-BBMP and Sri.G.Lakshmeesh Rao, learned counsel for Respondent No.5-BDA. Perused papers.

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The points that would arise for consideration are:

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i. Whether the utilisation and formation of a public road by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike over the Schedule ‘B’ property of the petitioners, without initiation of acquisition proceedings, is arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India?

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ii. Whether the condition contained in the conversion order dated 29.01.2010 and the undertaking dated 10.05.2012 furnished by the landowners/petitioners obligated them to provide and relinquish the road portion free of cost for public use, and as a condition precedent for the sanction of the building plan?

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iii. Whether the undertaking dated 10.05.2012 executed by Eshwar Naidu was restricted only to the improvement of the frontage road, footpath and skywalk abutting the premises, or whether it extended to the formation and improvement of the entire access road leading to the properties situated behind the apartment complex?

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iv. Whether the petitioners, having obtained sanction of the building plan and completed construction on the basis of the undertaking furnished to BBMP, are estopped from contending that the respondents could not utilise the subject land for road formation?

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v. Whether the action of BBMP in laying the road over the subject property was in exercise of its statutory powers and

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obligations to provide public access and infrastructure, particularly in view of the alleged failure of the petitioners to comply with the undertaking furnished by them?

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vi. Whether the petitioners have established a legally enforceable right to claim Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) / Development Right Certificates (“DRC”) in respect of the land utilised for the formation of the road?

¶239

vii. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and fairness in State action are attracted against the respondents?

¶240

viii. Whether the petitioners are entitled to monetary compensation in lieu of the land utilised for the formation of the road, and, if so, the nature and extent thereof?

¶241

ix. Whether any direction can be issued against the Bangalore Development Authority for the issuance of TDR certificates in the facts of the present case?

¶242

x. What order?

¶243

This Court answers the above points as under:

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Answer to Point No.(i): Whether the utilisation and formation of a public road by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike over the Schedule ‘B’ property of the petitioners, without initiation of acquisition proceedings, is arbitrary, illegal

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and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India?

¶249

20.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the formation of a public road over the Schedule 'B' property is wholly without authority of law. The Respondents, he contends, forcibly took over the land without initiating any acquisition proceedings and without paying compensation or issuing TDR certificates.

¶250

20.2. He submits that once the local Corporator had recommended issuance of TDR and once the Executive Engineer had submitted a report recommending acquisition, both forwarded through official channels, it was incumbent upon the Respondents to formally acquire the land or issue TDR. The failure to do either, is illegal.

¶251

20.3. He relies on Dr. Arun Kumar's³ case , where this Hon'ble Court held that a BBMP Circular requiring owners to surrender road-margin land free of cost as a condition for building-plan sanction violates Article 300A, on the principle that an owner cannot be deprived of property by a mere executive order without specific legal authority. The Court in that case also applied the

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principle stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KT Plantation case that the owner of immovable property cannot be deprived without specific legal authority or competent legislation.

¶256

20.4. He relies on Dwarkaprasad Sharada's⁴ case, where the Hon'ble Division Bench affirmed that no statutory authority can compel a citizen to surrender proprietary rights free of cost without express statutory sanction.

¶257

20.5. He relies on D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case , where the Coordinate Bench held that BBMP cannot resile from its promise to issue TDR and that promissory estoppel binds BBMP to honour its assurances. He particularly relies on paragraph (h) of that order which directed TDR even where formal acquisition had not been initiated, by virtue of the proviso to Section 14B(10) of the KTCP Act introduced by the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021.

¶258

20.6. He relies on A. Babu's² case , where the Hon'ble Division Bench held that BBMP cannot utilise private property for public purposes without payment of compensation.

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20.7. He relies on Srinivas Murthy's⁵ case , where this Court held that when a statutory authority has unauthorisedly formed a road on private property without sanction of law, it cannot disclaim responsibility or shift the burden to the owner.

¶263

20.8. The Petitioner fairly concedes that the road is already in use by the public and does not seek its removal. The limited grievance is entitlement to compensation, either in the form of TDR or money under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

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20.9. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara, learned counsel for BBMP, submits that the Official Memorandum dated 29.01.2010 granting conversion of the land expressly required areas needed for road margins, roads, parks, civic amenity sites and other public purposes to be relinquished to the planning authority or local body. This condition was accepted by the owners at the time of conversion.

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20.10. He further submits that the property owner Eshwar Naidu furnished an undertaking dated 10.05.2012 committing to improve the footpath, skywalks and the entire road at his own cost, and

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agreeing that if he failed to do so, BBMP could execute the works and recover costs as arrears of land revenue. The building plan was sanctioned expressly on the basis of this undertaking.

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20.11. He submits that Section 470 of the KMC Act, 1976 enables BBMP to recover all costs and expenses arising under any contract, which includes the undertaking, from the defaulting party. BBMP acted strictly within this statutory framework. BBMP issued notice dated 06.03.2019, followed by a further notice dated 23.06.2019 expressly invoking Section 470. When the owner still did not comply, BBMP formed the road at its own expense.

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20.12. He contends that all the cases relied on by the Petitioner are factually distinguishable because they involved either a unilateral circular compelling free surrender, or cases where the landowner had formally executed relinquishment deeds in reliance on express TDR assurances, neither of which is present here.

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20.13. Smt. Chandini Singh, learned HCGP, submits that the State's only role was administrative, the

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Secretary, Urban Development Department, called for information from BBMP upon receiving a complaint. This did not amount to any adjudication of rights or binding commitment. Once BBMP furnished the requisite particulars, no further action was taken by the State. No relief is maintainable against the State.

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20.14. Sri G. Lakshmeesh Rao, learned counsel for BDA, submits that BDA has no role whatsoever in this controversy. The land was utilised by BBMP, not BDA. TDR under the KTCP Act is issued by BDA only for lands acquired or surrendered for BDA's own development schemes. No direction lies against BDA.

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20.15. Article 300A of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

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"Article 300A, Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law: No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

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20.16. The constitutional guarantee in Article 300A is designed to protect citizens against arbitrary and non-consensual governmental deprivation of property, situations where the State takes property without the owner's participation and

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without the backing of a legal process. The word 'deprived' in Article 300A imports a nonconsensual taking.

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20.17. Where an owner has, in a commercial context and for commercial gain, voluntarily bound himself to provide land or land-use for a public purpose, and the public authority acts in enforcement of that very obligation upon the owner's default, the constitutional protection against deprivation operates differently. In such a case, the question is not whether the authority had a statute to 'acquire' the land, but whether the owner, by his own voluntary act, created a situation in which the authority's intervention was contractually sanctioned by the owner himself. Such a case does not engage Article 300A in the same way as a compulsory, nonconsensual State acquisition.

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20.18. This distinction, between consensual and nonconsensual taking, is the central reason why all the decisions relied upon by the Petitioner are distinguishable. Those decisions uniformly involved non-consensual governmental action. Dr. Arun Kumar's³ case involved a BBMP

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Circular dated 29.02.2016 imposing a blanket, coercive condition on all owners applying for plan sanction: surrender your road-margin land for free or we will not sanction your plan. There was no individual voluntary undertaking, the compulsion was systemic and unilateral. This Court, applying the principle of KT Plantation that no owner can be deprived by mere executive order without specific legislative authority, rightly struck it down.

¶291

20.19. Dwarkaprasad Sharada's⁴ case affirmed the same principle on analogous facts, the endorsements there too were based on the same Circular dated 18.12.2020 and were without statutory backing, imposing a coercive condition of free surrender. The Division Bench upheld the quashing on the same ground.

¶292

20.20. D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case is discussed in detail under Point (vi) below where the TDR claim is addressed. For the present, it suffices to note that in that case, the owners had formally executed registered Relinquishment Deeds in favour of BBMP and had physically handed over possession. The TDR assurance came from a

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Government Notification dated 18.01.2005 and a specific government letter dated 12.12.2011, both formal, authoritative governmental communications. The promissory estoppel was based on those formal assurances. None of these elements are present here.

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20.21. A. Babu's² case similarly dealt with a situation where a relinquishment deed had been executed pursuant to a 2011 government direction and BBMP was in admitted possession. The Division Bench held BBMP cannot use such land without compensation. The factual substrate is entirely different from the present case.

¶298

20.22. Srinivas Murthy's⁵ case dealt with BDA forming a road on private land without any sanction of law whatsoever, there was no conversion condition, no undertaking and no voluntary act by the owner. BBMP's position here is the opposite: there was an undertaking by the owner, the plan was sanctioned on the basis of that undertaking, and BBMP formed the road on the owner's default.

¶299

20.23. The present case is therefore fundamentally different from all the above cases in the following

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material respects: First, there was no unilateral circular or blanket directive, the road obligation arose from a voluntary undertaking given by the owner for his commercial benefit. Second, the plan was sanctioned on the basis of that undertaking, the Petitioner derived the entire economic benefit of the project from it. Third, BBMP acted not arbitrarily but pursuant to the owner's own contractual authorisation upon his default.

¶304

20.24. This Court answers Point No. (i) by holding that the formation of the road by BBMP over the Schedule 'B' property, in the specific circumstances of this case, where the owner voluntarily agreed to provide road access as a condition for plan sanction and where BBMP acted upon that undertaking on the owner's default, is not arbitrary, illegal or violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

¶305

Answer to Point No. (ii): Whether the condition contained in the conversion order dated 29.01.2010 and the undertaking dated 10.05.2012 furnished by the landowners/petitioners obligated them to provide and relinquish the road portion free of cost for public use and as a condition precedent for the sanction of the building plan?

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21.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the conversion order condition, being administrative and not statutory, cannot obligate permanent free relinquishment of land. He further contends that the Petitioner's consent letter dated 12.03.2012 was expressly conditional upon TDR or compensation there was never an unconditional agreement to give up land for free. Reliance is placed on Dr. Arun Kumar's³ case for the proposition that requiring land surrender free of cost, even as a plan-sanction condition, is unconstitutional.

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21.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that the conversion order condition is a valid binding condition flowing from the statutory landconversion framework, the owners accepted it knowingly when they applied for and obtained conversion. The undertaking dated 10.05.2012 is the operative document crystallising the obligation: it was given voluntarily by Eshwar Naidu as a condition precedent for plan sanction, and the Petitioner derived full commercial benefit from the project on that basis. The Petitioner's conditional consent letter was not

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accepted by BBMP as a binding commitment, the plan sanction was given on the basis of the undertaking, not on any TDR promise by BBMP.

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21.3. Before addressing the substance of Point (ii), it is necessary to clarify a terminological issue that has implications for harmonisation across all Points. Point (ii) as framed uses the phrase 'relinquish the road portion free of cost'. The Court clarifies at the outset that 'relinquishment' in this context means the giving up of the right to the use and occupation of the land for the purpose of road formation, not a permanent transfer of legal title to BBMP. The land title remains with the owners. What the conversion order condition and the undertaking together accomplish is that the owner agrees to make the road portion available for public use and to bear the cost of forming the road. This distinction is important: it explains why the action does not require a formal acquisition and why Article 300A is not engaged in the classical 'compulsory acquisition' sense.

¶316

21.4. The conversion order dated 29.01.2010 imposed a standard condition requiring relinquishment of

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areas needed for road margins, roads, parks, civic amenity sites and other public purposes to the planning authority or local body. Such conditions are integral to the land conversion framework and are accepted knowingly by the applicant. Having applied for and obtained the conversion, and thereby the right to develop the land commercially, the owners are bound by this condition. It is not an ex post facto imposition; it was a condition of the very benefit they sought.

¶321

21.5. The distinction from Dr. Arun Kumar's³ case (which the Petitioner relies upon) is clear and apparent, that case struck down a blanket BBMP Circular imposing free surrender on all plan applicants, without individual consent and without statutory backing. Here, there is no such blanket coercive circular, only a condition in a conversion order sought and accepted by the owners, followed by a voluntary individual undertaking given to obtain a further commercial benefit (plan sanction). Voluntariness is the decisive difference, for the reasons explained under Point (i) above.

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21.6. The undertaking dated 10.05.2012, the full text of which has been set out in the facts and contentions portion of this order, commits Eshwar Naidu, who submitted the plan in connection with the development project, to two obligations: (a) improve the footpath/skywalks in front of the premises within three months of plan sanction; and (b) take up the entire road for improvement at his own cost, failing which BBMP may do so and recover costs as arrears of land revenue. The plan sanction followed this undertaking, which was its direct basis.

¶326

21.7. Before addressing whether Eshwar Naidu's undertaking binds the Petitioner (GRC Infra Pvt Ltd), the Court examines their relationship. The owners executed a Joint Development Agreement with GRC Infra on 16.04.2010 and a General Power of Attorney on 16.04.2010. Eshwar Naidu submitted the plan in connection with this very development project. The reply dated 11.03.2019, in response to BBMP's notice calling for compliance with the undertaking, was sent by 'the petitioner' and mentioned a 'reshuffle in the Board of Directors', confirming that Eshwar Naidu was acting as a

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representative of or in the context of the Petitioner company. GRC Infra secured the plan sanction, carried out the construction and reaped the commercial benefit of the entire project, all of which was directly enabled by the plan sanction obtained on the basis of Eshwar Naidu's undertaking. Having benefited from the undertaking, GRC Infra cannot disown it.

¶331

21.8. What is also required to be considered is that there is partial compliance with the undertaking, the road in front of the building has been formed but the road to give access to the residents in the rear portion of the property was not. Essentially that part of the undertaking as which gave benefit to the owners and developers was implemented. The petitioners cannot now seek to distinguish these portions, they have to accept both the benefit and the obligations together or not at all.

¶332

21.9. This Court accordingly finds and holds that the conversion order condition and the undertaking together obligated the owners/Petitioner to make the road portion available for use as a public road as a condition precedent for plan

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sanction. 'Relinquishment' in this context means making the land available for road use and bearing the cost of forming it, it does not mean a permanent transfer of title without any process.

¶337

Answer to Point No. (iii): Whether the undertaking dated 10.05.2012 executed by Eshwar Naidu was restricted only to the improvement of the frontage road, footpath and skywalk abutting the premises, or whether it extended to the formation and improvement of the entire access road leading to the properties situated behind the apartment complex?

¶338

22.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the undertaking has two distinct obligations, the first relating to the frontage footpath and skywalk ('in front of the premises'), and the second using the phrase 'entire road'. He submits that 'entire road' should be read contextually to mean the road abutting and immediately adjacent to the premises, not a new road carved through the Schedule 'B' property on the northern and western sides. He further contends that Eshwar Naidu's letter dated 21.03.2019 itself interpreted the undertaking as confined to the frontage footpath.

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22.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that 'entire road' must be read as covering the complete access road from Mysore Road to and beyond the apartment complex, because the very purpose of the undertaking was to ensure access to residents situated behind the apartment. A frontage footpath alone would be meaningless for those residents. He further submits that Eshwar Naidu sought time to comply in his letter dated 11.03.2019, which is an acknowledgement by conduct, and that his subsequent attempt (in his letter dated 21.03.2019) to confine the undertaking to the frontage is a belated and self-serving reinterpretation.

¶343

22.3. The undertaking must be construed using settled principles of contractual interpretation: the document must be read as a whole; words must be given their ordinary meaning in context; and the purpose and circumstances of the agreement must be taken into account.

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22.4. The context is important and is not in dispute. At the time the plan was sanctioned, there was no proper road from Mysore Road to the property or

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to the properties behind the apartment complex. The reason the undertaking was insisted upon by BBMP was specifically to ensure that residents behind the apartment would have access. The local Corporator's letter dated 14.02.2012, which preceded the undertaking, specifically recommended that a 30-feet wide strip of land be provided for road formation. These communications establish the background against which the undertaking was furnished.

¶349

22.5. The phrase 'entire road' in the undertaking must be read in this specific background. 'Entire road' refers to the complete access road that was being discussed, not merely the footpath in front of the building. If the undertaking were limited to the frontage footpath and skywalk, it would have served no purpose to BBMP and would not have been accepted as a basis for plan sanction, since the frontage footpath alone does nothing to provide access to the residents behind the apartment, the very people whose complaints triggered the entire sequence of events.

¶350

22.6. The Petitioner argues that since the undertaking was drafted or required by BBMP, any ambiguity

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in its language should be resolved against BBMP. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the there is no genuine ambiguity. In the present case, reading the undertaking in context leaves no real ambiguity: 'entire road' in the context of a road-access dispute means the entire access road, not a footpath in front of the building. Second, the Petitioner's own reply dated 11.03.2019, preceding the letter seeking to confine the undertaking, sought time to comply with the road-formation obligation generally, without any qualification about the frontage only. This conduct controls any subsequently claimed restrictive interpretation.

¶355

22.7. Eshwar Naidu's letter dated 21.03.2019, which seeks to confine the undertaking to the frontage, came only after the formal notice dated 06.03.2019 calling for compliance. Its timing and context render it unreliable as an interpretive tool. The earlier reply dated 11.03.2019 (seeking time to comply) is the more authentic reflection of the parties' understanding and operates as an admission by conduct.

¶356

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22.8. This Court answers Point no. (iii) by holding that the undertaking covered the formation and improvement of the entire access road, including the portion providing access to the properties behind the apartment complex.

¶360

Answer to Point No. (iv): Whether the petitioners, having obtained sanction of the building plan and completed construction on the basis of the undertaking furnished to BBMP, are estopped from contending that the respondents could not utilise the subject land for road formation?

¶361

23.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that any estoppel on the facts of this case runs against BBMP, not the Petitioner, because it was BBMP that made representations about TDR and compensation. He submits that BBMP's conduct of surveying the land after receiving the Petitioner's conditional consent letter dated 12.03.2012 amounts to an implied acceptance of the conditional terms. He argues that the Petitioner's concession that the road cannot be removed does not constitute a waiver of the right to compensation.

¶362

23.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that the Petitioner obtained plan sanction, constructed a

¶363

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multi-storeyed residential complex, sold residential units and received the entire commercial benefit of the development, all on the basis of the undertaking. Having derived this benefit, the Petitioner now seeks compensation for the very road it agreed to provide. This is the clearest case of estoppel against the Petitioner.

¶366

23.3. He further submits that non-compliance with the undertaking could have resulted in cancellation of the plan sanction, rendering the entire construction unauthorised and potentially prejudicing hundreds of residents, harm that was averted only because BBMP formed the road at its own cost.

¶367

23.4. The doctrine of estoppel, as codified in Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, prevents a party from taking a position inconsistent with a prior representation made by it, upon which another party has acted to its detriment. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh⁶ cited by both sides through D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case , for promissory estoppel to apply there must be a clear and

¶368

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unambiguous promise, made by the promisor knowing it would be acted upon, and the promisee must have acted upon it.

¶372

23.5. The Petitioner and the landowner, through the undertaking dated 10.05.2012, made an unambiguous promise: that the road would be formed at their own cost and that BBMP could do so upon their default. BBMP acted on this promise by sanctioning the plan. The Petitioner then constructed the apartment complex, sold the units and realised the commercial benefit of the project in its entirety. This is a textbook case for estoppel against the Petitioner: an unambiguous promise, reliance by BBMP (plan sanction and eventual road formation at its own cost), and full commercial benefit to the promisor.

¶373

23.6. The Petitioner's counter-argument is that BBMP impliedly accepted the conditional terms of the consent letter dated 12.03.2012 by conducting a survey of the land thereafter. This argument is rejected. A survey of the land to identify the extent of land needed for road formation is an internal administrative step, it does not amount

¶374

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to an offer or acceptance of terms by BBMP. Acceptance, in the legal sense, requires a clear and unambiguous act communicated to the offeror. BBMP issued no such communication. The plan sanction, which was the intended commercial response to the consent letter, was given not on the basis of any TDR promise but on the basis of the undertaking dated 10.05.2012. This is the decisive indicator of BBMP's intent.

¶378

23.7. As regards the argument that estoppel runs against BBMP based on the Corporator's letter and the Petitioner's conditional consent letter, this argument is addressed fully under Point (vii) where the doctrine of promissory estoppel against BBMP is examined. For the purposes of this Point, it suffices to say that no clear and unambiguous promise was made by BBMP: the Corporator's letter was a recommendation, the plan sanction was on the basis of the undertaking, and no BBMP order ever accepted the Petitioner's conditional terms.

¶379

23.8. This Court answers point no. (iv) by holding that the Petitioner, having derived the complete

¶380

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commercial benefit of the project on the basis of the undertaking, is fully estopped from contending that BBMP could not utilise the subject land for road formation.

¶384

Answer to Point No. (v): Whether the action of BBMP in laying the road over the subject property was in exercise of its statutory powers and obligations to provide public access and infrastructure, particularly in view of the alleged failure of the petitioners to comply with the undertaking furnished by them?

¶385

24.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that even if BBMP has statutory powers relating to road formation, those powers must be exercised within constitutional limits. Section 470 of the KMC Act, he submits, is only a recovery mechanism for monetary dues, it does not confer power to permanently occupy private land without acquisition and compensation.

¶386

24.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that BBMP has a statutory duty to provide and maintain public roads. The owner's failure over years to comply with the undertaking, despite the notices dated 06.03.2019 and 23.06.2019, left BBMP with no option but to form the road itself to provide

¶387

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access to the public. Section 470 of the KMC Act specifically enables BBMP to recover the cost of doing so from the defaulting owner.

¶391

24.3. BBMP is a statutory body under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (at the relevant point of time) and has comprehensive powers and duties relating to the administration, development and maintenance of Bengaluru, including providing and maintaining public roads and civic infrastructure within its jurisdiction.

¶392

24.4. Section 470 of the KMC Act, upon which BBMP relies, reads as follows:

¶393

"470. Recovery of sums due as taxes, All costs, damages, penalties, compensation, charges, fees, rents, expenses, contributions and other sums which under this Act or any rule, bye-law or regulation made thereunder or any other law or under any contract including a contract in respect of water-supply or drainage made in accordance with this Act, and the rules, bye-laws and regulations are due by any person to the corporation shall, if there is no special provision in this Act for their recovery be demanded by bill, containing particulars of the demand and notice of the liability incurred in default of payment and may be recovered in the manner provided in Chapter X unless within fifteen days from the date of service of the bill such person shall have applied to the District Court having jurisdiction, under section 471."

¶394

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24.5. The Petitioner argues that Section 470 is only a monetary recovery provision and does not authorise physical occupation of land. That argument, while legally accurate as a general statement about the section's scope, misses the critical point. The question under this Point is not whether Section 470 authorises land acquisition, it does not, and BBMP does not claim it does. The question is whether BBMP's act of forming the road (rather than acquiring land) was within its statutory powers. The answer depends on the undertaking. The undertaking explicitly provides that if the owner fails, 'the BBMP may take up the work'. This is a contractual authorisation by the owner to BBMP to enter and carry out the road-formation work. BBMP did not permanently acquire the land, it formed the road pursuant to the owner's own contractual permission. Section 470 then provides the mechanism to recover the cost of doing so.

¶398

24.6. This Court has noted under Point (i) the procedural sequence: BBMP began laying the road on 15.02.2018, while the Section 470 notices were issued on 06.03.2019 and 23.06.2019. BBMP ideally should have issued

¶399

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the formal notices before commencing work rather than after. However, the substantive legal position is clear: the undertaking itself authorised BBMP to form the road upon the owner's default, and the owner's default was manifest, the undertaking dated 10.05.2012 required the road to be improved within three months of plan sanction (July 2012), and by 2018, over six years later, no compliance had occurred. The procedural anomaly of noticetiming does not vitiate the substantive authority.

¶402

24.7. This Court answers point No. (v) by holding that BBMP's action in forming the road was within its statutory powers and obligations, consistent with the undertaking, the conversion order condition and the framework of Section 470 of the KMC Act.

¶403

Answer to Point No. (vi): Whether the petitioners have established a legally enforceable right to claim Transferable Development Rights (“TDR”) / Development Right Certificates (“DRC”) in respect of the land utilised for the formation of the road?

¶404

25.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the Corporator's letter dated 14.02.2012, the Executive Engineer's

¶405

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report dated 25.06.2014 recommending acquisition, and the Principal Secretary's directions together create representations giving rise to a legally enforceable TDR claim. He relies on D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case and specifically on the proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 14B of the KTCP Act, as inserted by the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021, which confers TDR entitlement where land has been 'procured' by a public authority five or more years prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act but no DRC has been issued.

¶409

25.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that the TDR claim is misconceived. TDR is issued under a formal statutory scheme when land is surrendered or acquired through a prescribed legal process, not when a road is formed pursuant to a defaulted contractual undertaking. No relinquishment deed was executed, no formal TDR application was made, and no acquisition notification was issued. The road was formed at BBMP's own expense because the owner failed to do it, the owner cannot turn that default into a TDR entitlement.

¶410

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25.3. Sri G. Lakshmeesh Rao submits that TDR under the KTCP Act is issued by BDA exclusively for lands surrendered or acquired for BDA's own development schemes. Since the land was used by BBMP, not BDA, no TDR obligation falls on BDA. If any TDR obligation exists at all (which BDA does not concede), it would be for BBMP to address.

¶414

25.4. The TDR scheme under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 ('KTCP Act') is a statutory mechanism compensating landowners who surrender their land for public infrastructure by granting them tradeable development rights. Section 14B of the KTCP Act provides the framework for this scheme. The Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021 inserted a proviso to sub-section (10) of Section 14B, which reads as follows:

¶415

"Provided that, in cases where land has been procured and possession has been taken by the Public Authority five years or more prior to the date of commencement of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021 for the purpose specified above but no Development Right Certificate has been issued till the commencement of the said amendment Act, in such procurement process land owners shall be eligible for benefit of Development Rights as per the said amendment Act."

¶416

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25.5. The Petitioner relies heavily on D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case where the Coordinate Bench applied this proviso. A close reading of D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case reveals the precise factual conditions under which it was applied. The Court found (at paragraph (f) of the relevant extract): (a) a State policy in the form of a Government Notification dated 18.01.2005 promulgated under Section 14B of the KTCP Act; (b) a specific government letter dated 12.12.2011 assuring TDR to the landowners; and (c) the lands were obtained by BBMP 'pursuant to this' TDR assurance, meaning the authority actively obtained the land by promising TDR. The owners, relying on these formal governmental assurances, executed registered relinquishment deeds and handed over physical possession. Only in this complete factual matrix, statutory policy + formal assurance + registered deeds + actual possession transfer, did the Court apply the proviso and the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

¶420

25.6. The present case lacks every one of these elements. There is no Government Notification under Section 14B establishing a TDR policy

¶421

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applicable to this land. There is no government letter specifically assuring TDR to this Petitioner. No registered relinquishment deed was executed. No formal TDR application was made through any prescribed channel. The land was not 'procured' by BBMP through a TDR-backed scheme, it was used by BBMP pursuant to the owner's own undertaking on his default.

¶425

25.7. The word 'procured' in the 2021 proviso requires careful analysis. Procurement by a public authority connotes an affirmative act of the authority in obtaining land for public purposes, typically through acquisition, relinquishment under a scheme, or formal negotiation backed by policy. The proviso addresses the well-known situation where a public authority, under an established TDR scheme, took land from willing owners with a TDR promise but failed to issue the promised DRC. It remedies that specific failure of an authority that itself initiated the procurement. It was not designed to apply where the road is formed because an owner defaulted on his own contractual obligation to form it, in that situation, it is the owner who failed, not the authority, and allowing TDR in

¶426

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such a case would reward the very default that triggered BBMP's intervention.

¶430

25.8. There is a further, independent ground which conclusively establishes the absence of any bona fide TDR claim, and which arises from the timelines of the case itself. All the relevant events in this case occurred in the year 2012: the conditional consent letter was written in March 2012, the undertaking was given in May 2012, the building plan was sanctioned in July 2012, and construction commenced in 2012. The Karnataka Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act, 2021, which introduced the proviso to Section 14B(10), came into force on 05.07.2021, nearly a decade after these events. The Petitioner now invokes this 2021 amendment as the basis for its TDR entitlement.

¶431

25.9. The proviso to Section 14B(10) as inserted by the 2021 Amendment covers lands 'procured' by a public authority five years or more prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act. This means the proviso looks back to procurements from 05.07.2016 and not earlier. Arithmetically, the 2012 events do not fall within the proviso.

¶432

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The proviso was plainly designed to remedy cases where public authorities had obtained lands under an existing TDR scheme and then failed to issue the promised DRC. It was not intended as a windfall provision enabling persons to claim, with hindsight, that events which had a different legal character in 2012 should be recharacterised nine years later as 'procurement under a TDR scheme' to attract the proviso.

¶436

25.10. More fundamentally, the timeline exposes the internal contradiction at the heart of the Petitioner's case. In 2012, when the consent was given, the undertaking was furnished and the plan was sanctioned, there was no TDR scheme under which the Petitioner could reasonably have expected TDR for road-margin land in this area. The 2021 Amendment did not exist. The Government Notification dated 18.01.2005 under Section 14B, which was the basis of the TDR assurance in D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case , was either not applicable to this land or not communicated to the Petitioner as assurance. If, as the Petitioner now claims, the 2012 consent and undertaking were truly given in reliance on an expectation of TDR, the

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Petitioner would need to identify the legal basis for that expectation as it existed in 2012. The Petitioner points to nothing beyond the Corporator's letter, which, as held under Point (vii), is a recommendation and not a promise, and its own conditional consent letter, which was never accepted by BBMP.

¶441

25.11. The 2021 Amendment cannot be used retrospectively to create a TDR entitlement where none existed on the facts of the transaction as it stood in 2012. The Petitioner could not have given the 2012 consent and 2012 undertaking 'in reliance' on a 2021 statute that did not exist. The invocation of the 2021 Amendment therefore reveals not the strengthening but the weakness of the Petitioner's case, it demonstrates that the Petitioner had no contemporaneous legal basis for a TDR claim in 2012, and is attempting to clothe a 2012 contractual obligation with a 2021 legislative garment that was never intended for this purpose. This further establishes the absence of a bona fide, legally grounded TDR claim.

¶442

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25.12. This court answers Point (vi) by holding that the Petitioner has not established a legally enforceable right to TDR or DRC.

¶446

Answer to Point No. (vii): Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and fairness in State action are attracted against the respondents?

¶447

26.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that four strands of conduct together create a clear and actionable representation by BBMP that TDR or compensation would be provided: (a) the Corporator's letter dated 14.02.2012 recommending TDR to the Joint Commissioner, BBMP; (b) BBMP's receipt of the conditional consent letter dated 12.03.2012 and the subsequent survey of the land, which he argues amounts to implied acceptance of the conditional terms; (c) the Executive Engineer's report dated 25.06.2014 recommending formal acquisition; and (d) the Principal Secretary's directions to BBMP calling for acquisition-related information. He relies on Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh⁶ as cited in D.V.

¶448

6 AIR 1979 SC 621

¶449

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Venkateshappa's¹ case for the foundational principle.

¶453

26.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that none of the communications relied upon constitutes a clear and unambiguous promise by BBMP. The Corporator is a recommendation-making authority, not BBMP's decision-making authority. The survey was an internal administrative step. The Executive Engineer's report was forwarded upward, it was never acted upon and was not communicated to the Petitioner as a promise. The Principal Secretary's direction was an intragovernmental communication, not a representation to the Petitioner. The plan sanction, the only binding act by BBMP, was given on the basis of the undertaking, not on any TDR commitment.

¶454

26.3. The elements of promissory estoppel under Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills⁶ as quoted in D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case , require: (i) a promise by the promisor; (ii) made knowing it would be acted upon; (iii) actually acted upon by the promisee to his detriment; and (iv) making it inequitable to allow the promisor to resile. The

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Court now examines each of the four strands advanced by the Petitioner against this standard.

¶459

26.4. The Corporator's letter dated 14.02.2012 was a recommendation by the local elected representative to the Joint Commissioner, BBMP. A Corporator is not BBMP's decision-making authority. The letter recommended TDR, it did not promise it. A recommendation is not a promise for the purposes of promissory estoppel: it is an input into the decision-making process, not a decision. No BBMP resolution, official order or communication was ever issued by a competent BBMP functionary committing to pay TDR or compensation to the Petitioner as a result of this recommendation.

¶460

26.5. The survey of land following the receipt of the Petitioner's conditional consent letter dated 12.03.2012 is advanced as evidence of implied acceptance of the conditional terms. This argument was addressed and rejected under Point (iv). A survey is an administrative factfinding exercise, determining the extent of land needed for the road. It does not, by itself,

¶461

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communicate acceptance of any contractual terms to the Petitioner.

¶465

26.6. The Executive Engineer's report recommending acquisition (forwarded on 25.06.2014) is an internal departmental recommendation forwarded to the Additional Chief Secretary. It was not communicated to the Petitioner as a governmental decision or promise. No acquisition notification was issued following this report. The report lapsed without any consequential action. An internal administrative recommendation that leads to no decision and is not communicated to the beneficiary cannot constitute a 'promise' for promissory estoppel.

¶466

26.7. The Principal Secretary's direction to BBMP calling for acquisition details is an intragovernmental communication, from one government functionary to BBMP. It was not addressed to the Petitioner and was never communicated to the Petitioner as any kind of assurance. It has all the character of an administrative enquiry: upon receiving a complaint, the Principal Secretary asked BBMP

¶467

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to explain what was happening. That is not a representation to the Petitioner.

¶471

26.8. The contrast with D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case is once again decisive. In that case, as discussed under Point (vi), the TDR assurance came from a Government Notification (statutory policy) and a specific government letter, both of which are formal, authoritative governmental acts addressed to the class of affected persons. The present case has none of these: no statutory policy notification, no formal government letter to this Petitioner, no BBMP decision accepting the conditional terms, no relinquishment deed executed in reliance on any promise.

¶472

26.9. The doctrine of legitimate expectation requires a clear and consistent public law representation, by conduct, practice or promise, upon which a reasonable expectation is formed. The patchwork of communications here, a Corporator's recommendation, an unanswered conditional consent letter, an internal report, an intra-governmental direction, does not rise to that standard. None of these communications

¶473

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was made to the Petitioner as an authoritative assurance by BBMP.

¶477

26.10. As regards 'fairness in State action', the Court notes that it is the owner who made the unambiguous promise, the undertaking, and then defaulted on it. BBMP formed the road at its own expense to provide public access to residents who had been denied it for years. BBMP's conduct is not unfair. If anything, requiring BBMP to additionally pay compensation or TDR for work it had to do because of the owner's default would be the genuinely unfair outcome.

¶478

26.11. This Court answers point No. (vii) by holding that the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and fairness in State action are not attracted against the Respondents on the facts of this case.

¶479

Answer to Point No. (viii): Whether the petitioners are entitled to monetary compensation in lieu of the land utilised for the formation of the road and, if so, the nature and extent thereof?

¶480

27.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the amendment allowed

¶481

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on 01.04.2021 introduced Prayer b(i) seeking monetary compensation under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. He submits that since BBMP has permanently occupied the Petitioner's land for a public road without formal acquisition, this constitutes a de facto acquisition and compensation is obligatory. He argues that even where no formal acquisition notification is issued, courts apply the principles of the RFCTLARR Act when land is permanently occupied for public purposes. He contends that BBMP would be unjustly enriched if it retains the benefit of a public road without paying any compensation. He relies on D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case , A.Babu's² case and Srinivas Murthy's⁵ case .

¶485

27.2. Sri N.R. Jagadeeswara submits that no compensation is payable. The road was formed pursuant to the owner's own undertaking, the owner agreed that BBMP could do so and recover costs. If anything, BBMP is the party entitled to recover money from the Petitioner, not the other way around. The Petitioner seeks to be doubly enriched, first by the project returns enabled by the plan sanction, and second by compensation

¶486

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for the road that was the very condition for that plan sanction.

¶490

27.3. The Petitioner raises two distinct legal theories to support the compensation claim: (a) de facto acquisition, that permanent occupation of land for a public purpose is equivalent to acquisition, attracting RFCTLARR Act compensation regardless of formal procedure; and (b) unjust enrichment, that BBMP has been enriched by a public road it has not paid for, at the Petitioner's expense.

¶491

27.4. As regards de facto acquisition: the de facto acquisition doctrine applies where the State permanently occupies private land for public use without following any legal process, thereby depriving the owner of his property without authority of law. In such cases, courts have consistently held that compensation must be paid as if formal acquisition had been initiated. The doctrine is premised on involuntary dispossession, the owner did not consent to the taking. In the present case, however, the owner voluntarily agreed, by the undertaking, that BBMP could form the road upon his default. The

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occupation of the land for road formation is therefore not an involuntary dispossession triggering the de facto acquisition doctrine. The foundational premise is absent.

¶496

27.5. As regards unjust enrichment: the unjust enrichment argument would have force if BBMP had received a benefit from the Petitioner without any corresponding legal basis, i.e., if the Petitioner had given something for nothing. But the transaction here is not one of gift or gratuitous transfer. The owner agreed to form the road as the price for plan sanction. The plan sanction was given. The Petitioner realised the full commercial benefit of the project. BBMP, on the owner's default, performed the obligation the owner agreed to perform, and spent its own funds in doing so. It is BBMP, not the Petitioner, that has an unjust enrichment claim, BBMP spent money doing work the owner had agreed to do at his own cost.

¶497

27.6. As regards the RFCTLARR Act, 2013: the Act applies to compulsory acquisition of land pursuant to a statutory acquisition notification under that Act or other applicable laws. It

¶498

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operates on the premise that the government is compelling an unwilling owner to part with property. Where the owner has agreed, by contractual undertaking, to make land available for a road, there is no 'compulsory acquisition' in the statutory sense. The RFCTLARR Act is not designed to apply to, and cannot be extended to cover, road formation pursuant to a voluntary contractual undertaking.

¶502

27.7. The three decisions relied upon by the Petitioner, D.V. Venkateshappa¹ , A.Babu² and Srinivas Murthy⁵ , are all cases of involuntary taking without any contractual basis. In each case, the authority either breached an express TDR promise or acted entirely without legal foundation. Those cases do not assist the Petitioner on these facts, for the reasons detailed in Points (i), (vi) and (vii) above.

¶503

27.8. This Court answers point no. (viii) by holding that the Petitioner is not entitled to monetary compensation. BBMP's right to recover the cost of road formation from the Petitioner and the landowners under the undertaking and Section

¶504

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470 of the KMC Act is expressly preserved and is not affected by this judgment.

¶508

Answer to Point No. (ix): Whether any direction can be issued against the Bangalore Development Authority for the issuance of TDR certificates in the facts of the present case?

¶509

28.1. Shri G.V. Sudhakar, learned counsel for the Petitioner, included BDA as Respondent No.5 in the prayer for TDR, on the basis that BDA is the appropriate authority for issuance of TDR under the KTCP Act framework.

¶510

28.2. Sri G. Lakshmeesh Rao submits categorically that BDA has no role in this controversy. The land was utilised by BBMP. BDA played no part in the road formation, took no possession and has no administrative jurisdiction over the subject matter. TDR issued by BDA is exclusively for lands surrendered or acquired for BDA's own development schemes. No direction of any nature lies against BDA.

¶511

28.3. Since this Court has held under Point (vi) that the Petitioner has not established any legally enforceable right to TDR, the question of which authority should issue TDR does not arise on the facts. The TDR claim fails at the threshold.

¶512

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28.4. Even otherwise, BDA is completely uninvolved in the present controversy, factually, legally and administratively. The undertaking was given to BBMP, the road was formed by BBMP, and the dispute is entirely between the Petitioner and BBMP. BDA has no statutory, contractual or factual connection to the subject matter of this petition. No direction of any kind can be issued against BDA.

¶516

28.5. This Court answers point no. (ix) by holding that no direction can be issued against BDA.

¶517

29. Answer to Point No. (x): What order?

¶518

29.1. Having addressed all the Points for Determination, the cumulative position is as follows:

¶519

29.1.1. The formation of the road is not violative of Article 300A, the owner's voluntary undertaking negated the element of nonconsensual deprivation that Article 300A guards against.

¶520

29.1.2. The conversion order condition and the undertaking together obligated the owners/Petitioner to make the road

¶521

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portion available for public use as a condition for plan sanction, the 'relinquishment' being of the right to use for road purposes, not a transfer of title.

¶525

29.1.3. The undertaking extended to the entire access road, not merely the frontage. The owner's own conduct corroborates BBMP's interpretation.

¶526

29.1.4. The Petitioner, having derived full commercial benefit on the basis of the undertaking, is fully estopped from contending that BBMP could not form the road.

¶527

29.1.5. BBMP's road formation was within its statutory powers, was authorised by the undertaking on the owner's default, and was in accordance with Section 470 of the KMC Act.

¶528

29.1.6. The Petitioner has not established a legally enforceable right to TDR/DRC. The factual prerequisites for D.V. Venkateshappa's¹ case and the 2021 proviso are absent.

¶529

80 -

¶530

NC: 2026:KHC:25590 WP No. 8635 of 2019

¶531

HC-KAR

¶532

29.1.7. No clear and unambiguous promise of TDR or compensation was made by BBMP. Promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation and fairness in State action are not attracted against the Respondents.

¶533

29.1.8. The de facto acquisition doctrine does not apply, the taking was consensual under the undertaking. Unjust enrichment, if any, runs in favour of BBMP. The RFCTLARR Act does not apply. The Petitioner is not entitled to monetary compensation.

¶534

29.1.9. No direction can be issued against BDA.

¶535