Dismissed

Sri Umamaheshwar v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC12 Jun 2026WP/25199/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court dismissed two writ petitions filed to quash FIRs registered against petitioners regarding cooperative society plot disputes. It held that civil suits do not bar criminal prosecution where forgery is alleged and maintained that quashing requires no cognizable offence to be disclosed.

What did the court decide?

Writ petitions stood dismissed and any interim orders operating therein were dissolved.

Sri Umamaheshwar Vs State of Karnataka — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Karnataka HC (2026)

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Reserved on : 07.04.2026 Pronounced on : 12.06.2026

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 12^TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

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WRIT PETITION No.25199 OF 2025 (GM - RES)

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C/W

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WRIT PETITION No.7176 OF 2025 (GM - RES)

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IN WRIT PETITION No.25199 OF 2025

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BETWEEN:

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Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY

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Location: High Court of Karnataka

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1 . SRI UMAMAHESHWAR AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, S/O LATE BASAPPA, RESIDING AT:NO.155, HEMAGIRI NIVASA, NEAR ASHOKA PILLAR, 1^ST BLOCK, JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 011.

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2 . SRI KUSHAL H.M., AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, S/O MAHESHAPPA H.B RESIDING AT: NO. 151/E, 2^ND CROSS, REVANNA SIDDAPPA LAYOUT, KANCHAGHATTA EXTENSION,

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TIPTUR, KARNATAKA – 572 201.

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... PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W SRI MAYUR D.BHANU, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY SHO RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY SPP HIGH COURT BUILDING AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 560 001.

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2 . K.CHANDRAMMA AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS W/O G.NARAYANA NAIDU RESIDINGAT: FLAT NO.302, AKSHAYA RESIDENCY, NO.46 AND 47/1, ANJANAPPA LAYOUT, NEAR AYYAPPA SWAMY LAYOUT, YELACHENAHALLI, J.P.NAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 078.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1; SRI N KHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DATED 09.08.2025 IN CRIME NO. 247/2025 REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 316(2), 318(4), 336(2), 336(3), 351(2), 352, 61(2) READ WITH SECTION 3(5) OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 PENDING ON THE FILE OF IV ADDITIONAL CHIEF

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JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, AT BENGALURU, IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED. (ANNEXURE-A).

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IN WRIT PETITION No.7176 OF 2025

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BETWEEN:

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1 . SARASWATHI KERSARKAR AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, SECRETARY, VISHWA BHARATHI HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.35, RATHNAVILASA ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU – 560 004.

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2 . LATHA M., AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, W/O HIMAGIRI RESIDING AT:NO.315, 3^RD CROSS, 2^ND BLOCK, 3^RD PHASE, BANASHANKARI III STAGE, BENGALURU – 560 085.

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3 . HIMAGIRI

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AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 315, 3^RD CROSS, 2^ND BLOCK, 3^RD PHASE, BANASHANKARI III STAGE, BENGALURU – 560 085.

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4 . UMA MAHESHWARA

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AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, PRESIDENT VISHWA BHARATHI HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT

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NO.35, RATHNAVILASA ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU – 560 004.

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5 . SANDHYA RANI VICE PRESIDENT VISHWA BHARATHI HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.35, RATHNAVILASA ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU – 560 004. ... PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W SRI H.S. CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY SHO RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY SPP HIGH COURT BUILDING AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 560 001. 2 . SMT. PALLAVI G., AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, W/O VINOD A.C., RESIDING AT NO.14, 13^TH CROSS, OIL MILL ROAD, ARAVINDA NAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 084. ... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1; SRI SRIDHARA K., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DATED 10.01.2025 IN CRIME NO. 04/2025 OF THE RESPONDENT RAJARAJESHWARI NAGAR POLICE STATION REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 3(5), 316(2), 318(4), 329(3), 336(2), 336(3), 340, 351(2), 352, 62 AND 79 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED; (ANNEXURE-A).

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THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 07.04.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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CAV ORDER

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The petitioners are before this Court calling in question registration of crime in Crime No.4 of 2025 registered for offences punishable under Sections 3(5), 316(2), 318(4), 329(3), 336(2), 336(3), 340, 351(2), 352, 62 and 79 of the BNS in Writ Petition No.7176 of 2025 and the crime in Crime No.247 of 2025 registered for offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 336(2), 336(3), 351(2), 352, 61(2) r/w 3(5) of the BNS in Writ Petition No.25199 of 2025.

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Heard Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 in both the writ petitions; Sri K. Sridhara, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 in W.P.No.7176 of 2025 and Sri N. Khetty, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 in W.P.No.25199 of 2025.

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Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

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W.P.No.7176 OF 2025:

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3.1. One Krishna Bhat was the President of Vishwa Bharathi

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House Building Co-operative Society (‘the Society’ for short). It is alleged that during his tenure as President, he had conspired with other three Directors and had sold the same plot/site developed by the said Society to many individuals and had further conspired to transfer plots to his family members and to the Directors of the said Society, which had caused a loss of ₹19,09,54,267.66 to the Society and also to its members. The petitioners aver in the petition that after noticing the said discrepancy a complaint is made before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under Section 29C(8)(b) and

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(d) of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 (‘the Act’ for short) and on perusal of records by the Registrar, it was prima facie found that it was Krishna Bhat who was guilty of having misused the power of office of the President and had allocated sites in violation of the Rules as obtaining under the Act, as a result thereof, Krishna Bhat was disqualified as Director of the Society for a period of three years from 17-08-2009. It is the further averment of the petitioners that one Vadhiraj H.V., Secretary of the Society upon noticing that Krishna Bhat had fraudulently allocated plots developed by the Society, files a complaint before the jurisdictional Police against Krishna Bhat and three other Directors, which becomes a crime in Crime No.246 of 2012 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 r/w 120B of the IPC.

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3.2. The Society, due to the aforesaid misconduct of Krishna Bhat and others, issues publications in the newspaper on 25-122010 and 26-12-2010 informing the members that the prior executive Board had not provided the current executive Board with any information of the layout plan and other documents with

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respect to plots developed in 5^th stage of Sacchhidananda Nagar and further informed the members and purchasers of plots to approach the Society with documents to verify their allotments.

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3.3. It is the allegation in the complaint that the petitioners had changed the site layout with the intention to dispossess the 2^nd respondent from the site allocated to her. The petitioners are said to have changed the schedule of the site of respondent No.2 and re-numbered it to Site No.296/1, which was not in existence. The petitioners are alleged to have registered the said site and trespass into the same. The 2^nd respondent thus registers the subject complaint which becomes a crime in Crime No.4 of 2025 for the afore-mentioned offences. Registration of crime has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.

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W.P.No.25199 of 2025:

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This companion petition arises from similar facts. The allegation is that, a site which was allocated to the 2^nd respondent was also allotted/sold to a third party on the basis of fraudulent documents. Respondent No.2/allottee thus registers the subject

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complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.247 of 2025 for the aforementioned offences under the BNS.

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The learned senior counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the issue is purely civil in nature. The petitioners being the present office bearers of the Society have called upon the members to demonstrate allotment of plots. This can by no stretch of imagination become ingredients of the crime. He would further contend that the complainants have also instituted civil suits in O.S.No.97 of 2025 and, therefore, the crime and the civil proceedings cannot go hand in hand is the settle principle of law according to the learned senior counsel. He would, therefore, contend that the investigation, in the cases at hand, must not be permitted to continue and the crimes must be obliterated.

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Per contra , the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Sri B.N. Jagadeesha appearing for 1^st respondent/State would seek to place reliance upon the charge sheet material in Crime No.4 of 2025, which has now been registered as C.C.No.31037 of 2025 for the aforesaid offences. He would submit that there is large scale

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forgery, impersonation and several other factors that have to be unearthed in the investigation. He would submit that it is no law that a civil case and the criminal proceedings cannot go hand in hand. He would submit further that there is abundant material against these petitioners for having committed offences that are alleged against them. He would submit that the petitions must meet their fate of dismissal leaving open the remedies available to the petitioners, if any, in law.

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respondents/complainants would reiterate the submissions of the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor in contending that the petitioners are office bearers of the Society and guilty of the offences so alleged. They would seek to place reliance on the complaints to contend that the complaints are in detail as to the overt acts of the petitioners.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

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There are two complainants in the cases at hand. Criminal

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law is set into motion in both these cases by registration of complaints. The complaint registered concerning Writ Petition No.7176 of 2025 reads as follows:

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“�ೆ ��ಾಂಕ10-01-2025

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The complaint registered concerning Writ Petition No.25199 of 2025

reads as follows:

“ರವ��ೆ .

��ಾಂಕ:09.08.2025

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¶94

¶95

4/10/2024 ರಂದು KEN-1-08787-2024-25 �ೋಂNಾ:.�ೊGHರು]ಾ8�ೆ . �ಾನು ಸದ� Z[ೇಶನದ�( FUÀ C ನುಭವದ�(ರು]ೆ8ೕ�ೆ ಸದ� ಸ�%8�ೆ �ಾನು \ಾತ ªÀiÁr¹PÉÆ¼ÀÄîªÀ ¸À®ÄªÁV ©©JA¦ PÀZÉÃjUÉ ºÉÆÃV ){ಾ�.Nಾಗ ನನ�ೆ %?ದುಬಂದ Iಾb% ಏ�ೆಂದ�ೆ , )ಶ�Rಾರ% ಸಂಘವu ಸದ� Z[ೇಶನ PÉÌ ನಕ� Nಾಖiೆ ಮತು8 ನಕ� ನಂಬa Iಾl Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlರುವ ಬ�ೆ› �ೊ]ಾ8c Iಾb% ಮತು8 Nಾಖiೆಗಳನುm ಸಂಗ#bಸiಾc )ಶ�Rಾರ% ಸಂಘವu ಸದ� ನನ�ೆ Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlರುವ Z[ೇಶವ�ೆmೕ "#ೕಮ% �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ಎಂಬುವ��ೆ Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlರುತ8Nೆ . ಆದ�ೆ ಸದ� �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವರು )ಶ�Rಾರ% ಸಂಘದ�( ಸದಸJ�ೇ ಆcರುವu�ಲ( . �ಾವu ಸದ� Z[ೇಶನದ�( ಅನುಭವದ�(ರು[ಾಗiೇ ಸಂಘ[ೇ �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವ�ಂದ ರೂ . 3 ಲe ಹಣ ಪOೆದು�ೊಂಡು , ��ಾಂಕ : 19-08-2024 ರಂದು ರ"ೕ� ಸಂ\ೆJ : 1826 Zೕlರುತ8Nೆ . ನಂತರ �ಾವu �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವರು ಸದಸJ�ಾcರುವ ಬ�ೆ› ಸಂಘದ�(ರುವ ಆಡ?]ಾ��ಾ�ಯವರನುm ಪತ# ಮೂಲಕ �ೇಳiಾc , �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವರು ಸದಸJ�ೇ ಆcರುವu�ಲ( . ಚಂದ#ಮ=ರವರು ಸದಸJ�ಾcರು]ಾ8�ೆಂದು ಪತ# ಮೂಲಕ ಉತ8ರ Zೕlರು]ಾ8�ೆ .

¶96

ಸದ� ಸ�%8ನ ){ಾರ[ಾcœೕ IಾನJ .); �ಾJಾಲಯದ�( ಓ . ಎ� . ನಂ . 7705/2024 ರ�( Nಾ[ೆ ಹೂlNಾಗ �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವರು ಘನ �ಾJಾಲಯ�ೆp ಾವuNೇ ಸಂಘದ ಸದಸJತ� Nಾಖiೆಾಗ�ೕ , ಹಣ Uಾವ%.ರುವ Nಾಖiೆಗ2ಾಗ�ೕ Zೕlರುವu�ಲ( . ನಮ= ಪರ[ಾc ]ಾ]ಾpಲಕ ತOೆಾ•ೆ ಆNೇಶ[ಾcರುತ8Nೆ . ಆದ�ೆ ಈಗ ಸದ� ಸಂಘವu �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವ��ೆ ನಕ�ಾc - ಸದಸJತ� Nಾಖiೆ ಮತು8 ಹಣ ಕGH.�ೊಂಡಂ]ೆ ರ"ೕ�ಗಳನುm ಸೃkHIಾl ಯ%mಸು%8ರುವuದು %?ದುಬಂ�ರುತ8Nೆ .

¶97

PೆLMನ Iಾb%ಯನುm ಸಂಗ#b.�ೊಡುವಂ]ೆ ನಮ= ಕುಟುಂಬ 7ೆmೕbತ�ಾcರುವ "#ೕಮೂ%1 (9449666660) ರವ��ೆ Pೇಳiಾc , ಅವರು ಎiಾ( Nಾಖiೆ ಸಂಗ#b.�ೊಟHರು . ಅಲ(Nೇ "#ೕಮೂ%1ರವರು 7ೇ�ದಂ]ೆ ಮೂ�ಾಲುp ಜನ�ಂದ �ಾ�ೇ ಸದ� Z[ೇಶನ ನಂ , 288/ ಎ ಖ�ೕ�ಸುವ ಸಲು[ಾc ಆ�ಾ�ೆ› �ೈ7ಾಲ Iಾl�ೊಂಡು . ಸಂಘ�ೆp ಉIಾಮPೇಶ�aರವ��ೆ ನಗದು ರೂಪದ�( �ೊGHರುತ8Nೆ . ಮಂಜು�ಾ• ಮತು8 ಉIಾಮPೇಶ�ರವರು ಒ]ಾ8ಯ Iಾl ನಗದು ರೂಪದ�(œೕ ನ<=ಂದ ಹಣ ಪOೆದು�ೊಂlರು]ಾ8�ೆ . �ಾನು ಈಗiೇ ಅವರುಗ?ಂದ ಪOೆದು�ೊಂlರುವ �ೈ7ಾಲಗಳನುm %ೕ�ಸಲು ಕಷHಪಡು%8Nೆtೕ�ೆ .

¶98

"#ೕಮೂ%1ರವರು �ೆಲವu �ನಗಳ ನಂತರ Iಾb% ಮತು8 Nಾಖiೆ ಸಂಗ#b.�ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ನನ�ೆ Pೇ?ದುt . ಆಗ ನನ�ೆ ಖLತ[ಾದNೆtೕ�ೆಂದ�ೆ , ಸದ� ಸಂಘ , ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ , ಉIಾಮPೇಶ�a Pಾಗೂ ಇತರರು 7ೇ��ೊಂಡು ನಕ� \ಾ]ಾ Nಾಖiೆ , ಕಂNಾಯ Uಾವ%.ದಂ]ೆ ನಕ� ರ"ೕ� Pಾಗೂ ಇತ�ೆ ನಕ� Nಾಖiೆಗಳನುm ಸೃkH.�ೊಂಡು . ಈ bಂNೆ ZIಾ1ಣ Iಾlದ ಬOಾವ�ೆಯ�(ನ Z[ೇಶನದ ಸ�ರೂಪ ಮತು8 ಅಳ]ೆಯನುm ಬದiಾ:. . ಇNೇ Z[ೇಶನವನುm �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ಎಂಬುವರ Pೆಸ��ೆ

¶99

¶100

Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlದುt . ಅದ�ಾpc ಸಂಘದ�( �ೇ\ಾ nರ– Pೆಸ�ನ�( ಸದಸJತ� ಇಲ(�ದtರೂ ಈಗ ಅವರ Pೆಸ�ನ�( ಸದಸJತ� Iಾlದಂ]ೆ ನಕ�`ಾc ಸೃkH.ಲು ಯ%mಸು%8Nಾt�ೆ . ಈ ಬ�ೆ› �ಾವu �ೇ?ದ�ೆ c�ನಗರ ��ೕ� �ಾ�ೆಯ�( �ೌl"ೕಟa ಆcರುವ ರ).ಂT @ �ಾಂ• ರ) , �ೇ\ಾ nರ– , �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವರ ಪ% nರ– Pಾಗೂ ಇತರರು ನಮ= Eೕiೆ ಜಗಳ Iಾlದುt ದ «ÄÌ Pಾnದುt , �ೆಟHNಾc �ೈದು �ೆದ��ೆ Pಾnದುt , �ಾಗ Iಾl�ೊಂಡು Pೋಗುವಂ]ೆ ಆ�ಾ�ೆ› ಒ]ಾ8ಯ Iಾlರು]ಾ8�ೆ . ಅಲ(Nೇ ಆ�ಾ�ೆ› ನಮ�ೆ ಮತು8 ನಮ= ಕOೆಯುವ��ೆ 7ೈಟನುm �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವ��ೆ ^ಟುH�ೊಡುವಂ]ೆ �ೆದ��ೆ Pಾnಸು%8ರು]ಾ8�ೆ .

¶101

ಸದ� ಉIಾಮPೇಶ�a ರವರು ಅವರ ಅ?ಯ ಕುFಾ; ರವ�ೊಂ��ೆ ನಮ=ನುm "#ೕಮೂ%1ರವರ ಮ�ೆ�ೆ ಕ�ೆ.�ೊಂಡು . ಅ�( ವJವPಾರ Iಾlದುt Uಾ#Iಾqಕ[ಾc ಸಂಘದ ಕOೆ:ಂದ ಾವuNೇ ]ೊಂದ�ೆಾಗದಂ]ೆ Z[ೇಶನ �ೊಡುವuNಾc Pೇ? ಹಣ ಪOೆದು�ೊಂlದುt . ನಂತರ ಸದ� ನಮ�ೆ Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlದt Z[ೇಶನವನುm �ೇ\ಾ nರ– ರವ��ೆ Iಾ�ಾಟ Iಾlದt ಬ�ೆ› �ೇಳiಾc ಅNೇ ಉIಾಮPೇಶ ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ ಕುFಾ; ಮತು8 ರ).ಂT Pಾಗೂ ಇತರರು 7ೇ��ೊಂಡು , �ೇ�ೊಂದು 7ೈಟು ZೕಡುವuNಾc ಭರವ7ೆ Zೕlದುt , ಅದ�ಾpc ಇನೂm PೆLMನ ಹಣ �ೊಡ�ೇಕು Pಾಗೂ ನಗದು ರೂಪದ�œೕ �ೊಡ�ೇಕು ಎಂದು ಒ]ಾ8ಯ Iಾಡು%8Nಾt�ೆ .

¶102

*ನನm ವ‡ೕಸಹಜ �ಾರಣ�ಂದ �ಾJ`ಾಲಯ ದ�( Nಾ[ೆ�ೆ ಮತು8 ಸ� wÛ �ೆ ಸಂಬಂ�.ದಂ]ೆ ^ ಮುZ�ಾಜು ರವ��ೆ GPA Zೕlರು]ೆ8ೕ�ೆ . ^ ಮುZ�ಾಜು ರವರು ಸ�ತ8ನುm �ೋl�ೊಳ�@%8ರು]ಾ8�ೆ ಒಂದು �ನ �ಾಂ• ರ) ಅನುmವ ವJn8 ^ ಮುZ�ಾಜು ರವ��ೆ Iಾ�ಾ�ಾಸž ವನುm ]ೋ�. , Zಮ=ನುm ೕವದ ಸEೕತ ^ಡುವu�ಲ([ೆಂದು �ೆದ��ೆ Zೕlರು]ಾ8�ೆ .

¶103

ಆದುದ�ಂದ. ನಕ�-\ಾ]ಾ Nಾಖiೆ , ಕಂNಾಯ ]ೆ��ೆ 7ೇ�ದಂ]ೆ �*ಸH�ೆ1�ೆ �ೇ�ಾದ ಇತ�ೆ ಎiಾ( Nಾಖiೆಗಳನುm ನಕ�`ಾc ಸೃkH.�ೊಂಡು Aೕಸ Iಾlರುವ )ಶ�Rಾರ% ಸಂಘ, ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ. ಉIಾಮPೇಶ�a, ರ).ಂT @ �ಾಂ• ರ), �ೇ\ಾnರ–, nರ–, ಕುFಾ;, )ಶ�Rಾರ% Pೌ� ^�6ಂT �ೋ ಆಪ�ೇGೕ_ 7ೊ7ೈG�ೆ Pಾಗೂ ಇತರರ )ರುದ— �ಾನೂನು ಕ#ಮ �ೈ�ೊಂಡು. ನಮ�ೆ �ಾJಯ Nೊರn.�ೊlಸ�ೇ�ೆಂದು �ೋರು]ೆ8ೕ�ೆ .

¶104

ವಂದ�ೆಗ2ೆ�ಂ��ೆ .

¶105

¸ À »/-

¶106

ತಮ= )¸Áé. K. Chandrana [ಚ೦ದ#ಮ=]”

¶107

(Emphasis added at each instance)

¶108

¶109

The allegation is that the complainants have been allotted plots. They have all the documents of allotment. But, the same plots are sold to third parties by creating documents and forging the signatures, inter alia . Therefore, the complaint comes to be registered seeking investigation into the said act of forgery. In the second complaint also the offence is again identical; that the site is allotted to the complainant and the same site is sold to third parties by creating a GPA, creating other documents and by impersonation. No doubt civil suit is filed by both these parties, which cannot mean that investigation into the offence like that of forgery and impersonation cannot go hand in hand with the civil proceedings.

¶110

Jurisprudence in this regard is replete with the judgments rendered by the Apex Court that both criminal proceedings and civil cases can go hand in hand. I deem it appropriate to quote some of them. They read as follows:

¶111

10.1. The Apex Court in ROCKY v. STATE OF TELANGANA¹ has held as follows:

¶112

1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2713

¶113

¶114

“….

¶115

24. The appellant's core contention, that the dispute is purely civil in nature, is untenable at this stage. Although courts must guard against giving criminal colour to civil disputes, it is equally well settled that the existence of civil remedies does not preclude criminal prosecution where the allegations disclose the essential ingredients of an offence. Civil and criminal proceedings may validly coexist if the factual matrix supports both.”

¶116

10.2. The Apex Court in ANURAG BHATNAGAR v. STATE

¶117

(NCT OF DELHI)² has held as follows:

¶118

“…. ….. ….

¶119

45. The allegations in the application moved under Section 156(3) CrPC and the material in support thereof reveals that SHL is contending breach of the conditions of MoU dated 11.03.1995 and that it has been induced and deceived by VLS for entering into the aforesaid MoU. VLS has cheated SHL and its officers by making a false promise which was legally impossible to be carried out. The allegations of breach of conditions of the MoU or of making a false promise by itself may not give rise to any criminal action as no criminality is attached to it. However, there are elements of inducement, criminal conspiracy and cheating which are also borne out from the allegations made in the application and the complaint, which if proved, may amount to commission of an offence. Therefore, once such allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

¶120

46. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court, especially in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal Singh ,

¶121

2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1514

¶122

¶123

that the discretion to quash an FIR at a nascent stage has to be exercised with great caution and circumspection. In this connection, it would be beneficial to refer to an old case of Privy Council in King Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja wherein the law was well settled that the courts would not thwart any investigation or that the courts should be very slow in interfering with the process of investigation. It is only in rare cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed in the FIR that the court may stop the investigation so as to avoid the harassment of the alleged accused. Even in such exercise of power, the court cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint which have to be examined only after the evidence is collected.

¶124

47. The breach of conditions of the MoU or allegations of false promises in relation to the aforesaid MoU are undisputedly subject matter of the different FIRs lodged by VLS itself. Therefore, violation of those conditions for some reasons have been considered by VLS to be offensive. Therefore, the High Court rightly held that if breach of those conditions of the MoU itself has been considered to be of criminal nature by VLS, it cannot be permitted to turn around and allege that such breach of conditions would be of pure civil nature.

¶125

48. Thus, in the above facts and circumstances, we do not consider to go into detail as to the exact nature of disputes involved in the FIR and leave the same to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate court where the chargesheets have been submitted.”

¶126

10.3. In KATHYAYINI v. SIDHARTH P.S. REDDY³ the Apex

¶127

Court has held as follows:

¶128

“…. …. ….

¶129

19. We now come to the issue of bar against prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit. We

¶130

3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1428

¶131

¶132

hereby hold that no such bar exists against prosecution if the offences punishable under criminal law are made out against the parties to the civil suit. Learned senior counsel Dr.MenakaGuruswamy has rightly placed the relevant judicial precedents to support the above submission. In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S.³ , this Court has reviewed its precedents which clarify the position. The relevant paragraph from the above judgment is extracted below:

¶133

“8. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law.”

¶134

20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kuma r⁴ , this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under:

¶135

“21. … There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”

¶136

21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. ,

¶137

¶138

“17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.”

¶139

22. After surveying the abovementioned cases, this Court in K. Jagadish (supra) set aside the holding of High Court to quash the criminal proceedings and held that criminal proceedings shall continue to its logical end.

¶140

23. The above precedents set by this Court make it crystal clear that pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter, involving the same parties is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons. In present case certainly such prima facie case exists against the respondents. Considering the long chain of events from creation of family tree excluding the daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, partition deed among only the sons and grandsons of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, distribution of compensation award among the respondents is sufficient to conclude that there was active effort by respondents to reap off the benefits from the land in question. Further, the alleged threat to appellant and her sisters on revelation of the above chain of events further affirms the motive of respondents. All the above factors suggest that a criminal trial is necessary to ensure justice to the appellant.”

¶141

¶142

10.4. In PUNIT BERIWALA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)⁴

¶143

the Apex Court holds as follows:

¶144

“… …. ….

¶145

MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES

¶146

28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction , it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial. [See: Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.) , (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP , (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal , (1999) 8 SCC 686 ]”.

¶147

10.5. The Apex Court in the case of C.S. PRASAD v. C. SATYAKUMAR⁵ , has held as follows:

¶148

“….

¶149

22. The jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised with great caution. This Court in catena of judgments has emphasised that the High Court must avoid usurping the function of a trial court or conducting a mini-

¶150

4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983

¶151

52026 SCC OnLine SC 50

¶152

¶153

trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint. The only requirement is to examine whether the uncontroverted allegations, as contained in the FIR, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal⁵ , a Division Bench of this Court had discussed about the scope of Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. as follows:

¶154

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

¶155

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

¶156

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶157

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶158

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by

¶159

¶160

a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶161

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

¶162

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶163

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

¶164

(emphasis supplied)

¶165

23. Furthermore, in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra⁶ , a three-Judge Bench of this Court had held that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, and only where the complaint, even if accepted in full, discloses no offence or continuation would amount to abuse of process. This Court had issued the following directions to the High Courts to be kept in mind while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:

¶166

“ Conclusions

¶167

33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the

¶168

¶169

accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

¶170

33.1….

¶171

33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.

¶172

33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on.

¶173

33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

¶174

33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

¶175

33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.

¶176

33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule.

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33.8 to 33.11….

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33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR

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does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

¶181

33.13 and 33.14….

¶182

33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.

¶183

…..”

¶184

(emphasis supplied)

¶185

24. On these lines, it is apt clear that even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. are very wide, its conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.

¶186

25. Testing on the aforesaid parameters, we find that the complaint dated 08.01.2020 made by the appellant contains categorical allegations that respondent Nos. 1 to 3, by abusing the advanced age and medical vulnerability of the executants, caused the execution and registration of the three settlement deeds to their unlawful advantage, and thereafter used such documents as genuine for the purpose of deriving proprietary benefits. The allegations in the complaint also disclose dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction as well as fabrication and wrongful use of

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documents. At this stage, we must note that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is bound to take the allegations on its face value. Whether these allegations can ultimately be proved is a matter strictly within the province of the Trial Court.

¶189

26. In the impugned order, the High Court has quashed the proceedings primarily on the ground that the validity of the settlement deeds has been upheld in the proceedings before the Civil Court. We are of the view that this approach adopted by the High Court is not correct. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed. In Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy⁷ , this Court had made it crystal clear that “ pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter, involving the same parties is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons.”

¶190

27. Adjudication in civil matters and criminal prosecution proceed on different principles. The decree passed by the Civil Court neither records findings on criminal intent nor on the existence of offences such as forgery, cheating, or use of forged documents. Therefore, civil adjudication cannot always be treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment. Moreover, in the case at hand, the civil proceedings have not attained finality.

¶191

28. Adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. Therefore, there cannot be any general proposition that whenever dispute involves a civil element, a criminal proceeding cannot go on. Criminal liability must be examined independently. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled to acquittal only upon failure of proof in the trial and not at the threshold jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. To permit quashing on the sole ground of a civil suit would encourage unscrupulous

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¶193

litigants to defeat criminal prosecution by instituting civil proceedings.

¶194

29. A further perusal of the impugned order would show that the High Court has also attached significance to the conduct of the appellant and the delay of almost 6 years on his part in initiation of criminal proceedings without any plausible explanation. The High Court had noted that the appellant remained ex parte instead of participating in the civil proceedings in O.S. No. 2190 of 2014 of which he was already a party. Instead, the appellant had preferred a private complaint suppressing the fact that the settlement deeds are already a subject matter of the said suit. The High Court had found this conduct of the appellant to be in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and had proceeded to quash the proceedings against them. Before we express our opinion on this, it is apposite to reproduce the relevant observations of the High Court on this aspect:

¶195

“8. ……. In the said suit O.S. No. 2190 of 2014, the defacto complainant C.S. Prasad was arrayed as 2^nd defendant. He had entered appearance through a counsel, but had not contested the suit neither he filed statement or adduced evidence challenging the validity of the registered documents. He remained exparte. If really he had any material to establish that he was cheated by his elder brother by making false documents and forgery, he should have participated in the suit proceedings or atleast filed complaint immediately. He had filed a complaint to the Commissioner of Police only on 08.01.2020 and the same after enquiry was closed on 17.03.2020 as civil dispute. When his complaint was closed as dispute is civil in nature, the suit O.S. No. 2190 of 2014 was pending. Hence, he had all opportunities to file application to set aside the exparte order passed against him on 08.06.2015 and participate in the suit where the validity of the 3 settlements deeds were one of the issues under consideration.

¶196

9. Instead of participating in the civil proceeding, the private complaint filed on 12.10.2021 under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C., suppressing the fact that settlement deeds are subject matter in the pending suit. In this regard it can be safely presumed that the 2^nd respondent herein had knowledge about the

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settlement deeds if not earlier at least on the date of receipt of suit summons in O.S. No. 2190 of 2014. Whereas no plausible explanation placed by him in his complaint for delay of 6 years in filing the complaint.”

¶199

(emphasis supplied)

¶200

30. We are not impressed with the above findings reached by the High Court. In Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited (supra), this Court had made it clear that while exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot undertake a roving inquiry into the disputed questions of fact or record findings on the merits of the allegations. On perusal of the above observations of the High Court, we find that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an inquiry with regard to the conduct of the appellant and credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaint and the FIR. Delay in filing a complaint, by itself, is never a ground for quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold. Whether the delay stands satisfactorily explained or whether it impacts the credibility of the prosecution, is a matter of appreciation of evidence before the Trial Court and not for summary determination by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.

¶201

31. It is a settled proposition that when a factual foundation for prosecution exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited by invoking inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Where allegations require adjudication on evidence, the proper course is to permit the trial to proceed in accordance with law. In the present case, the issues relating to the state of mind of the executants at the time of execution of the settlement deeds, the role of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the execution and the use of the settlement deeds, the existence of fraudulent intent, and the manner in which proprietary advantage was obtained by them, all require a full-fledged trial on evidence .”

¶202

(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

¶203

¶204

The Apex Court in ROCKY 's case supra reaffirmed the settled principle, that a mere availability of a civil remedy does not by itself eclipse the jurisdiction of the criminal law, where the allegations on their face disclose essential ingredients of a recognizable offence. In the said matter, the allegations levelled were invoking Sections 406, 420, 344 and 506 of the IPC. Upon a careful and nuanced examination of the factual matrix, the Apex Court deemed it appropriate to interdict the prosecution, only insofar as the offence under Section 406 of the IPC was concerned, while allowing the remaining charges to stand and the criminal trial to proceed. This course was adopted upon Court's satisfaction, that notwithstanding the presence of civil elements, the controversy could not be characterized as one of a purely civil complexion.

¶205

In ANURAG BHATNAGAR 's case supra , the Apex Court once again declined to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings, noting that the memorandum of understanding between the parties was not a mere commercial arrangement simpliciter, but one imbued with allegations of inducement and

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criminal breach of trust, as borne out from the averments contained in the complaint. The Court held that the allegations, if taken to its face value, were sufficient to constitute the commission of a criminal offence and therefore, warranted adjudication through the rigours of a criminal trial.

¶208

In KATHYAYINI's case supra , where civil suits involving identical parties arising out of the same transaction were admittedly pending, the Apex Court held that pendency of civil proceedings cannot be employed as a shield to thwart criminal prosecution. The Court underscored that where the allegations disclose a prima facie case against the accused, the continuance of criminal proceedings is neither impermissible nor an abuse of the process, notwithstanding the existence of parallel civil litigation between the same parties.

¶209

Echoing this well entrenched jurisprudence, the Apex Court in PUNIT BERIWALA supra categorically held that mere institution of civil proceedings does not operate as a legal embargo upon the investigation or prosecution of a cognizable criminal offence. The Court, thus, reinforced the

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salutary principle that civil and criminal remedies though they may arise from the same set of facts, operate in distinct spheres and pursue fundamentally different objectives , a caveat , it would depend on facts obtaining in each of the cases.

¶212

In C.S. PRASAD supra , the Apex Court holds that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are disclosed. The Apex Court was considering a case pertaining to a fraudulent settlement deed and observed that adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. Therefore, there cannot be any general proposition that whenever a dispute involves a civil element, a criminal proceeding cannot go on. Further, the Apex Court reiterates the principle that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised in cases where disputed questions of fact exist.

¶213

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In view of the matters still being at the stage of crime or what is challenged in the cases at hand being registration of Crime No.4 of 2025 and Crime No.247 of 2025, there is no warrant of interference at this juncture, as the issue is now shrouded with seriously disputed questions of fact and allegations of impersonation and forgery.

¶215

Finding no merit in these petitions, the petitions stand dismissed.

¶216

Interim order of any kind if operating shall stand dissolved.

¶217

Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

¶218

bkp

¶219

CT:MJ

Sri Umamaheshwar v. State of Karnataka

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Sri Umamaheshwar v. State of Karnataka

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