“7. In answer to this view of the High Court, the learned Attorney-General appearing for the appellants says that the High Court overlooked Section 47 of the Registration Act the effect of which was to make a registered document operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required and not from the time of its registration. His contention is that once a document is registered, as the deed of sale in this case was, it begins to operate from the time it would have otherwise operated and therefore, the position in this case is that the sale became operative and hence complete on January 31, 1946. The learned Attorney-General further contends that the proper construction of the deed of sale was that it became operative from the day it was executed and that if it was not so, it was not a sale but could only be an agreement to sell in which latter case his clients, though this present suit might fail, would be entitled, if they so desired, to enforce their right of pre-emption when the sale was completed in pursuance of that agreement. As authority in support of his contention that in view of Section 47 of the Registration Act the sale in the present case must be deemed to have been completed on the day the instrument was executed, the learned Attorney-General relied on Bindeshri v. Somnath Bhadry [AIR (1916) All 199] and Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Misir [AIR (1926) All 549] .
