Division Bench upheld quashing of an Assistant Commissioner's PTCL Act restoration order passed after about 24 years' delay by the original grantee's son, applying the Coordinate Bench ruling that laches bars relief notwithstanding the 2023 amendment removing limitation, and dismissed the appeal.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S RACHAIAH WRIT APPEAL NO. 1039 OF 2023 (SC-ST)
BETWEEN:
SRI. L. PRAKASH, S/O LATE LAKSHMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, RESIDENT OF DODDAKANNAHALLI VILLAGE, CARMELARAM POST, BENGALURU-560 035.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. DIWAKAR, ADVOCATE) AND:
Digitally signed by PRAJWAL A Location: High Court of Karnataka
ADDRESSS WRONGLY STATED IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS C/O DR. K.S. CHANDRAMOULI, NO. 464, 13TH CROSS, VYALIKAVAL, BANGALORE – 560 003.
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO. 55/261M, JAYANTHI NILAYA, JANATHA COLONY, DODDAKANAHALLI, CARMELARAMA POST, BENGALURU – 560 035,
ADDRESS WRONGLY STATED IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS NO. 3467, 13TH A MAIN, HAL 2ND STAGE, INDIRANAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 068.
ADDRESS WRONGLY STATED IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS NO.185, 5TH SECTOR, HSR LAYOUT, KORAMANGALA BENGALURU – 560 034.
BENGALURU – 560 035,
ADDRESS WRONGLY STATED IN THE IMPUGED ORDER AS NO. 2, 1ST ‘A’ CROSS, PAPPANNA LAYOUT, BENGALURU – 560 039.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SHRUTI C. CHAGANTI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 & R2 TO R5, SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R6 & R7, R8, R9 & R10 ARE SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED)
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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF HON’BLE COURT OF KARNATAKA IN WRIT PETITION N0.16960/2022(SC-ST) DATED 15.06.2023 AS PER ANNEXURE-A AND ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S RACHAIAH
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO)
The challenge in this appeal is to an order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 15.06.2023 in W.P.No.16960/2022, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein by stating in paragraph No.22 as under:
“22. For the reasons stated supra, I pass the following;
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 23.06.2022 passed by respondent No.1/Assistant Commissioner
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bearing No.K.SC.ST(BE):07/2019 vide
Annexure-A is hereby set aside.
(iii) The concerned Deputy Commissioner is directed to take suitable action against respondent No.1- Assistant Commissioner and shall report compliance to the Registry of this Court.
(iv) Copy of this order shall be furnished to the learned HCGP to communicate the same to the concerned Authority.
(v) Pending applications, if any, are also disposed off.”
the writ petition was to an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, who has allowed the petition filed by the appellant herein under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (for short ‘PTCL’ Act), and ordered for restoration of the granted land on the premise that the alienations are found to be in contravention of the PTCL Act. The learned Single Judge has noted the facts in paragraphs No.4 to 6 of the impugned order as follows:
“4. Facts leading to the case are as under;
In the instant case, the land in question was granted by the Authorities to one Lakshmaiah s/o Poojappa in the year 1978-79. After his demise, his widow by name Ammayamma and her two sons sold land bearing Sy. No.9 measuring 20 guntas to one P.Krishnappa under registered sale deed dated 25.01.1995. The said P.Krishnappa, in turn, sold 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.1 under registered sale deed dated 05.08.1998, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.2 under registered sale deed dated 24.09.1998, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.3 under registered sale deed dated 20.11.1998, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.4 under registered sale deed dated 05.03.1999 and lastly, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.5 under registered sale deed dated 31.07.2013.
5. Respondent No.3, who claims to be son of original grantee - Lakshmaiah, initiated proceedings by submitting a petition to respondent No.1 - Assistant Commissioner under Section 5 of the "PTCL Act" seeking restoration alleging that alienations are in contravention of provisions of the "PTCL Act".
6. On receipt of notice, the present petitioners, who are subsequent purchasers, tendered their objections and in the objections, the petitioners brought to the notice of respondent No.1 - Assistant Commissioner that in view of inordinate delay of 24
years, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (cited above) and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner (cited above) and also Chhedi Lal Yadav vs. Hari Kishore Yadav [(2018) 12 SCC 527], the petition seeking restoration is liable to be rejected only on the ground of delay. The present petitioners herein have also placed on record the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court.”
Nos. 1 to 5 herein, who were the petitioners before the learned Single Judge, in the writ petition. While setting aside the order
passed by the Assistant Commissioner dated 23.06.2022, the learned Single Judge, from paragraph 15 onwards, has stated as under:
“15. It is unfortunate that though petitioners
- purchasers have placed on record the judgments squarely applicable to the present case on hand, respondent No.1 - Assistant Commissioner has not even referred to the judgments. He has conveniently ignored the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited supra. Therefore, the order of restoration passed by respondent No.1 is not only capricious but the same is passed ignoring the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that the order passed by respondent No.1 - Assistant Commissioner is not at all sustainable and the same is liable to be quashed.
16. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to relegate the petitioners to avail remedy of an appeal, which would further prejudice the rights of the petitioners. If law is settled and if the Authorities are consistently ignoring the judgments and passing cryptic and capricious orders, a bonafide purchaser, who has acquired valid right and title and whose rights stood
crystallized, has to be protected by this Court by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
17. Therefore, in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case MAGADH SUGAR AND ENERGY LIMITED VS. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS (cited supra) , I am of the view that this Court can exercise jurisdiction in entertaining a writ petition as the order passed by respondent No.1 - Assistant Commissioner is found to be wholly without jurisdiction and in violation of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court on this point.
18. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav vs. Hari Kishore Yadav [(2018) 12 SCC 527] is also squarely applicable to the present case on hand. The land in question was granted by the Authorities to one Lakshmaiah s/o Poojappa in the year 197879. After his demise, his widow by name Ammayamma and two sons sold land to one P.Krishnappa under registered sale deed dated 25.01.1995. The said P.Krishnappa, in turn, sold 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.1 under registered sale deed dated 05.08.1998, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.2 under registered sale deed dated 24.09.1998,
4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.3 under registered sale deed dated 20.11.1998, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.4 under registered sale deed dated 05.03.1999 and lastly, 4.8 guntas of land in favour of petitioner No.5 under registered sale deed dated 31.07.2013. The Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that if there is inordinate, unexplained and unjustified delay on the part of the applicant in seeking restoration of the land, such inaction would create a right in favour of other party. Therefore, the Apex Court was of the view that time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve the rights and advantages which party possesses but equally to protect each party from losses he ought not to suffer. The registered sale deeds are public documents and after verifying the public documents, if citizens enter into further transaction believing such public documents to be genuine, the subsequent alienations cannot be set at naught by showing leniency to aggrieved party who has slept over his rights, if rights are crystallized on account of inaction on the part of the original grantee. The said application has to be rejected on this count also.
19. As far as the doctrine of precedent is concerned, it connotes the binding nature of precedents . The ground work of this doctrine has been laid down by article 141 of Indian
constitution, as it provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts and Quasi judicial authorities. substantially, in the case of UOI VS. RAGHUBIR SINGH (1989 AIR 1933) , it was held that “ the judgment of decided cases is binding precedent and the same will operate as a binding precedent to all possible contingencies when a similar issue of law arise. The doctrine of Precedent as recognised under the Constitution is an instrument of certainty, creativity and predictability of judicial interpretation. The High Court’s Act as intermediary between the Supreme Court and subordinate courts/quasi judicial authorities. Division bench of this court as well as coordinate benches have been consistently following the law laid down by apex court in the case of Nekkanti and Vivek Hinduja (cited supra).
20. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is no less important than the law laid down by the Parliament that should be scrupulously followed by the executive wing of the state. The Quasi judicial authorities are not following the law laid down by apex court as well as by this court. The Assistant commissioners and deputy commissioners are entertaining restoration petitions even though there is inordinate delay in seeking restoration. In the present case on hand, there is delay of
24 years. Ignoring delay and in violation of the law laid down by apex court, the restoration petitions are being entertained by the authorities. This tendency of revenue authorities in not following the judgements of apex court, as well as this court deserves to be strongly condemned and deprecated by imposing exemplary cost on such authorities on account of such callous orders. The backbone of judiciary is already at stake and such orders are further aggravating and adding up pendency.
21. It is unfortunate, that notwithstanding the authoritative pronouncements by the apex court, and by this court, the authorities are passing orders contrary to law despite there being binding precedents. when a position of law is well settled , it is nothing short of contempt in not following the dictum laid down by the apex court. The judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court are produced by the purchasers. It is also indicated in the objections filed by the purchasers. Still Assistant commissioner has audacity to ignore the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It’s a conscious attempt to belittle the judgments rendered by apex court and also judgements rendered by this court as to what constitutes a reasonable period. To say, the least, the order of restoration, is plainly perverse and amounts to gross contempt. This
Court has been noticing that Quasi judicial authorities have scant respect for the orders passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by this Court. Therefore, this is a fit case where suitable direction is required to be issued to the concerned Deputy Commissioner to take appropriate action against the concerned Assistant Commissioner.
22. For the reasons stated supra, I pass the following;
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The order dated 23.06.2022 passed by respondent No.1/Assistant Commissioner bearing No.K.SC.ST(BE):07/2019 vide Annexure-A is hereby set aside.
(iii) The concerned Deputy Commissioner is directed to take suitable action against respondent No.1- Assistant Commissioner and shall report compliance to the Registry of this Court.
(iv) Copy of this order shall be furnished to the learned HCGP to communicate the same to the concerned Authority.
(v) Pending applications, if any, are also disposed off.”
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“(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act.
(d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.”
“ 4.1 As per sub-Section (2), no person shall after commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by
transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Under sub-Section (3), the provisions in sub-Sections (1) and (2) are made applicable to the sale of any land in execution of any decree or award, etc., of the Court. Section 5 of the Act deals with the resumption and restitution of granted lands.
(1) Where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo-motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under Sub-section (1) of Section 4, he may,-
(a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard;
(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir; such
land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land.
(1-A) After an enquiry referred to in Sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.
(2) Subject to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-А, any order passed under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.
(3) For the purposes of this Section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other then the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 4."
4.3 It would be noticed from the aforesaid provision that there is no prescription of time limit for resumption or restitution of the land which is null and void under
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Section 4(1) of the Act. However, various judicial decisions, prominent amongst is Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka [(2020) 14 SCC 232] , which was in the very context of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It was held therein that the application made for restitution of the land after delay of 25 years, was not liable to be acceptable in law, as it was after unreasonable delay. It was held that there was no annulment of transfer could be allowed.
4.3.1 It was observed and held in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) ,
“However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav & Ors., [2017 (6) Scale 459] and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011] reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or
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suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time.’’
(para 8)
4.3.2 It was further stated,
“An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. ……”
4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed
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to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely,
4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings.
4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) , vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri , which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024.
4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d),
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"The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity."
4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) , did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f),
"It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all
aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti , it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate."
4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25] , the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate.
4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra) , proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is
marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus,
"The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy."
(para 21)
5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches,
"Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."
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(Para 22)
5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law.
6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void.
7. The appeal is dismissed.
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In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly disposed of.”
KARNATAKA [(2020) 14 SCC 232], of which a reference has been made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order to hold that, the Court did not speak of limitation period but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of land.
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petition filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 5, in the manner stated above.
Sd/(V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE
Sd/(S RACHAIAH) JUDGE
SMC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 22
2 issues framed by the court
Whether a land restoration order under Section 5 of the PTCL Act could stand despite an approximately 24-year delay by the grantee's heir in seeking restitution.
Whether the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the Assistant Commissioner's restoration order ignoring Apex Court precedent on delay.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of KarnatakaRelied on¶7
Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka [(2020) 14 SCC 232] · Who else cites this
W.A.No.210/2023 decided on 25.11.2024Applied¶6
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Sri L Prakash
Major General K.S. Kali Prasad (R)
Jayanthi
Krishna
S Geetha
Madhukara Shetty
V Kameswar Rao
S Rachaiah
As recorded by the court registry
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