Sri K Krishnappa, Since Deceased Rep. by His Lr's. Vs Smt Puttamma Since Deceased Rep by Her Lrs.

1a) GUJJARAPPA @ RAJANNA S/O HANUMANTHAIAH AND PUTTAMMA AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS R/AT GANGASANDRA VILLAGE, K.GOLLAHATTI POST, KENGERI HOBLI, BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. Y.R. SADASHIVA REDDY., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. RAHUL S. REDDY., ADVOCATE FOR R1(A))

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THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED U/O 41 RULE OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.04.2007 PASSED IN OS.NO.794/2000 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL.CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.) BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 02.04.2026 FOR JUDGMENT COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THIS COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.G.S.KAMAL

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CAV JUDGMENT

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(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S.KAMAL)

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This appeal is by the plaintiff-Krishnappa since deceased represented by his legal representatives aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 21.04.2007 passed in O.S.No.794/2000 on the file of II Additional City Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court'), by which suit of the plaintiff for declaration, possession and for permanent injunction has been dismissed.

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2. Subject matter of the suit are the following properties;

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"I. Western Potion of the dry land bearing Sy.No.41/7, old Sy.No.42, measuring One Acre Twenty Guntas, assessed at Rs.3.28 Ps.(Rupees Three Paise Twenty Eight only) situated at Gangasandra Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore south Taluk, bounded on:

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East by	:	Remaining extent of land in
		Sy.No.41/7, (Old No.42) retained by Nanjundappa now in possession of Puttamma (defendant)
West by	:	Land of Muddaiah
North by	:	Land of Choodappa
South by	:	Land of Bettadahalli Venkatappa

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II Northern portion of the Land Bearing S.No.40, measuring One Acre Twenty One Guntas, assessed at Rs.4.76 Ps (Rupees Four and Paise Seventy Six Only), situated at Devagere Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, bounded on :

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East by : Land of Muninarasappa

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West by : Land of Choodappa North by : Land of Chikkonu South by : Remaining extent of land bearing S.No.40 retained by Nanjundappa, Now in possession of Puttamma (Defendant).

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The above suit is filed by the plaintiff contending inter ali a:

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(a) That he is the absolute owner in possession of the suit schedule properties having purchased the same in terms of deed of sale dated 06.05.1969 from one Nanjunappa, the father of the defendant.

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(b) That though it was the duty of the Sub-Registrar to intimate the Revenue Department to enter the name of plaintiff in the revenue records, the plaintiff learnt about his name not having been entered in the revenue records only in the year 1995 when he intended to obtain loan from financial institutions.

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(c) that upon the application made by the plaintiff, the Tahsildar after conducting the enquiry mutated the name of the plaintiff in the revenue records. The said order has remained unchallenged.

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(d) Defendant, filed a suit in O.S.No.269/1995 on the file of Civil Judge, (Jn.Dn), Bangalore for seeking relief of permanent injunction against the plaintiff and two others on the premise of she having acquired the suit schedule properties in terms of a deed of gift dated 23.07.1970

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executed by her father the aforesaid Nanjundappa. Plaintiff learnt about the present suit properties being included in the said deed of gift only on receipt of summons. That Nanjundappa had no right to execute the such deed of gift Said suit in O.S.No.269/1995 was decreed without proper appreciation of evidence. Plaintiff had preferred a regular appeal in R.A.No.93/1998.

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(e) Defendant has no right, title, interest or the possession over the suit schedule property. Defendant however dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit schedule properties subsequent to the entries made in the revenue records that is in the month of September, 1998 on the basis of decree passed in the O.S.No.269/1995. Thus the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit for declaration, possession and injunction.

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Defendant filed written statement contending:

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(a) That the claim of the plaintiff of he being the owner of the suit schedule properties having purchased from her father Nanjundappa is false and time barred. The alleged deed of sale executed by Nanjundappa in favour the plaintiff was a nominal document, as no possession was handed over and plaintiff has never exercised his right of ownership over the suit schedule properties anytime.

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(b) The revenue records were not mutated in the name of the plaintiff, even after lapse of 25 years of execution of the deed of sale. It is only in the year 1994-95 on the

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basis of alleged sale deed without notice of defendant, the revenue records were entered in the name of the plaintiff.

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(d) That ever since her father Nanjundappa, executed deed of gift in her favour on 23.07.1970 conveying the title of the suit schedule properties she has been in possession of the same as the owner thereafter.

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(e) That she had filed a suit in O.S.No.269/1995 for injunction against the plaintiff herein and others. That plaintiff herein who has been examined as DW1 in the said suit, has admitted that he is not the owner in possession but the defendant is the owner in possession of the suit schedule properties. As such, the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable.

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Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

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5. Based on the pleadings the trial Court framed the following issues:

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"(i) Whether plaintiff proves that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 6.5.1969, executed by one Nanjundappa?

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(ii) Whether plaintiff proves that the defendant encroached over a portion of suit property?

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(iii) Whether the plaintiff further proves that he has been in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property?

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(iv) Whether plaintiff further proves that the defendant interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property?

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(v) Whether the defendant proves that suit is barred by time?

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(vi) Whether defendant proves that suit is not properly valued and court fee paid is insufficient?

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(vii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief sought for?

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(viii) what decree or order?"

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Plaintiff examined himself as PW.1 and two other

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witnesses as PW2 and PW3 and exhibited 38 documents marked as Ex.P1 to Ex.P38. Defendant got herself examined as DW1 and exhibited 50 documents marked as Ex.D1 to D50 and closed her side.

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Trial Court on appreciation of evidence answered Issue Nos.1 and 5 in the affirmative and Issue Nos.2 to 4, 6 and 7 in the negative and consequently dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the same, plaintiff is before this Court.

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Sri.B.Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff taking this Court through the records submitted:

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(a) that when the trial Court has answered Issue No.1 in the affirmative holding the plaintiff to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties and has also held that the defendant failed to prove the very execution of the deed of gift by her father, it ought to have consequently decreed the suit.

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(b) That instead the trial Court has taken upon itself the issue as to whether the defendant had perfected her title by adverse possession and that in the absence of any pleadings to that effect, proceeded to dismiss the suit on the premise of defendant having perfected the title over the suit schedule properties.

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(c) that once the title of the plaintiff is established based on the registered deed of sale, the defendant in the absence of pleading and proving adverse possession, the trial Court ought not to have dismissed the suit. That merely because the name of the plaintiff was not entered in the revenue records, despite there being a registered deed of sale admittedly executed by the father of the defendant in his favour conveying the suit schedule properties, the trial Court could not have concluded that plaintiff was not in possession.

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(c) That the deed of gift even according to the trial Court not having been proved, no title could have been claimed by the defendant. That the revenue records produced by the defendant would show that her name having been entered into the revenue records as only by way of inheritance and not on the basis of gift deed.

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(d) That the trial Court also grossly erred in misconstruing the pleading with regard to the cause of action as pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint. That the cause of action to the present suit actually arose on passing of the decree of permanent injunction in the suit

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filed by the defendant in O.S.No.269/1995, against the plaintiff, and based on the said decree the defendant had dispossessed the plaintiff which was the cause of action for the plaintiff to prefer the comprehensive suit.

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(e) Referring to paragraph 31 of the judgment of MALLAVVA AND ANOTHER Vs. KALSAMMANAVARA KALAMMA (SINCE DEAD) BY LEGAL HEIRS AND OTHERS reported in 2024 SCC ONLINE SC 3846 he submits that in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when a relief in suit for possession is sought based on title, the period of limitation is 12 years and not 3 years as wrongly observed by the trial Court.

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Hence seeks for allowing of the appeal.

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Per contra , Sri.Y.R.Sadashiva Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the defendant submitted:

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(a) though the trial Court has held that plaintiff has proved his title, defendant has taken a specific stand that said deed of sale was merely a nominal document.

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(b) That the plaintiff could not have slept over his rights having purportedly acquired the in the year 1969 and woke up only in the year 1995 to realize his name had not been entered in the revenue records. Thus, the possession over the property has not been established.

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(c) That the deed of gift executed by the father of the defendant was in respect to the land which was retained by him after execution of the nominal deed of sale in favour of the defendant.

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(d) That in any event even assuming the gift deed was not proved, the defendant by virtue of being a daughter has inherited the property and the same has been noted in the revenue records back in the year 1970. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim to be in possession of the suit schedule properties.

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(e) that the Plaintiff himself is not clear as to which is the actual date on which cause of action arose as he has given four different dates namely (i) 06.05.1969, (ii) 23.07.1970, (iii) 05.06.1995; and (iv) thereafter in September 1998. If the cause of action arose in the year 1969 or even in the year 1970, the suit was thus hopelessly barred by limitation.

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(f) That plaintiff has neither pleaded nor proved as to the date when he was actually dispossessed from the suit property by the defendant. Therefore, suit for declaration and possession was not maintainable.

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(g) That since the defendant has established her continuous possession ever since the date of gift deed and her name being entered in the revenue record, the trial Court has made no mistake in holding that the defendant has established her right over the property by her adverse possession. That plaintiff who was examined

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as DW1 in the suit in OS No. 269/1995 filed by the defendant, has admitted that he is not the owner of the property and the defendant is in possession of the suit schedule properties .

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Thus, he submitted the material placed on record categorically established the case of defendant being owner in possession and not the plaintiff.

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Application for production of additional documents:

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(h) Son of original defendant/respondent-Puttamma has filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27(aa) r/w Section 151 of CPC in I.A.No.1/2026 seeking production of additional evidence, namely, certified copy of sale deed dated 18.02.1946 that was executed by one Gujjarappa and Narasappa in favour of Nanjundappa, wherein the extent of land shown is 4 acres 21 guntas as sold. It is contended that apart from the suit schedule properties sold in favour of plaintiff, Nanjundappa the father of defendant was owing and possessing additional land which he had gifted in favour of his daughter. That the property subject matter of the gift was part of the said additional land. Therefore the production of the said document is necessary.

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(i) He relied upon the following judgments in support

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of his case:

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1. NIKHILA DIVYANG MEHTA AND ANOTHER Vs. HITESH P. SANGHVI AND ORS reported in 2025 LiveLaw(SC) 428.

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RAMIAH Vs. N. NARAYANA REDDY reported in LAWS(SC) 2004 8 72.

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Heard. Perused the records.

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The points that arise for consideration are:

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"(i) Whether the application filed by defendant under Order 41 Rule 27(aa) in I.A.No.1/2026 is required to be allowed?

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(ii) Whether the plaintiff has proved his title and possession over the suit schedule property?

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(iii) Whether the trial Court is justified in holding that the defendant has perfected her title by adverse possession?

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(iv) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation?''

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REGARDING POINT NO.1:

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Son of original defendant-Puttamma has filed this

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application under Order 47 Rule 27(aa) read with Section 151 of CPC seeking to produce a certified copy of the deed of sale

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dated 18.02.1946. In the affidavit accompanying said application, it is contended that one Gujjarappa and Narasappa had executed aforesaid sale deed dated 18.02.1946 in favour of his grandfather Nanjundappa, in which extent of land conveyed is shown as 4 acres 21 guntas, in old Sy.No.42, New Sy.No.41/7 situated at Gangasandra Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore-South Taluk. Out of which his grandfather Nanjundappa had conveyed land measuring 3 acres 21 guntas in terms of gift deed dated 23.07.1970 in respect of land in favour of his mother-Puttamma, that is the original defendant. Therefore, the deed of gift executed to the extent of 3 acres 21 guntas was valid. That after the execution of gift deed his mother was in possession. It is submitted that he could not produce the said document on earlier occasion as the said document was not available.

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Learned Senior counsel appearing for the defendantrespondent in support of the said application submitted that the said document is necessary to be produced as additional evidence to establish the case of the defendant that the father of defendant was holding excess land. Therefore, the deed of gift was valid and subsisting.

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The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that since the plaintiff is also deriving rights under the said document he would not dispute the same.

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Perusal of the said document would indicate that there was a sale transaction by Gujjarappa and Narasappa in favour of Nanjundappa father of the original defendant in respect of 4 acres 21 Guntas of land in Sy.No.42. The production of additional evidence is governed under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC which requires 3 components to be fulfilled, which is extracted hereunder;

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''27. Production of additional evidence in Appellant Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if:

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(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or

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[(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or]

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(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.

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(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.''

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Necessary to note that in the written statement defendant

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has disputed the very conveyance of suit property by Nanjundappa in favor of plaintiff alleging it to be a nominal transaction. The document now sought to be produced is apparently to justify the fact of Nanjundappa retaining additional land after the sale of suit schedule properties in favor of plaintiff. No such plea is taken in the written statement as now being taken in the application for production of additional evidence. Evidence in the absence of pleading is of no avail. Further this Court do not find said document is necessary for pronouncement of judgment, as sufficient material evidence is already available on record. Accordingly, the said document is not taken on record. Application in I.A.No.1 /2026 is rejected.

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REGARDING POINT NO .2:

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Admittedly Nanjundappa being the owner of the suit schedule properties had executed a deed of sale on 06.05.1969 conveying the same in favour of the plaintiff. The only dispute raised by the defendant is that the said deed of sale dated 06.05.1969 is nominal, as neither the possession of the suit

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schedule properties was delivered nor the name of plaintiff has been entered in the revenue records.

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Settled position of law being `possession follows title'. In the light of the undisputed fact of plaintiff having purchased the suit schedule properties in terms of the deed of sale dated 06.05.1969, the question that would arise is whether mere non-entry of name of the plaintiff in the revenue records would make his title any less?

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Relevant to refer to Section 128 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 which reads as under;

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"128. Acquisitions of rights to be reported.—

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(1) Any person acquiring by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, any right as holder, occupant, owner, mortgagee, landlord or tenant of the land or assignee of the rent or revenue thereof, shall report orally or in writing his acquisition of such right to the prescribed officer of the village within three months from the date of such acquisition, and the said officer shall at once give a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the report to the person making it:

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Provided that where the person acquiring the right is a minor or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other person having charge of his property shall make the report to the prescribed officer:

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Provided further that any person acquiring a right by virtue of a registered document shall be exempted form the obligation to report to the prescribed officer:

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Provided also that any person reporting under this subsection the acquisition by him of a right in partition in

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respect of the land shall annex with the report a sketch showing the metes and bounds and other prescribed particulars of such land and such person shall get the sketch prepared by a licensed surveyor."

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"(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government may, by notification, appoint any Revenue Officer to whom a report under subSection(1) may be made, in which case such Office shall give a written acknowledgment of the receipt of such report to the person making it, and forward the report to the Prescribed Officer of the village concerned."

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It is clear from the above provisions that if a person has acquired rights in immovable property in terms of a registered instrument, it is incumbent upon the registering officer to inform the revenue authorities regarding such transaction and based upon which the name of such person would be mutated.

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Relevant here to refer to the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Golappa v. Malakappa reported in SCC OnLine Kar 350 at paragraph 3 and 4 held as

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under:

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"3. So far as the question of delay in filing the worthy is concerned, it may be stated here that when there is an acquisition of right in any land pursuant to a registered document, it is the duty cast upon the registering authority under Section 128 of the Act to make a report of such acquisition of right to the prescribed authority.

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4. In the present case it seems that no such report was made by the registering authority, or, if made, no notice thereof was taken by the revenue authority for initiating desired proceedings as provided under Section 129 of the Act. The duty on the part of the registering authority is mandatory as noticed by this Court in the case of N. Shivanna v. State of Karnataka [1980 (1) Kar. L.J. 419.] .

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Moreover, neither Section 128 nor Section 129 of the Act prescribes any period for filing an application seeking mutation in case of acquisition of a right. That being the position, the reasoning given by the Tahsildar that the application was belated and therefore the same cannot be entertained is erroneous being based on extraneous ground. Further, since the execution of the sale deed at Annexure-A was not disputed by respondent No. 1 either before the revenue courts or before this Court, ex facie, for the purpose of the Act, it has to be taken that the document confers a good title on the petitioner; and, therefore it was incumbent upon the revenue authorities to enter the name of the petitioner in the owner's column, namely Column No. 4 of the record of rights".

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Thus belated revenue entries cannot be a ground to deny the title which was otherwise legally and validly conveyed by Nanjundappa in favor of Plaintiff.

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As regard to the claim set out by the defendant that she having acquired the property in terms of deed of gift executed by her father on 23.07.1970 , the trial Court at paragraph 19 and 20 has categorically held that the defendant has neither examined the attesting witness nor has she proved that she had accepted the gift as required under law. The trial Court has held that the defendant has also not produced the original deed of gift and she has produced only a certified copy of the deed of gift which is produced as Ex.P28. The trial Court has also noted that in the said document it is not stated that the donee had indeed accepted the gift. This finding has attained finality.

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Therefore, the defendant failed to establish her title over the suit schedule properties having acquired under the deed of gift.

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Having declined to accept the claim of the defendant over the suit schedule properties based on purported deed of gift the trial Court proceeded to dismiss the suit while answering Issue No.2 by holding that the name of the defendant has been consistently reflected in the revenue records and that the plaintiff has not proved to be in possession of suit schedule properties except for the brief period between 1996 to 2000.

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Relevant to note at this juncture that the revenue entries made in the name of the defendant as seen in RTC extracts produced at Ex.D3 to D7 are for the year 1977-78 . Perusal of column 10 of the said RTC extracts would indicate that name of the defendant has been mutated vide IHC 3 of 77-78. In other words, her name has been mutated in the revenue records on the basis of her right claimed through inheritance and not based on the deed of gift. Even assuming the name of the defendant was entered into in the revenue record based on the gift deed, as taken note of by the Trial Court the execution of deed of gift not having been proved, that entries so made in the revenue records may have to be termed and read only as

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the stray entries and they neither create any right in favour of defendant nor extinguish any right in respect of suit schedule properties.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P. Kishore Kumar

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v. Vittal K. Patkar reported in (2024) 13 SCC 553 at para 22 to 27 has held as under;

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22. It is trite law that revenue records are not documents of title.

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23. This Court in Sawarni v. Inder Kaur , (1996) 6 SCC 223] held that “mutation in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question”.

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24. This was further affirmed in Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh , (1997) 7 SCC 137 wherein this Court held that mere mutation of records would not divest the owners of a land of their right, title and interest in the land.

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25. In Jitendra Singh v. State of M.P ., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802 , this Court after considering a catena of judgments, reiterated the principle of law as follows:

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“6. … mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose.”

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26. We may also profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil , (1977) 2 SCC 49 wherein it was held that there exists no universal principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence to the contrary.

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27. In the present case, the Commissioner's order distinctly denying the rights of occupancy to the plaintiff's vendor is evidence that renders these revenue entries unworthy of acceptance.

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Therefore, the reasons and conclusion arrived at by the

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trial Court denying the right, title and interest of plaintiff in respect of suit schedule properties cannot be sustained. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff has proved his title, right, interest over the suit schedule properties. Point No.1 is answered accordingly.

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REGARDING POINT NO.3:

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Though the trial Court declined the case of defendant based

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on the deed of gift, has however further proceeded to hold that the defendant has perfected her title by virtue adverse possession. The trial Court at paragraph 30 of the judgment has come to the conclusion that the defendant has been in possession of the property, hostile to the right claimed by the plaintiff, which is adverse to his right and interest since 1970 till filing of the suit. This finding and conclusion of the trial Court also cannot be countenanced as there is neither any

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pleading by the defendant in this regard nor any issue framed, nor even any evidence led in this regard.

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The Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India , reported in (2004) 10 SCC 779 at

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paragraph 11 has held as under:

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11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a wellsettled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is “ nec vi, nec clam, nec precario ”, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina [AIR 1964 SC 1254] , Parsinni v. Sukhi [(1993) 4 SCC 375] and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka [(1997) 7 SCC 567].) Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d)

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how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v. Raj Kumari Sharma[(1996) 8 SCC 128] .]

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30. Defendant claimed right and possession based on deed of

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gift and not adverse to the title of the plaintiff. Defendant does not even recognize the plaintiff to be the owner of the suit schedule properties. Not clear as to from when her possession became hostile to the right, title and interest of plaintiff. There is complete lack of animus possesendi. In the absence of these foundational pleading and proof by the defendant, the trial Court could not have held she having perfected the title by way of adverse possession.

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REGARDING POINT NO 4:

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The trial Court while answering issue No.5 on the question of limitation, referring to paragraph 21 of the plaint wherein the plaintiff has pleaded cause of action to have arose on 6.5.1969, 23.7.1970, 5.6.1995 and September 1998 has opined that the plaintiff has not explained how the suit was in time. It has further opined that once the period of limitation starts running

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it will not stop. The trial Court has observed limitation in the instant case has commenced on and from 6.5.1969 and that the period of limitation for seeking relief of declaration is three years. That since the defendant had filed suit in the year 1995, Plaintiff ought to have filed filed the suit within three years thereof. This finding and conclusion is incorrect.

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Admittedly Suit schedule properties are vacant pieces of land. Possession will have to be established based on the revenue records. Specific case of the plaintiff is that he learnt about his name not being entered in the revenue records only in the year 1995, when he was intending to avail financial assistance. That he thereafter applied and got his name mutated in the revenue records. The defendant herein had a filed suit in OS No.269/1995 against the plaintiff on 06.06.1995 for permanent injunction based on deed of gift purportedly executed by her father, which was decreed on 19.1.1998. It is his further case that he was dispossessed thereafter. Present suit is filed by the plaintiff on 21.11.2000 for declaration of his title, for delivery of possession, which is within three years from the date of decreeing of the suit of the defendant.

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Relevant also to note Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation

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Act, which read as under:

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	*"Description of suit*	*Period* of *limitation*	*Time* *from* *which* *period* *begins to run*
58	To obtain any other declaration.	Three years.	When the right to sue first accrues".
65	For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Explanation.—For the purposes of this article— (a)where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession; (b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c)where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgmentdebtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession	Twelve Years	When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Thajudeen v. T.N.

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Khadi & Village Industries Board , (2024) 19 SCC at

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Paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 held as under:

¶202

"26. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

¶203

27. In C. Mohammad Yunus v. Unnissa , 1961 SCC OnLine SC it has been laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.

¶204

28. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title is three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act but for recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, suit for the relief of possession was not actually barred and as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed the entire suit as barred by time."

¶205

As regards the admission purportedly made by the plaintiff as defendant No.1 in Suit No.269/1995 as found at

¶206

para 11, page 9 of the said judgment is as under;

¶207

28 -

¶208

"….. zÁªÁ ¸ÀéwÛ£À LlA £ÀA.1 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 2 zÁªÁ¸ÀéwÛ£À ªÉÄÃ¯É £À£ÀßzÀÄ AiÀiÁªÀ jÃwAiÀÄ ºÀPÀÄÌ E®è ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £Á£ÀÄ ¸Áé¢üÃ£ÀzÀ°èAiÀÄÆ E®è…. LlA £ÀA§gï 1 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 2 gÀ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀAdÄAqÀ¥Àà vÀ£Àß ªÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¥ÀÄlÖªÀÄä¤UÉ zÁ£À ¥ÀvÀæªÀ£ÀÄß §gÉzÀÄPÉÆnÖzÁÝ£É JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj......

¶209

Even if the aforesaid deposition of DW.1 is taken into consideration the same would not in any manner help the cause of the defendant in the instant case. The very suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration is based on the deed of sale dated 06.05.1969 which is a registered document. Even as rightly taken note of by the trial Court at paragraph 18 of its judgment, in terms of Section 91 and 92 to the Indian Evidence Act, any oral evidence contrary to the registered document cannot be countenanced.

¶210

Defendant denied the title of plaintiff first time in her suit in O S No.269/1995 . There is no evidence of any such denial prior to her suit. Plaintiff need not have to rush and file his suit soon after filing of suit by the defendant. Plaintiff has filed his suit for declaration and possession within three years from the date of decree passed in the said suit of the defendant in OS No.269/1995. Thus the trial court in the considered view of this Court erred in holding that the suit is barred by limitation.

¶211

Points answered accordingly.

¶212

29 -

¶213

38. Before parting necessary to note the order dated

¶214

29.11.2023 passed by this Court which reads as under;

¶215

" Sri B.Ramesh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that appellant is the absolute owner of the property having purchased the same from the donor of the respondent and respondent being the donee and gift deed executed by the vendor of the appellant, did not possess any right, title or interest to execute the gift deed in favour of the respondent after having sold the property in favour of the appellant.

¶216

He further submits that though the trial court has come to the conclusion that the sale deed of the appellant is valid, on the question of non proving the possession over the property, suit came to be dismissed and therefore the appellant has preferred the present appeal".

¶217

He also submits that after the present appeal came to be filed, in respect of item No.2 of the suit property there is a settlement and very same respondent has recognized the right of the appellant and has shared the sale proceeds in respect of item No.2, which has been sold by the respondent to third party.

¶218

He further submits that in respect of item No.1 also a proposal has been given to the respondent to retain 1 acre 20 guntas by the respondent and 1 acre be given to the appellant or the appellant may be permitted to purchase the rights of the respondent to the extent of 1 acre 20 guntas or the appellant be given the market price of 1 acre 20 guntas in item No.1 of the suit property.

¶219

Ms. Sunanda Sarkar representing the Sri Rahul Reddy, seeks for a short accommodation to report in the matter.

¶220

Re-list this matter on 05.12.2023 at 2.30 p.m."

¶221

30 -

¶222

Thus, parties have settled the dispute with regard to item No.2 of the suit schedule properties in terms of which defendant is stated to have recognized the right, title and interest of the plaintiff in respect of item No.2 of the suit schedule properties and both have shared sale proceeds in respect thereof. What therefore remains for consideration is only item No.1 of the suit schedule properties measuring 1 acres 20 guntas which is stated to be vacant even as on this date.

¶223

Since this Court while answering point Nos.2 and 3 has held that the plaintiff has proved and established his right, title interest over the suit property and in the light of changed circumstances noted above, following;

¶224

ORDER

¶225

Appeal is allowed in part .

¶226

Suit in O.S.No.794/2000 is decreed in part to the extent of item No.1 of the suit schedule properties. Plaintiff (since deceased by Lrs.) are declared to be the absolute owners of item No.1 of suit schedule properties.

¶227

Defendant (deceased by Lrs.) is directed to deliver vacant possession of the item No.1 of the suit

¶228

31 -

¶229

schedule properties. Defendant (deceased by Lrs.) is restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of item No.1 of suit schedule properties by plaintiff (deceased by Lrs.).

¶230

No order as to cost.

¶231

Sd/(M.G.S. KAMAL) JUDGE

¶232

RU/SBN

Sri K Krishnappa, Since Deceased Rep. by His Lr's. v. Smt Puttamma Since Deceased Rep by Her Lrs.

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Sri K Krishnappa, Since Deceased Rep. by His Lr's. v. Smt Puttamma Since Deceased Rep by Her Lrs.

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