Dismissed¶152

Vimaladevi Since Deceased by Lrs v. Smt Lalithamma

Karnataka HC10 Feb 2026RFA/175/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Partition suit between co-sisters; joint purchase under registered sale deed dated 31.10.1958; unregistered and insufficiently stamped release deed dated 11.11.1959 (Ex.D-2); proviso to Section 49 Registration Act - 'collateral transaction' vs 'collateral purpose'; Section 35 Karnataka Stamp Act bar; ouster and relinquishment; presumption of joint ownership from joint registered purchase; pleadings prerequisite for evidence; preliminary decree for half share affirmed, RFA dismissed. Coram: Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum; decided 10-02-2026; NC: 2026:KHC:8049; RFA No. 175 of 2011.

What did the court decide?

None to the appellants; the appeal was dismissed and the trial Court's preliminary decree granting the plaintiff half share in the suit schedule property stands. ¶152

Vimaladevi Since Deceased by Lrs Vs Smt Lalithamma — Karnataka HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None to the appellants; the appeal was dismissed and the trial Court's preliminary decree granting the plaintiff half share in the suit schedule property stands.

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Issue for consideration

Point (i): Whether the trial Court's finding that the original defendant and her legal representatives failed to prove due execution of the Release Deed dated 11.11.1959 (Ex.D-2) and that the said document cannot be looked into even for collateral purpose suffers from perversity or illegality. +1 more

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Court's answer

Under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, only a transaction independent of and distinct from the main transaction requiring compulsory registration qualifies as a 'collateral transaction'; what can be looked into is something collateral to the principal transaction, not something which directly or indirectly establishes or defeats title, and the proviso does not permit reliance on substantive terms of an unregistered document to prove relinquishment, transfer or extinction of rights.

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Ratio / Principle

The recital in Ex.D-2 regarding payment/discharge of the family debt of Rs.1,000/- is not an independent or separable collateral transaction; being the very foundation of the alleged relinquishment, it forms part of the main transaction of relinquishment, and permitting reliance on it would amount to indirectly enforcing an unregistered document affecting immovable property.

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Key takeaways

The exception under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act has no application to the facts of the present case.ratio¶123
The registered Sale Deed dated 31.10.1958 (Ex.D-1) discloses that the property was jointly purchased by the two co-sisters and contains no covenant of exclusive payment by the defendant; the plea of exclusive payment of the entire sale consideration therefore remains unsubstantiated.ratio¶124
The alternate defence raised during trial (that the defendant cleared the debts and the plaintiff thereupon gave up her rights) is inconsistent with the earlier plea and lacks foundational pleadings; no amount of evidence can be looked into in the absence of specific pleadings, and a new case introduced at the stage of evidence cannot be countenanced.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Regular First Appeal by the defendants against the preliminary decree in O.S.No.8230/2000 (XLIII Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, CCH-44, Bangalore) granting the plaintiff, a co-owner, half share in the suit schedule property jointly purchased by two co-sisters under registered sale deed dated 31.10.1958. The defence rested on a release deed dated 11.11.1959 (Ex.D-2), admittedly unregistered and insufficiently stamped. Held: the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act permits an unregistered document to be read only for an independent 'collateral transaction', not a 'collateral purpose'; the recital of discharge of a Rs.1,000/- family debt is inseparably part of the main relinquishment transaction and cannot be used to prove relinquishment or ouster; the defences of exclusive payment of sale consideration and of release upon debt discharge were mutually destructive, the latter lacking foundational pleadings; joint purchase under a registered instrument raises a presumption of joint ownership unrebutted by cogent evidence. Trial Court findings held free of perversity or illegality; appeal dismissed.

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NC: 2026:KHC:8049 RFA No. 175 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 175 OF 2011 (PAR)

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BETWEEN:

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VIMALADEVI

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SINCE DECEASED BY LRS

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1(A) SRI. R. RAMACHANDRA RAJU S/O.LATE S M RAMAKRISHNAIAH RAJU AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs APPELLANT NO. 1(B) TO (J)

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1(B) SRI. R. VISHWANATHA RAJU S/O R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

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Digitally signed by AL BHAGYA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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1(C) SRI. R. ANANDA RAJU S/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS

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1(D) SRI. R. VENKATESHWARA RAJU S/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS

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1(E) SRI. R. MANJUNATHA RAJU S/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS

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1(F) SRI. R. VARAHA VENKATA RAJU S/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS

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NC: 2026:KHC:8049 RFA No. 175 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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1(G) SMT. SHASHIKALA D/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

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1(H) SMT. VIJAYALAKSHMI D/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS

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1(I) SMT VASANTHI D/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU

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1(J) SMT SARASWATHI D/O.R RAMACHANDRA RAJU AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS

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ALL ARE R/O.NO.47, 1^ST FLOOR 11^TH CROSS, RANGASWAMY TEMPLE STREET BANGALORE - 560 053.

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…APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI. SIDDHARTH SUMAN, ADVOCATE FOR APPELLANTS NO. 1(B TO J);

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V/O DATED 28.01.2020, APPELLANTS NO. 1(B TO J) ARE LRs OF APPELLANT NO.1(A)

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AND:

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SMT LALITHAMMA

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SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRs

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1(A) SRI S. SRINIVAS RAJU S/O LATE S.M.RAMAKRISHNA RAJU SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs RESPONDENTS NOS. 1(B) TO (F) ARE LRs OF R1(A)

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1(B) SRI. S. VENKATESHWARA RAJU S/O LATE LALITHAMMA AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS

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1(C) SRI. S. VASUDEVA RAJU

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NC: 2026:KHC:8049 RFA No. 175 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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S/O LATE LALITHAMMA AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

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1(D) SRI. S. VENKATAKRISHNA RAJU S/O LATE LALITHAMMA AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS

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1(E) SRI. S. LAKSHMINARAYANA RAJU S/O LATE LALITHAMMA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS

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1(F) SRI. S. VENKATARAMANA RAJU S/O LATE LALITHAMMA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS

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ALL ARE R/AT NO. 788/E, 3^RD MAIN ROAD RPC LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR 2^ND STAGE BANGALORE-560 104.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. ABHINAV .R, ADVOCATE FOR R1(B TO F) ARE TREATED AS LRs OF R 1(A)

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THIS RFA IS FILED U/O-XLI, RULE-1, R/W, SEC.96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 06.10.2010 PASSED IN O.S.8230/2000 ON THE FILE OF THE XLIII-ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH-44), BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND PARTLY DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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NC: 2026:KHC:8049 RFA No. 175 of 2011

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HC-KAR

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The captioned appeal is by the defendant assailing the preliminary decree drawn by the Court below in O.S.No.8230/2000 whereby the plaintiff's suit for partition is decreed granting half share in the suit schedule property.

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For the sake of convenience, the parties are

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referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.

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The brief facts of the case are as under:

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The plaintiff initially instituted a suit for bare injunction in O.S.No.8230/2000 against the defendant, specifically asserting that the suit schedule property had

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been jointly purchased by the plaintiff and the defendant under a registered Sale Deed dated 31.10.1958. In the said suit, it was categorically pleaded that both the plaintiff and the defendant, who are co-sisters, had acquired the property for valuable consideration and that the property comprised a residential house along with a

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vacant site. The plaintiff further averred that ever since the purchase, both of them have been in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as co-owners.

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Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an application seeking amendment of the plaint, whereby the relief of partition and separate possession was incorporated in addition to the original relief of injunction. The necessity for seeking partition, as pleaded by the plaintiff, arose on account of subsequent events. It is specifically alleged that on 01.12.2000, the defendant attempted to put up a compound wall on the southern side of the property, delineated as ‘ABCD’ in the sketch appended to the plaint.

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According to the plaintiff, though there was an earlier understanding between the parties to amicably divide the property by allotting the northern portion to one and the southern portion to the other, the defendant resiled from

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the said arrangement and began asserting exclusive and absolute ownership over the entire suit schedule property. It is in this backdrop that the plaintiff sought not only

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protection of possession but also partition and separate possession of her legitimate share.

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Upon receipt of summons, defendant entered appearance, filed written statement and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. Defendant on the contrary asserted that she has paid the entire sale consideration while purchasing the property in 1958 and defendant never contributed any part of the sale consideration. The defendant further contended that since the entire sale consideration was paid by defendant, plaintiff has voluntarily given up her rights by executing the release deed in her favour and therefore, defendant sought for dismissal of the suit.

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Based on rival pleadings, the trial Court formulated appropriate issues. Plaintiff and defendant were permitted to substantiate their respective claims by leading oral and documentary evidence. Plaintiff in support of her claim examined her son by executing a GPA

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and in all produced 36 documents marked at Exs.P-1 to P-

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Since defendant died, her husband contested the suit and mounted the witness box and led rebuttal evidence and relied on 12 documents marked at Exs.D-1 to D-12.

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The trial Court on appraisal of oral and documentary evidence answered additional Issue No.3 in the negative. While answering additional issue No.3 in the negative, the trial Court held that the release deed dated 11.11.1959 set up by defendant as a rebuttal to plaintiff's case is admittedly insufficiently stamped and is also not registered. It is in this background, the trial Court discarded the so called rebuttal evidence let in by the defendant and having answered additional Issue No.3 in the negative, the trial Court proceeded to draw the preliminary decree thereby granting half share to the plaintiff in the suit schedule property.

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7. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants,

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reiterating the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal, vehemently contended that the Release Deed

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dated 11.11.1959, though unregistered, could

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nevertheless be looked into for collateral purposes. Elaborating his submission, he placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.15209/2015 and submitted that recitals pertaining to discharge of antecedent debts, as reflected in Ex.D-2, could be relied upon to demonstrate that the plaintiff had not contributed towards liquidation of the family liabilities. According to him, such non-contribution disentitles the plaintiff from claiming half share in the suit schedule property. He would further invite attention of this Court to certain admissions elicited in the crossexamination of the plaintiff to contend that the plaintiff had, in fact, relinquished her interest and lost possession long ago. It is his specific submission that even if the document as a whole is inadmissible for want of

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registration, certain recitals therein, particularly those indicating loss of possession, can be relied upon to

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establish ouster and consequently to contend that the present suit for partition is not maintainable.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would submit that the Release Deed marked at Ex.D-2 is not only unregistered but also insufficiently stamped and, therefore, is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose whatsoever. To buttress his submission, reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. V.Vijay Krishna Mishra¹ , Ram Rattan vs. Parama Nand² as well as the decision of this Court in the case of K. Dinesh vs. Sri. Kumaraswamy and Others³ . Placing strong reliance on these authorities, he would contend that in view of the statutory bar under Section 35 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, an insufficiently stamped document cannot be acted upon or even looked into unless duly impounded and the

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1 (2009) 2 SCC 532

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2 AIR 1946 PC 51

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3 W.P.No.1428 of 2009

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requisite duty and penalty are paid. He would further submit that the payment of a sum of Rs.1,000/- towards alleged legal debts, as recited in Ex.D-2, cannot be termed as a collateral transaction independent of the main transaction of relinquishment. According to him, the very foundation of the defence rests upon the alleged relinquishment of share and, therefore, the defendants cannot be permitted to indirectly prove relinquishment or ouster by relying on selective recitals. He would therefore contend that the proviso to Section 49(c) of the Registration Act has no application to the facts of the present case.

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Having heard the learned counsel on both sides and on anxious consideration of the pleadings in the plaint as well as the written statements filed by the defendants, this Court has also examined the admissibility and evidentiary value of the Release Deed dated 11.11.1959 marked at Ex.D-2. In light of the rival contentions, the following points arise for consideration:

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HC-KAR

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(i) Whether the finding of the trial Court that the original defendant and the legal representatives of the deceased defendant have failed to prove due execution of the Release Deed dated 11.11.1959 and that the said document marked at Ex.D-2 cannot be looked into even for collateral purpose suffers from perversity or illegality?

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(ii) What order?

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Finding on Point No.(i):

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The entire edifice of defence of the defendant heavily banks on the release deed dated 11.11.1959. In the backdrop of admitted facts that two co-sisters jointly purchased the suit schedule property under registered sale deed dated 31.10.1958, the defendant was required to demonstrate that entire sale consideration was paid by the original defendant and therefore, this prompted plaintiff to voluntarily give up her rights under a release deed dated 11.11.1959. While in the written statement, defendant has

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laid a strong emphasis on the fact that entire sale consideration was paid by her while purchasing this

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property in 1958, during the course of the trial, defendant

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has deviated from the original stance taken in the written statement and there is some sort of improvisation whereby defendant has later tried to introduce a new case indicating that since all the debts attached to the suit schedule property were cleared by the defendant, it prompted the plaintiff to give up her rights and it is in this backdrop, she released the property in favour of plaintiff under release deed dated 11.11.1959. Therefore, there are clear conflicting stance taken by the defendant, one in the written statement and one during the course of the trial.

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Be that as it may, the entire edifice of the defence rests upon the alleged Release Deed dated 11.11.1959. It is not in dispute that the said document is unregistered. In that view of the matter, the primary question that falls for consideration is whether such an unregistered release deed can be looked into for any

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collateral transaction in terms of the proviso to Section 49

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of the Registration Act, 1908.

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The proviso to Section 49 carves out a limited exception to the general bar against reception of an unregistered document affecting immovable property. The expression employed therein is “collateral transaction” and not “collateral purpose.” A collateral transaction, within the meaning of the proviso, must be a transaction which is independent of, or distinct from, the main transaction that requires compulsory registration. It must not itself create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property. In other words, what can be looked into is a transaction collateral to the principal transaction affecting immovable property and not something which directly or indirectly establishes or defeats title. The proviso does not permit a party to rely upon the substantive terms of an unregistered document so as to prove relinquishment, transfer, or extinction of

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rights in immovable property under the guise of a collateral enquiry.

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In the present case, though the defence is projected in more than one manner, the substratum of the defence is that the plaintiff relinquished her rights under the unregistered Release Deed, as the defendant alone discharged the family debt of Rs.1,000/-. The defendants seek to rely upon the recital regarding payment of Rs.1,000/- and contend that such payment constitutes a collateral circumstance evidencing that the plaintiff had no subsisting right. This Court is unable to accept the said contention. The alleged payment of Rs.1,000/- is not an independent or separable transaction. On the contrary, it is intrinsically and inseparably connected with the very foundation of the alleged relinquishment. According to the defendants themselves, it is the clearance of debt that prompted the plaintiff to execute the Release Deed. Therefore, the recital regarding payment of debt forms part of the main transaction of relinquishment and is not a

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collateral transaction independent of it. Permitting the defendants to rely on such recital would, in effect, amount to indirectly enforcing an unregistered document which directly affects rights in immovable property.

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Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the exception carved out under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act has no application to the peculiar facts of the present case. The initial defence taken in the written statement was that the entire sale consideration under the registered Sale Deed dated 31.10.1958 (Ex.D-1) was paid exclusively by the defendant and that such exclusive payment prompted the plaintiff to relinquish her rights. However, a careful perusal of the registered Sale Deed marked at Ex.D-1 does not support this plea. The recitals therein clearly disclose that the property was jointly purchased by the two co-sisters. There is no specific covenant indicating that the entire sale consideration was paid solely by the defendant to the exclusion of the plaintiff. In the absence of such recital in a

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registered document, the plea of exclusive payment remains unsubstantiated.

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The subsequent and alternate defence raised during the course of trial, namely that the defendant cleared the debts and therefore the plaintiff gave up her rights, is not only inconsistent with the earlier plea but also suffers from absence of foundational pleadings. It is trite that no amount of evidence can be looked into in the absence of specific pleadings. The attempt to introduce a new case at the stage of evidence, without proper foundation in the written statement, cannot be countenanced.

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As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the two defences are mutually destructive. On the one hand, the defendant contends that he alone paid the entire sale consideration at the time of purchase and hence the plaintiff had no real interest; on the other hand, he asserts that the plaintiff executed a Release Deed

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subsequent to discharge of debts. If the defendant had exclusive title by virtue of payment of entire consideration, there was no necessity to secure a Release Deed from the plaintiff. The very act of procuring a Release Deed presupposes the existence of a right in the plaintiff. These inconsistent stands erode the credibility of the defence.

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Be that as it may, once the Release Deed is found to be unregistered and hit by the bar under Section 49 of the Registration Act, and in view of the authoritative pronouncements relied upon by the plaintiff, the said document cannot be looked into to establish relinquishment of right or ouster. When the document itself is inadmissible and is eschewed from consideration, the defendants are left without any cogent documentary evidence to substantiate their plea of relinquishment or exclusive ownership.

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In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff has successfully

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demonstrated that the suit schedule property was jointly purchased under a registered Sale Deed in the year 1958 and that both parties became co-owners thereunder. Joint purchase under a registered instrument necessarily gives rise to a presumption of joint ownership, unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In the present case, the defendants have failed to rebut such presumption. Once the status of co-ownership is established, the plaintiff, being a coowner, is well within her rights to institute a suit for partition and seek her legitimate share.

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The learned Trial Judge has meticulously

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appreciated both the documentary evidence and the oral testimony on record, including the so-called rebuttal evidence set up by the defendants. The finding that the plaintiff, as a co-owner, is entitled to enforce partition is based on proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence and does not suffer from perversity or illegality. In the absence of any acceptable rebuttal evidence on the part of the defendants, this Court finds no ground to interfere

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