Chandru v Vs the State of Karnataka

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9^TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 13557 OF 2025

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BETWEEN:

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CHANDRU V., S/O VENKATESH, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT 254, 9^TH MAIN, VRUSHABHAVATHI NAGAR, CHANNIGAPPA LAYOUT, NEAR GANESH TEMPLE, BENGALURU NORTH – 560 079.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI ARUN KUMAR Y.H., ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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Digitally signed 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY THROUGH NANDINI LAYOUT P.S., Location: High BENGALURU CITY Court of THROUGH THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Karnataka

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THROUGH THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR STATE OF KARNATAKA HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU – 560 001.

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XXXX XXXX

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SMT.SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R-1; SRI RUDRESHA D., ADVOCATE FOR R-2)

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNNS) PRAYING TO 1.SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 13.08.2025 IN SPL.C.NO.1724/2025 PASSED BY THE LXX ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE SPL.JUDGE(CCH-71) AT BENGALURU, PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES P/U/SEC.3(2)(v) OF THE SC/ST (POA) ACT 1989 AND SEC.64, 74, 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4), 351(2), 352 OF THE BNS 2023 PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-A; 2.CONSEQUENTLY QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED IN SPL.C.C.NO.1724/2025 IN CR.NO.160/2025 DATED 09.06.2025 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 NANDINI LAYOUT P.S. FOR THE ALLEGED OFFNECES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION AFTER COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION, THE RESPONDENT NO.1 POLICE HAVE LAID THE CHARGE SHEET BEFORE THE CCH-71 AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFENCES P/U/SEC.3(2)(v) OF SC/ST (POA ACT 1989, AND SEC.64, 74, 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4), 351(2), 352 OF BNS 2023 PENDING BEFORE LXX ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE SPL.JUDGE CCH71, CITY CIVIL COURT COMPLEX, BENGALURU CITY PRODUCED HERETO AS ANNEXURE-A IN SO FAR AS THESE PETITIONER IS CONCERNED.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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ORAL ORDER

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The petitioner is before this Court calling in question proceedings in Spl.C.C.No.1724/2025, pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (CCH-71), Bengaluru, registered for the offences under Section 3 and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Schedule

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HC-KAR

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Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short ‘the Act’) and Sections 64, 74, 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, 2023.

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Heard Sri Arun Kumar Y.H., learned counsel for petitioner, Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 and Sri Rudresha D., learned counsel for respondent No.2.

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Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:

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The petitioner is the accused, respondent No.2, the complainant. Accused and the complainant meet on Facebook. Meeting of the two develops into friendship and blossoms into physical relationship as well. The relationship between the two would go on for 5 years from 2019 to 2024. The allegation is that, the physical relationship with the petitioner had by respondent No.2 - complainant was on promise of marriage and on its breach, the complainant registers a crime. During the period between 2019 and 2024, it is the case of respondent No.2 - complainant that the petitioner has indulged in several acts of assault, financial transactions and consensual relationship with the complainant. The complaint is registered

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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on the allegations of ‘rape’, ‘sexual harassment’, ‘assault’, ‘cheating’, ‘intimidation’ inter alia along with the offences under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet for the afore-quoted offences. Filing of the charge sheet has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would reiterate the averments made in the petition to contend that the relation between the accused and the complainant were all consensual and it went on for 5 years between 2019 and 2024, but was never on the pretext of marriage. They were all consensual acts and there was neither assault nor intimidation or cheating as is alleged and even any foundation for the alleged offences. There is no wound certificate produced by the complainant.

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Contrariwise, learned counsel for respondent No.2 – complainant would vehemently refute the submissions and contends that the petitioner for 5 years indulged in physical relationship solely on the promise of marriage. The breach of promise of marriage would clearly indicate that the petitioner

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HC-KAR

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for all the 5 years have had several sexual escapades with the complainant by deceitful means, by obtaining the consent of the complainant. He would take this Court to the complaint and the statements made therein, to buttress his submission and submits that the petitioner has assaulted the complainant on several occasions and a wound certificate is appended to the charge sheet. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

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Learned High Court Government Pleader would also toe the lines of the learned counsel for the complainant in seeking dismissal of the petition.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the material on record.

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The afore-narrated facts, link in the chain of events and the dates are not in dispute. The petitioner and respondent No.2 – complainant meet on Facebook, is a matter of record. The friendship blossoming into physical relationship is also a matter of record. The relationship went on for 5 years i.e., from 2019 to 2024, is the narration in the complaint. Since the entire issue sprang from registration of the

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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complaint, I deem it appropriate to quote the complaint. It

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reads as follows:

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“ರವ��ೆ , ¢£ÁAPÀ: 09.06.2025

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��ೕ� ಸ� ಇ�� ೆಕ��, ನಂ��ೇಔ� ��ೕ� �ಾ�ೆ ,

�ೆಂಗಳ!ರು ನಗರ.

ಇಂದ.

XXXX XXXX XXXX

&ಾನ'(ೇ,

)ಷಯ: ನನ, -ೕ�ೆ ಹ�ೆ/ &ಾ0, ರಕ1�ಾಯ ಪ03, 4ೈ 60ದು ಏ8ೆ9ಾ0, ನ�,ಂದ ಹಣ ಮತು1 =ನ,ದ ಆಭರಣಗಳನು, @ೆ�ೆದು4ೊಂಡು CೋD Eೕಸ &ಾ0, �ೈದು �ೆದ�4ೆ CಾF, ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0, JಾK �ಂದLೆ &ಾ0ರುವ ಚಂದುN ) ರವರ )ರುದO ದೂರು.

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*****

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Lಾನು ಹ�ಜನ [&ಾದರ] ವಗQ4ೆR Sೇ�ದುO, ಈ -ೕ�ನ )8ಾಸದ ಸUಂತ ಮLೆಯ�/ ಈ�ೆV ಸು&ಾರು 20 ವಷQಗWಂದ XಾಸXಾDದುO4ೊಂಡು ಗೃಹZ[ಾDರು@ೆ1ೕLೆ . ನನ�ೆ ಈ 6ಂ9ೆ ಮದುXೆ[ಾDದುO, ಗಂಡ ನ�,ಂದ ಈ�ೆV ಸು&ಾರು 20 ವಷQಗWಂದ ದೂರ ಇರು@ಾ1Lೆ . 6ೕDರುXಾಗ ಈ�ೆV ಸು&ಾರು 6 ವಷQಗಳ 6ಂ9ೆ ನನ�ೆ ಚಂದುN ) ಎಂಬುವವರು �ೇ�ಬು] ನ�/ ಪ�ಚಯXಾDದುO, ಒಬ_��ೊಬ_ರು Sೆ,ೕ6ತ(ಾDರು@ೆ1ೕXೆ , ನಂತರ Lಾ)ಬ_ರು ಆ�ಾಗ Iೇ[ಾD &ಾತLಾಡುK19ೆOೕವa, ನಂತರ ಚಂದುN ) ರವರು ನLೊ,ಂ��ೆ &ಾತLಾ0 ತನ�ೆ Eದ�ೇ ಮದುXೆ[ಾDದುO ಈಗ CೆಂಡK �ೇ(ೆಯವರ Jೊ@ೆ CೋD9ಾO(ೆ ಎಂದು CೇW ತನ,ನು, ಮದುXೆ[ಾಗುವಂ@ೆ ಒ@ಾ1b3ದುO, ಆದ(ೆ Lಾನು ಒcdರುವa�ಲ/, ನಂತರ ಸ� 2019 ರ ದು�ಾQಷ�e �ನದಂದು ಚಂದುN ರವರು ನನ,ನು, �ೊಲ/ರ�ಯ ಅವರ ಊ��ೆ ಕ(ೆb34ೊಂಡು (ಾKN ಅ�/hೕ ಉWಯುವಂ@ೆ &ಾ0 (ಾKN ಸು&ಾರು 12 ಗಂjೆಯ�/ �ನ,ನು, ಮದುXೆ &ಾ04ೊಳkl@ೆ1ೕLೆಂದು ಎಂದು CೇW ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ ನನ, -ೕ�ೆ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ನಂತರ ಆತ Lಾನು Xಾಸ)zÀÝ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ¥ÀzÉÃ ¥ÀzÉÃ §Aದು ಮLೆಯ�/ ಗ�ಾjೆ &ಾ0 ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . Cಾ�ೇ ಚಂದುN

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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ತನ�ೆ ಅವಶ'ಕ@ೆ ಇ9ಾOಗ�ೆ�ಾ/ ನLೊ,ಂ��ೆ ಜಗಳ &ಾ0 Sಾಲ ಇ9ೆ ಎಂದು CೇW ಹಂತ ಹಂತXಾD ನ�,ಂದ ಈವ(ೆಗೂ ಒಟು� 5 ಲo ರೂ ಹಣವನು, ನಗದು ರೂಪದ�/ Cಾಗೂ 138 �ಾNಂ =ನ,ದ ಒಡXೆಗಳನು, @ೆ�ೆದು4ೊಂಡು CೋD ಈವ(ೆಗೂ Xಾಪ� 4ೊಡ9ೆ ನನ�ೆ Eೕಸ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ನನ, ಬW ಇದO �ೕ� ಗಳನು, ಸಹ Cೊpೆದು CಾF ನಷ� &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ .

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ಸ� 2023 ರ�/ ಒಂದು �ನ ಸರಸUKಪaರ 2 Lೇ 4ಾN� ನ�/ದO ನನ, ವಂದLಾ �ಾಲQ� �ೆ ಬಂದು ನನ, Jೊ@ೆ ಜಗಳ &ಾ0 ನನ�ೆ 4ೈbಂದ Cೊpೆದು ಹ�ೆ/ &ಾ0 �ಾಲQ� �ಾ/� ಒpೆದು CಾF ನಷ� ಉಂಟು &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ವಕR�ಗ JಾK�ೆ Sೇ�ದ ಚಂದುN ರವರು ಆ�ಾಗ ನನ, ಮLೆ ಬW ಬಂದು ಸೂ8ೆ ಮುಂpೆ , &ಾ�ಗ ಮುಂpೆ , �ೕನು �ೇ(ೆ ಗಂಡಸ(ೊಂ��ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಇಟು�4ೊಂ0�O[ಾ ಎಂದು SಾವQಜ�ಕXಾD ಅXಾಚ' ಶಬOಗWಂದ �ೈದು , ನನ, -ೖ 4ೈ ಮು`� ಏ8ೆ9ಾ0 ನನ�ೆ 9ೈ6ಕXಾD 6ಂSೆ �ೕ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ನಂತರ �Lಾಂಕ : 13/11/2024 ರಂದು ಮಧ'(ಾKN 2.00 ಗಂjೆ ಸಮಯದ�/ ಚಂದುN ರವರು ನನ, ಮLೆ�ೆ ಬಂದು ಗ�ಾjೆ &ಾ0 ಸೂ8ೆ ಮುಂpೆ �ಾDಲು @ೆDhೕ [ಾರ Jೊ@ೆ ಮಲD�O[ಾ , &ಾ�ಗ ಮುಂpೆ ಎಷು� ಜನ �ನ�ೆ eಂಡು�ಾರರು �ೇಕು ಎಂದು ಅXಾಚ' ಶಬOಗWಂದ �ೈದು , �ನ, rೕವ ಸ6ತ sಡುವa�ಲ/ ಎಂದು ಗ�ಾjೆ &ಾ0 ಮLೆಯ�/ದO ಒಂದು �ಾ@ೆNbಂದ ನನ, ಹ�ೆ�ೆ Cೊpೆದು ರಕ1�ಾಯ ಪ03 , ನಮt ಮLೆಯ FಟFಯ �ಾ/� �ೆ Cೊpೆದು pಾ'-ೕu &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1(ೆ . �ೕLೆLಾದರೂ ��ೕ� ಕಂ�ೆ/ೕಂ� 4ೊಟ�(ೆ �ನ, ಉ3ರು ��/3 sಡು@ೆ1ೕXೆ ಎಂದು ಚಂದುN ನನ�ೆ rೕವ �ೆದ�4ೆ CಾFರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ನಮt ಮLೆಯವ��ೆ ಮತು1 ಸಂಬಂvಕ��ೆ �ೊ@ಾ1ಗುತ19ೆಂದು Lಾನು ಈವ(ೆಗೂ �ಾ�ೆಯ�/ ದೂರು �ೕ0ರುವa�ಲ/ .

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ಆದO�ಂದ ನನ, -ೕ�ೆ 4ೈbಂದ ಹ�ೆ/ &ಾ0, �ಾ@ೆNbಂದ Cೊpೆದು ರಕ1�ಾಯ ಪ03, ಅXಾZÀå ಶಬOಗWಂದ �ೈದು, -ೖ 4ೈ ಮು`� ಏ8ೆ9ಾ0, ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0, ಸೂ8ೆ ಮುಂpೆ . &ಾ�ಗ ಮುಂpೆ ಎಂದು JಾK �ಂದLೆ &ಾ0, E�ೈw xೕ�, �ಾಲQ� ನ �ಾ/� ಮತು1 ಮLೆ FಟF �ಾ/� ಒpೆದು CಾF, rೕವ �ೆದ�4ೆ CಾF ಹಣ ಮತು1 =ನ,ದ ಒಡXೆಗಳನು, Xಾಪ� �ೕಡ9ೆ Eೕಸ &ಾ0ರುವ ಸದ� ಚಂದುN ರವರ )ರುದy ಮುಂ�ನ ಸೂಕ1 4ಾನೂನು ಕNಮ ಜರುDಸ�ೇ4ೆಂದು ತಮt�/ 4ೋ�4ೊಳkl@ೆ1ೕLೆ .

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ವಂದLೆಗ8ೆ!ಂ��ೆ ,

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(Emphasis added)

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining under column No.17 is as follows:

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“17.4ೇ3ನ ಸಂ~ಪ1 Sಾ(ಾಂಶ

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ಈ Eೕ•ಾ(ೋಪ�ಾಪ� 4ಾಲಂ ನಂ 14 ರ�/, ನಮೂ�3ರುವ Sಾ~-1 ರವ��ೆ ಈ 9ೋ•ಾ(ೋಪ�ಾಪಟ�ಯ 4ಾಲಂ ನಂ 12 ರ�/ ನಮೂ�3ರುವ ಆ(ೋcತನು �Lಾಂಕ:09/06/20254ೆR 06 ವಷQಗಳ 6ಂ9ೆ €ೇ� ಬುಕR°è ಪ�ಚಯ &ಾ04ೊಂಡು Iೇ &ಾಡು@ಾ1, Sಾ~-1 ರವ��ೆ ಆ(ೋcತನು ತನ�ೆ ಈ�ಾಗ�ೇ ಮದುXೆ[ಾD9ೆ ತನ, CೆಂಡK �ೇ(ೆಯವರ Jೊ@ೆಯ� CೋDರು@ಾ18ೆ ಎಂದು ಮದುXೆ[ಾಗುವಂ@ೆ ಒ@ಾ1b3ದುO, Sಾ~-1 ರವರು ಇದ4ೆR ಒಪd9ೇ ಇದುO, ಆ(ೋcತನು Sಾ~-1 ರವರನು, 2019Lೇ Sಾ�ನ ದುUÁðµÀÖeಯ �ನದಂದು ತನ, ಮLೆ[ಾದ �ೆಂಗಳ!ರು ನಗರ �ಾ'ಡರಹWl, ��ೕ� �ಾ�ೆಯ ಸರಹ�Oನ &ಾಗ0 ಮುಖ'ರSೆ1, �ೊಲ/ರಹ� 10Lೇ 4ಾN� CೊಸಹWl ಮLೆ ನಂ 10 ರ Lೆಲಮಹ0ಯ ಮLೆ�ೆ ಕ(ೆ34ೊಂಡು (ಾKN ಅ�/hೕ ಉW34ೊಂಡು (ಾKN 12-00 ಗಂjೆಯ ಸಮಯದ�/, ಆ(ೋcತನು Sಾ~-1 ರವ��ೆ ಮದುXೆ[ಾಗು@ೆ1ೕLೆಂದು CೇW ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ Sಾ~-1 ರವರ -ೕ�ೆ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . ಇ9ಾದ ನಂತರವ‚ Sಾ~-1 ರವರ ಮLೆ[ಾದ �ೆಂಗಳ!�ನ ನಂ�� ೇಔ� ��ೕ� �ಾ�ಾ ಸರಹ�Oನ ನಂ�� ೇಔ� ಸರಸUKಪaರ jೆಂmï ರSೆ1, 8Lೇ 4ಾN� ಮLೆ ನಂ 34 ರ�/�ೆ ಪ9ೇ ಪ9ೇ CೋD, Sಾ~-1 ರವರ -ೕ�ೆ ಜಗಳ &ಾ0 ಬಲವಂತ�ಂದ �ೈಂDಕ ಸಂIೋಗ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ , Sಾ~-1 ರವ�ಂದ ಆ(ೋcತನು Sಾಲ ಇ9ೆ ಎಂದು CೇW ಹಂತ ಹಂತXಾD 5 ಲo ನಗದು ಹಣವನು, ಮತು1 ಒಡXೆಗಳನು, ಪpೆದು4ೊಂಡು Xಾಪ� 4ೊಡ9ೇ Eೕಸ &ಾ0ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . Sಾ~-1 ರವರ E�ೈw xೕನ,ಳನು, Cೊpೆದು CಾF Sಾ~-1 ರವ��ೆ ನಮt £ÀµÀÖ ಪ03ದುO 2023Lೇ Sಾ�ನ�/ Sಾ~-1 ರವರು ವಂದLಾ ಬೂ'�ಾಲQ� ನpೆಸುK1ದO. ಸಮಯದ�/ ಆ(ೋcತನು ಬೂ'�ಾಲQನN �ಾ/ಸನು, 4ೈbಂದ Cೊpೆದು CಾF ನಷ�ಪ03, Sೊ8ೆಮುಂpೆ �ೇ(ೆ ಗಂಡಸ(ೊಂ��ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಇಟು�4ೊಂ0�Oೕ[ಾ ಎಂದು ಅXಾಚ' ಶಬOಗWಂದ �ೈದು Sಾ~-1 ರವರ -ೖ 4ೈ ಮು� ಎ8ೆ9ಾ0 ಅವ&ಾನಪ03 4ೈಗWಂದ Cೊpೆ�ರು@ಾ1Lೆ . �Lಾಂಕ:13/11/2024 ರಂದು ಮದ'(ಾKN 02-00 ಗಂjೆಯ ಸಮಯದ�/, ಆ(ೋcತನು Sಾ~-1 ರವರ ಮLೆ�ೆ CೋD Sಾ~-1 ರವರ -ೕ�ೆ ಜಗಳ @ೆ�ೆದು [ಾರ Jೊ@ೆ ಮಲD�Oೕ[ಾ, ಎಷು� ಜನ eಂಡ�ಾರರು �ೇಕು ಎಂದು ಅXಾಚ' ಶಬOಗWಂದ �ೈದು, �ನ, rೕವ ಸ6ತ sಡುವa�ಲ/, Xೆಂದು �ಾNಣ �ೆದ�4ೆ CಾF, ಮLೆಯ�/ದO �ಾ@ೆNbಂದ Sಾ~1 ರವರ ಹ�ೆ�ೆ Cೊpೆದು ರಕ1�ಾಯಪ03, ಮLೆಯ FಟF �ಾ/ಸುಗಳನು, Cೊpೆದು CಾF £ÀµÀÖ

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NC: 2026:KHC:20130 CRL.P No. 13557 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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ಪ03, ಈ ಬ�ೆV, ��ೕ� ಕಂ�ೆ/ಂ� 4ೊಟ�(ೆ ಉ3ರು ��/3 sಡು@ೆ1ೕLೆಂದು rೕವ�ೆದ�4ೆಯನು, CಾFರುವaದು ತ�ƒೆbಂದ ದೃಢಪ`�ರುತ19ೆ .

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ಆದO�ಂದ -ೕಲRಂಡ ಕಲಂಗಳ ಅನUಯ ಆ(ೋcತನ )ರುದy …oCಾQ 9ೋ•ಾ(ೋಪ�ಾಪ`�.

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(�XೇದLೆ :- ಈ ಪNಕರಣದ�/ ಕೃತ' ನpೆದ ಸ†ಳದ ಕ‡ಾˆ ನ‰ೆಯನು, ಮತು1 ಕೃತ' ನpೆದ ಸ†ಳವa [ಾರ Cೆಸ�ನ�/ ಇರುತ19ೆ ಎಂಬ ಬ�ೆV 9ಾಖ�ಾKಗಳನು, ಮತು1 c[ಾQದು9ಾರರ ಮತು1 ಆ(ೋcತನ JಾK ಪN&ಾಣ ಪತNಗಳನು, ಮತು1 c[ಾQದು9ಾರ��ೆ Cೊpೆ�ರುವ ಬ�ೆV �ಾಯದ ಪN&ಾಣ ಪತNಗಳನು, ಪpೆದು4ೊಂಡು Cಾಗೂ ಇತ(ೆ ಲಭ'Xಾಗುವ Sಾ‰ಾŠಾರಗಳನು, ಕಲಂ 193(9) s.ಎ�.ಎ�.ಎ� �ೕ@ಾ' &ಾನ' Lಾ'[ಾಲಯ4ೆR �Xೇ�34ೊಳl�ಾಗುವaದು.)”

¶77

In the interregnum of filing the complaint and the charge sheet, the statement of the complainant was recorded. Though the statements are inadmissible evidence as they are made before the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., the contents that are found in the charge sheet would merit some semblance of the offences under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4) 351(2) and 352 of the BNS.

¶78

Insofar as the offences under Sections 64 and 74 of the BNS are concerned, as observed hereinabove, the acts between the petitioner and respondent No.2 goes on for 5 years and all are consensual acts, which do meet the ingredients of offences under Section 64 of the BNS or Section

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376 of the IPC, the earlier regime. Jurisprudence is replete with plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court and that of this Court, on this issue. The Apex Court has held that the consensual acts between the parties, would not amount to an offence under Section 64 of the BNS, which was Section 376 of the IPC, the earlier regime. I deem it appropriate to quote two of the judgments of the Apex Court in this regard. In the case of SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA¹ the Apex

¶83

Court has held as follows:

¶84

“….

¶85

28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.

¶86

29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such

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1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528

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instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation.

¶92

30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi , (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under:

¶93

“20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.”

¶94

(underlining by us)

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31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her

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partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture.

¶100

33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy.

¶101

34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.

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35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under:

¶106

“33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship.

¶107

34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception.

¶108

35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-32022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the

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One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped.

¶113

xxx

¶114

39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.”

¶115

(underlining by us)

¶116

36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred.

¶117

37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned.

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38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu , wherein the following observations were made:

¶122

“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [ Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24)

¶123

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the

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intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

¶128

xxx

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24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.”

¶130

(underlining by us)”

¶131

Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v. STATE

¶132

OF MAHARASHTRA² the Apex Court has held as follows:

¶133

“….

¶134

8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully considering the material on record, the following attributes come to the fore:

¶135

(a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted frequently and fell in

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2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230

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love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct.

¶141

(b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama , was executed on 29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant.

¶142

(c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that there was any threat caused to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant when all along the relationship was cordial, and it was only when the Appellant graduated and left for his hometown to Ahmednagar, the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated. We also cannot ignore the conduct of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the native village of the Appellant without any intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects the agitated and unnerved state of mind of the

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Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same reason, the criminal prosecution against the Appellant herein is probably with an underlying motive and disgruntled state of mind.

¶147

(d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being married before and having a child of four years, would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with an individual who has sexually assaulted and exploited her.

¶148

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a foll y³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.”

¶149

The Apex Court has held that the consensual acts between the accused and the victim for long years cannot become the ingredients of the offence under Section 64 of the BNS or Section 376 of the IPC, the earlier regime. If the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet are read in tandem, it would clearly indicate that the offences under Sections 64 and 74 of the BNS, which were Sections 376 and 354 of the IPC, the earlier regime, against the petitioner are

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not made out. Therefore, permitting further proceedings to continue against this petitioner for the offences under Section 64 of the BNS or Section 74 of the BNS would become an abuse of the process of the law.

¶153

Insofar as other offences under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, are concerned, a perusal at the wound certificate appended to the charge sheet and the fact that the petitioner has financial transactions with the complainant, which are questions of fact required to be thrashed out in a full blown trial. Therefore, proceedings qua these offences shall continue.

¶154

The petitioner is also alleged for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. It reads as follows;

¶155

“Section 3 : Punishments for offences atrocities

¶156

xxxxx

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(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

¶158

xxxxxx

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(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such

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property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The afore-quoted provision of the Act would be attracted only if an offence under the provisions of the BNS, which is punishable more than ten years of imprisonment. In the case at hand, the only offence which could have been punishable for more than ten years of imprisonment was under Section 64 of the BNS, which has now been obliterated. Therefore, the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, would not sustain and the same is also obliterated.

¶166

For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

¶167

ORDER

¶168

a. The criminal petition is allowed in-part.

¶169

b. The proceedings in Spl.C.C.No.1724/2025, pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (CCH-71), Bengaluru, insofar as the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,

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1989 and Sections 64 and 74 of the BNS, 2023, stand

¶174

quashed.

¶175

c. The proceedings in Spl.C.C.No.1724/2025, pending before the LXX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge (CCH-71), Bengaluru, insofar as the offences under Sections 115(2), 118(1), 318(4), 324(4), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, shall sustain and the proceedings to continue.

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Ordered accordingly.

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Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

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NVJ List No.: 2 Sl No.: 45

Chandru v. Vs the State of Karnataka

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Chandru v. Vs the State of Karnataka

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