M/S Sodexo Food Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. Vs B Keshava Murthy

1 -

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

HC-KAR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17^TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI M WRIT PETITION NO. 58747 OF 2013 (L-TER)

¶5

BETWEEN:

¶6

M/S. SODEXO FOOD SOLUTIONS INDIA PVT. LTD., 1^ST FLOOR, GEMSTAR COMMERCIAL COMPLEX, RAMACHANDRA LANE, KANCHAPADA, MALAD WEST, MUMBAI-400 064, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE PRESIDENT-HR.

¶7

...PETITIONER

¶8

(BY SRI. K.PRABHAKAR RAO, ADVOCATE)

¶9

AND:

¶10

B. KESHAVA MURTHY S/O LATE SRI. G.BALASUNDARAM, NO.465, 13^TH MAIN, OPP. PRIYADARSHINI CONVENT, MANJUNATHANAGAR III STAGE, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶11

Digitally signed by PREMCHANDRA M R Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

¶12

(BY SRI.V.S.NAIK, ADVOCATE)

¶13

…RESPONDENT

¶14

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, SEEKING CERTAIN RELIEFS.

¶15

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS AT PRINCIPAL BENCH BENGALURU ON 26.02.2026, LISTED FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER AT DHARWAD BENCH THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, THE ORDER IS PRONOUNCED AS UNDER:

¶16

2 -

¶17

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶18

HC-KAR

¶19

CAV ORDER

¶20

Sri.K.Prabhakar Rao, counsel for the petitioner and Sri.V.S.Naik, counsel for the respondent, appeared in person.

¶21

The captioned Writ Petition is filed seeking a Writ of Certiorari to quash the award dated:07.06.2013 passed by the Court of III Addl. Labor Court, Bengaluru, in I.D.No.84/2009 vide Annexure-V.

¶22

For convenience's sake, the parties shall be referred

¶23

to as per their status and ranking and before the Labor court.

¶24

4. The petition averments are as follows:

¶25

The first party was appointed as an Office Assistant in the year 1985. Subsequently, two charge sheets dated 14.11.2006 and 18.04.2007 were issued against him, alleging acts of misconduct, including misappropriation of employees' salaries and insubordination.

¶26

Pursuant to the issuance of the charge sheets, departmental inquiry proceedings were initiated. The Inquiry Officer conducted a detailed inquiry into the allegations contained in both charge sheets. Upon completion of the

¶27

3 -

¶28

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶29

HC-KAR

¶30

inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charges contained in the charge sheet dated 14.11.2006 were proved, whereas the charges contained in the charge sheet dated 18.04.2007 were not proved.

¶31

Based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the respondent was issued a second show-cause notice by the disciplinary authority. The respondent submitted his explanation to the said notice. After considering the inquiry report and the respondent’s reply, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 09.03.2009 dismissing the respondent from service.

¶32

Aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the first party raised an industrial dispute in I.D. No. 84/2009 before the Labor Court at Bengaluru. The Labor Court, after considering the material on record, held that the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management was fair and proper.

¶33

However, by its Award dated 07.06.2013, the Labor Court allowed the claim petition in part. The Labor Court set aside the order of dismissal dated 09.03.2009 passed by the disciplinary authority and directed the Management to reinstate the

¶34

4 - NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶35

HC-KAR

¶36

workman to his original post within one month from the date on which the award becomes enforceable. The Labor Court further directed payment of 25% back wages, while imposing a penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect, and granted continuity of service along with all other consequential benefits.

¶37

Being aggrieved by the said Award, the petitioner– Management has filed the present Writ Petition before this Court, challenging the Award on various grounds as set out in the Memorandum of Writ Petition.

¶38

Counsel for the respective parties urged several contentions.

¶39

Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following decisions:

¶40

1. MANAGING DIRECTOR, BALASAHEB DESAI SAHAKARI S.K.LIMITED V/S. KASHINATH GANAPATI KAMBALE reported in 2009 2 SCC 288.

¶41

5 - NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶42

HC-KAR

¶43

2. DELHI HIGH COURT - PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK V/S. SMT.SNEH AGGARWAL reported in 2023 LLR 1108.

¶44

3. OM PAL SINGH V/S. DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY AND OTHERS reported in (2020) 3 SCC 103

¶45

Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the following decision:

¶46

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND OTHERS V/S. KUNJ BEHARI MISRA. CHIEF PERSONNEL (DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY), PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND OTHERS V/S. SHANTI PRASAD GOEL reported in AIR 1998 SC 2713.

¶47

Heard the arguments and perused the Writ papers and the records with care.

¶48

As the facts are already clearly articulated, repetition is deemed unnecessary. The second party alleged

¶49

that the first party misappropriated the amount via a pawnbroker. Following disciplinary proceedings where the charge remained unproven by the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority exercised its discretion to dismiss the first party from service. The Labor Court's award is called into

¶50

6 -

¶51

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶52

HC-KAR

¶53

question on several grounds: it is deemed perverse, illegal, and unsustainable under the law.

¶54

It has been specifically contended on behalf of the second party that the Inquiry officer and the Labor Court erred by failing to apply the preponderance of the evidence test, incorrectly imposing a higher standard of proof.

¶55

Much of the argument challenges the procedural integrity of the dismissal, specifically the failure to record tentative reasons for disagreement with the inquiry report, specifically citing the failure to share the Disciplinary Authority’s tentative reasons, and communicate the same to the employee, coupled with the unauthorized dismissal order passed by the Senior Manager i.e., the lack of authority of the Senior Manager to dismiss, and the perverse exercise of discretionary power by the Labor Court.

¶56

Against the backdrop of these rival submissions, the following points fall for consideration.

¶57

Whether, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India,

¶58

7 -

¶59

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶60

HC-KAR

¶61

the High Court is empowered to examine the validity of the findings recorded in a domestic enquiry and interfere with the enquiry report where the Inquiry Officer has failed to apply the test of preponderance of probabilities , thereby rendering the findings perverse?

¶62

Whether the Inquiry Officer and the Labor Court have committed an error of law in not applying the test of preponderance of probabilities , and instead subjecting the dispute to a higher standard of proof than that applicable to disciplinary proceedings in industrial disputes?

¶63

Whether the Senior Manager was the competent authority to pass the order of dismissal against the first party, and if not, whether the dismissal order is liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?

¶64

It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction

¶65

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the

¶66

8 - NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶67

HC-KAR

¶68

evidence recorded in a domestic inquiry. However, the High Court is empowered to exercise the power of judicial review to examine whether the findings recorded in such an inquiry are perverse, arbitrary, or based on no evidence.

¶69

The principal ground of challenge in the present case is that the findings of the Inquiry Officer are perverse, since the Inquiry Officer failed to apply the well-established test of preponderance of probabilities, which is the applicable standard of proof in departmental and disciplinary proceedings. A failure to apply this settled standard may render the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer legally unsustainable.

¶70

Therefore, although the High Court ordinarily refrains from re-appreciating evidence, it may interfere with and set aside an inquiry report where the findings are demonstrated to be perverse, irrational, or contrary to the settled principles governing disciplinary proceedings.

¶71

The second party has alleged that the first party had fraudulently misused five cheques by illegally negotiating the same with a pawnbroker. Having answered Point No. 1 in

¶72

9 -

¶73

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶74

HC-KAR

¶75

the affirmative, this Court now proceeds to consider Point No. 2.

¶76

It is not in dispute that on 28.08.2006, the second party received 79 cheques drawn on ICICI Bank, the banker of the second party, from its Mumbai Corporate Office, representing full and final settlement amounts payable to employees who had resigned or left the organization. The cheques were issued for different amounts corresponding to the respective employees’ dues.

¶77

The controversy arises from the allegation that five of these cheques were misused and negotiated through a pawnbroker, which forms the basis of the charge of misappropriation against the first party.

¶78

The second charge levelled against the first party pertains to the misuse of five cheques and the consequent misappropriation of the amount. It is the case of the second party that when the said cheques were found to be missing, an internal inquiry was conducted. During the course of such inquiry, it was allegedly revealed that a pawnbroker, namely Mr

¶79

10 -

¶80

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶81

HC-KAR

¶82

Sohnalal of Srirampura, had deposited the said cheques and got them discounted.

¶83

The evidence relied upon by the Management indicates that the pawnbroker had stated that he had paid a sum of Rs.80,000/- in cash to the first party in consideration of the said cheques. The records further disclose that on 13.03.2007, a written statement was given by a close relative of the first party as well as by the pawnbroker. In the said statement, it was indicated that in September 2006, the first party had approached Mr Sunil and requested him to introduce him to a pawnbroker for the purpose of encashing the cheques.

¶84

From the original records produced before this Court, it is evident that the written statements/letters of the close relative and the pawnbroker formed part of the materials placed before the Inquiry Officer. In his letter, Mr Sunil stated that the pawnbroker, Mr Sohnalal, had paid the amount to the first party, whereas Mr Sohnalal stated that Mr Sunil had introduced the first party to him and requested him to assist in encashing the cheques at a discounted value, pursuant to which he paid the amount in cash.

¶85

11 -

¶86

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶87

HC-KAR

¶88

In the present case, the aforesaid material was very much available on record before the Inquiry Officer, who was required to assess the same while conducting the departmental inquiry. In such proceedings, the applicable standard of proof is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal trials, but the test of preponderance of probabilities. However, a careful examination of the inquiry report indicates that the Inquiry Officer proceeded on an erroneous premise, as though the charge had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. By adopting such a higher standard of proof, the Inquiry Officer failed to properly appreciate the evidentiary value of the statements and documents placed before him. Had the correct test of preponderance of probabilities been applied, the material available on record, including the written statements of the pawnbroker and the close relative of the first party, would have required proper consideration to determine whether the charge was more probable than not. It is well settled that disciplinary proceedings are not criminal trials, and the strict standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not applicable. Instead, the findings in such proceedings must be based on the preponderance of probabilities.

¶89

12 -

¶90

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶91

HC-KAR

¶92

Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the Inquiry Officer failed to apply the correct legal standard while appreciating the evidence, and consequently, the conclusion that the second charge was not proved cannot be sustained in law. The inquiry report, to that extent, is vitiated for failure to apply the settled test of preponderance of probabilities.

¶93

It has been vehemently contended on behalf of the first party that the Senior Manager did not possess the authority to pass the order of dismissal.

¶94

However, the said contention cannot be accepted. A perusal of the Certified Standing Orders governing the establishment clearly indicates that the Senior Manager is designated as the Disciplinary Authority and is vested with the power to consider the inquiry report, disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, and impose appropriate punishment, including dismissal from service. In the present case, the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority cannot be said to be contrary to law. The Senior Manager acted within the scope of the authority conferred under the Certified Standing Orders while passing the order of dismissal. Hence, in view of

¶95

13 - NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶96

HC-KAR

¶97

the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the dismissal order was passed by the Senior Manager acting within the scope of the authority conferred under the Certified Standing Orders. Consequently, the order of dismissal is not liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

¶98

Further, the Labor Court, despite having held that the domestic inquiry was fair and proper, failed to appreciate that the material available on record satisfied the test of preponderance of probabilities. Instead of confirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, the Labor Court proceeded to interfere with the punishment by exercising its discretionary power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such exercise of discretion, in the absence of cogent and convincing reasons, cannot be sustained in law. The modification of the punishment appears to have been made casually and without adequate justification, rendering the impugned award legally unsustainable.

¶99

To conclude, it may be observed that this case presents an interesting industrial dispute where the well-settled test of preponderance of probabilities in departmental and disciplinary

¶100

14 -

¶101

NC: 2026:KHC:15566 WP No. 58747 of 2013

¶102

HC-KAR

¶103

proceedings appears to have lost its relevance, as the Inquiry

¶104

Officer and the Labor Court applied a higher standard of proof akin to criminal proceedings, resulting in conclusions that are unsustainable in law.

¶105

As the first party has not challenged the modification of the punishment, the dismissal order is confirmed in its entirety. Consequently, the Award of the Labor Court dated 07.06.2013, to the extent it set aside the order of dismissal, is hereby set aside. As the dismissal order is confirmed, the second party is directed to stop the payment of 17(B) wages to the first party.

¶106

13. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed .

¶107

Sd/(JYOTI M) JUDGE

¶108

MRP

¶109

List No.: 19 Sl No.: 1

M/S Sodexo Food Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. B Keshava Murthy

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

M/S Sodexo Food Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. B Keshava Murthy

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt.Shantawwa W/O. Ramchandra Kalal Vs the Chief Officer

Smt. M. Shobha, Vs the State of Karnataka

North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Vs Shri Pramod S/O Jinnappa Ningannavar Since Deceased Rep. by His Lrs

Mr Shabbir Rasulsab Mujawar Vs the State of Karnataka

Neeraj Kumar Sharma Vs the State of Karnataka

Vikas Souharda Co. Operative Bank Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals