Ramesh P v. K Jyothi

Karnataka HC18 Feb 2026RFA/70/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Keywords: pendente lite purchaser; Order XXI Rule 97 CPC; Section 47 CPC; Section 96 CPC appeal against execution order; lis pendens; undivided share versus specific boundaries; third-party obstruction/resistance to execution; execution of possession decree against terminated tenants; representatives-in-interest of decree holder bound by decree; partition remedy only after execution; Karnataka High Court RFA No. 70 of 2026; Sachin Shankar Magadum J.; Parvathibai v. Dattatreya Janardhan Dhopeshwarkar (ILR 1992 KAR 929) cited by counsel.

What did the court decide?

None; appeal dismissed with clarification that the Court's observations will not affect the appellants' right to pursue their remedies strictly in accordance with law. ¶¶174

Ramesh P Vs K Jyothi — Karnataka HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; appeal dismissed with clarification that the Court's observations will not affect the appellants' right to pursue their remedies strictly in accordance with law.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the Executing Court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure? +1 more

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Court's answer

The question of title set up by the appellants on the basis of the sale deed dated 11.11.2021 cannot be adjudicated within the narrow compass of execution proceedings arising out of a decree for possession passed against tenants.

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Ratio / Principle

An undivided share in joint property, by its very nature, does not translate into a demarcated and identifiable parcel unless there has been a lawful partition.

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Key takeaways

The sale deed's recital of an undivided 50% share coupled with a schedule of specific boundaries is inherently incongruous and in direct derogation of law laid down by this Court that a joint family member cannot sell his/her undivided share by specifying boundaries.ratio¶¶91
A purchaser of an undivided share steps into the vendor's shoes only to the extent of the vendor's right, title and interest, and cannot resist enforcement of a decree for possession against tenants when execution is incomplete and possession has not been recovered.ratio¶¶97

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Regular First Appeal under S.96 CPC by third-party purchasers assailing the Executing Court's order rejecting their application under S.47 r/w Order XXI Rules 97 & 101 and S.151 CPC in execution (EP No.25014/2016, off decree in O.S.No.15399/2004) of a possession decree against tenants, confirmed up to the Supreme Court (SLP No.14568/2016 dismissed 21.09.2021). Held: (i) a pendente lite purchaser deriving title during pendency of execution from the widow of one of the joint decree holders is a representative-in-interest bound by the decree and cannot maintain an Order XXI Rule 97 third-party application, which is reserved for strangers asserting an independent right adverse to or dehors the decree; (ii) the transferee is hit by lis pendens and takes no right superior to the vendor's; (iii) an undivided 50% share confers no exclusive possession of any demarcated portion absent partition by metes and bounds — specific-boundary recitals in the sale deed notwithstanding, such a recital being incongruous and contrary to law laid down by this Court; (iv) questions of title between co-owners or their transferees cannot be adjudicated within execution of a possession decree against tenants. Executing Court rightly rejected the application; no perversity or jurisdictional error. Appeal dismissed; the appellants' substantive rights under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021 survive and may be worked out (e.g., by partition) only after the decree is fully executed.

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NC: 2026:KHC:9964 RFA No. 70 of 2026

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 18^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.70 OF 2026 (PAR)

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BETWEEN:

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RAMESH P

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AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

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SON OF LATE PONNUSWAMY N

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RESIDING AT NO.23 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR

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BENGALURU - 560 008

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RAJA P

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AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS SON OF LATE PONNUSWAMY N RESIDING AT NO.23 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET

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ULSOOR

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Digitally signed by CHAITHRA A Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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BENGALURU - 560 008

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…APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI.JOSHUA HUDSON SAMUEL, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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K.JYOTHI (SINCE DEAD NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE)

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NC: 2026:KHC:9964 RFA No. 70 of 2026

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HC-KAR

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SMT.KOKILA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS W/O LATE JYOTHI AT PORTION OF NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR, BENGALURU - 560 008 (NOW NOT RESIDING IN THE SAID PREMISES PURSUANT TO SALE DEED DATED11.11.2021)

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K. KUMARESHAN (SINCE DEAD NOW REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES)

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R.RAMANI

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W/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008

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LAKSHMI K D/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17, YELLAMMA KOIL STREET, ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008

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DEEPA K

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D/O LATE KUMARESHAN K AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17, YELLAMMA KOIL STREET, ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008

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5. K.YUVARAJAN S/O LATE KUMARESHAN K

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HC-KAR

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AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.17, YELLAMMA KOIL STREET, ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008

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SHYAM @ SAMSON S/O LATE SEBASTINE AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS RESIDING AT PORTION OF NO.17 YELLAMMA KOIL STREET ULSOOR BENGALURU - 560 008

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI.A.KESHAV BHAT, ADVOCATE FOR C/R.5)

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10.10.2025 PASSED ON I.A.NO.1/2023 IN EX.PETITION NO.25014/2016 ON THE FILE OF XXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH-29), MAYO HALL, BENGALURU., DISMISSING THE I.A.NO.1/2023 FILED UNDER SEC.XLVII R/W ORDER XXI RULE 97 AND 101 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC AND ETC.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The captioned Regular First Appeal is filed by the

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third party applicants assailing the order dated 10.10.2025

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NC: 2026:KHC:9964 RFA No. 70 of 2026

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of the Executing Court passed on I.A.No.1/2023 filed under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 97 and 101

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read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short 'CPC').

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Facts leading to the case are as under;

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The records disclose that the original decree holders, who are full brothers, had instituted four independent suits in the year 2004 against different tenants seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of the respective tenanted premises. All the suits were decreed directing the tenants to vacate and hand over vacant possession. The tenants carried the matter in four separate appeals before this Court; the appeals came to be dismissed, affirming the decrees. Thereafter, the tenants approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing SLP No.14568/2016, which was dismissed on 21.09.2021, thereby lending finality to the decrees. Consequent upon the decrees attaining finality, separate execution petitions

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were initiated. The present appeal arises out of Execution Petition No.25014/2016, which relates to the decree passed in O.S.No.15399/2004.

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In the said execution proceedings, the present appellants entered appearance claiming to be third parties and filed an application under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 and Section 151 of the CPC seeking to resist execution. Their principal assertion was that Smt.Kokila, widow of late K.Jyothi Ram - one of the original decree holders, had, during the pendency of the execution proceedings, executed a registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021 conveying 50% undivided share in the schedule property in their favour. On the strength of the said alienation, they contended that the decree holders were not entitled to enforce the decree in respect of the entire property. The decree holders filed detailed objections. As rival title documents were produced, the Executing Court permitted the parties to adduce evidence.

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Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Executing Court recorded a finding that the appellants had purchased only an undivided 50% share from Smt.Kokila and that the decree was yet to be fully executed against all the tenants. The Executing Court accordingly rejected the application, holding that a mere recital regarding transfer of an undivided share would not clothe the appellants with any right to obstruct execution of a decree that had attained finality.

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Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that though the sale deed describes the property conveyed as an undivided 50% share, the schedule appended thereto demarcates a specific portion and that the appellants are in exclusive possession of the said portion. It is argued that the legal heirs of the other brother, namely late K.Kumareshan, cannot enforce the decree in respect of the entire property so as to prejudice the rights allegedly acquired by the appellants. Placing reliance on

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the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in Parvathibai vs. Dattatreya Janardhan Dhopeshwarkar¹ , it is submitted

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that a transferee from one of the decree holders is entitled to maintain an application under Order XXI Rules 97 and

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101 CPC and seek adjudication of his independent rights within execution proceedings. On that premise, it is urged that the Executing Court erred in rejecting the application without properly adjudicating the appellants’ claim.

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Per contra , learned counsel for the decree holders would submit that the appellants are pendente lite purchasers, having acquired an undivided share during the pendency of the execution proceedings, and are therefore bound by the doctrine of lis pendens . It is contended that the alienation effected by Smt.Kokila does not confer upon

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the appellants any superior right to stall or obstruct execution of a decree, which has been confirmed up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Emphasis is laid on the fact that

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the litigation commenced in the year 2004 and after

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1 ILR 1992 KAR 929

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protracted proceedings, has attained finality. Both the original decree holders have passed away and their legal representatives are merely seeking enforcement of the decree. It is further contended that if the appellants' claim any independent title under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021, their remedy lies in instituting a properly constituted substantive suit and not in impeding the execution proceedings.

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In the backdrop of the rival contentions and the material placed on record, the following points arise for consideration:

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(i) Whether the Executing Court was justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

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(ii) What order?

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Findings on Point No.(i):-

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The material on record unmistakably discloses that the original plaintiffs have been embroiled in

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protracted litigation commencing from the year 2004. For more than two decades, the decree holders have been pursuing their remedies to secure possession of the tenanted premises, and the decrees have attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. We are now in the year 2026. At this distant point of time, when the decree holders are seeking to reap the fruits of a decree that has stood the test of appellate scrutiny, the appellants have entered the fray on the strength of a sale deed dated 11.11.2021, claiming an undivided half share in the property. In the considered view of this Court, the question of title set up by the appellants on the basis of the said sale deed cannot be adjudicated within the narrow compass of execution proceedings arising out of a decree for possession passed against tenants.

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On a specific query put by this Court to the learned counsel for the appellants as to how a sale deed conveying an “undivided 50% share” could nevertheless contain specific boundaries demarcating a definite portion,

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no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming. This aspect assumes significance, for an undivided share in joint property, by its very nature, does not translate into a demarcated and identifiable parcel unless there has been a lawful partition.

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A careful perusal of the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants by the widow of one of the decree holders reveals that, though the recital speaks of transfer of an undivided 50% share, the schedule appended thereto describes the property with specific boundaries. This recital is inherently incongruous and is in direct derogation to law laid down by this Court that a joint family member cannot sell his/her undivided share by specifying boundaries. When the two original plaintiffs had

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jointly instituted suits seeking possession from four tenants in respect of the entire property, and when the decree for possession is joint and indivisible as against the tenants, a transferee from one co-owner cannot, at the

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stage of execution, carve out a defined portion and claim exclusive possession thereof.

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Even assuming that the appellants have validly purchased the undivided half share of one of the decree holders under the registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021, they remain strangers to the family arrangement between the co-owners and strangers to the original tenancy proceedings. Such a purchaser of an undivided share steps into the shoes of the vendor only to the extent of the vendor’s right, title and interest. They cannot, however, resist enforcement of a decree for possession against the tenants, particularly when the decree is yet to be fully executed and possession has not been recovered from the tenants.

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It is trite that until the decree holders secure actual possession from the tenants in execution of the decree, neither the original decree holders nor the appellants claiming under one of them can assert exclusive

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possession of any specific portion. The right of the appellants, if any, is inchoate and remains subject to the enforcement of the decree in its entirety. Only after possession is secured from the tenants would a proper cause of action accrue to the appellants to work out their remedies in accordance with law be it by seeking partition or other appropriate relief in respect of the undivided 50% share claimed under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021.

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The attempt of the appellants to invoke Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC to effectively seek an adjudication akin to a preliminary decree for partition within execution proceedings is wholly misconceived. Execution proceedings cannot be converted into a forum for resolving inter se disputes of title between co-owners or their transferees, particularly when the decree sought to be executed is one for possession against tenants whose tenancy stood terminated long ago.

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There is yet another significant angle from which the appellants’ claim deserves to be examined. The

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appellants are admittedly purchasers pendente lite , having acquired an alleged undivided half share under a registered sale deed dated 11.11.2021 during the pendency of the execution proceedings. Such a purchaser is squarely hit by the doctrine of lis pendens . A transferee pendente lite does not acquire any right superior to that of his vendor and takes the property subject to the result of the pending proceedings. The appellants, therefore, step into the shoes of the widow of one of the decree holders and can claim no independent or higher right than what she herself could assert in law.

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The scope and ambit of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC read with Section 47 CPC are well settled. Order XXI Rule 97 is intended to provide a remedy where resistance or obstruction to possession is offered by a person claiming an independent right in the property, adverse to or dehors the decree. Section 47 CPC mandates that all questions arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives, relating to execution, discharge or

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satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Executing Court and not by a separate suit. However, the provision cannot be stretched to convert execution proceedings into a forum for adjudicating complicated questions of title between co-owners or their transferees, especially when such transferees claim only through one of the decree holders and not in their own independent right.

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In the present case, the appellants have not set up an independent or adverse title as against the decree holders. On the contrary, they trace their claim through the widow of one of the original decree holders. Therefore, they are representatives-in-interest of one of the decree holders and are bound by the decree in the same manner as their vendor. When the durable jural relationship between the original plaintiffs (landlords) and the original defendants (tenants) stood conclusively adjudicated in the suit for possession, and the decree has attained finality at the hands of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the execution proceedings are confined to enforcement of that decree

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against the tenants. Both the original decree holders had jointly sought possession, and their legal representatives

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are merely seeking to enforce the decree.

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A purchaser pendente lite claiming through one of the decree holders cannot maintain a third-party application under Order XXI Rule 97 to obstruct execution of a decree which his own vendor was actively seeking to enforce. The remedy under Rule 97 is primarily intended for a stranger who asserts an independent right in resistance to delivery of possession. It is not available to a transferee who derives title from one of the decree holders during the pendency of execution and seeks to interdict the decree itself. Such a course would defeat the very object of execution proceedings and undermine the finality attached to decrees.

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More particularly, the appellants’ reliance on the specific boundaries mentioned in the sale deed does not advance their case. As already observed, what is conveyed

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under the document is only an undivided half share. In law, an undivided share does not confer exclusive possession over any identified portion unless there is a partition by metes and bounds. The attempt to rely upon specific boundaries at the stage of execution, when possession has not yet been recovered from the tenants, is wholly misconceived. The appellants cannot, by virtue of such recitals, carve out a defined portion and resist delivery of possession pursuant to a decree that binds their vendor.

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Execution proceedings cannot be permitted to be derailed by transferees pendente lite, who seek to project intra-family or co-ownership disputes as a ground to stall enforcement of a decree for possession against tenants. If such objections are entertained, it would render decrees illusory and enable endless obstruction. The appellants’ rights, if any, are subject to the decree and can be worked out only after the decree holders secure possession in entirety. Thereafter, the appellants may pursue

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appropriate remedies in accordance with law, such as seeking partition.

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In the totality of circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the third-party application filed by the appellants under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Section 47 CPC is not maintainable. The appellants, being pendente lite purchasers claiming through one of the decree holders and not asserting any independent adverse title, have no locus to obstruct execution of a decree that has attained finality. The application is thus wholly misconceived and was rightly rejected by the Executing Court.

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The further contention urged on behalf of the appellants that they are in exclusive possession of a specific portion equivalent to half share is equally misconceived and legally untenable. This assertion runs directly contrary to the foundational pleadings and relief sought by the original plaintiffs. The very suits instituted in

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the year 2004 were for declaration of title and recovery of

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possession from four tenants. The decree holders themselves were not in physical possession of the premises and had approached the Court seeking recovery of possession after termination of tenancy. The decree for possession was granted on that basis and has attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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When the original plaintiffs were admittedly not in possession and had to secure a decree for recovery of possession from tenants, the appellants, who claim only through the widow of one of the decree holders, cannot, during the pendency of execution proceedings, assert that they are in exclusive possession of a defined half portion. A transferee cannot claim a better or higher right than that of his vendor. If the vendor herself was not in possession and was prosecuting execution proceedings to recover possession from tenants, the appellants cannot, on the strength of a subsequent sale deed, project a case of settled or exclusive possession over any specific portion.

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Moreover, what is conveyed under the sale deed

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is only an undivided half share. In law, an undivided share

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does not translate into possession of a specific demarcated portion unless there is a partition by metes and bounds.

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The plea of “exclusive possession of half share” is inherently inconsistent with the concept of joint ownership and wholly incompatible with the admitted fact that tenants are in occupation and execution proceedings are pending for recovery of possession. The appellants cannot simultaneously acknowledge that the property is under tenancy and yet claim exclusive possession of a defined portion thereof.

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Such a contention also falls outside the permissible ambit of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The scheme of Rule 97 CPC contemplates resistance or obstruction by a person claiming an independent right to possession in

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his own capacity. It does not envisage a situation where a

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pendente lite purchaser from one of the decree holders asserts a notional or constructive possession over an

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undivided share, contrary to the decree itself. The appellants’ plea neither discloses an independent adverse title nor establishes actual possession capable of being protected under the execution framework.

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In that view of the matter, the contention that the appellants are in exclusive possession of a specific half share pending execution proceedings cannot be accepted. The plea is inconsistent with the decree for possession, contrary to the legal character of an undivided share, and does not fit within the statutory scheme governing resistance to execution under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The said contention is therefore rejected.

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Having regard to the above circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the Executing Court has rightly appreciated the scope of its jurisdiction and has correctly rejected the application filed by the appellants. The findings recorded do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference in

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appeal. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the

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“Affirmative.”

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CONCLUSIONS

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At the same time, it requires to be clarified that the appellants, being transferees pendente lite from one of the decree holders, are not remediless in law. A purchaser from a decree holder during the pendency of execution does not acquire an independent right to obstruct execution; however, such purchaser is entitled to work out his remedies in accordance with law through the decree holder whose interest he has acquired. In other words, the transferee merely steps into the shoes of his vendor and can claim the benefit of the decree to the extent of the vendor’s right, but cannot impede or stall its enforcement.

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Once the decree holders secure possession from the tenants in execution of the decree, the benefit of such recovery enures to the extent of the undivided share

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conveyed under the sale deed dated 11.11.2021. The appellants, as purchasers of an undivided half share, would then be entitled to assert their derivative rights against the co-owners in appropriate proceedings known to law, such as by seeking partition and separate possession. Their remedy, therefore, lies not in resisting execution under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, but in allowing the decree to be executed in its entirety and thereafter claiming through the decree holder whose interest they have purchased.

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It is well settled that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the result of the litigation and cannot defeat the decree. However, the transferee is entitled to the fruits of the decree to the extent of the interest transferred, once possession is recovered. Thus, the appellants’ lawful course is to support execution and not obstruct it. After possession is delivered in favour of the decree holders, the appellants may seek appropriate relief in respect of their

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undivided share, including partition and allotment of their share in accordance with law.

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Therefore, while the third-party application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is not maintainable, it is made clear that the dismissal of the said application does not extinguish the appellants’ substantive rights, if any, flowing from the sale deed dated 11.11.2021. Their rights remain subject to the decree and can be worked out only after the decree is fully enforced.

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Point No.(ii) :- For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following;

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ORDER

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(i) The appeal is dismissed.

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(ii) It is made clear that the observations made by this Court shall be confined to the orders passed by this Court and observations made therein would not affect the appellants right in pursuing

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