R. Chamappa S/O T.R. Ranganaik Vs the Commissioner

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1 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:911 WP No. 60831 of 2011

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 23^RD DAY OF JANUARY 2026 BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA WRIT PETITION NO. 60831 OF 2011 (S-DIS)

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BETWEEN:

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R. CHAMAPPA S/O. T.R. RANGANAIK AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: RTD. SECOND DIVISION ASSISTANT, HUBLI-DHARWAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, HUBLI.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. ANANT P.SAVADI, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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THE COMMISSIONER HUBLI-DHARWAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, HUBLI-580020.

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THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY ITS SECERTARY TO GOVERNMENT, URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, VIKAS SOUDHA, BANGALORE-560001.

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MANJANNA E

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ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRIES-1, KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, BANGALORE.

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…RESPONDENTS

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Digitally signed by MANJANNA E Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH Date: 2026.02.04 10:28:04 +0530

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(BY SRI. R.H.ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SMT. NANDINI B.SOMAPUR, AGA FOR R2; SRI. ANIL KALE, ADVOCATE FOR R3)

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THIS WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER NO.HDMC 22 GAE 98 DATED 30/08/2010 PASSED BY THE 1^ST RESPONDENT, THE COPY OF WHICH IS PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A, BY ALSO QUASHING THE ENQUIRY REPORT OF THE 3^RD RESPONDENT DATED 12/09/2005 AND NO.LOK/ARE-1/ENQ-60/2002-03 IN ANNEXURE-G; A DIRECTION MAY KINDLY ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENT TO RELEASE ALL THE SERVICE BENEFITS OF THE PETITIONER INCLUDING THE PENSION AMOUNT AND ETC.

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THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDER THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA

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ORAL ORDER

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The petitioner has called in question the order dated 30.08.2010, passed by respondent No.1, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry and consequently, denied service and pensionary benefits, and has sought quashing of the said order along with the direction to release all terminal benefits.

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Brief facts:

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The petitioner was appointed as a Second Division Assistant in Hubballi-Dharwad Municipal Corporation in the year 1976. While he was working, under Birth and Death Registration Section, a complaint was lodged before the Lokayukta alleging demand and acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs.200/- for issuance of

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death certificates. A trap was conducted and the tainted amount was recovered from the petitioner.

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Parallel criminal proceedings were initiated, in which, the petitioner came to be acquitted by judgment dated 30.12.2004, granting benefit of doubt. Independently, a departmental enquiry was initiated, the Enquiry Officer found the charges proved and recommended dismissal. Based on the said recommendation, an order of dismissal dated 21.07.2006 was passed. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No.10450/2006, which

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came to be allowed on 29.07.2010, not on merits of the charges, but solely on the ground that the enquiry report had not been furnished before imposition of penalty. The matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority from the stage of furnishing the enquiry report. Thereafter, after furnishing the enquiry report and considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order dated 30.08.2010, again

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dismissing the petitioner from service on the last day of his superannuation.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned dismissal order is vitiated by non-application of mind and mechanical deterioration of the earlier order. It is submitted that the petitioner having been acquitted in the criminal case, continuation of disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalty is arbitrary. The punishment of dismissal imposed on the date of superannuation is grossly disproportionate. It is submitted that the entire proceedings suffer from procedural irregularities and violation of principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the show-cause notice and the final order are without jurisdiction and competence.

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Per contra , learned counsel for the respondents submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with law, and the charges of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification stood proved by cogent

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evidence. The acquittal in criminal case was only on a benefit of doubt and does not preclude disciplinary action. After remand by this Court in W.P.No.10450/2006, the enquiry report was duly furnished and the petitioner was afforded full opportunity. The impugned order is passed by the competent authority with due application of mind.

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Having heard the learned counsel for the parties,

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the point that arises for consideration is:

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“Whether the petitioner has made out a ground for interference with the impugned order of dismissal dated 30.08.2010?”

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On careful consideration of the rival submission

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and the material on record, this Court answers the point framed for consideration in negative for the following reasons:

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i. It is well settled that in matters arising out of disciplinary enquiry, this Court does not sit in appeal as an appellate authority to re-appreciate

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evidence. Interference is warranted only if the enquiry is vitiated by perversity, violation of statutory rules or principles of natural justice. No such infirmity is demonstrated in the present case.

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ii. The earlier W.P.No.10450/2006, was allowed only on the ground of non-furnishing of the enquiry report. After remand, the enquiry report was admittedly furnished and the petitioner submitted his reply. Therefore, the procedural defect pointed out earlier cured, and the disciplinary authority was justified in proceeding to pass a fresh order. The acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case was not an honorable acquittal but one based on the benefit of doubt. The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is entirely different from that of that in departmental enquiries.

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iii. The evidence on record before the Enquiry Officer

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was sufficient to establish the misconduct on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.

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iv. The contention regarding lack of competency of

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the authority issuing the show-cause notice is wholly untenable. Significantly, this ground was not raised by the petitioner in the earlier W.P.No.10450/2006, though the very same proceedings and authority were under challenge. Having failed to raise such a plea at the earliest opportunity, the petitioner is deemed to have waived the said objection. A party cannot be permitted to raise such technical plea in a peaceful manner after having participated in the proceedings without demur.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed

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reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Chairman-

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cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. and Others

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Vs. Ananta Saha and Others¹ (Ananta Saha) to contend

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that if initial action is vitiated in law, any subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same and that the legal maxim Sublato fundamento cadit opus meaning that when the foundation is removed, the superstructure would not apply. There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the said decision. However, the applicability to the said principle depends upon finding that foundation itself is illegal or non est in the eye of law.

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The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is questioning the authority of the Lokayukta to initiate the complaint, trigger consequential proceedings and issue consequential notice is equally devoid of merit. The Lokayukta, under the provisions of the Lokayukta Act is statutory empowered to receive complaints, conduct investigation or enquiry into allegations of corruptions or maladministration against public servants and upon being satisfied to submit a report and recommendation to the

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1 (2011) 5 SCC 142

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competent authority. The role of the Lokayukta is thus not adjudicatory but recommendatory and ultimate decision to impose penalty rests with the Disciplinary Authority alone.

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In the present case, the Lokayukta has acted strictly within the four corners of the statute by initiating enquiry on receipt of the complaint, conducting investigation in accordance with law, and forwarding its report to the competent authority. The issuance of notice, holding enquiry, submitting of enquiry report, continuation of disciplinary proceedings thereafter were undertaken by the Disciplinary Authority, who independently applied its mind to the enquiry report and the reply submitted by the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be contended that Lokayukta, who served the powers of Disciplinary Authority are acted without jurisdiction.

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It is also significant to note that the petitioner had participated in the enquiry proceedings without demur, submitted his explanation and contested the matter on

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merits. No challenge to the competence or jurisdiction of

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the Lokayukta was raised at the stage of enquiry nor was such a plea urged in the earlier writ petition. Even otherwise, mere initiation of a proceedings by Lokayukta does not vitiate the disciplinary action so long as the enquiry and the disciplinary proceedings as well as the final order is passed by the Competent Authority after following due process, which has been done in the present case. Accordingly, the objections relating to competency of competence or authority of the Lokayukta to initiate proceedings or issue notice is untenable both in law and fact and does not warrant any interference by this Court.

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The reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Syndicate Bank Vs. R. Bali Reddy² (R. Bali Reddy) is also misplaced. In the said case, the Appellate Authority has dismissed the appeal by a non-speaking one line order and the reasons

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2 ILR 2015 KAR 46

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were sought to be supplied subsequently, which was held to be impermissible in law.

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In the present case, however the impugned order is not cryptic or mechanical affirmation. The Disciplinary Authority has considered the enquiry report, the reply submitted by the petitioner and the material on record and has assigned reasons for imposing the penalty. Therefore, R. Bali Reddy's case is clearly distinguishable.

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Learned counsel appearing for the Lokayukta has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gopal Hanumanth Kase Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others³ (Gopal Hanumanth Kase) , wherein while interpreting clause 12 of Section 2 of the Karnataka Lokayuktha Act, 1984 (‘Act, 1984’ for short), it has held as under:

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“Having examined the decisions aforesaid and the statutory provisions applicable to the case, we have no hesitation in finding that the petitioner answers to the

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3 WP.No.5674/2018 D.D 13.04.2018

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definition of “public servant” as occurring in clause (12) of Section 2 of the Act of 1984, being in the service of local authority in the State of Karnataka; and in his case, the Competent Authority for the purpose of dealing with the matter under the Act of 1984 would be such Authority, as may be prescribed, by virtue of subclause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2 thereof. The relevant clauses read as under:

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“2. Definitions.-

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xxx

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(4) “competent authority” in relation to a public servant means,-

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(a) in the case of Chief Minister or a member of the State Legislature, the Governor acting in his direction;

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(b) in the case of a Minister or Secretary, the Chief Minister;

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(c) in the case of a Government servant other than a Secretary, the Government of Karnataka;

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(d) in the case of any other public servant, such authority as may be prescribed;

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(12) “public servant” means a person who is or was at any time,-

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xxx

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(g) a person in the service or pay of,-

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(i) a local authority in the State of Karnataka xxx”

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It has been pointed out that under the Rules of 1985, the Government of Karnataka is the prescribed

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Competent Authority for the public servants referred to in sub-clause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2 of the Act of 1984. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1985, reads as under:

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“3. Competent Authority.- In respect of the public servants referred to in sub-clause (d) of clause (4) of Section 2, the Government of Karnataka shall be the Competent Authority.”

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In view of the above, the submission that the matter has not been dealt with by the Competent Authority because of applicability of the Rules of 2010 to the service of the petitioner, is required to be rejected. Even under the said Rules of 2010, it is but clear that the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 do apply in regard to the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The applicability of the said Rules of 1957 is distinctly stated in clause (1) of Rule 11 of the Rules of 2010, which reads as under:

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“11. Application of certain other rules: Without prejudice to these rules, the provisions of,-

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(1) The Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 shall apply subject to modifications specified in Schedule III.

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xxx”

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Of course, under the said clause (1) of Rule 11, the Rules of 1957 apply to the employees like the petitioner, subject to the modifications specified in Schedule III to the Rules of 2010. But, such

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modifications in Schedule III have no bearing on the subject matter of this petition. Under the said Schedule-III, only the authorities, who are competent to impose punishment, as also the Appellate Authorities have been specified. Such provisions do not, in any manner, nullify or override the effect of the Act of 1984 and the Rules made thereunder. The first submission as made on behalf of the petitioner is, therefore, required to be rejected.”

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The Division Bench categorically held that a public servant in service of a local authority falls within the sweep of the said definition and that the competent authority for the purpose of action under Act, 1984 is to be determined having regard to the nature of service and controlling authority. The Division Bench, after an elaborate examination of the statutory scheme and relevant provisions, has observed that the operation of Act, 1984, is not in any manner nullified, diluted or overridden by any other service regulations. The said principle squarely applies to the present case and answers the objections raised as to the jurisdiction and competency against the petitioner.

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The misconduct proved against the petitioner

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relates to demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which strikes at the root of public service. Such misconduct cannot be treated lightly. That punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference.

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For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition and the impugned order does not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness or jurisdictional error warranting interference. Accordingly, the following:

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ORDER

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The writ petition is dismissed.

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Sd/JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA

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AT Ct:VH List No.: 1 Sl No.: 25

R. Chamappa S/O T.R. Ranganaik v. the Commissioner

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R. Chamappa S/O T.R. Ranganaik v. the Commissioner

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