Dismissed¶88

The Registar Karnataka Lokayuktha v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC28 Jul 2025WP/28331/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Keywords: delay and laches; reasonable time for Article 226 writ petition; unexplained delay of over four years; rejection at preliminary hearing; Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal Application Nos. 673/2019 and 3150/2019; quashing of Lokayukta entrustment of enquiry dated 17.10.2018 and articles of charge dated 11.12.2018; superannuated government engineers; Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley (2024 SCC OnLine SC 551) relied on; Tridip Kumar Dingal (2009) 1 SCC 768 and Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006) 4 SCC 322 referred. Useful to advocates assessing delay-based refusal of writ petitions against tribunal orders in disciplinary/enquiry matters.

What did the court decide?

None to the petitioners; writ petition rejected at the preliminary hearing stage without issuing notice to respondent Nos. 4 and 5. ¶88

The Registar Karnataka Lokayuktha Vs State of… — Writ and Judicial Review | Karnataka HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None to the petitioners; writ petition rejected at the preliminary hearing stage without issuing notice to respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the writ petition filed on 11.12.2023 against the Tribunal's common order dated 12.11.2019 — a delay of more than four years with no explanation offered — should be entertained, given that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 have since attained superannuation and retired.

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Court's answer

Though no limitation is prescribed for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it must be filed within a reasonable time; the four years taken by the petitioners to file the present writ petition cannot be considered a reasonable time, and no explanation for the delay is stated anywhere in the writ petition.

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Ratio / Principle

Entertaining the writ petition after more than four years would adversely prejudice respondent Nos. 4 and 5, who have attained the age of superannuation and retired from service.

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Key takeaways

The Court is not inclined to issue notice to respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the evening of their life; accordingly, the writ petition stands rejected.ratio¶87

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Delay and laches — writ petition under Articles 226/227 by Karnataka Lokayuktha authorities (Registrar and Additional Registrar of Enquiry-13) seeking certiorari against the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal's common order dated 12.11.2019 in Application Nos. 673/2019 c/w 3150/2019, whereby the applications of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 (Assistant Executive Engineers) were allowed and the entrustment of enquiry dated 17.10.2018 and articles of charge dated 11.12.2018 were quashed — petition filed only on 11.12.2023, after more than four years, with no explanation for the delay, by which time respondent Nos. 4 and 5 had superannuated and retired. HELD: though no limitation is prescribed for an Article 226 petition, it must be filed within a reasonable time, and four years is not a reasonable time; entertaining it would adversely prejudice the superannuated respondents. Relying on Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551, the Division Bench (S.G. Pandit and K.V. Aravind; order per S.G. Pandit) declined to issue notice to respondent Nos. 4 and 5 'in the evening of their life' and rejected the writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage.

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NC: 2025:KHC:28832-DB WP No. 28331 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 28^TH DAY OF JULY, 2025

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PRESENT

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT

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AND

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO. 28331 OF 2023 (S-KSAT)

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BETWEEN:

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THE REGISTAR KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA M S BUILDINGS

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DR. B R AMBEDKAR ROAD BANGALORE-560001.

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THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF ENQUIRY - 13 KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, M. S. BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 001.

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…PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI. B B PATIL, ADV.)

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AND:

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Digitally signed by MARIGANGAIAH PREMAKUMARI Location: HIGH

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COURT OF KARNATAKA

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STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (BBMP) VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.

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STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY PUBLIC WORKS PORT AND INLAND WATER TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT VIKASA SOUDHA, BENGALURU-560001.

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THE COMMISSIONER BRUHATH BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE N R SQUARE, BENGALURU-560002.

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SRI MAHABALESHWAR GANESH HEGDE S/O GANESH HEGDE AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS WORKING AS ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

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HC-KAR

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PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT ON DEPUTATION TO BRUHAT BENGALURU MAHANAGARA PALIKE DOMLUR SUB-DIVISION BENGALURU-560071 R/AT NO.2493, 3^RD CROSS 4^TH MAIN, BDA LAYOUT BENGALURU-560017.

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SRI S N MAHESHWARAPPA S/O LATE S C NANJUNDAPPA AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS OCC: ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER RAJAJINAGAR SUB- DIVISION BBMP, BANGALORE, R/AT NO.1027, 5^TH MAIN 3^RD STAGE, 3^RD BLOCK BASAVESHWARANAGARA BENGALURU-560079.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI.B RAVINDRANATH, AGA FOR R1 & R2)

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THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT, QUASHING THE COMMON ORDER DATED 12.11.2019 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL IN APPLICATION NO. 673/2019 CONNECTED WITH APPLICATION NO.3150/2019, VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

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ORAL ORDER

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(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)

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This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the

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Constitution of India by the petitioners-Lokayukta Authorities questioning the order dated 12.11.2019 in

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HC-KAR

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Application Nos.673/2019 c/w. 3150/2019 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru (for short, ‘Tribunal’), whereunder the respondent No.4 and 5’s application were allowed, quashing the order of entrustment of enquiry dated 17.10.2018 and also the consequent issuance of articles of charge dated 11.12.2018.

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Heard learned counsel Sri.B.B.Patil for the petitioners and learned Additional Government Advocate Sri.B.Ravindranath for respondent Nos.1 and 2. Perused the entire writ petition papers.

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Against the order allowing the application by order dated 12.11.2019, the present writ petition is filed on 11.12.2023, after more than four years. No explanation is offered or stated in the entire writ petition. As on the date of filing the application by respondent Nos.4 and 5 before the Tribunal, they were aged 56 and 58 years

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respectively, and as on this day, Respondent Nos.4 and 5 have attained superannuation and retired from service.

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Though no limitation is prescribed to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same shall be filed within a reasonable time. Four years taken by the petitioners to file the present writ petition cannot be considered a reasonable time. Apart from the above, the petitioners have not even stated a sentence with regard to the delay.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

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MRINMOY MAITY V. CHHANDA KOLEY AND OTHERS , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 was considering the question of delay in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the

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cause of action which has had a natural death. Relevant

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paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 read as follows:

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“ 9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

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10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such

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circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.

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11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own

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wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

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“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

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57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd.

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v. Industrial Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).

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58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”

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12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:

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“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as

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taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

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7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, [[L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:

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“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always

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important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”

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8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

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9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ

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jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”

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In the instant case also, the petitioners have knocked the

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doors of the High Court after more than four years and if entertained at this length of time, it would adversely prejudice the respondent who has attained the age of superannuation and retired from service.

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