Smt. Eramma Vs the Deputy Commissioner

SMT VENKATESHAMMA D/O LATE MUNIVENKATAPPA, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS BEHIND SLS TILES FACTORY, SULIBELE ROAD, DEVANAHALLI TOWN, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT PIN-562 100

¶22

SMT BHAGYAMMA D/O LATE MUNIVENKATAPPA, CHOKKAHALLI VILLAGE, CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUK, CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT PIN-562 103

¶23

SMT MANJULA D/O LATE MUNIVENKATAPPA, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS BAICHAPURA VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT PIN-562 100

¶24

GPA HOLDER OF APPELLANT NOS.1 TO 9 IS SHANTHA J PAI, PARISHRAM, NO.46/52, 10TH A MAIN, 4TH CROSS ROAD, 1ST BLOCK, JAYANAGARA, BANGALORE-560 011

¶25

…APPELLANTS

¶26

(BY SRI JAYAKUMAR S. PATIL, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI S KALYAN BASAVARAJ, ADVOCATE)

¶27

AND:

¶28

THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT

¶29

3 -

¶30

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶31

DEVANAHALLI TALUK

¶32

BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT-562 100

¶33

THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER DODDABALLAPURA SUB DIVISION DODDABALLAPURA PIN-561 203

¶34

THE TAHSILDAR DEVANAHALLI TALUK, DEVANAHALLI-562 100

¶35

SMT.MALAMMA W/O LATE MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT CHANNAHALLI VILLAGE, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT PIN-562 135

¶36

SMT.ANJINAMMA D/O LATE MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT CHANNAHALLI VILLAGE, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT PIN-562 135

¶37

SRI MUKTHAR AHMED KHAN S/O LATE BASHEER KHAN, NO.88/11, 2ND CROSS, COLES PARK, FRAZER TOWN, BENGALURU-560 005.

¶38

SRI.B.NAGARAJ S/O BYRAPPA, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS SUDDAGUNTEPALYA K.R.PURAM HOBLI, BENGALURU EAST TALUK, PIN-560 036.

¶39

SRI JAYARAM S/O CHIKKA KEMPAIAH, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS

¶40

4 -

¶41

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶42

GOREGUNTEPALYA, JARAKABANDEKAVAL, YESHWANTPURA HOBLI,

¶43

BENGALURU NORTH TALUK, PIN-560 064.

¶44

9. SRI.RAJANNA

¶45

S/O LATE HUCHAPPANAVARA SIDDAPPA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

¶46

SRI.NARAYANASWAMY S/O LATE HUCHCHAPPANAVARA SIDDAPPA AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

¶47

SRI.RAMACHANDRA

¶48

S/O LATE DYAVANNA, AGED ABOUT43 YEARS R9 TO 11 ARE R/AT CHANNAHALLI VILLAGE, CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK PIN-562 100

¶49

…RESPONDENTS

¶50

(BY SRI S.H. RAGHAVENDRA, AGA FOR R1 TO R3; SRI L. CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR CR4 AND R11)

¶51

THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS IN WP NO.15158/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON'BLE COURT AND ETC.

¶52

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶53

5 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶54

CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA and

¶55

HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

¶56

ORAL JUDGMENT

¶57

(PER: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. JUSTICE N. V. ANJARIA)

¶58

Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil with learned advocate Mr. S. Kalyan Basavaraj for the appellants, learned Additional Government Advocate Mr. S.H. Raghavendra for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and learned advocate Mr. L. Chandrashekar for respondent Nos.4 and 11.

¶59

The appellants are the original petitioners who have challenged the judgment and order of learned Single Judge dated 06.01.2025, whereby the writ petition came to be dismissed.

¶60

2.1 The prayer in the writ petition was to set aside the order passed by respondent No.1-the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Rural District dated 29.03.2019 whereby, upon setting aside the order of respondent No.2-the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner held that the prayer of the petitioners for resumption of land on the alleged ground of breach of the provisions of the

¶61

6 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶62

Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 was not grantable in view of delay of more than three decades on part of the petitioners in making application for restoration.

¶63

The appellants-petitioners happen to be the heirs of the original grantee of the land described as Survey No.6 (New Survey No.51) admeasuring 3 Acres situated at Agalakote Village, Channarayapatna Hobli, Devanahalli Taluka, it was granted by the competent authority to the ancestor Munivenkatappa by order dated 01.02.1965, with a condition not to alienate the same for 15 years from the date of grant. The land in question was sold by the grantee within a span of three years in contravention of the terms of the grant. While the grant was made on 01.02.1965, a portion of the property came to be sold in the same year on 12.11.1965 and three years later, another portion thereof was sold on 24.06.1968.

¶64

3.1 The application by the grantee seeking restoration of the land on the ground of breach of the provisions of the 1978 Act was filed in the year 2012. In other words, the application was filed after lapse of 33 years from the date of the grant.

¶65

7 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶66

3.2 Learned Single Judge held that the proceedings for resumption of land has to be initiated only within reasonable period and that, the period of 33 years was too long and amounted to inordinate delay and laches not to entitle the petitioners to any relief. Consequentially, the order of the Deputy Commissioner was upheld and the petition was dismissed.

¶67

3.3 The issue whether the application for restoration under the Act of 1978 could have been made after inordinate delay and laches on part of the applicants, is no longer res integra .

¶68

3.4 In Smt. M. Manjula and others vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Bengaluru District , which was the decision dated 25.11.2024 in Writ Appeal No.210 of 2023 and followed in umpteen number of judgments, it was held that the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1978 cannot be made after lapse of unreasonable time.

¶69

3.5 Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the aforesaid judgment contain the discussion and proposition of law in respect of the controversy and in relation to the issue involved, which are incorporated herein below as paragraphs 4 to 5.3 to be the part of reasoning for the present order.

¶70

8 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶71

The legal provisions and development of law in the subject deserve to be noticed. While ‘granted land’ is defined in Section 3(b) of the Act, Section 4 of the Act deals with the prohibition of transfer of granted lands, to provide that notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or commencement of the Act, in terms of the contravention of the grant or in contravention of the law in that regard or in breach of sub-Section (2) of Section 4, such transfer shall be treated as null and void, not to give any right, title or interest in favour of the person to whom the land is transferred.

¶72

4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Under sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1) and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution of granted lands.

¶73

4.2 Section 5 as it stood originally, reads as under,

¶74

"5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands-

¶75

9 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶76

(1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu , and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may,-

¶77

(a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:

¶78

Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard;

¶79

(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land.

¶80

(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.

¶81

(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be

¶82

10 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶83

final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.

¶84

(3) For the purposes of this Section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4."

¶85

4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision that there is no prescription of time limit for resumption or restitution of the land which is null and void under Section 4(1) of the Act. However, various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka [(2020) 14 SCC 232] , which was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein that the application made for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay. It was held that there was no annulment of transfer could be allowed.

¶86

11 -

¶87

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶88

4.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi

¶89

( supra ),

¶90

“However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.’’

¶91

(para 8)

¶92

4.3.2 It was further stated,

¶93

“An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High

¶94

12 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶95

Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ……”

¶96

4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer

¶97

could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27^nd July 2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely,

¶98

“(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act.

¶99

(d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.”

¶100

13 -

¶101

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶102

4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings.

¶103

4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi ( supra ), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in

¶104

Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri , which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29.07.2024.

¶105

4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d),

¶106

"The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not

¶107

14 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶108

bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity."

¶109

4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi ( supra ),

¶110

did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f),

¶111

"It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti , it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 &

¶112

15 -

¶113

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶114

227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate."

¶115

4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs.

¶116

N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25] , the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and laches’ , as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and laches’ has a different connotation to operate.

¶117

4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma

¶118

( supra ), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in

¶119

Smt. Gouramma ( supra ) that on the ground of laches , the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by laches .

¶120

16 -

¶121

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶122

5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan ( supra ), explained the

¶123

word ‘laches’ thus,

¶124

"The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy."

¶125

(para 21)

¶126

5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for

¶127

which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from laches ,

¶128

"Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a

¶129

17 -

¶130

NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶131

challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

¶132

(Para 22)

¶133

5.2 Though the principles governing the delay and laches has

¶134

the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the laches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, laches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law.

¶135

5.3 In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 33 years. The question of laches would come into play. 33 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void.

¶136

18 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶137

Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil for the appellants submitted that there was amendment to Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) and (d) to sub-section (1) of Section 5, whereby the aspect of limitation was taken away and therefore, the limitation of delay would not have any play.

¶138

The said amendment is another challenge before learned Single Judge. This court, while dismissing the appeal and upholding the dismissal of the writ petition, has only rested on the ground of inordinate delay of 33 years which is in the nature of laches and indolence on part of the applicants-appellants and has not expressed any opinion on the validity of the amendment. This was observed in Smt. Manjula ( supra ) itself.

¶139

It is to be further noted that the concept of delay is distinct from the idea of laches. Laches is a personal attribute which is an indolence on part of the litigant who remains negligent in asserting his rights. It has nothing to do with limitation or delay.

¶140

The distinction between 'delay and laches' on one hand and 'limitation' on the other hand was specially brought out in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan which was relied on by the court in Smt. Manjula ( supra ).

¶141

19 - NC: 2025:KHC:15697-DB WA No. 153 of 2025

¶142

For all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and order of

¶143

learned Single Judge does not book any error when it has upheld the order of the Deputy Commissioner which did not permit acceding to the request of the appellants-petitioners seeking restoration of land after 33 years and consequently dismissing the petition.

¶144

The present appeal stands meritless and is hereby dismissed.

¶145

In view of dismissal of the appeal, any interlocutory applications that may be pending would not survive and stand accordingly disposed of.

¶146

Sd/(N. V. ANJARIA) CHIEF JUSTICE

¶147

Sd/(K. V. ARAVIND) JUDGE

¶148

KPS

¶149

List No.: 1 Sl No.: 112

Smt. Eramma v. the Deputy Commissioner

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt. Eramma v. the Deputy Commissioner

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Y R Shanthe Gowda Vs Dr. Manjunath v

M/S Tumkur Grain Merchants Co. Operative Bank Ltd., Vs Mr Ajay Sarathi

Mrs. Leena Pol Menezes Vs M/S Keshav Ram Educational Foundation Trust

State of Karnataka Vs Yogesh K

Sri M Thayappa Vs the State of Karnataka

Mr. Sharanappagouda Vs the State of Karnataka