Smt Indira Devi Vs the State of Karnataka

SMT. INDIRA DEVI DAUGHTER OF LATE J.M.KRISHNAPPA, WIFE OF LATE SANTHOSH REDDY, AGED 53 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.171/1, LAKE PARK VIEW APARTMENT, 4^TH MAIN ROAD, SFS 208, 4^TH PHASE, YELAHANKA NEW TOWN, BENGALURU-560064.

¶11

…PETITIONER

¶12

(BY SRI MAHENDRA S.S., ADVOCATE)

¶13

AND:

¶14

Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

¶15

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, M.S. BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.

¶16

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VISHWESHWARAIAH BUILDING, PODIUM BLOCK, V.V. TOWER, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560 001.

¶17

THE KARNATAKA STATE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER THE KARNATAKA CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT,

¶18

2 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶19

HC-KAR

¶20

REGD. NO.7/2, SURYA COMPLEX 2^ND FLOOR, I MAIN, SESHADRIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 020 REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.

¶21

…RESPONDENTS

¶22

(BY SRI HARISHA A.S., AGA FOR R-1 & R-2; SMT. VIDYULATHA, ADVOCATE FOR R-3; SRI RAJ PRABHU, ADV. FOR PROPOSED RESPONDENT ON I.A.5/25)

¶23

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO DIRECT QUASHING THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION BEARING NO.L.Q(1)S.R.5/87-88 DATED 11.02.1988 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 4(1) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-B AND THE NOTIFICATION BEARING R.D/156/LQB/84 DATED 24.02.1989 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 6(1) OF THE ACT OF 1894 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2, PRODUCED AS ANNEXURE-C RESPECTIVELY, DECLARING THAT THE ACQUISITION OF THE LAND MEASURING 1 ACRE 10 GUNTAS IN SY NO.4 OF JAKKUR PLANTATION, YELAHANKA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK, HAS LAPSED UNDER SECTION 24(2) OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR COMPENSATION AND TRANSPARENCY IN LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT ACT, 2013, DUE TO THE NONIMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF ACQUISITION, AND THE PETITIONER’S CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND AND ETC.

¶24

THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDER, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶25

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

¶26

3 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶27

HC-KAR

¶28

ORAL ORDER

¶29

The petitioner has approached this Court seeking to quash the preliminary and final notification dated 11.02.1988 (Annexure-B) and 24.02.1989 (Annexure-C), issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act, 1894’ for short) and for declaration that the acquisition in respect of land measuring 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.4 of Jakkur Plantation, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk (‘petition land’ for short), has lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘Act, 2013’ for short). Further to declare that respondent No.3 has no legal right, title or interest over the land measuring 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.4 of Jakkur Plantation, Yelahanka Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk, as per the settlement agreement dated 16.02.1994.

¶30

The petition land, originally belonged to the petitioner's father-J.M. Krishnappa, who had purchased it

¶31

4 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶32

HC-KAR

¶33

under a registered sale deed dated 15.04.1962. The petition land was notified for acquisition in 1988-1989 for the benefit of the respondent No.3-society. Krishnappa challenged the said acquisition in W.P.No.7084/1989, which was subsequently withdrawn unconditionally on 13.11.1992. An award was passed on 11.12.1990, determining compensation at `1,96,800/-, and possession of the land was delivered to the society on 02.09.1994 under an official memorandum.

¶34

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

¶35

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that notwithstanding such a notification, a settlement agreement dated 16.02.1994 was entered into between her father and the office bearers of respondent No.3, by which 1 acre 10 guntas was released to him and that her family continued in peaceful possession thereafter. It is a case that the society, after 35 years, is now attempting to

¶36

5 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶37

HC-KAR

¶38

interfere with the possession without authority of law. It is the submission that the land acquisition proceedings has lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the 2013, Act as neither possession was taken nor compensation paid in accordance with law. It is argued that the settlement agreement and the resolution of the society acknowledges release of 1 acre 10 guntas in favour of Krishnappa and is binding and conclusive.

¶39

Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the writ petition is barred by res judicata, as W.P. No.7084/1989, filed by the petitioner's father against the same notifications, was dismissed as withdrawn unconditionally on 13.11.1992. The general award was passed on 11.12.1990, and the possession was delivered to respondent No.3 on 02.09.1994. The compensation was received by J. M. Krishnappa in LAC No.221/1999 and Execution Case No.1/2005, which were recorded as ‘ fully satisfied’ .

¶40

6 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶41

HC-KAR

¶42

It is submitted that the subsequent civil suit in O.S. No.3124/2009, filed by the petitioner’s family seeking injunction and later specific performance of the agreement dated 16.02.1994, was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by the judgment dated 20.12.2024, as being barred by limitation and based on an unenforceable agreement. It is contended that the alleged agreement dated 16.02.1994 is non est in law, having been executed after the land had vested in the State, and is therefore void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, being opposed to Public Policy. Learned counsel relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and others¹ (Indore Development Authority) contending that the acquisition cannot be deemed to have lapsed.

¶43

Having heard the learned counsel for the

¶44

parties, the point that arises for consideration is:

¶45

“Whether the writ petition is maintainable?”

¶46

1 (2020) 8 SCC 129

¶47

7 -

¶48

NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶49

HC-KAR

¶50

This Court has carefully considered the rival

¶51

contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material on record.

¶52

The record reveals that the petitioner's father had challenged the same acquisition proceedings in W.P. No.7084/1989, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 13.11.1992. Once the petition was withdrawn, without liberty, the acquisition proceedings attained finality. The petitioners also approached the Civil Court in O.S. No.3124/2009, seeking an injunction and later, by way of amendment specific performance, which was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on 20.12.2024 as being barred by limitation. The present writ petition has been filed after the rejection of the suit on 20.12.2024.

¶53

The principle of res judicata is embodied in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which declares that no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter has been directly and substantially in issue in a

¶54

8 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶55

HC-KAR

¶56

former suit between the same parties or their privies and

¶57

has been heard and finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The underlying object is to bring finality to judicial decision, prevent multiplicity of litigation, and protect parties from being vexed twice for the same cause of action. Further, the principle of constructive res judicata as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, bars not only issues that have already been decided, but also those which might and ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings.

¶58

In the present case, the petitioner's father, having challenged the same notifications in W.P. No.7084/1989 and having unconditionally withdrawn it, allowed the acquisition to attain finality. The subsequent writ petition and the present writ proceedings both are founded on the same cause and are therefore hit by principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata , including any fresh challenge to their acquisition proceedings or the consequences thereof.

¶59

9 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶60

HC-KAR

¶61

The material on record also indicates that the

¶62

award was passed on 11.12.1990. Official memorandum dated 02.09.1994 and order in LAC No.221/1999 conclusively establish that the possession was delivered and compensation was paid and received by the land owner. The scope and interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority stated supra . The Apex Court held that the expression, ‘where compensation has not been paid or possession has not been taken’ must be read conjunctively , meaning that both conditions must be satisfied to claim a lapse of acquisition. It further clarified that once the possession has been taken or compensation paid, the acquisition proceedings do not lapse merely by efflux of time. The Apex Court in Indore Development

¶63

Authority’s case held at paragraph Nos. 244, 245, 256 as under:

¶64

“244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State

¶65

10 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶66

HC-KAR

¶67

Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression “physical possession” is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances.

¶68

245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression “physical possession” used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession

¶69

11 -

¶70

NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶71

HC-KAR

¶72

under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case.

¶73

xxx xxx xxx

¶74

256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession

¶75

12 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶76

HC-KAR

¶77

thereafter. The vesting specified under Section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification under Section 4, declaration under Section 6, notice under Section 9, award under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner.”

¶78

(emphasis supplied)

¶79

And further held at paragraph Nos.356, 357, 358, 359, 366, 366.9 as under:

¶80

“356. We are of the opinion that courts cannot invalidate acquisitions, which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and agitated as they have not been revived. There has

¶81

13 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶82

HC-KAR

¶83

to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India [Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 867] . The landowners had urged that since the 2013 Act creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to reagitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills [A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills, (1994) 2 SCC 647] , this Court observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth of talent left in longing for the undue

¶84

14 -

¶85

NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶86

HC-KAR

¶87

advantage of the wholesome provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretation.

¶88

357. In British Railways Board v. Pickin [British Railways Board v. Pickin, 1974 AC 765 : (1974) 2 WLR 208 (HL)] , the following observations were made : (AC pp. 795-96)

¶89

“… equity, when faced with an appeal to a regulatory public statute, which requires compliance with formalities, will not allow such a statute (assumedly passed to prevent fraud) to be used to promote fraud and will do so by imposing a trust or equity upon a legal right.”

¶90

358. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the 1894 Act, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [Mathura Prasad Bajoo

¶91

15 -

¶92

NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶93

HC-KAR

¶94

Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613] was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty [Canara Bank v. N.G. SubbarayaSetty, (2018) 16 SCC 228], where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal [Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613] was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar [Anil Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar, (2012) 12 SCC 443 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 418] in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice issued under Section 9 and the award passed under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44] to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the

¶95

16 -

¶96

NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶97

HC-KAR

¶98

acquiring authority would also give rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner.

¶99

359. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of Reference Court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the

¶100

17 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶101

HC-KAR

¶102

deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein.

¶103

xxx xxx xxx

¶104

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:

¶105

xxx xxx xxx

¶106

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition."

¶107

The position laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority has been

¶108

considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Sri M.

¶109

18 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶110

HC-KAR

¶111

Rajappa Vs. State of Karnataka and another² (M. Rajappa) . The Division Bench, while referring to paragraph Nos . 244 and 245 of Indore Development Authority, held that once the land vests in the State upon completion of acquisition under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the title of the original owner or any person claiming through him is completely extinguished, and any continued occupation thereafter is only a Trespasser . The Division Bench observed that, ‘possession, once taken in pursuance of an award and delivered to the beneficiary, is irreversible in law, any private occupation thereafter cannot be recognized as lawful possession and confers no right under Article 300A of the Constitution’.

¶112

Following that ratio, it was concluded that no person who continues to remain in possession after vesting can invoke Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act to claim re-conveyance or regularization. Applying the said principle to the present case, since the lands in question

¶113

2 W.A. No.1926/2024 D.D. 01.08.2025

¶114

19 - NC: 2025:KHC:43491 WP No. 35434 of 2024

¶115

HC-KAR

¶116

were acquired under a notification, an award was passed, possession was taken, and compensation was paid, the subsequent occupation claimed by the petitioner’s family cannot be treated as lawful occupation, but only an unauthorized, incapable of creating any right or equity against the State or the beneficiary society. In view of the above, there is no merit in the petition. Accordingly, this Court pass the following:

¶117

ORDER

¶118

Writ petition is hereby dismissed .

¶119

Sd/-

¶120

_____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

¶121

MBM

¶122

List No.: 1 Sl No.: 27

Smt Indira Devi v. the State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt Indira Devi v. the State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt Bhagya B R Vs the State of Karnataka

Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. Vs Karnataka Electricity Regulatory Commission

Sri H B Muniraj Vs the Commissioner

Sri Krishnegowda Vs Deputy Commissioner

Sri M Veerabhadrappa Vs the State of Karnataka

Lexington Terrace Residents Owners Association Vs Bangalore Development Authority