Smt. Sakamma Vs the Assistant Executive Engineer

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NC: 2026:KHC:26625-DB WA No. 547 of 2026

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 4^TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026

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PRESENT

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THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE

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AND

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THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA WRIT APPEAL NO. 547 OF 2026 (GM-PP)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. SAKAMMA W/O MARIDEVAIAH AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS D.NO. 79, 3^RD INFANTRY LINE PWD RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS ASHOKA ROAD MYSURU - 570 007

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Digitally signed by SRIDEVI S Location: High Court of Karnataka

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SMT. SAJEEDA BEGUM W/O SYED GAFFAR AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS D.NO.95, 3^RD INFANTRY LINE PWD RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS ASHOKA ROAD MYSURU - 570 007

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SMT. KHAMARUNNISA W/O ABDUL KHUDDUS AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS D.NO. 83M, 3^RD INFANTRY LINE PWD RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS ASHOKA ROAD MYSURU - 570 007

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NC: 2026:KHC:26625-DB WA No. 547 of 2026

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SMT. CHIKKAMMANNI W/O LATE CHANNANAYAKA AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS D.NO.53, 3^RD INFANTRY LINE PWD RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS ASHOKA ROAD MYSURU - 570 007

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SMT. MAMTAX BEGUM W/O LATE MOHAMMED PEER AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS D NO. 82, 3^RD INFANTRY LINE PWD RESIDENTIAL QUARTERS ASHOKA ROAD MYSURU - 570 007

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…APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI N. RAVINDRANATH KAMATH, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR MS. VANAJAKSHI, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER PWD NO.1, SPECIAL SUB-DIVISION VINOBHA ROAD MYSURU - 570 001

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…RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI K.S. HARISH, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE)

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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 18.12.2025 IN W.P NO.6015/2018 (GM-PP) ON THE FILE OF LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE COURT IN DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANTS & ETC.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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NC: 2026:KHC:26625-DB WA No. 547 of 2026

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HC-KAR

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE and HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)

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The appellants have filed the present intra-court appeal impugning an order dated 18.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP.No.6015/2018 (GM-PP). The appellants had filed the said petition impugning the order under Section 5 (1) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 [ the Act ] directing that the residential quarters occupied by the appellants be vacated and further action be taken for recovery of the outstanding rent.

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The appellants had filed appeals against the respective orders under Section 10 of the Act, which were dismissed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Mysore by an order dated 02.01.2018.

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The appellants claim that they are descendants of persons who were employed by the Maharaja of Mysore to train horses. They were provided accommodation by virtue of them being employed by the Maharaja of Mysore. Subsequently, the said

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employees were absorbed by the Public Works Department [ PWD ], Government of Karnataka and continued to reside in the residential accommodation provided to them.

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During the course of the arguments, the learned counsel for the appellants clarified that the respective husbands of the appellants were employed with PWD, and they were the descendants of the employees of the Maharaja of Mysore. It is undisputed that the residential quarters occupied by the appellants, from which they are sought to be evicted, are the properties of the Government of Karnataka, and the husbands of the appellants were permitted to reside in the said quarters by virtue of being employed with the Government.

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The appellants, and such similarly placed persons, had made representations to the Government to sell and transfer the premises in question to them on lease-cum-sale basis. Some of the persons who were similarly placed, had also filed writ petitions, which were disposed of by this Court by an order dated 22.07.1999 (WP.No.20499/1997) directing the Government to consider their representations.

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NC: 2026:KHC:26625-DB WA No. 547 of 2026

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On 27.04.2013, the respondent passed a final order directing

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the appellants to vacate the premises occupied by them. These orders were challenged in the appeals which were allowed, and the matter was remanded back to the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent issued notices under Section 4 of the Act. The appellants filed their objections and an inquiry was conducted. The said proceedings culminated in the order dated 31.05.2016 passed by the respondent. As noted above, the appeals preferred by the appellants under Section 10 of the Act were disposed of by an order dated 02.01.2018 by the District Court.

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It was the appellants' case before the District Court that the competent officer had not issued proper notices under Section 4 of the Act; he had not followed the procedure for conducting the inquiry in accordance with Section 9 of the Act; he had issued a common notice, which was not sustainable; and the order passed was contrary to the guidelines as set out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a decision New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Nusli Neville Wadia, reported in AIR 2008 SC 876 .

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The learned District Court noted that the following points arose for consideration.

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"1. Whether the Competent Officer / Respondent has not followed the procedure while conducting enquiry?

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Whether the Respondent has committed any error in passing impugned order and the same is not sustainable?

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Whether the same is call for interference by this Court?"

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The learned District Court did not accept the aforesaid contentions and decided the aforesaid questions against the appellants. Accordingly, the appeals preferred were dismissed.

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The appellants filed the writ petition against the aforesaid order passed by the learned District Court. The learned Single Judge also found that the appellants were unauthorised occupants of the premises in question and, therefore, held that the notices for ejecting them under the Act were rightly issued by the respondents.

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The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has advanced submissions on three fronts. First, he submitted that the proceedings initiated for evicting the appellants were voilative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Second, he submitted that the appellants have a legitimate expectation that the premises occupied by them would be granted or sold to them, as they, as well as the earlier generation, were in occupation of the premises in question. And third, he contended that other similarly placed

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persons were granted the premises occupied by them. Thus, on the principle of parity, the appellants ought to be granted the ownership of the premises in question or the same may be sold to them on lease cum sale basis.

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The learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis and others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and others : (1985) 3 SCC 545 and on the strength of the said decision, contended that Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes the right to livelihood and if the appellants are evicted from their residential premises, they would be deprived of their livelihood. He has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sivanandan C. T. and others v High Court of Kerala and others: 2023 INSC 709 and on the strength of the said decision, he submitted that Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of this country.

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The learned Government Advocate countered the said submissions. He stated on instructions that no other similarly placed person had been granted or sold residential premises occupied by them. Thus, the contention that the appellants were

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entitled to seek transfer of the accommodation in their favour on

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the principles of parity is without any basis.

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As noted above, there is no dispute that the premises occupied by the appellants are owned by the Government. The spouses of the appellants were permitted to occupy the said premises for their residential use on account of being employed by PWD, Government of Karnataka. Although, the appellants claim that they are descendants of persons who were employed by the Maharaja of Mysore to train horses, the pleadings in the writ petition and the present appeal do not contain any specific details regarding the same. The pleadings do not set out the name of the persons who was employed by the Maharaja of Mysore and there are no further details tracing the ancestry of the appellants to the said persons. However, for the purposes of the present appeal, we may assume that the father of the husbands of the appellants or their fathers had been employed by the Maharaja of Mysore and their families had been inducted in the premises by virtue of them being employed with the Maharaja of Mysore. However, the premises in question were not granted to the said persons, and they had acquired no interest therein. The appellants had occupied

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the said premises, being the family members (spouses) of the persons who were absorbed by the PWD, Government of Karnataka. The appellants had no right to continue occupying the premises after their husbands had superannuated or ceased to be in employment of the PWD, Government of Karnataka. Clearly, the appellants are in unauthorised occupation of the premises in question.

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The contention that evicting them would violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is unmerited.

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The employees who are provided with government accommodation cannot retain it after the cessation of their employment. The reliance placed on the decision in Olga Tellis (supra) is misplaced. The said case involved removal of slum dwellers .

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The reliance placed on the decision in Sivanandan C. T . (supra) is also misplaced. There is no cavil that the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence. However, in the present case, the appellants could have had no

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legitimate expectation of being granted ownership of the premises they occupied.

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In Union of India v Hindustan Development Corporation :

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(1993) 3 SC 499 , the Supreme Court had explained that "legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular or natural sequence".

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In the case of Ram Parvesh Singh v State of Bihar : (2006)

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8 SCC 381, the Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"15. What is legitimate expectation? Obviously, it is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. The term "established practice" refers to a regular, consistent, predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of the decisionmaking authority. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation."

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20. In Sivanandan C. T. (supra), the Supreme Court referred to

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the decision in Ram Pravesh Singh (supra) and various other

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decisions, and observed as under:

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"The underlying basis for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation has expanded and evolved to include the principles of good administration. Since

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citizens repose their trust in the state, the actions and policies of the state give rise to legitimate expectations that the state will adhere to its assurance or past practice by acting in a consistent, transparent, and predictable manner. The principles of good administration require that the decisions of public authorities must withstand the test of consistency, transparency, and predictability to avoid being regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14."

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In the present case, there is no material placed on record to establish that there has been either any custom or any law that an employee who has been provided accommodation by virtue of his employment would be conferred the ownership of such residential property. Thus, the appellants could have no legitimate expectation that the residential premises occupied by them would be sold to them on lease-cum-sale basis or otherwise granted to them.

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We find no infirmity with the decision of the learned Single Judge. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.

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Sd/(VIBHU BAKHRU) CHIEF JUSTICE

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Sd/(K.S. HEMALEKHA) JUDGE

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SD, List No.: 2 Sl No.: 6

Smt. Sakamma v. the Assistant Executive Engineer

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Smt. Sakamma v. the Assistant Executive Engineer

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