Sri Rajasekhara Vs State of Karnataka

(BY SRI. MOHAMMAD JAFFER SHAH, AGA FOR R-1; VENKATESH S ARABATTI, FOR R2 & R3 (VK NOT FILED) R4-OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OFFICER, TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MASKI- SERVED; R5-SADASHIVA SERVED)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARY AND QUASH ORDER DATED 06.04.2021 BEARING NO. NAE 301 TMS 2012, PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO. 1 VIDE ANNEXURE - C, ETC.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH

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and

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HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU

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ORAL ORDER

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(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)

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The present writ petition has been filed impugning the enquiry report of the Karnataka Lokayukta dated 15.12.2015 bearing No.LOK-1/ARE-1/Enq-165/2013 (Annexure-A) and recommendation dated 08.01.2016 (Annexure-B) and an other recommendation dated 30.06.2016 (Annexure-B1). The petitioner has also challenged the punishment order dated 06.04.2021 (Annexure-C) for petitioner's compulsory retirement under Rule 8(vi) of the Karnataka Public Service Rules and the order dated 06.08.2021 (Annexure-J) for relieving from his duty from 06.08.2021.

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A complaint was filed before the Lokayukta by one Sadashiva stating that on the applications filed before the Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council, Maski Taluk, Raichur District, one house was allotted to his father Gangappa and his elder brother Sidram. The complainant approached the petitioner enquiring about sending letter to the State Bank of India for sanction of loan towards the houses allotted to his father and his elder brother. For attending the applications and doing the

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needful, the petitioner demanded bribe of Rs.5,000/- for each house i.e, in total Rs.10,000/-. When the complainant pleaded the petitioner about his inability to pay Rs.10,000/-, the petitioner reduced the bribe amount to Rs.8,000/- and told him to pay Rs.6,000/- in advance and balance amount of Rs.2,000/after the receipt of subsidy amount. The Lokayukta caught the petitioner in possession of Rs.6,000/- bribe amount for which mahazar was prepared.

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The petitioner did not furnish any explanation about

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the bribe money having been found in his possession. After the completion of the enquiry on the allegation of accepting the bribe, which was recovered from the petitioner, the Lokayukta issued show cause notice as to why a recommendation should not be made to the competent authority for initiating departmental enquiry against him in the matter. The petitioner did not submit any reply to the said show cause notice, and a report was submitted under Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, recommending initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and entrusting the enquiry to

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the Lokayukta under Section 14-A of the Karnataka Civil

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Services(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957.

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Considering the report under Section 12(3) of the

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Karnataka Lokayukta Act, the Government entrusted enquiry to the Lokayukta vide order dated 23.02.2013 to conduct disciplinary enquiry. The following charge was leveled against the petitioner:

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"That you, Sri.Rajasekhara, SDA, Indi Town Municipal Council, Bijapura demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs.6,000/on 10.03.2011 from complainant Sri. Sadashiva S/o Gangappa Kaalebag, resident of Indi, Bijapura District for recommending fresh applications to the SBI, Indi for sanction of loan towards the houses allotted to the father of the complainant Sri. Gangappa and his elder brother Sri.Sidram that is for doing an official act, and thereby you DGO had failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and committed an act which is unbecoming of Government Servant and thus you are guilty of misconduct under Rule3(1) of Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966."

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The Investigating Officer submitted the enquiry

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report. The charge against the petitioner was found proved.

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Having considered the enquiry report, the Lokayukta vide impugned order dated 08.01.2016 recommended for imposition of penalty of with-holding of 50% of the pension permanently of the petitioner. The Government vide impugned order dated 06.04.2021 (Annexure-C) imposed punishment of compulsory retirement. Hence, the petitioner has been relieved from his duty with effect from 06.08.2021.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case in respect of accepting bribe of Rs.6,000/- i.e., the very same incident for which the petitioner has been acquitted vide judgment and order dated 07.12.2013 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Bijapur in Special Case (LOK) No.7/2012 for the offence under Section 7 and 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. As the charge in the criminal case and departmental proceedings was one and

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the same, the punishment imposed on the petitioner for compulsory retirement is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions:

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i. Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and others

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reported in (2024) 1 SCC 175 .

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ii. G.M.Tank Vs. State of Gujarat and Others

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reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 .

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iii. Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines

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Ltd. and Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 .

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Mr. Venkatesh S Arabatti, learned counsel appearing for the Lokayukta as well as Mr. M. Sudev Hegde, learned Additional Government Advocate have submitted that the petitioner's acquittal in criminal case was not a clean acquittal. The Trial Court has itself recorded the finding of fact that recovery of Rs.6,000/- from the petitioner was not in doubt. However, as the complainant did not support the prosecution case, the demand and acceptance was not proved. Therefore, the petitioner has been acquitted on technical ground. It is further submitted that as complainant and other witnesses turned hostile, the petitioner's acquittal was not a clean acquittal and therefore, the departmental proceedings

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cannot be set aside on mere ground that the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal prosecution. In support of this

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submission he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Hiriyanna Gowda Vs. Karnataka Power Tansformer Corporation Ltd., in W.P.No.52205/2019 dated 15.09.2025.

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It is not in dispute that Rs.6,000/- tainted amount was seized from the petitioner in search and seizure procedure conducted by the Lokayukta. The petitioner's acquittal in the criminal case was on the basis of the witnesses turning hostile, and therefore, as the complainant himself turned hostile the demand and acceptance was not said to be proved but no explanation has came from the petitioner regarding Rs.6,000/tainted amount found in his possession.

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This Court has considered the judgments in Ram Lal (supra) in its judgment in Hiriyanna Gowda Vs. Karnataka Power Transformer Corporation Ltd.

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It is well settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry as held in the case of Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), State of Haryana Vs. Rattan Singh reported in (1977) 2 SCC 491 and State of Karnataka Vs. Umesh reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 . These

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judgments have been taken note by this Court in the case of Hiriyanna Gowda (supra) and therefore, it would be apt to extract paragraphs 19 to 25.

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"19. The strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a domestic enquiry, as held in the case of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) and State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (Supra) . Paragraph 4 of the said judgment is extracted herein, which would read as under:

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"4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reason able nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of However, the

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courts below a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground."

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A similar view has been taken in State of Karnataka v. Umesh (Supra) , wherein, after relying on the judgment in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (Supra) , it has been held in paragraph Nos. 18 to 21 as under:

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18. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placed reliance on the decision in Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 129] . In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One of the charges was that he demanded a commission of 1% for paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. The disciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed the punishment of reversion to a lower rank. Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since the witnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the payment could be the expectation of a commission amount. The respondent placed reliance on the following passages from the decision: (paras 21 & 31)

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“21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities.

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***

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31. … wherein it has been held that the punishment should always be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However, in a case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal from service. Therefore, the

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charge of corruption must always be dealt with keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminal consequences.”

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19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, supra] are not the ratio decidendi of the case. These observations were made while discussing the judgment of the High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequent passages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material and compliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh was reiterated : (Gyan Chand Chattar case SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)

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“35. … an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct.

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36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appears to be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there had been an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment of pay and

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allowances and they detained the train illegally and there has been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railway station. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration the non-existing material and failed to consider the relevant material and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot be sustained in the eye of the law.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the above decision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction of the respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where the witnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “could be” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with.

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20. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju , this Court has held : (SCC p. 371, para 9)

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“9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the

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case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different.

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21. The Court also held that : (C. Nagaraju case, SCC p. 372, para 13)

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“13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the enquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.”

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21. In exercise of the power of the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court should restrict its review to determine whether:

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i) the principles of natural justice have been complied with;

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ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence;

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iii) the statutory rules governing conduct of the disciplinary proceedings have been observed;

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iv) the findings of disciplinary authority suffers from any perversity;

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v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven misconduct;

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22. Applying these tests/parameters, we find that neither the principles of natural justice have been violated, nor the finding of the misconduct is based on no evidence. The statutory rules governing conduct of domestic enquiry have been fully complied with, and the finding of the disciplinary authority does not suffer from any perversity. We are also of the opinion that the penalty of withholding 50% of the pension is not disproportionate to the misconduct of the petitioner, so as to shock the conscience of this Court.

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23. It may also be relevant to take note the judgment in Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju (Supra) , wherein it was held that if prosecution witnesses turn hostile in a criminal trial and the accused gets acquittal, the same would not have any bearing if in the domestic enquiry if the charge is otherwise proved against the delinquent officer. Paragraph Nos. 10 and 11 of the said judgment, which are relevant, are extracted hereunder:

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"10. ……….. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned hostile in the criminal trial against Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the criminal court on the ground that the prosecution could not produce any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other hand, the complainant and the other witnesses appeared before the inquiry officer and deposed against Respondent 1. The evidence available in the departmental inquiry is completely different from that led by the prosecution in criminal trial.

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11. ………… On the basis that the evidence in both the criminal trial and departmental inquiry is the same, the order of dismissal of the appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case are entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due to nonavailability of any evidence before the criminal court. The order of dismissal was on the basis of a report of the

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inquiry officer before whom there was ample evidence against Respondent 1."

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A similar view has been taken by this Court in Mehiboobsab v. Upalokayukta (Supra) , paragraph Nos.17 and 18 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:

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"17. Therefore, the principle that emerges is that an acquittal in a criminal proceedings does not take away the right of the employer to initiate or continue departmental proceedings against the employee, in regard to the same charges. But, where the employee is honourably acquitted by being completely exonerated, then normally it would not be expedient or appropriate to initiate or continue the departmental enquiry, on the very same charges.

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18. Where the Criminal Court acquits an accused on a technical ground [for example on the ground of failure to obtain requisite sanction for prosecution or on the ground of limitation] or where the accused is acquitted for want of sufficient evidence or nonexamination of material witnesses or on account of material witnesses turning hostile or on account of conflict in evidence or where the accused is acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, then such acquittal is not an exoneration of the accused by an honourable acquittal. In such cases, the management is at liberty to proceed with

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the enquiry or initiate an enquiry on the very same charges, even after the acquittal. The reasons are evident."

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25. Insofar as the decision in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, paragraph 20 make it evident that the acquittal of the accused in that criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence, which miserably failed to prove the charge. Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the said judgment, which are relevant, are extracted hereunder:

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28. Expressions like "benefit of doubt" and "honourably acquitted", used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used.

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29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that

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the charge against the appellant was not just, "not proved" in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be "disproved" when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is neither "proved" nor "disproved" (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.8).

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30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank."

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It may also be noted that the scope of criminal prosecution and the domestic enquiry is distinct and separate. In criminal prosecution, the guilt has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in domestic enquiry misconduct has to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Mere acquittal in criminal prosecution would not absolve the

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employees in domestic enquiry, if the acquittal in the criminal trial for the same charge is not clean acquittal but it is technical acquittal such as witnesses turning hostile.

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In the present case, the acquittal secured by the petitioner was only because the complainant himself turned hostile and therefore, it cannot be said to be a clean acquittal. When the tainted amount of Rs.6,000/- was found in possession of the petitioner, for which no plausible explanation could be given by him, we are of the view that there is no scope for interference by this Court in the impugned punishment awarded to the petitioner. Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed .

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No costs.

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Sd/(D K SINGH) JUDGE

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Sd/(TARA VITASTA GANJU) JUDGE

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RKA List No.: 1 Sl No.: 43

Sri Rajasekhara v. State of Karnataka

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Sri Rajasekhara v. State of Karnataka

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