North Roof Ventures Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mr H R Suresh

NORTH ROOF VENTURES PVT. LTD., (EARLIER KNOWN AS NITESH HOUSING DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,) A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 AND HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO. 1/B. 1^ST FLOOR, 41, CASTLE STREET, OPP SACRED HEART CHURCH, RICHMOND ROAD, ASHOK NAGAR, RICHMOND TOWN, BENGALURU -560 025. REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE MR.SATISH KUMAR S.

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Digitally signed by SUVARNA T Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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(BY SRI.S.S.NAGANAND, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI.SIDDHARTH SUMAN, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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…PETITIONER

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MR.H.R.SURESH

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AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS, S/O LATE H.K.RAMAIAH, RESIDING AT NO. 1. “SHRESHTA”, JAKKUR LAYOUT, MAIN ROAD, JAKKUR POST JAKKUR, BENGALURU – 560 064

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SATCHMO HOLDINGS LTD., EARLIER KNOWN AS NITESH ESTATES LTD., A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956 AND HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 110 'B' WING. LEVEL-1, ANDREW BUILDING, M.G.ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001 REP.BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER, LEGAL SRI.PRADEEP K.P.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. ANANT MANDGI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI.V. SANJAY KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE EX-PARTE AD-INTERIM ORDER OF INJUNCTION DATED 16.02.2026 IN O.S NO. 64/2026, PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, DEVANHALLI, BENGALURU RURAL (ANNEXURE A) ON I.A.NO.1 UNDER ORDER XXXIX RULE 1 AND 2, CPC, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

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ORAL ORDER

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Aggrieved by the order dated 16.02.2026 passed in I.A.No.1 in O.S.No.64/2026 by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli, Bengaluru Rural, the petitioner/defendant No.1 is before this Court.

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The facts of the case are that respondent No.1 herein filed O.S.No.64/2026 seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendants No.1/developer, its agents, or any persons claiming under it, from delivering possession of the apartments at Sl.Nos.1 to 46, 68 to 94, 100 to 180, and 241 in the suit C schedule property, apartments in block A, B, and C, to any third parties, including agreement holders of defendant No.1/developer, until the Occupancy Certificate and other clearance certificates are obtained and the directions for completion of the construction issued under the Award passed in A.C.No.164/2019 are complied with. It is the specific case of respondent No.1/plaintiff herein that the plaintiff is the owner of the land measuring 4 acres and 14 guntas situated in Survey Nos.174/4 and 175/2 of Kattigenahalli Village, Jala Hobli,

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Bengaluru North (Additional) Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District, described as Schedule A property.

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The plaintiff entered into a Joint Development Agreement and a General Power of Attorney with the defendants on 30.09.2009 for the construction of a multistoried building comprising both commercial and residential complexes. Defendant No.1 is the developer, and Defendant No.2 is also a signatory to the documents. Although no relief is sought against Defendant No.2, it is arrayed as a party to the suit because it is a signatory to the Joint Development Agreement. The originals of the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney are in the defendants’ custody. It is stated that, in furtherance of the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney, the plaintiff and defendant No.1, the developer, entered into a Sharing Agreement dated 21.04.2011 and an Addendum to the Sharing Agreement dated 04.07.2013, which define the built-up area, the undivided share, and other areas, and set out the owner’s and developer’s shares in the proposed project. The owner’s share of apartments under construction in the Suit A

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schedule property is more fully described as the suit schedule B property, and Defendant No.1, the developer’s, share of apartments under construction is more fully described in the suit schedule C property. The developer obtained sanction for the building plan for the construction of a residential apartment building, all having 364 apartments, named ‘NITESH COLUMBUS SQUARE’. Out of these, the plaintiff is allocated 123 apartments and 34% of the commercial building, and Defendant No.1 is allocated 241 apartments and the remaining portion of the commercial building. It is stated that, though the development works in the project had not been completed, Defendant No.1 obtained a partial occupancy certificate in respect of Block-D, Block-E, and Block-F sometime in the year 2017. However, they did not take up the remaining development works in the project even after nine years from the date of the Joint Development Agreement.

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It is stated that as there was a breach of the terms of the Joint Development Agreement, the plaintiff initiated arbitration proceedings against the defendants in A.C.No.164/2019 before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is stated that

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prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, he had also filed an Arbitration Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’ 1996) in A.A.No.53/2018, wherein the Civil Court, by its order dated 07.01.2019, had restrained the defendants from creating any third-party interests by way of alienation/mortgage/lien until the dispute was resolved by the Arbitrator. Thereafter, the Sole Arbitrator, by his award dated 03.08.2021, not only directed the defendants herein to complete the development works in the project within a period of 12 months but also held defendant No.1 and its principal company, defendant No.2, liable to pay compensation to the plaintiff, among other reliefs. It was also held by the Arbitrator that the plaintiff was entitled to 123 apartments out of 364 apartments in the project. Against that, the defendants had filed a Commercial Appeal in A.P.No.87/2021 under Section 34 of the Act before the 83^rd Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, challenging the award passed in A.C.No.164/2019, which was dismissed by order dated 25.07.2023.

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It is stated that the plaintiff had preferred an execution petition in Execution case Com.Ex.P.No.82/2022 for recovery of Rs.11,93,43,196/- as on 18.02.2022. The said execution proceedings are still pending before the Court. The petitioner/defendant No.1 preferred an appeal in Com Appeal No.390/2023 against the order dated 25.07.2023 before the High Court, and the same is pending consideration, with no interim orders passed in that. When the award passed by the Arbitrator was not complied with and the defendants were making hectic efforts to execute and register the sale deeds, the plaintiff filed another application under Section 9 of the Act in A.A.No.53/2022 to restrain the defendants from alienating or creating a third-party interest in respect of the apartments that have fallen to the share of defendant No.1. It is stated that although an ex parte interim order of injunction had been granted, by a subsequent order dated 24.04.2024, the application was dismissed on the ground that once the award was passed by the Arbitrator and the same was put to enforcement by the plaintiff through execution proceedings, the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act. Since defendant No.1, without complying with the directions

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given in the award dated 03.08.2021 for completion of development works in the project, was trying to create a thirdparty interest in respect of the apartments of the Suit C schedule property on the basis of the existing General Power of Attorney dated 30.09.2009, the plaintiff immediately revoked the General Power of Attorney and executed a Deed of Revocation of General Power of Attorney and registered the same on 24.04.2024.

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Questioning the said action, the petitioner herein preferred WP.No.16770/2024 challenging the Deed of Revocation of General Power of Attorney and the High Court, by order dated 18.11.2025, dismissed the writ petition, holding that the adjudication regarding the legality of cancellation of

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the document is outside the purview of the writ jurisdiction, and also dismissed it on the ground that there was no merit in the said writ petition. Even after the dismissal, despite the revocation of the General Power of Attorney, defendant No.1 started to create third-party interest in favour of a gullible purchaser by delivering possession of the apartments without completion of the construction in terms of the award and

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without obtaining the occupancy certificate and other clearances, including the fire clearance, in respect of apartments in Blocks A, B, C, i.e., apartment at Sl.Nos.1 to 46, 68 to 94, 100 to 180, and 241, including suit schedule C property. On 06.02.2026, when the plaintiff visited the project site, he noticed that some household belongings were being moved into an apartment bearing No. C-0502 in Block C, which is incomplete and without an occupancy certificate.

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The plaintiff made enquiries and came to know that defendant No.1/developer was unduly influencing the customers to take possession of the apartments in accordance with the terms of the joint development agreement and sharing agreement, and without completing the development works in the project, particularly without the fire clearance certificate for the high-rise buildings, and without satisfying the award in AC.No.164/2019, with an intention to defeat the rights of the plaintiff over his share of apartments, and that he was unduly receiving amounts from them. The plaintiff, having no other alternative, had filed the instant suit in the interest of gullible

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parties, and as he is the owner of the property, any untoward incident that takes place will reflect on them.

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Along with the suit, the plaintiff had filed I.A.No.1 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC seeking a temporary injunction restraining defendant No.1 from delivering possession of the apartments. The trial court, by the impugned order, had granted the injunction.

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While granting the injunction, the trial court observed that it had heard and perused the material on record. The plaintiff has produced copies of the joint development agreement and orders in arbitration application No. 53/2018, A.C. No. 164/2019, Com. A.P. No. 87/2021, execution petition No. 82/2022, A.A. No. 53/2022, and WP. No. 16770/2024, and these documents prima facie prove the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendants. If a temporary injunction order is not granted, the very purpose of filing the suit will fail and will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is just and necessary to pass an

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ex parte temporary injunction order, and accordingly the impugned order was passed, restraining defendant No. 1 by

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way of temporary injunction from inducting any person into the apartments in block-A, B, and C, i.e., the application schedule property, and from delivering possession of the same to any third parties till the next date of hearing.

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The impugned order was passed on 16.02.2026, and the writ petition was filed on 24.03.2026. When this matter came up before this Court on 05.06.2026. Before the commencement of arguments, this Court had asked the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner when the matter is coming up before the Court on 02.04.2026, why the petitioner cannot approach the Court and seek the relief from the trial court. Then this Court granted an interim order on 05.06.2026 recording the contentions. The order dated 05.06.2026 reads thus:

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“Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the respondent herein has filed a suit for injunction and sought for an ex parte interim injunction. The trial Court without giving any finding with regard to the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, has granted injunction. It is submitted that there was arbitration between the parties and an award was passed and the same is questioned. An appeal is

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pending before this Court. It is submitted that even Section 9 application that is filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. In the order impugned before the Court, it has observed that the plaintiff has produced copies of the orders in Arbitration Application No.53/2022, A.C No.164/2019, COM.A.P.No.87/2021, Execution petition No.82 of 2022 and WP No.16770/2024.

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Learned senior counsel submits that the court having perused the orders, still granted the injunction. It is submitted that the suit itself is not maintainable and the Court in this manner cannot grant injunction. Hence, the petitioner has come before this Court, though there is a remedy to file an appeal against this order.

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Considering the submission of learned senior counsel, there shall be stay of operation of order dated 16.02.2026, till the next date of hearing.

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Issue notice to the respondents.

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In addition to that, learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to take out hand summons on the learned counsel appearing for the respondent before the trial Court and shall file a memo to that effect by 02.07.2026, or else, the stay granted by this Court shall stand vacated.

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Office objection with regard to the maintainability is overruled.”

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Learned Senior counsel representing the learned counsel for respondent No. 1/plaintiff has drawn the attention of this Court to all the proceedings and submits that there is an award in favour of the plaintiff. Against that, the petitioner has filed the commercial appeal before this Court and the same is pending consideration. The defendant No.1/petitioner is executing the sale deeds by virtue of a GPA granted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had revoked the GPA, and that was questioned before this Court by filing the writ petition, and the same was dismissed. Against that, a writ appeal is filed, and that is also pending consideration. Before the award was passed, the plaintiff filed an application under Section 9 of the Act, and an injunction was granted. Even after the award was passed, when the execution petition was pending, it was argued before the Court that, as the award was passed and the execution petition was filed, no application under Section 9 of the Act is maintainable, and accordingly the same was dismissed. It is submitted that, in view of the cancellation of the GPA by the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 cannot execute any documents in favour of third parties. The occupancy certificate has not been issued, and the fire clearance certificate and other

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permissions are not obtained. At this point of time, if the parties are inducted into possession of the property and they start living in the apartments, it will cause serious concern for safety, and that is the cause of action for the plaintiff to file the suit. In the suit also, the injunction that is sought is not to deliver possession of the property until obtaining the occupancy certificate and other clearance certificates. The trial Court had considered all the aspects and granted an injunction. It is submitted that the petitioner ought to have approached the trial Court and filed an appropriate application bypassing the said remedy available to him, but he has come before this court. The matter was posted on 02.04.2026 before the trial court. On 05.06.2026 interim order was passed by this Court. It is submitted that the interim order is obtained by suppressing the material facts before this Court.

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Learned Senior counsel representing the learned counsel for the respondent No.1/plaintiff had relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Parsvnath Developers

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Ltd. Vs. Mohit Khirbat¹ .

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1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 281

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In response, to that learned Senior counsel

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appearing for the petitioner/defendant No.1 submits that the suit before the trial Court is not maintainable and that the trial Court ought not to have granted an injunction. It is the submission of the learned Senior counsel that once there is an arbitration clause and the arbitral proceedings are initiated, if any ancillary reliefs with regard to the very same joint development agreement or the GPA are sought, the plaintiff has to go before the Court before whom the proceedings were initiated. It is submitted that the earlier proceedings were initiated before the City Civil Court, Bangalore, under Section 9 of the Act. However, the present suit is filed before the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli, Bengaluru Rural. It is submitted that the Court do not have jurisdiction. Further against the award and also with regard to the dismissal of the writ petition, wherein the GPA was cancelled by the respondent No.1 herein, they have preferred the writ petitions and the same are pending. It is submitted that, in the commercial appeal, no stay was granted, but in respect of the appeal filed by the petitioner's sister’s concern, a stay was granted on the

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condition of depositing the amount. When the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the question of granting an injunction will not arise. In this regard, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Dolphin Drilling Ltd. Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.² . He relied on paragraph No. 6 of the said judgement which reads thus:

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“ 6. The plea of the respondent is based on the words “all disputes" occurring in paragraph 28.3 of the agreement. Mr. Agrawal submitted that those two words must be understood to mean "all disputes under the agreement" that might arise between the parties throughout the period of its subsistence. However, he had no answer as to what would happen to such disputes that might arise in the earlier period of the contract and get barred by limitation till the time comes to refer "all disputes" at the conclusion of the contract. The words "all disputes" in clause 28.3 of the agreement can only mean "all disputes" that might be in existence when the arbitration clause is invoked and one of the parties to the agreement gives the arbitration notice to the other. In its present form clause 28 of the agreement cannot be said to be a one time measure and it cannot be held that once the arbitration clause is invoked the remedy of arbitration is

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2 AIR 2010 SC 1296

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no longer available in regard to other disputes that might arise in future.”

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He also relied on another judgment of the Apex

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Court in the case of State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Associated Contractors³ . Paragraph Nos.22, 23 and 24 of the

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said judgment reads as follows:

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“22. One more question that may arise under Section 42 is whether Section 42 would apply in cases where an application made in a court is found to be without jurisdiction. Under Section 31(4) of the old Act, it has been held in FCI represented by Managing Director & Anr. v. A.M. Ahmed & Co., through MD & Anr., (2001) 10 SCC 532 at para 6 and Neycer India Ltd. v. GNB Ceramics Ltd., (2002) 9 SCC 489 at para 3 that Section 31(4) of the 1940 Act would not be applicable if it were found that an application was to be made before a court which had no jurisdiction. In Jatinder Nath v. Chopra Land Developers Pvt. Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 453 at para 9 and Rajasthan State Electrical Board v. Universal Petrol Chemical Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 107 at paras 33 to 36 and Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation, 2013 (9) SCC 32 at para 32, it was held that where the agreement between the parties restricted jurisdiction to only one particular court, that court alone would have jurisdiction as neither Section 31(4) nor Section 42 contains a non-obstante

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3 (2015) 1 SCC 32

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clause wiping out a contrary agreement between the parties. It has thus been held that applications preferred to courts outside the exclusive court agreed to by parties would also be without jurisdiction.

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23. Even under Section 42 itself, a Designated Judge has held in HBM Print Ltd. v. Scantrans India (Pvt.) Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 338, that where the Chief Justice has no jurisdiction under Section 11, Section 42 will not apply. This is quite apart from the fact that Section 42, as has been held above, will not apply to Section 11 applications at all.

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24. If an application were to be preferred to a Court which is not a Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, or a High Court exercising original jurisdiction to decide questions forming the subject matter of an arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, then obviously such application would be outside the four corners of Section 42. If, for example, an application were to be filed in a court inferior to a Principal Civil Court, or to a High Court which has no original jurisdiction, or if an application were to be made to a court which has no subject matter jurisdiction, such application would be outside Section 42 and would not debar subsequent applications from being filed in a court other than such court.”

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Relying on the above judgments, it is submitted that the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to grant an order of injunction.

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Having heard the learned counsels on either side, perused the material on record. The undisputed facts in this case are that there is a joint development agreement and a GPA. In the light of the disputes, between the parties, the plaintiff has invoked the arbitration proceedings. Initially, when an application was filed under Section 9 of the Act, an injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter, an award was passed, and now commercial appeal is pending before this Court. In the appeal filed by the petitioner, there is no order of stay. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit before the present court and he must go before the very same Court where the arbitration proceedings were initiated. It is also an admitted fact that when an earlier application was filed under Section 9 of the Act, it was submitted by the petitioner herein that when the arbitration proceedings are concluded, the Court has no jurisdiction particularly when an execution petition is

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pending, and accordingly, the application was dismissed. Now, by virtue of a GPA given by the plaintiff to the defendant No.1, he has a right to execute the sale deed. Plaintiff has cancelled the said sale deed, and the appeal filed by the defendant No.1 is pending consideration. Then, claiming cause of action where certain people are inducted into possession without an occupancy certificate and other clearances, the plaintiff filed the suit and sought for an injunction. He sought injunction till the occupancy certificate is given and other formalities are completed, defendant shall not induct the people into the property. The injunction was granted, and the matter was directed to be listed on 02.04.2026. Till the interim order was granted by this Court on 05.06.2026, the petitioner did not appear before the trial Court.

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There are several orders passed against the petitioner and in favour of petitioner. There is no dispute about the fact that the occupancy certificates and fire clearance certificates, etc are not obtained by the defendant. For a period of almost four months, though there is an injunction operating against him, without going before the trial Court, without

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getting the orders vacated, and without raising all these grounds before the Court, the petitioner is waiting before this court for four months till the interim order is passed by this court.

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The main objection of the petitioner herein is that the suit is not maintainable before the court, where the present suit is instituted. At this interlocutory stage, this court is not inclined to vacate the order of temporary injunction merely basing on the objection relating to jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction requires a full fledged consideration at an appropriate stage. Prima facie it is not disputed that the building has neither a valid occupancy certificate nor the requisite fire safety clearance from the competent authorities. In such circumstances permitting the defendant to induct third parties into the premises would expose occupants to safety hazards and may give rise to untoward incidents. The purpose of an interim order is to preserve the subject matter and prevent a situation which may render the ultimate adjudication ineffective. Where the issues are concerning the fire safety and lawfull occupation of a building arises the court cannot be

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oblivious to the larger public interest involved. Individual commercial considerations must yield, atleast temporarily to concerns relating to public safety.

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The balance of convenience presently lies in maintaining the existing stage of affairs. If third parties are induced contrary to statutory requirement. The consequency may be difficult to undo. On the other hand postponement of such induction pending adjudication does not occasion comparable prejudice. The Hon’ble Supreme court has repeatedly emphasized that courts while exercising equitable jurisdiction, must be guided not by private rights but also by consideration of public interest particularly where questions of safety and compliance with statutory safeguards arise.

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In the light of the above discussion without expressing any opinion on the question of jurisdiction and keeping all contentions open. This court is of the view that the ad interium order granted by the trial court shall continue. The issue of jurisdiction shall be examined independently.

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ORDER

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i. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed .

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ii. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observations on the merits of the matter. Any observations that are made for the purpose of deciding this application shall not be construed as an expression of this Court.

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iii.The issues regarding the jurisdiction, as well other issues, parties are at liberty to agitate before the trial Court and trial court shall consider the same in accordance with law.

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iv. All I.As. in this petition shall stand closed.

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SD/(LALITHA KANNEGANTI) JUDGE

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MEG

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List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4

North Roof Ventures Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr H R Suresh

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North Roof Ventures Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr H R Suresh

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