Yeshas Kumar v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC20 Feb 2026CRL.P/17730/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of FIR; Section 69 BNS; false promise of marriage versus breach of promise; consensual physical relationship arising from social media contact; complainant's withdrawal affidavit (amicable settlement, wishes to marry another); reliance on Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 18 SCC 191, which discusses Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana and Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka; CRL.P No. 17730 of 2025; Crime No.83/2025, Kothanur P.S.; Sections 115(2), 351(2), 69, 74 BNS; petition under S. 528 BNNS; XXIX A.C.J.M Bengaluru; Justice M. Nagaprasanna; decided 20-02-2026.

What did the court decide?

Quashing of the FIR in Crime No.83/2025 of Kothanur Police and of the proceedings thereon pending before the XXIX A.C.J.M at Bengaluru City, qua the petitioner.

Yeshas Kumar Vs State of Karnataka — Karnataka HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Quashing of the FIR in Crime No.83/2025 of Kothanur Police and of the proceedings thereon pending before the XXIX A.C.J.M at Bengaluru City, qua the petitioner.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the FIR in Crime No. 83/2025 of Kothanur Police, alleging offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 69 and 74 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and the proceedings thereon should be quashed qua the petitioner. +1 more

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Court's answer

Criminal Petition allowed; proceedings in Crime No.83/2025 pending before the XXIX A.C.J.M at Bengaluru City qua the petitioner stand quashed.

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Ratio / Principle

On a perusal of the complaint, the acts between the petitioner and respondent No.2 were all consensual.

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Key takeaways

The law with regard to consensual acts being clear from the judgment of the Apex Court in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, the Court decided the petition in the light thereof and quashed the proceedings.ratio¶82

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Karnataka (His Honour M. Nagaprasanna, J.), Criminal Petition No. 17730 of 2025 under S. 528 BNNS — FIR in Crime No.83/2025, Kothanur Police Station, for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 69 and 74 of BNS, pending before the XXIX A.C.J.M., Bengaluru — petitioner and complainant (respondent No.2) met on a social media platform; the friendship ripened into a consensual physical relationship of close to a year; the complaint dated 04.04.2025 followed the petitioner's denial of marriage; the complainant later swore an affidavit expressing unwillingness to pursue the prosecution (wishing to marry another; matter stated to have been amicably settled voluntarily and without coercion) — on a perusal of the complaint the Court found the acts between the parties to be wholly consensual, placed reliance on the Apex Court's decision in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 (which distinguishes consent flowing from love/breach of promise from consent induced by a false promise), and allowed the petition — proceedings in Crime No.83/2025 quashed qua the petitioner. Decision dated 20-02-2026.

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NC: 2026:KHC:10745 CRL.P No. 17730 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 20^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 17730 OF 2025

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BETWEEN:

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YESHAS KUMAR, S/O LATE UMESH KUMAR, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 6, BELAKU, 1^ST CROSS, AYYAPPA ENCLAVE, KOGILU MAIN ROAD, YELAHANKA, BENGALURU – 560 064.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. LOKESH BABU M., ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka

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STATE OF KARNATAKA, BY KOTHANUR P.S. BENGALURU, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU - 560 001.

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NIVETHA, D/O R.MOHAN, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 70209,

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NC: 2026:KHC:10745 CRL.P No. 17730 of 2025

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TOWER-7, NICKCO HOMES I THANISANDRA MAIN ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 064.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. VINAY MAHADEVAIAH, HCGP FOR R1; SRI. MANOJ GOWDA M. L., ADVOCATE FOR R2)

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 528 BNNS PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN CR.NO.83/2025 OF KOTHANUR POLICE FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE P/U/S 115(2), 351(2), 69, 74 OF BNS PENDING ON THE FILE OF HON’BLE XXIX A.C.J.M AT BENGALURU CITY.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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ORAL ORDER

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The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following

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prayers:

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"a) Call for records in Crime No. 83/2025 of Kothanur Police for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 69, 74 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita pending on the file of Hon'ble XXIX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bengaluru City;

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b) Quash the FIR registered against the Petitioner in Crime No. 83/2025 of Kothanur Police for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 115(2), 351(2), 69, 74 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita pending on the file of Hon'ble XXIX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bengaluru City;

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c) Pass such other relief/s as this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice."

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Heard Sri. Lokesh Babu M, learned counsel

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appearing for the petitioner, Sri. Vinay Mahadevaiah, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1, Sri. Manoj Gowda M.L, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record.

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The petitioner is the accused. Respondent No.2 is the complainant. It transpires that petitioner and respondent No.2 meet on a social media platform. The meeting develops into friendship, friendship blossoms into relationship, relationship develops into physical relationship, for close to a year. At one point in time, it transpires that the complainant visits the house of the petitioner seeking the hands of the petitioner for marriage and the petitioner is said to have denied. This leads the complainant to register a complaint before the jurisdictional police on 04.04.2025. The complaint then becomes a crime in Crime No.83/2025. Registration of the

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NC: 2026:KHC:10745 CRL.P No. 17730 of 2025

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crime is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the acts between the petitioner and the complainant were all consensual and was never on the promise of marriage. Therefore, the consensual acts between the two cannot become acts by deceitful means on false promise of marriage. Learned counsel submits that the crime is to be obliterated as consensual acts would not become an offence under Section 69 of the BNS.

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The respondent No.2-complainant has filed an affidavit that she is not willing to pursue the matter any further, as she is wanting to get married to someone else. In that light, the petition is heard on its merit. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint, the complaint reads as follows:

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“From

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Nivetha D/o R.Mohan Age 31 years

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Residing at no-70209, Tower - 7 Nikoo homes-1 Thanisandra main road Bengaluru – 560 064.

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The Circle Inspector of Police Kothanur Police Station Bengalru.

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Respected Sir,

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Sub: Complaint against Yeshas kumar for cheating, raping multiple times on pretext of marrying me and physical assault and criminal intimidation.

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I, Nivetha. M, Dlo R.Mohan, aged 31 years residing at no-70209, Tower 7, Nikoo Homes -1 Thanisandra main road, Bengaluru wish to lodge complaint against Mr. Yeshas Kumar aged 31 years, residing at NO-6 Belaku 1^st cross Street, Ayyappa Enclave, Kogilu main road Bengaluru.

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I came into contact with Yeshas Kumar on 04/11/2024, and we developed a friendship that later turned into relationship. He proposed marriage to me and induced me into a Physical relationship under the false pretence of marrying me in the future on 12/2/2025) the Said Yeshas kumar took me to his house residing at no: 6, 2^nd floor, Belaku, 1^st cross street, Ayyappa Enclave, kogilu main road when no one was there at his house and there he forcefully used to have sex with me on pretence that we both will get married on coming days. Once again on 18/2/2025 he took me to his house when no one was there at his house and therein also he used to forcefully have Sex with me. He has sexually exploited numerous times on pretence of getting me married. Also forced to have sex in my house from Jan 1^st to Jan 25^th at Nikoo Tower 9. 90209.

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He continuously taken money from me on multiple occasions, approximately around 5L (3L account transfer, 1L for hotel damage at Park hotel, 1L gifts he forced to buy) all these transactions are recorded via bank account to Yeshas Kumar under false pretences.

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Recently in 1^st week of march 2025, I discovered that he was already married when I checked his mobile and later confronted his wife, Ms. Harita, who confirmed the same. When asked him about the same he confronted the same and told that me that he has already applied for divorce and thereafter he will marry me, when I cross check with his wife I came to know that he had not filed any divorce petition as such.

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On 31/03/2025 in night between 8.15 to 8.30 when I was going to my house from Yelahanka kogilu cross to my house in thanisandra, the Yeshas Kumar came following me and told me to sit inside car by saying that he wanted to speak to me for one last time during the course of conversation he told me that he took explicit photos and videos of me during the course of our physical relationship without my consent and later threaten me that if I force him for marriage he will Circulate my private photos and videos, thereby engaging in character assassination and psychological harassment. He became very aggressive and started assaulting me physically caused severe injuries and prevented me from escaping. I had to flee to a petrol bunk near Reva University and seek help. The Incident is recorded in the petrol bunk’s CCTV footage at approximately 8:30 pm on 31/03/2025. Later he forcefully took away my phone and laptop and has since refused to return them. My mother, Mrs. Shanthy (aged 60 yrs) and I went to his house to retrieve my belongings, but he refused to return them. I subsequently called the emergency helpline (112) and they advised me to file a formal Police complaint, the said police gave me back my phone and office laptop.

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In light of the aforementioned facts, I request you to take strict legal action against Yeshas kumar under the following provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

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I request your kind office to register an FIR against Yeshas kumar under the relevant Sections of BNS and take immediate action and provide protection to me and my family, as I fear for my safety.

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I am ready to co-operate fully in the investigation and provide any evidence to necessary to support my

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complaint. I sincerely urge you to take swift and stringent action against the accused to ensure that Justice is served.

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Thanking You, Yours faithfully Nivetha M.”

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The affidavit filed by the Complainant reads as

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follows:

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"I, Nivetha Mohan, D/o Mohan, aged about 32 years, residing at Flat No. 70209, Tower & Niko Homes, Bharathiya City, Bengaluru - 560064, do hereby solemnly affirm and state as follows:

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1. I say that I am the Respondent No. 2 in the above petition and deponent herein and hence I am swearing this Affidavit.

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2. I say that I have filed a complaint in crime No. 83/2025 which is pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru in F.I.R. No. 83/2025 viz Kothnur P.S. for the offence punishable under section 115(2), 351(2), 69 and 74 of BNS Act, 2023.

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3. I say that the complaint which led to criminal proceedings against the Petitioners is filed under misconception and wrong advice by some of the colleagues working in the company.

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4. I say that since the matter arose from wrong advise of some colleagues, the Petitioners and I have amicably settled the matter and I further do not wish to continue with the criminal prosecution.

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5. I say that this compromise is entered by me voluntarily and out of my own free will and there is no coercion or undue influence by anybody.

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6. I say that in view of the aforesaid agreement entered, I pray that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to

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pass appropriate orders quashing the proceedings against the Petitioner in the interest of justice."

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A perusal at the complaint would clearly indicate

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that the acts between the petitioner and respondent No.2 were

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all consensual. In the light of the law being clear with regard to consensual acts, right from the judgment of the Apex Court, in

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the case of DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA¹ , has held as follows:

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“….

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18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775, this Court was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, had given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was held thus : (SCC pp. 56-57, paras 21 & 23)

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“21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate

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1(2019) 18 SCC 191

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analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.

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23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studying in a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact .”

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19. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253], the Court framed the following two questions relating to consent : (SCC p. 104, para 30)

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(1) Is it a case of passive submission in the face of psychological pressure exerted or allurements made by the accused or was it a conscious decision on the part of the prosecutrix knowing fully the nature and consequences of the act she was asked to indulge in?

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(2) Whether the tacit consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of a misconception created in her mind as to the intention of the accused to marry her?

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In this case, the girl lodged a complaint with the police stating that she and the accused were neighbours and they fell in love with each other. One day in February 1988, the accused forcibly raped her and later consoled her by saying that he would marry her. She succumbed to the entreaties of the accused to have sexual relations with him, on account of the promise made by him to marry her, and therefore continued to have sex on several occasions. After she became pregnant, she revealed the matter to her parents. Even thereafter, the intimacy continued to the knowledge of the parents and other relations who were under the impression that the accused would marry the girl, but the accused avoided marrying her and his father took him out of the village to thwart the bid to marry. The efforts made by the father of the girl to establish the marital tie failed. Therefore, she was constrained to file the complaint after waiting for some time.

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20. With this factual background, the Court held that the girl had taken a conscious decision, after active application of mind to the events that had transpired. It was further held that at best, it is a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry, for which the accused is prima facie accountable for damages under civil law. It was held thus: (Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 8 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 253], SCC p. 106, para 35)

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“35. The remaining question is whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is reasonably possible to hold that the accused with the fraudulent intention of inducing her to sexual intercourse, made a false promise to marry. We have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. PW 12 was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. No circumstances emerging from the prosecution evidence establish this fact. On the other hand, the statement of PW 12 that “later on”, the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialise on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. On this aspect also, the observations of this Court in Uday case [Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 775] at para 24 come to the aid of the appellant.”

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21. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] , the Court has drawn a distinction between rape and consensual sex. This is a case of a prosecutrix aged 19 years at the time of the incident. She had an inclination towards the accused. The accused had been giving her assurances of the fact that he would get married to her. The prosecutrix, therefore, left her home voluntarily and of her own free will to go with the accused to get married to him. She called the accused on a phone number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived, she went with him to a place called Karna Lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at that stage and made no complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she went to Kurukshetra with the

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accused, where she lived with his relatives. Here too, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at Birla Mandir there. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married at the court in Ambala. At the bus station, the accused was arrested by the police. The Court held that the physical relationship between the parties had clearly developed with the consent of the prosecutrix as there was neither a case of any resistance nor had she raised any complaint anywhere at any time, despite the fact that she had been living with the accused for several days and had travelled with him from one place to another. The Court further held that it is not possible to apprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be levelled against the accused.

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22. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , disposed of on 6-4-2018, has observed that it is difficult to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years is “rape”, especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife. It was held as under: (Shivashankar case [Shivashankar v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 18 SCC 204] , SCC p. 205, para 4)

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“4. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant. It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as “rape” especially in the face of the complainant's own allegation that they lived together as man and wife.”

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23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false

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promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do . Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC.

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24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant

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had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained. ”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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